Joe Francis Rounsaville v. State of Arkansas

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR 07­75  JOE FRANCIS ROUNSAVILLE,  APPELLANT,  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS,  Opinion Delivered  1­31­08  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. CR 2006­964,  HON. WILLARD PROCTOR JR., JUDGE,  APPELLEE,  AFFIRMED.  PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice  Appellant Joe Rounsaville appeals from his convictions of rape, a Class Y felony,  kidnapping, a Class B felony, and third­degree domestic battery.  He asserts two points on  appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for kidnapping and third­  degree  domestic  battery  because  the  amount  of  restraint  or  force  allegedly  used  was  de  minimis, and (2) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to present evidence of prior  consensual  “bondage”  activity  between  himself  and  the  victim,  Kathleen  Tucker.  The  appellant’s arguments are not preserved for our review.  We therefore affirm.  A review  of  the record reveals the following facts.  In December 2005, Kathleen  Tucker moved into Rounsaville’s home after she lost her job and became unable to afford  the rent and bills at her own residence.  On December 14, 2005, an argument ensued between  Tucker and Rounsaville. According to Tucker’s testimony, Rounsaville had been requesting sex and informed her that if she refused, she would have to move out.  Tucker began to  gather her things; however, she remained at Rounsaville’s residence that evening because she  did not know where else to go and also realized she was required to meet with her probation  officer the next morning.  Before going to sleep, she attempted to barricade herself in her  bedroom with a chair and a heavy box.  Around 11:00 that evening, Rounsaville forced the  door to Tucker’s bedroom open and began to hit her in the head while yelling profanities at  her.  Rounsaville followed Tucker to the kitchen and the living room after she attempted  to get away from him.  He pushed her, and she fell over the side of the couch.  Rounsaville  then put his penis in Tucker’s face and told her to suck it.  When she refused, he began to  hit her repeatedly in the head.  While Tucker was on the floor, Rounsaville pinned her down  and bound her hands behind her back with a zip tie.  He then dragged Tucker around the  house, allowing her body to bump into walls and doorways.  After Rounsaville had dragged her into her bedroom, he ripped off her tank top and  picked up a knife. Rounsaville pointed the knife at Tucker’s breasts and asked her which one  she wanted to have him cut off.  He then dragged her to his bedroom, placed her on her  stomach on the bed, and proceeded to have anal sex with her, causing her great pain.  He  ignored her pleas for him to stop and repeatedly struck her in the head.  When Rounsaville  finished, he left the room and left Tucker on the bed, still bound by her hands.  He returned  a  few  minutes  later  and  allowed  her  to  use  the  bathroom,  but  only  in  his  presence. ­2­  CR 07­75  Rounsaville also unbound her at that time.  Tucker attempted to put her clothes back on, but Rounsaville got on top of her on the  bed and tied a necktie around her neck.  He pulled the tie tight to the point at which Tucker  could not breathe and placed a pillow over her face, stating, “you wanted to die. I’m going  to help you.”  After removing the pillow from her face, he took her to the shower where he  urinated on her.  Tucker went into the living room and wrapped herself in a blanket on the  couch.  A short time later, Rounsaville returned and told her he was going to have sex with  her again.  She refused; however, he crawled on top of her and proceeded to have sex with  her.  In the course of Rounsaville having sex with her, she bit his arm and, in response, he  struck her in the head.  Rounsaville  instructed  Tucker  to  sit  in  the  living  room,  where  he  also  remained,  turned on a movie, and fell asleep.  Tucker sat awake until around 7:00 the next morning,  when Rounsaville awoke and went into his bedroom.  At that time, she also left the living  room and went to her bedroom to sleep for about an hour and get ready for the appointment  with her probation officer.  Tucker’s  probation  officer,  Melinda  Perkins,  was  concerned  about  the  noticeable  injuries  Tucker  had  sustained.    The  injuries  that  Perkins  saw  included  Tucker’s  cut  lip,  bruising on her face, shoulders, arms, and thighs, and bruising and indentation marks on her  wrists.  Tucker’s head, arm, and bottom hurt, and she finally told Perkins what had happened  to  her,  but  refrained  from telling her  who  did  it.  Perkins  called  the  Jacksonville  Police ­3­  CR 07­75  Department  and  took  Tucker  to  the  hospital.  In  a  subsequent  search  of  Rounsaville’s  residence, police found a zip tie, a necktie, and Tucker’s torn tank top in his garbage.  After a couple of weeks, Tucker could not find a place to stay after seeking help from  her ex­husband and her family.  She called Rounsaville and asked if they could talk.  Tucker  believed he was sorry for his actions and lived with him again.  She told Rounsaville she  would not pursue the charges pending against him. However, Rounsaville insisted that if she  was going to stay with him, she had to write a letter to the prosecutor stating that he did not  rape or assault her.  Tucker wrote the first letter to the prosecutor, dated January 15, 2006, simply stating  that she did not want any charges filed against Rounsaville, or, alternatively, wanted any  charges already pending to be dropped.  However, Rounsaville was not satisfied with that  letter and made her write a second letter, dated January 17, 2006, stating that she was never  assaulted or raped by Rounsaville.  