Robert Sherman Robinson v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  07­982  Opinion Delivered  ROBERT SHERMAN ROBINSON  Appellant  v.  LARRY NORRIS, DIRECTOR,  ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF  CORRECTION  Appellee  January 10, 2008  PRO SE MOTION FOR EXTENSION  OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF [CIRCUIT  COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY, LCV  2007­42, HON. ROBERT H. WYATT,  JR., JUDGE]  APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION  MOOT.  PER CURIAM  Robert  Sherman Robinson, appellant  herein, is an inmate in the  custody of the Arkansas  Department of Correction (ADC).  He filed a pro se petition for declaratory judgment against the  ADC director seeking a determination that his 1990 convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of  property in  Pulaski County Circuit  Court  violated  the  constitutional  protections  against  double  1  jeopardy.  The trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and appellant has lodged an  appeal here from the order.  2  Appellant  now  seeks  an  extension  of  time  to  file  his  brief.  As  appellant  could  not  be  successful on appeal, the appeal is dismissed and the motion is moot.  An appeal from an order that 1  In that case, appellant was also convicted of theft by receiving, first­degree assault and  being a felon in possession of a firearm, but those charges are not at issue here.  On appeal, we  affirmed the convictions for all charges.  Robinson v. State, 303 Ark. 351, 797 S.W.2d 425  (1990).  2  After appellant filed the motion, he timely filed the brief.  As there is clearly no merit to  the appeal, we nevertheless decline to permit the appeal to go forward.  denied a petition for postconviction relief or other civil remedy will not be permitted to go forward  where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail.  Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198  (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam).  We find that appellant’s declaratory judgment action was properly dismissed for the reasons  stated herein.  This court has long enumerated the four prerequisites that must be present in order for  a declaratory judgment to be issued.  In Andres v. First Arkansas Development Finance Corp., 230  Ark.  594,  324  S.W.2d  97  (1959),  we  quoted  W.  Anderson,  ACTIONS  FOR  DECLARATORY  JUDGMENTS, § 187 (2d ed.1951):  (1) There must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim  of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must  be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must  have a legal interest in the controversy; in other words, a legally protectable interest; and (4)  the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.  Andres,  230  Ark.  at  606­607,  324  S.W.2d  at  104­105.    A  declaratory  judgment  action  is  not  a  substitute for ordinary causes of action, and is intended to supplement, rather than supersede, those  causes of action.  City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005);  Martin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001).  Moreover,  such an action is not a proper means of trying a case or various issues involved in it on a piecemeal  basis.  Boyett v. Boyett, 269 Ark. 36, 598 S.W.2d 86 (1980).  Within this framework, appellant had no basis to obtain a declaratory judgment related to his  double­jeopardy claim.  The gravamen of appellant’s complaint was that he was convicted twice for  the same conduct related to the aggravated robbery and theft of property charges.  This issue has been fully addressed in appellant’s direct appeal.  Robinson, supra.  Our court  has held that a greater offense and its lesser­included offenses are considered the same for purposes ­2­  of double jeopardy.  See e.g. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004) (citing  Hughes  v.  State,  347  Ark.  696,  703,  66  S.W.3d  645,  648  (2002)).  Therefore,  in  making  a  determination  that  a  theft­of­property  charge  was  not  a  lesser­included  offense  to  a  charge  of  aggravated robbery, appellant was not subjected to double jeopardy.  It is apparent that the only purpose for bringing a declaratory judgment action was as an  attempt to supersede our prior decision on appeal and create a substitute for the criminal trial in  circuit court.  Neither of these ends present a proper basis for issuance of a declaratory judgment.  City of Ft. Smith, supra.  Appeal dismissed; motion moot. ­3­ 

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