Keith Allen Deaton v. State of Arkansas
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No.
KEITH ALLEN DEATON
Appellant
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Appellee
CR 07-1198
Opinion Delivered
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF INDEPENDENCE
COUNTY, CR 76-131, HON. JOHN
DAN KEMP, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
In 1977, appellant Keith Allen Deaton entered a guilty plea in Independence County Circuit
Court to charges of capital murder and burglary and received concurrent sentences of life
imprisonment without parole and twenty years’ incarceration. In 2007, appellant filed a petition for
writ of error coram nobis in the trial court, which was denied without a hearing. Appellant now
brings this appeal of that order.
Appellant’s sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying the writ without a
hearing. Appellant asserts that he was entitled to a hearing on the petition because the petition
presented allegations of a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record, that the fact was not
known to the trial court at the time the judgment was entered, and that the failure to disclose the fact
did not result from the defendant’s negligence or fault. The trial court denied the petition on the
basis that appellant failed to show due diligence in his application for the writ. Because the petition
clearly did not show due diligence in bringing a timely petition, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
the writ without a hearing.
A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than
its approval. State v. Larimore, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). The writ is allowed only under
compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature.
Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per curiam). The function of the writ is to
secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented
its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the
defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of judgment. Thomas v. State, 367 Ark. 478,
241 S.W.3d 247 (2006) (per curiam).
In those instances, as here, where the judgment of conviction was entered on a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, or the judgment of conviction was not appealed, the petition for writ of error
coram nobis is filed directly in the trial court. If the judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal,
the petitioner must first proceed in this court and gain leave to file a petition in the trial court by
means of a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error
coram nobis Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001) (per curiam). Denial of a writ
of error coram nobis is reviewed by appeal. Magby v. State, 348 Ark. 415, 72 S.W.3d 508 (2002)
(per curiam).
The standard of review of the denial of a writ of error coram nobis is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the writ. Id. at 420, 72 S.W.3d at 510. An abuse of discretion
occurs when the circuit court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Cloird v. State, 357 Ark. 446, 182
S.W.3d 477 (2004). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion to deny the petition without a
hearing.
In his petition, appellant alleged that the cause of death of the murder victim was an infection
unrelated to the injuries inflicted by appellant. He contended that, because certain medical records
-2-
were unavailable to the medical examiner who prepared the autopsy report, this information was
unavailable at the time that appellant entered his guilty plea. On appeal, appellant contends that the
trial court should have allowed him to present evidence at a hearing in order to establish these facts.
He further contends that the trial court was required to provide a hearing if there was a possibility
that he might succeed and that the determination as to whether petitioner had exercised due diligence
was a factual inquiry that merited a hearing.
Where a petition for writ of error coram nobis is filed directly in the trial court, a hearing is
not required if the petition clearly has no merit, either in that it fails to state a cause of action to
support issuance of the writ, or where it is clear from the petition that the petitioner did not act with
due diligence. Appellant cites to Cloird as supporting the proposition that a hearing is required to
provide the petitioner with an opportunity to meet the burden of proof for issuance of the writ. But,
Cloird was a case where this court had previously granted a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the
trial court and gave permission for the petitioner to file his petition in the trial court, with directions
for findings of fact. Under those circumstances, a hearing on the petition was required.
In denying the petition, the trial court determined that appellant did not act with due
diligence in that the victim’s medical records were available to defense counsel at appellant’s trial.
While there is no specific time limit for seeking a writ of error coram nobis, due diligence is required
in making an application for relief and in the absence of a valid excuse for delay, the petition will
be denied. Echols v. State, 360 Ark. 332, 201 S.W.3d 890 (2005). Due diligence requires that: (1)
the defendant be unaware of the fact at the time of trial; (2) the defendant could not have, in the
exercise of due diligence, presented the fact at trial; (3) upon discovering the fact, the defendant did
not delay bringing the petition. Id.
-3-
Here, appellant contends that the trial court should have taken evidence on the issue of
whether the fact could have been presented at trial through an exercise of due diligence on the part
of appellant’s trial counsel. But, appellant’s statements in the petition displayed a lack of diligence
on the part of the petitioner under the third requirement, whether trial counsel failed to exercise
diligence or not. The petition indicates that the reason for the victim’s death was not discovered
until “several years after Petitioner pled guilty.” One of appellant’s exhibits is a letter dated April
19, 1995, that discussed infection as the cause of the victim’s death and indicated that it was
submitted with appellant’s pardon application. The petition indicates that appellant had previously
sought relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, as well as through applications to two governors for
pardon based on this same information.
The petition shows a delay of at least ten or, quite possibly, more than twenty, years
following appellant’s discovery of the allegedly hidden facts before appellant filed the petition for
writ of error coram nobis. The petition acknowledged a delay, but contended that appellant’s pursuit
of these other remedies was a valid excuse for the delay. It was not.
Relief under Rule 37.1 and error coram nobis proceedings are not exclusive and may be
pursued simultaneously. See, e.g., Echols, 360 Ark. at 335, 201 S.W.3d at 892; Dansby, 343 Ark.
at 637, 37 S.W.3d at 600; Larimore, 341 Ark. at 400, 17 S.W.3d at 88. Appellant did not cite, and
we are not aware of, any restriction that would prevent pursuit of relief through the writ while a
petitioner pursues an application for pardon. Appellant’s petition did not present a valid excuse for
the delay.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition without a hearing because
the petition was clearly without merit. It is clear from the petition that appellant did not act with due
-4-
diligence in bringing the petition; appellant acknowledged a delay, but did not present a valid
excuse. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition without a hearing.
Affirmed.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.