Tucker testified in court that the second letter was not  true and that she only wrote it because Rounsaville insisted that she write the letter or leave  his residence.  A third letter was received by the detective in the case also stating that the  accusations made by  Tucker were false.  It appeared to be a letter from Tucker, but she  testified  in  the  circuit  court  that  she  did  not  write,  sign,  or  send  the  letter  and  that  the  handwriting was Rounsaville’s.  After a jury trial, Rounsaville was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and third­degree  battery.  He filed a timely notice of appeal on October 25, 2006, which led to the appeal ­4­  CR 07­75  currently before us.  Rounsaville first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of both  kidnapping and third­degree battery in addition to rape.  He contends that the record reflects  that the restraint involved in the instant case was no more than was necessary to consummate  the  sexual  act  for  which  he  was  convicted  of  rape.    Therefore,  Rounsaville  argues  the  convictions for kidnapping and battery must be reversed and dismissed.  First, the State responds by asserting that Rounsaville failed to make these arguments  to the circuit court, thereby failing to preserve them for appeal.  Alternatively, the State avers  that substantial evidence indeed supports his convictions.  Our standard of review for a sufficiency challenge is well settled.  In reviewing a  challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable  to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.  See Cluck v. State, 365  Ark. 166, 226 S.W.3d 780 (2006).  We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to  support it.  See id.  Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that  it  will,  with  reasonable  certainty,  compel  a  conclusion  one  way  or  the  other,  without  resorting to speculation or conjecture.  See id.  Furthermore, circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but  it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable  conclusion.  See id.  Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury  to decide.  See id.  The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court.  See ­5­  CR 07­75  id.  The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve  questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence.  See id.  Rounsaville,  quoting Summerlin  v.  State,  296  Ark.  347,  756  S.W.2d  908  (1988),  specifically  argues  that  “[t]he  exclusion  of  de  minimis  restraints  from  the  definition  of  kidnapping  is  desirable  since  offenses  such  as  rape  or  robbery  necessarily  contemplate  restrictions on the victim’s liberty while the crime is actually committed.  Thus, it is only  when the restraint exceeds that normally incidental to the crime that the rapist (or robber)  should also be subject to prosecution for kidnapping.”  Rounsaville contends that the same  reasoning must  also  be  applied  to  the  conviction  of  domestic  battery,  as  he  alleges  that  physical injury is incidental to the crime of rape; however, he fails to support that argument  with legal authority.  We do not reach the merits of Rounsaville’s argument, as we agree with the State that  it is not preserved for appellate review.  Rounsaville moved for directed verdict, making the  following argument regarding the charges of kidnapping and battery:  I would move that a directed verdict be given, that I don’t believe that Ms.  Tucker left.  She was free to leave at any time, that the State has not made a  prima facia case that she was kidnapped or on the battery third, I would move  for a directed verdict that the State has not made a prima facia case that Joe  Rounsaville was the one that battered her.  Rounsaville did not raise any additional issues in his directed­verdict motion at the close of  his case, but simply renewed his previous motion.  On appeal he has changed his argument,  and argues for the first time that the amount of restraint or force used does not warrant a ­6­  CR 07­75  kidnapping conviction and a third­degree battery conviction in addition to the conviction of  rape.  A  directed­verdict  motion  is  a  challenge  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  and  requires the movant to apprise the circuit court of the specific basis on which the motion is  made.  See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 319 Ark. 332, 891 S.W.2d 55 (1995).  Arguments not  raised at trial will not be addressed for the first time on appeal, and parties cannot change the  grounds for an objection on appeal, but are bound by the scope and nature of the objections  and  arguments  presented  at  trial.  See  id.  Rounsaville’s  arguments  were  not  part  of  his  directed­verdict motion in the circuit court. Consequently, these arguments are not preserved  for our review.  For his second point on appeal,  Rounsaville argues that the circuit court erred in  finding that evidence that he and Tucker had once before engaged in “bondage” activity was  encompassed  by  the  rape­shield  statute.  He  first  argues  that  “prior  consensual  bondage  activity” is not covered by the rape­shield statute because it is not prior sexual conduct as  defined by the statute and that it was critical to Rounsaville’s defense as the bondage was the  same type that occurred during the incident for which he was convicted of rape, kidnapping,  and battery.  Second, Rounsaville claims that because of this exclusion, he was precluded  from presenting a defense in violation of his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Sixth  and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  The State again avers that Rounsaville’s arguments are not preserved for our review ­7­  CR 07­75  as he did not argue the same at the circuit court.  