Joe Newton v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No.
CR 07-645
Opinion Delivered
JOE NEWTON
Appellant
April 17, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF ASHLEY COUNTY, CR 2003-227,
HON. SAMUEL B. POPE, JUDGE
v.
AFFIRMED.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Appellee
PER CURIAM
In 2006, appellant Joe Newton, who is also known as Joe Gene Newton, was convicted by
a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. We affirmed. Newton
v. State, 336 Ark. 587, 237 S.W.3d 451 (2006). Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial
court a verified pro se petition pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The trial court denied the petition
and appellant, now represented by counsel, has lodged an appeal here from the order.
We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly
erroneous. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there was evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v.
State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). Additionally, on appeal, we do not consider matters
outside the scope of the verified petition filed in the trial court. Morgan v. State, 296 Ark. 370, 757
S.W.2d 530 (1988).
In his original pro se petition, appellant made two arguments: (1) there was insufficient
evidence to convict him and he was actually innocent of the charge against him; (2) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to suppress an illegal search and seizure and the
evidence obtained during that search. The trial court, in denying Rule 37.1 relief, held that
appellant’s first claim was a direct attack on the judgment, and not a proper postconviction
argument. The trial court also found that appellant’s second claim, regarding illegal search and
seizure, was raised on direct appeal and could not be reargued in a Rule 37.1 petition.
Turning to appellant’s appeal, in Point I, he alleges that the trial court failed to liberally
construe the original Rule 37.1 petition and address all issues raised by appellant. As his sub-points,
he contends that: (a) the first ground raised by appellant in the trial court regarding sufficiency of
the evidence was actually a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which the trial court failed to
consider; (b) appellant’s Rule 37.1 illegal search and seizure issue differed from the illegal search
and seizure issue raised in the direct appeal, and the trial court erred in failing to address that issue.
As to Point I(a), it is clear that appellant’s original argument was not a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. He argued to the trial court that the State did not meet its burden of proving
each element of either capital murder, first degree murder, or second degree murder. He also argued
that he was not charged with an underlying felony to support a capital murder conviction, and that
he was actually innocent of the crime. At no point in this argument did appellant point to deficient
actions of trial counsel, although he did so in his second ground for Rule 37.1 relief. He is thus
precluded from raising a new argument of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Morgan,
supra.
Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument was a direct attack on the judgment. Rule
37.1 provides a means to collaterally attack a conviction, and is not a method for a direct attack on
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the judgment or a substitute for an appeal. Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449
(1992) (per curiam). This argument in the original Rule 37.1 petition was couched in terms of
sufficiency of the evidence and actual innocence. A claim of actual innocence is a direct challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence that supported a conviction, and sufficiency of the evidence can
not be raised in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Sanford v. State, 342 Ark. 22, 25 S.W.3d 414 (2000).
As for requiring a liberal interpretation of Rule 37.1 petitions as appellant urges, he provides
no valid authority for this contention. The United States Supreme Court case cited by appellant,
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), does not stand for the proposition that pro se petitions for
state postconviction relief must be liberally construed by the state courts. We will not consider an
argument, even a constitutional one, when the appellant presents no citation to authority or
convincing argument in its support, and it is not apparent without further research that the argument
is well taken. Weatherford v. State, 352 Ark. 324, 101 S.W.3d 227 (2003). There is no legal basis
to apply a liberal interpretation to appellant’s Rule 37.1 petition in order to consider an improper
direct challenge to the judgment as a valid collateral attack.
Next, in Point I(b) on appeal, appellant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. Under the standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must prove
that counsel’s performance was deficient and, as a result, that appellant was deprived of a fair trial.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352
(2003). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). The burden
is on appellant to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39
S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam).
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After quoting from the original Rule 37.1 petition argument at length, appellant complains
on appeal that the trial court failed to address appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
related to his assertion of an illegal search and seizure. Appellant acknowledges that illegal search
and seizure was raised in his direct appeal. He nonetheless contends that the search and seizure
argument articulated in the Rule 37.1 petition presented a different underlying theory for suppression
and is therefore not precluded in seeking postconviction relief.
In the original Rule 37.1 petition, the gravamen of appellant’s argument was that the lack
of probable cause and exigent circumstances resulted in an illegal search and seizure. Further,
appellant contended that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to
suppress the search in order to seek an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of the motion
to suppress.1 There is no merit to the arguments made below or to this court.
