City of Centerton v. City of Bentonville
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
08-380
Opinion Delivered January
CITY OF CENTERTON,
30, 2009
APPELLANT,
APPEAL FROM THE BENTO N
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CV-2005-2066,
HON. DAVID S. CLINGER, JUDGE,
VS.
CITY OF BENTONVILLE,
APPELLEE,
AFFIRMED.
JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice
The City of Centerton appeals a judgment of the Benton County Circuit Court
declaring as invalid its annexation of surrounded land described as “West Island.” Centerton
argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the appellees City of Bentonville, a
municipal corporation, George and Nancy Huber, Daniel and Ruby Davies, Sandra and Gary
Townsend, and the Lois Peters Revocable Trust (collectively referred to as Bentonville) bore
their burden of proof to show that Centerton’s annexation of “West Island” failed to meet the
requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a) (Supp. 2005). We affirm the
decision of the circuit court. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule
1-2(b)(5).
Centerton annexed two areas of unincorporated and surrounded land known as “West
Island” and “East Island.”
Both sections of land are completely surrounded by the
neighboring municipalities of Centerton and Bentonville. Only “West Island” is at issue in
this appeal.
As permitted under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-501 (Supp. 2005),
Centerton, as the municipality with the greatest distance of city limits adjoining “West
Island”, passed an ordinance to annex “West Island”. At about the same time, Bentonville
annexed “West Island” by petition of adjoining landowners, as permitted under Arkansas
Code Annotated section 14-40-601 (Repl. 1998). Bentonville sued Centerton, alleging that
“West Island” failed to comply with the requirements qualifying the land for annexation by
Centerton under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a). A judgment was entered
declaring Centerton’s annexation invalid.
Admission by Bentonville
Centerton argues first that Bentonville’s annexation of “West Island” by petition
constitutes an admission by Bentonville that “West Island” met not only the requirements for
annexation by Bentonville, but also for annexation by Centerton. Based on this alleged
admission, Centerton argues that Bentonville may not assert that Centerton’s annexation was
invalid. An admission is an acknowledgment or concession of a fact. See Ferguson v. State,
362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005).
Centerton asserts that “Mr. Peter’s signature on that petition is an admission that the
Trust’s property met at least one of the five criteria set out in A.C.A. § 14-40-302(a).” Peters
is an owner of property in “West Island” in an area referred to as the land south of Motley
Road. He, among other landowners, petitioned to be annexed into Bentonville. Centerton
cites us to City of Marion v. Guaranty Loan and Real Estate Co., 75 Ark. App. 427, 58 S.W.3d
-2-
08-380
410 (2001), for the proposition that annexations by petition under section 14-40-601 must
satisfy at least one of the listed criteria for annexation set out in section 14-40-302(a) before
an area may be annexed. Centerton further argues that only when the land to be annexed
meets at least one of the criteria set out in section 14-40-302(a) is the petition “right and
proper” as required for annexation by petition in Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40603(a) (Repl. 1998).
With regard to whether the criteria of section 14-40-302(a) apply to annexation by
petition of adjoining landowners, even though section 14-40-302(a) is not mentioned in the
statutes on annexation by petition (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 14-40-601- 14-40 - 606 (Repl.
1998)), this court in City of Jacksonville v. City of Sherwood, ___ Ark. ___, ___, ___ S.W.3d
___, ___ (Nov. 13, 2008), stated that “the criteria apply regardless of whether the annexation
proceeding was initiated by the city or by adjoining landowners.” See also Town of Houston
v. Carden, 332 Ark. 340, 965 S.W.2d 131 (1998).1 Where at least one of the criteria of
section 14-40-302(a) is met, the petition of adjoining landowners is “right and proper” under
section 14-40-603(a). Id.
We agree that Bentonville in the landowners’ petition asserted that the annexation of
“West Island” was right and proper, and that implicit within that petition is an assertion that
“West Island” met at least one criteria of section 14-40-302(a) with respect to the annexation
1
Centerton argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the analysis of whether any one of
the criteria of Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a) (Supp. 2005) does not apply to annexation
by petition of adjoining landowners under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-601 (Supp. 2005).
The circuit court erred. See City of Jacksonville v. City of Sherwood, ___ Ark. ___, ___, ___ S.W.3d ___,
___ (Nov. 13, 2008). However, this error does not require reversal in this case because Bentonville also
showed that none of the section 14-40-302(a) criteria were met.
-3-
08-380
by Bentonville. However, the landowners’ petition makes no assertion, implicit or otherwise,
that “West Island” met at least one criteria of section 14-40-302(a) with respect to the
annexation by Centerton. That “West Island” met a criteria with respect to Bentonville does
not necessarily mean that it met that same criteria or any other criteria with respect to
Centerton. For example, the actual growth of one municipality surrounding an island might
be moving into an island while the actual growth of another surrounding municipality might
not. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(a)(3). In the landowners’ petition, Bentonville, or
the petitioners did not make an admission that “West Island” met the requirements for
annexation by Centerton.
Prima Facie Presumption of Compliance With Section 14-40-302(a)
Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-503(a)(2) (Repl. 1998), Centerton
next argues that when the majority of its governing body voted for annexation, a prima facie
case of annexation was established that Bentonville had to overcome in its suit challenging the
annexation. Section 14-40-503(a)(2) provides, “If a majority of the total number of members
of the governing body vote for the proposed annexation ordinance, then a prima facie case
for annexation shall be established, and the city shall proceed to render services to the annexed
area.” A decision to annex becomes final in thirty days unless challenged in circuit court.