Furthermore, the State contends that his  first argument clearly ignores the record, in which the victim clearly and unambiguously  confirmed that the prior conduct Rounsaville wished to introduce was “sex in which bondage  was involved.”  Regarding his constitutional arguments, the State  argues that even if no  procedural bar applies, they must fail as he was able to present a defense, simply not the  defense he wanted to due to the exclusion.  The rape­shield statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16­14­101 (Repl.1999), was enacted with  the purpose of protecting victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their  personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public  when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt.  See Parish v. State, 357 Ark. 260,  163 S.W.3d 843 (2004).  Section 16­42­101(b) provides that in a criminal prosecution for  a sex crime the following evidence is not admissible:  [O]pinion evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of  the  victim's  prior  sexual  conduct  with  the  defendant  or  any  other  person,  evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant  or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true, or evidence  offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual conduct by the  victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies making the  allegations  is  not  admissible  by  the  defendant,  either  through  direct  examination of any defense witness or through cross­examination of the victim  or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove  consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose.  Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­101(b).  A defendant may, however, file a rape­shield motion under  subsection 16­42­101(c) requesting that the circuit court make a determination  as  to  the  admissibility of the proposed evidence.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­101(c).  Upon holding ­8­  CR 07­75  a hearing, if the circuit court determines that the offered proof is relevant to a fact in issue,  “and that its probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature,” the circuit  court may grant the defendant's motion to admit the evidence.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 16­42­  101(c)(2)(C).  The  circuit  court  is  vested  with  a  great  deal  of  discretion  in  ruling  whether  the  evidence is relevant.  See Harris v. State, 322 Ark. 167, 907 S.W.2d 729 (1995).  This court  will not reverse the circuit court's decision as to the admissibility of rape­shield evidence  unless its ruling constituted clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion.  See Parish v. State,  supra.  We first address the State’s preservation argument.  We agree that Rounsaville argues  for the first time on appeal that the prior bondage activity was not sexual conduct covered  by the statute.  At the hearing on his rape­shield motion, Rounsaville argued that he was  trying  to  get  evidence  admitted  that  he  and  Tucker  had  engaged  in  “rough  sex  before.”  Rounsaville argued specifically at the hearing that the evidence was relevant to his defense  and was “more highly probative and goes to the credibility or the consent [of the victim].”  As previously noted, arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed on appeal, and parties  cannot change their grounds for an objection on appeal.  See Campbell v. State, supra.  As for Rounsaville’s constitutional arguments, they were also not raised at the hearing  on his rape­shield motion.  While Rounsaville did include them in his written motion, he  failed to get a ruling on the constitutional issues at the hearing, at which the circuit court ­9­  CR 07­75  carefully considered each issue one at a time and gave a ruling.  In Eastin v. State, 370 Ark.  10,  16,  ___  S.W.3d  ___,  ___  (2007),  this  court  discussed  when  multiple  arguments  are  presented by a motion:  It is the appellant's burden to present a case before the trial court that fully and  completely develops all the issues. See Raymond v. State, 354 Ark. 157, 118  S.W.3d 567 (2003); Walker v. State, 314 Ark. 628, 864 S.W.2d 230 (1993).  Moreover, it is the appellant's burden to obtain a clear ruling on an issue from  the trial court. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert. denied,  519 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 246, 136 L.Ed.2d 174 (1996); Bowen v. State, 322  Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1226, 116 S. Ct.  1861, 134 L.Ed.2d 960 (1996). In both Misskelley and Bowen, the appellants  raised multiple arguments in their motions to suppress. This court refused to  reach the merits of those arguments that were not specifically ruled upon by  the trial court in denying the motions.  Here, the issues regarding the delay in being brought before a judicial  officer were raised by Appellant in his written motion to suppress. However,  they were not developed, either factually or legally, during the hearing on the  motion. To the contrary, the record of the hearing demonstrates that Appellant  abandoned  these  arguments  in  favor  of  pursuing  the  issue  of  his  alleged  pretextual arrest. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Appellant did not  obtain clear rulings on these issues.  Eastin, supra (citing Romes v. State, 356 Ark. 26, 46, 144 S.W.3d 750, 763­64 (2004)).  In  the instant case, appellant abandoned his constitutional arguments at the hearing on his rape­  shield motion, and we hold they are also not preserved for our review.  Affirmed. ­10­  CR 07­75 

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