Vasun Buford v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 07­580  VASUN BUFORD  Appellant  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  Opinion Delivered January 24, 2008  PRO SE MOTION FOR EXTENSION  OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT’S  BRIEF [CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARK  COUNTY, CR 2004­61, HON. JOHN A.  THOMAS, JUDGE]  APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION  MOOT.  PER CURIAM  A jury found appellant Vasun Buford guilty of rape and sentenced him to life imprisonment.  This court affirmed the judgment.  Buford v. State, 368 Ark. 87, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Appellant  timely filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, which  was denied.  Appellant lodged an appeal of that order in this court, and he has filed the motion for  extension of time in which to file appellant’s brief that is now before us.  This court has consistently held that an appeal of the denial of postconviction relief will not  be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail.  Pardue v. State, 338  Ark. 606,  999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam);  Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13  (1996) (per curiam);  Harris v. State, 318 Ark. 599, 887 S.W.2d 514 (1994) (per curiam);  Reed v.  State, 317 Ark. 286, 878 S.W.2d 376 (1994) (per curiam).  It is clear that appellant cannot prevail  as his petition was not sufficient to support relief under Rule 37.1.  Appellant filed his petition on January 23, 2007.  On February 21, 2007, appellant filed a pleading styled as a memorandum and brief in support of the petition.  Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2,  all grounds for relief must be raised in the original petition, and appellant did not request leave to  amend  the  petition  under  Rule  37.2(e).    Nor  does  the  trial  court’s  order  indicate  that  the  later  pleading was taken into consideration.  We therefore only consider the initial petition in determining  whether appellant pleaded grounds sufficient to support relief under Rule 37.1.  Each of appellant’s nine claims was based upon an allegation of ineffective assistance  of  counsel.  In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective  assistance of counsel, the question presented is whether, under the standard set forth by the United  States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and based on the totality  of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Small v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Oct. 4, 2007) (per curiam).  A finding is clearly  erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the  entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Id.  Under the Strickland test, a claimant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and  the claimant must also show that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense through a showing  that petitioner was deprived of a fair trial.  Walker v. State, 367 Ark. 523, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Counsel  is  presumed  effective  and  allegations  without  factual  substantiation  are  insufficient  to  overcome that presumption.  Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam); see  also State v. Barrett, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Sept. 27, 2007).  Conclusory statements cannot  be the basis of postconviction relief.  Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003).  The petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of overcoming the  presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance  by identifying the acts and omissions of counsel which, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.  Burton v. State,  367 Ark. 109, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  The petitioner must show that, but for counsel’s errors, the  fact­finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt and that the decision reached would  have been different absent the errors.  Id.  In  appellant’s  first  claim,  he  asserted  ineffective  assistance  for  trial  counsel’s  failure  to  preserve for review a question of error concerning the trial court’s admission of expert testimony that  the victim had been sexually abused. The question, however, was preserved for appeal and addressed  in our opinion.  We held that the trial court did err in admitting opinion testimony by the expert in  which she concluded that the victim was not lying about the sexual abuse, but that the error was  harmless.  Buford, 368 Ark. at 91, ___ S.W.3d at ___.  A proceeding under Rule 37.1 does not allow  an appellant the opportunity to reargue points that were decided on direct appeal.  Williams v. State,  369 Ark. 104, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  In appellant’s next  claim, he argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to call a  witness who would testify as to certain evidence in the case that did not indicate the presence of  semen.  The objective in reviewing an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the  failure to call certain witnesses is to determine whether this failure resulted in actual prejudice that  denied the petitioner a fair trial.  Hill v. State, 292 Ark. 144, 728 S.W.2d 510 (1987) (per curiam).  An attorney’s decision not to call a particular witness is largely a matter of professional judgment,  and the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the  defense is not, itself, proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334  (2001).  