First, criminal defendants who seek to appeal adverse rulings must do so from the judgment
of conviction, and not from the order that denied a suppression motion. Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 505,
215 S.W.3d 586 (2005); see also Avery v. State, 361 Ark. 352, 206 S.W.3d 828 (2005). Pursuant
to Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3(a), the right to an interlocutory appeal is vested only in the State in
limited circumstances. In the case before us, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek an
interlocutory appeal when none was available.
In addition, appellant complained in the original Rule 37.1 petition, and in this appeal by
incorporation, that the lack of probable cause and exigent circumstances caused the search and
1
Specifically, appellant contended that trial counsel:
should have Filed a Motion in Limine on Evidence and witnesses in which the Trial
Court would not make the Final Judgment, and could be Appealed to Higher Courts for
Final Judgment before Proceedings could continue. Thus, allowing the Defendant a
better Review and closer Judgment of what was proper and allowable to be presented to
the Jury, without any prejudice occurring.
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seizure to be unconstitutional. This argument amounts to an attempt to reargue a settled evidentiary
issue under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rule 37.1 does not provide an opportunity
to reargue points that were settled on direct appeal. Coulter v. State, 343 Ark. 22, 31 S.W.3d 826
(2000). Moreover, arguments regarding evidentiary issues as argued by petitioner are not the proper
basis for a Rule 37.1 petition. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). Appellant
fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 37.1 petition.
In Point II on appeal, appellant avers that the trial court erred in not granting appellant’s
motions to file an over-length amended petition and for additional time in the Rule 37.1 proceeding
in which to obtain counsel.2 Appellant sets out several bases altogether in support of granting the
motions, none of which were presented to the trial court.3 However, he is limited to the arguments
made below. Morgan, supra.
Further, appellant argues to this court that these motions were filed in tandem, i.e., he was
seeking additional time to hire an attorney for assistance to file an over-length amended petition.
As neither motion indicated that claim of symbiosis, we will consider the motions independently.
We review a circuit court’s denial of leave to amend a Rule 37.1 petition by an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151 (2004). Abuse of discretion
is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the trial court’s decision, but establishes that
the trial decision was arbitrary or groundless. Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502
(1991).
2
The motion for additional time was captioned as a motion to stay disposition of the case.
3
The arguments on appeal in support of granting the motions are: (1) appellant received life
imprisonment without parole as the sentence for capital murder; (2) appellant needed legal assistance as
shown by his pleadings; (3) his family was in the process of hiring an attorney to represent him; (4) a
sixty-day extension was not unreasonable; (5) appellant suffers from mental or emotional disease or
defect.
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Appellant makes no showing here that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
motion for leave to file an over-length amended petition. In order for the trial court to grant the
motion for an over-length Rule 37.1 petition, appellant was required to show a “legitimate ground
or justification for filing the enlarged petition.” Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33, 35, 13 S.W.3d
904, 906 (2000). Appellant’s motion argued only that the ten-page limit was unreasonable in light
of the length of the trial transcript and the number of exhibits introduced at trial. As appellant
previously filed a petition within the page limitation, and failed to state a legitimate ground for filing
an over-length brief, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to file an
amended petition.
Appellant maintains on appeal that the present case is similar to Butler v. State, 367 Ark.
318, 239 S.W.3d 514 (2006), in which this court upheld an appellant’s right to amend a Rule 37.1
petition. There is no factual similarity between the two cases and the instant matter is not more
compelling than the facts in Butler, as appellant argues here. The situation in Butler was far more
complex than the present case and spanned a time period of nearly three years. It involved
numerous appeals related to the Rule 37.1 petition, and concerned pleadings that were filed during
a time in which the trial court had no jurisdiction over the Rule 37.1 petition. Butler does not
factually support appellant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
appellant’s motion to file an amended Rule 37.1 petition.
Now turning to the motion for continuance, we likewise review denial of the motion under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Stenhouse v. State, 362 Ark. 480, 209 S.W.3d 352 (2005). In
addition, an appellant must demonstrate prejudice that rises to the level of denial of justice, and
results from deprivation of a continuance. Id.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for continuance in
order for appellant to hire an attorney in the instant matter. The motion itself stated no grounds for
the request. Furthermore, appellant fails to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of the motion
being denied. Appellant waited more than five months after filing his original Rule 37.1 petition
before he filed the motion for continuance, during which time he could have hired an attorney to
represent him but failed to do so.
Affirmed.
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