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-503(b) (Repl. 1998). The burden rests on those objecting to the
annexation to produce sufficient evidence to defeat the prima facie case, and that means that
they must show that the area should not be annexed. Gay v. City of Springdale, 298 Ark. 554,
769 S.W.2d 740 (1989). The party challenging the ordinance bears the burden of proving
-4-
08-380
the annexation was improper. Id. However, this court has noted that “by the very nature
of this type of litigation, there is a wide latitude for divergence of opinion and, consequently,
a high degree of reliance must be placed upon the findings of the trial judge.” Id. at 557, 769
S.W.2d at 741. A finding by a circuit court on annexation will not be reversed unless it is
clearly erroneous. Town of Houston, supra.
Annexation is proper where any one of the criteria set out in section 14-40-302(a) is
met. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1989). However, “[i]f a part
of the proposed area does not meet one of the five requirements, the annexation of the entire
area is void in toto.” Town of Houston, 332 Ark. at 348, 965 S.W.2d at 135. Section 14-40302(a) 2 provides as follows:
(a) By vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the total number of members making up its
governing body, any municipality may adopt an ordinance to annex lands
contiguous to the municipality if the lands are any of the following:
(1) Platted and held for sale or use as municipal lots;
(2) Whether platted or not, if the lands are held to be sold as suburban
property;
(3) When the lands furnish the abode for a densely settled community or
represent the actual growth of the municipality beyond its legal boundary;
2
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a) (Supp. 2005) sets out what are sometimes
referred to as the “Vestal criteria.” See Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 221, 101 S.W.3d 191, 194
(2003); Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 142, 741 S.W.2d 632, 636 (1987). This court in Vestal v. Little
Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 16 S.W. 291 (1891), discussed the criteria that could be met to satisfy the requirements
of the then applicable statutes on annexation. See 29 Mansfield Digest sections 916-923 at 324-325 (1884).
Annexation is a special statutory proceeding. Posey v. Paxton, 201 Ark. 825, 147 S.W.2d 39 (1941).
Thus, annexation is defined by statute. See Rooker v. City of Little Rock, 234 Ark. 372, 352 S.W.2d 172,
(1967); Grayson v. Arrington, 225 Ark. 922, 286 S.W.2d 501 (1956). The criteria set out in Vestal were
modified and adopted into the current statutes as section 14-40-302(a).
-5-
08-380
(4) When the lands are needed for any proper municipal purposes such as for
the extension of needed police regulation; or
(5) When they are valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective
municipal uses.
After all the evidence was admitted, the circuit court issued a decision and stated that
there was no indication that Centerton “looks at that property as meeting any of these factors
in 14-40-302.” The circuit court went on to state that it had carefully considered the criteria
in section 14-40-302(a), and that while the court was reluctant to overturn an action of the
Centerton city council, the “Peters property and the property below the road [Motley] on the
south simply don’t meet any of the criteria of 14-40-302.” The evidence supports this
decision. Centerton Mayor Ken Williams testified that the Peters’s land south of Motley
Road was annexed because, “in order to take in the whole island we had to take it in.”
Williams made no reference to any requirement of section 14-40-302(a). The land south of
Motley Road was annexed because to get the land Centerton wanted, Centerton had to
annex the land south of Motley Road as well. Nonetheless, Centerton argues that there was
no proof that “West Island” did not meet the requirements of section 14-40-302(a)(3-5)
(Supp. 2005).
Section 14-40-302(a)(3) provides that lands may be annexed “when the lands furnish
the abode for a densely settled community or represent the actual growth of the municipality
beyond its legal boundary.” Mayor Williams testified that the area south of Motley Road in
“West Island” was not densely populated. He also testified that to his knowledge, “there are
no municipal plans or uses for the property south of Motley Road.” Williams did make
-6-
08-380
reference to a “small subdivision” that would be in the area south of Motley Road, but the
annexation did not represent the actual growth of Centerton beyond its legal boundary.
Further, the circuit court found that the only evidence regarding the use of the Peters
property south of Motley Road was that is was used for farming.
Agricultural and
horticultural lands are not to be annexed when their highest and best use is agriculture or
horticulture. Town of Houston, supra.
Section 14-40-302(a)(4) provides that lands may be annexed when “the lands are
needed for any proper municipal purposes such as for the extension of needed police
regulation.” In an October 7, 2005 letter providing notice of an annexation hearing on
“West Island” and “East Island”, Centerton stated plainly that the annexation was necessary
to protect Centerton’s loans, funding, and plans for water service. No other reason for
annexation was offered. Mayor Williams was asked in cross-examination to confirm that “the
sole reason for this island annexation was to preserve water customers for the City of
Centerton.” He responded, “Correct.” He then testified that the area south of Motley Road
was not part of the water service area the annexation was to protect. Clearly, the land south
of Motley Road was only annexed to obtain the “whole island.” Bentonville showed that
there was no municipal purpose in annexing the property south of Motley Road. When part
of the annexed land fails to meet at least one of the five criteria of section 14-40-302(a), the
entire annexation is void in toto.
Section 14-40-302(a)(5) provides that lands are subject to annexation “[w]hen they are
valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective municipal uses.” Mayor Williams was
-7-
08-380
asked, “To your knowledge, do you have any municipal plans, municipal uses for this
property south of Motley Road?” He responded, “No, we don’t.” Centerton now argues
that other municipal services such as fire and police constitute evidence that the presumption
arising from the prima facie case was not overcome; however, as the circuit court noted,
Centerton was asked about municipal services and responded that water service was the sole
reason for annexation.
The circuit court stated that it had looked carefully at the section 14-40-302(a) criteria
and that not one of the criteria was met as to the land lying south of Motley Road. In
reviewing this matter with a high degree of reliance placed upon the findings of the trial
judge, we find no basis for Centerton’s allegation that the circuit court’s decision declaring
the annexation invalid was clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
-8-
08-380
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.