Appellant did not plead facts in his petition that would establish prejudice as to this claim.  As our opinion on direct appeal noted, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.  The victim and two eye witnesses testified as to the events.  Appellant failed to establish that testimony concerning the  absence of this particular physical evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial.  His claim  therefore failed to provide substantive facts to meet his burden to overcome the presumption that  counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.  In  appellant’s  third  claim,  he  asserted  ineffective  assistance  for  failure  to  object  to  an  amendment to the information.  While appellant contended this failure left trial counsel inadequate  time to prepare a defense, he did not indicate what further preparation might have been undertaken  or the resulting benefit of that preparation.  His claim was conclusory and he again failed to provide  a basis to establish prejudice from the alleged deficient performance.  In  appellant’s  fourth  claim,  he  alleged  ineffective  assistance  for  failure  to  request  an  instruction  for  a  lesser­included  offense.  This  court  has  held  that  as  a  matter  of  trial  strategy,  competent counsel may elect not to request an instruction on lesser­included offenses.  Henderson  v. State, 281 Ark. 406, 664 S.W.2d 451 (1984) (per curiam).  Appellant’s defense at trial was a  complete denial, and not to request instructions as to lesser­included offenses was consistent with that  strategy.  Appellant next claimed ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury  selection process and move for a change of venue.  Appellant alleged that he was convicted by an all­  white jury and that the process was not free from racial discrimination and prejudice.  Appellant’s  allegations were made without factual substantiation, in that he did not present a proposed basis for  either the objection or the motion.  Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make an argument that is  meritless.  Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001).  Appellant’s conclusory claims  did not serve to establish how trial counsel could have successfully challenged the selection process.  Counsel did object as to the venire panel, as noted in our opinion on direct appeal, although the objection was based upon pretrial publicity, not racial bias.  In his petition, appellant failed to  provide a basis for objection to the panel, or any other basis on which counsel might have objected  to the process.  Persons comprising the venire are presumed to be unbiased and qualified to serve.  Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003).  Appellant’s allegation that the jury was all­  white, without more, did not raise an implication that the process was not free from discrimination.  See id.; Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984).  Nor did appellant offer any factual basis on which trial counsel might have sought a change  in venue.  To establish that the failure to seek a change in venue amounted to ineffective assistance  of counsel, a petitioner must offer some basis on which to conclude that an impartial jury was not  empaneled.  Echols v. State, 354 Ark. 530, 560, 127 S.W.3d 486, 505 (2003) (quoting Huls v. State,  301 Ark. 572, 580, 785 S.W.2d 467, 471­472 (1990) (per curiam)).  Appellant did not include any  offer of such a basis in his petition.  Next, appellant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate.  He did not  specify what would have been discovered through further investigation or explain how any additional  information could have changed the outcome of the trial.  A petitioner cannot succeed merely by  alleging that counsel was not prepared or did not spend enough time on the case, but must show that,  but for counsel’s lack of preparation, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial or  sentence would have been different.  Camargo, 346 Ark. at 129, 55 S.W.3d at 263.  In appellant’s seventh claim, he alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failure to request a  comparison of semen found on certain evidence.  Appellant did not state what such a comparison  would show or how this information could have changed the outcome  of the trial.  Once again,  appellant’s claim was conclusory, without factual basis.  In appellant’s last two claims in his petition, he sought to reassert the preceding claims, and in the eighth claim restated  failure to object or preserve the arguments for appeal as grounds.  In the  last claim, he alleged that the claims individually and collectively violated appellant’s constitutional  right to a fair trial.  To the extent that each of the claims individually might be restated as a failure to  object or preserve for appeal, as restated, the claims again failed as conclusory allegations without  sufficient factual substantiation because appellant provided no basis for objection.  The claims failed  collectively, as well.  This court has consistently refused to recognize the doctrine of cumulative error  in allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Weatherford v. State, 363 Ark. 579, 215 S.W.3d  642 (2005) (per curiam); Echols v. State, 354 Ark. 530, 127 S.W.3d 486 (2003).  Because none of appellant’s claims in his petition were sufficient to support relief on a petition  under Rule 37.1, he cannot prevail upon appeal of the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and the motion is moot.  Appeal dismissed; motion moot.

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