Leslie Young v. State of Arkansas
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
CR07-1136
Opinion Delivered March
LESLIE A. YOUNG,
20, 2008
APPELLANT,
APPEAL FRO M THE SHARP
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR06-6,
HON. HAROLD S. ERWIN, JUDGE,
VS.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
AFFIRMED.
JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice
Leslie A. Young, a.k.a. Leslie A. Williams, appeals an order of the Sharp County
Circuit Court denying her motion to suppress. In Young v. State, 370 Ark. 147, ___ S.W.3d
___ (2007), Young’s convictions for capital murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted arson
were affirmed; however, the case was returned to the circuit court under a limited remand
for the circuit court to hold a new hearing on the suppression of Young’s in-custody
statement. Young now appeals the circuit court’s decision denying her motion to suppress
on remand.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress a custodial statement, this court looks
to see if the confession was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception. Reese v. State, 371 Ark. 1, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2007). When we review
a trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness of a confession, we make an independent
determination based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. We will reverse the circuit
court only if its decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Flowers v.
State, 362 Ark. 193, 208 S.W.3d 113 (2005). Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct.
R. 1-2(a)(2). We affirm the circuit court’s decision denying the motion to suppress.
At issue is an interrogation of Young by Sharp County Sheriff Dale Weaver. It took
place in the Sharp County jail. Both parties agree that Young was advised of her Miranda
rights by Arkansas State Trooper Jeremy Page prior to the interrogation by Weaver.1
Trooper Page took custody of Young earlier that day on January 3, 2006, at about
1:15 p.m. at the county line between Sharp County and Independence County. He had the
video recorder in his patrol car running at the time. The video portion of the tape shows only
the scenery and passing vehicles; however, the audio portion recorded Page advising Young
of her rights. Pursuant to testimony at the suppression hearing, and as confirmed by review
of the audio recording on the video tape, Young was advised of her rights, acknowledged that
she understood her rights, and, aside from a single complaint about handcuffs, made no further
comment then or at any time while being transported by Page.
Elaine Moody testified that she was the “jail matron” at the Sharp County jail who
received Young upon her arrival when Page turned Young over to the Sharp County Sheriff’s
Department. According to Moody, Young spoke to her in order to respond to questions
regarding processing into custody; however, there was no discussion related to the crime for
which Young was arrested.
1
The record reveals that the interrogation by Sheriff Weaver occurred within no
more than two hours of being advised of her rights.
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After processing Young, Moody called Sheriff Weaver to inform him that it appeared
that there might be blood on Young’s face and arms. Weaver came to the jail to determine
if he should try to take samples from Young’s person. Sharp County Sheriff’s Deputy Wendy
Flynn accompanied him. Weaver concluded there was no blood on Young’s face and arms
that he could sample. He testified at the suppression hearing about his discussion with Young:
Well, there were some scratches on her arms and so I wanted to ask her
about those scratches and prior to that I wanted to know if she had been
Mirandized. So I asked her that. I said, Leslie have you been
Mirandized? And she said does that mean I’ve been read my rights. And
I said yes that’s what it means. And she said yes. And I said well, with
that in mind would you want to speak to me about this? And she said
yes. And so I asked her about the scratches on her arms.
Weaver then asked Young about where she was on the night of the murder. She
answered those questions, and Weaver then told her that she had been seen in the area after
the murder and that items from the victim’s house had been pawned by her husband. Young
then denied any involvement in the murder or other crimes against the victim. According
to Weaver, it was then that Young said, “I think I need to talk to a lawyer.” Weaver stopped
the interrogation at this point. Deputy Flynn also testified and recounted essentially the same
facts about the interrogation.
Young argues that her statement was not voluntary. To be admissible, a “statement
must be voluntary ‘in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’ ” Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 31, 952 S.W.2d
646, 657-58 (1997) (quoting Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. at 246-47, 831 S.W.2d at 109
(1992)) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Further, the statement was
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given while Young was in-custody. An in custody statement is presumptively involuntary,
and the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial
statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Reese, supra.
Young was advised of her Miranda rights, acknowledged that she understood them,
and, prior to submitting to interrogation, did not invoke her Miranda rights in any manner.2
Rather, she chose to submit to questioning by law enforcement. In Scott v. State, 298 Ark.
214, 217, 766 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1989), this court noted that “[t]he United States Supreme
Court discussed waiver of the right to counsel in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct.
2389 (1988), and that Patterson reemphasized the holding in Miranda that a proper warning,
prior to waiver of rights, is necessary before the police may question an accused.” A criminal
defendant may waive the Miranda rights when he or she is advised of the Miranda rights, fails
to invoke those rights in any manner, and then proceeds to give inculpatory statements. In
Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 827 S.W.2d 110 (1992), the defendant was arrested on suspicion
of murder and advised of his Miranda rights. While being transported to the police station,
Ward stated that he had not hurt anybody and repeated an account of his encounter with the
victim that he had given prior to his arrest. At the police station, Ward was again advised of
his Miranda rights. Ward acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk to
2
If having been advised of the Miranda rights, a criminal defendant “indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, [or
if he] states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 473-474 (emphasis in original). This holding in Miranda, supra is reflected
in Ark. R. Crim P. 4.5, which provides: “No law enforcement officer shall question an
arrested person if the person has indicated in any manner that he does not wish to be
questioned, or that he wishes to consult counsel before submitting to any questioning.”
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the officers on the condition that his statement not be taped. Ward also refused to sign the
waiver of rights form, and yet made a statement that was then introduced at trial. The
statements made after Ward was advised of his Miranda rights were admissible because he had
been advised of his rights, acknowledged that he understood them, and chose to speak with
law enforcement. Similarly in United States v. Ogden, 572 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1978), the court
found that where Ogden was arrested, advised of his Miranda rights, indicated that he
understood them, and nevertheless chose to speak with law enforcement and give inculpatory
statements, those statements were admissible. In Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d
390 (1984), the criminal defendant was advised of his rights, made no comment invoking
them, and thereafter answered questions. The statements were found to be voluntary and
admissible.
Here, Young was advised of her rights, acknowledged that she understood her rights,
and then chose to submit to interrogation. Weaver specifically asked her if she had been
advised of her rights, and when she answered that she had, Weaver asked if keeping that in
mind she wished to speak with him.3 She responded that she did. It is clear to this court that
Young waived her Miranda rights by implication. We hold that the circuit court’s ruling is
not against the preponderance of the evidence and affirm the circuit court’s decision that the
statement was voluntary and admissible.
3
Deputy Flynn testified that she did not recall Weaver asking Young, whether having her
rights in mind she wished to speak with him. The circuit court accepted Weaver’s version, and
to the extent this calls for a decision on credibility of the witnesses, that was an issue left to the
sound discretion of the circuit court. See Reese v. State, 371 Ark. 1, 214 S.W.3d 811 (2007)
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Affirmed.
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