R.K. Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Nationwide Nurses, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Katherine Hefley, Mary Burks, Traca Lane, and Raymond Hefley v. Pro-Comp Management, Inc., d/b/a The Right Solutions, an Arkansas Corporation, The D.L.J. Wright Industries, Inc., d/b/a The Right Solutions, an Oklahoma Corporation, and Amedistaf, LLC, d/b/a The Right Solutions, a Delaware Limited Liability Company

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­671  R.K.  ENTERPRISES,  LLC,  D/B/A  NATIONWIDE  NURSES,  A  NEVADA  LIMITED  LIABILITY  COMPANY,  KATHERINE  HEFLEY,  MARY  BURKS,  TRACA  LANE,  AND  RAYMOND  HEFLEY,  APPELLANTS,  VS.  PRO­COMP MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A  TH E   R IG H T   SO LU T IO NS,   AN  ARKANSAS CORPORATION, THE D.L.J.  WRIGHT INDUSTRIES, INC., D/B/A THE  RIGHT  SOLUTIONS,  AN  OKLAHOMA  CORPORATION, AND AMEDISTAF, LLC,  D/B/A  THE  RIGHT  SOLUTIONS,  A  DELAWARE  LIMITED  LIABILITY  COMPANY,  APPELLEES,  Opinion Delivered  1­24­08  APPEAL  FROM  THE  WASHINGTON  COUNTY    CIRCUIT  COURT,  NO.  CV­  01­898­4,  HONORABLE  MARY  ANN  GUNN , JUDGE,  AFFIRMED.  ROBERT L. BROWN, Associate Justice  R.K.  Enterprises,  LLC,  d/b/a  Nationwide  Nurses,  a  Nevada  Limited  Liability  Company,  and  Katherine  Hefley,  Mary  Burks,  Traca  Lane,  and  Raymond  Hefley,  all  individuals (collectively referred to as Nationwide), appeal from an order of the circuit court  awarding a judgment in the amount of $262,303 under the theory of unjust enrichment to  Pro­Comp  Management,  Inc.,  d/b/a  The  Right  Solutions,  an  Arkansas  corporation,  The  D.L.J. Wright Industries, Inc., d/b/a The Right Solutions, an Oklahoma corporation, and Amedistaf,  LLC,  d/b/a  The  Right  Solutions,  a  Delaware  Limited  Liability  Company  (collectively referred to as TRS).  We affirm the judgment.  This  is  the  third  appeal  in  this  case,  see  R.K.  Enterprises,  LLC  v.  Pro­Comp  Management,  Inc.,  356  Ark.  565,  158  S.W.3d  685  (2004)  (R.K.  I)  and  Pro­Comp  Management, Inc. v. R.K. Enterprises, LLC, 366 Ark. 463, 237 S.W.3d 20 (2006) (R.K. II),  and the underlying facts in this case were dictated at length by this court in R.K. I.  Suffice  it to say that TRS was in the business of providing nursing care services to medical care  facilities,  and  the  lawsuit  involved  the  theft  of  trade  secrets  by  Nationwide  from  TRS  involving those services.  The  procedural  facts  relevant  to  this  appeal  are  as  follows.    Upon  discovery  that  Nationwide had misappropriated various trade secrets from TRS,  TRS  filed a complaint  against  Nationwide  alleging,  among  other  things,  conversion,  civil  conspiracy,  and  a  violation of the Arkansas Theft of Trade Secrets Act.  Following a bench trial, the circuit  court  entered  an  order  on  January  21,  2003,  in  which  it  found  Nationwide  liable  for  conversion, civil conspiracy, and misappropriating trade secrets in violation of the Trade  Secrets Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4­75­601 – 4­75­607 (Repl. 2001).  The circuit court  then allowed TRS to elect to either seek damages under the Trade Secrets Act or on the basis  of the tort claims of conversion and civil conspiracy.  TRS chose recovery under the tort  claims, and the circuit court awarded TRS judgment in the amount of $262,312.  Nationwide  appealed, and in R.K. I, this court held that the Trade Secrets Act preempted damages based 2  on the tort claims of conversion and civil conspiracy and reversed and remanded the case for  a determination of damages under the Trade Secrets Act.  Following remand, the circuit court entered an order on January 14, 2005, in which  it concluded that Nationwide had been unjustly enriched by the misappropriation of the trade  secrets but that sufficient evidence had not been developed at trial for the court to determine  the  amount  of  damages  to  be  awarded  under  the  Trade  Secrets  Act.  The  court  entered  judgment in favor of Nationwide.  TRS appealed, and in R.K. II, this court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of relief  under  the  Trade  Secrets  Act  but  reversed  and  remanded  the  case  for  a  determination  of  damages based on unjust enrichment.  In R.K. II, this court also considered Nationwide’s  cross­appeal, which asserted that this court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case in R.K. I  for a determination of damages under the Trade Secrets Act because TRS did not cross­  appeal on that point.  This court rejected Nationwide’s jurisdictional argument in R.K.II and  held that this court had jurisdiction to remand the case.  After  the  second  remand,  the  circuit  court  entered  an  order  on  March  20,  2007,  awarding TRS damages in the amount of $262,303 based on the theory of unjust enrichment.  Specifically, the court said:  4.  The Court finds that although liability for misappropriation of trade  secrets  has  been  proven,  the  evidence  presented  on  actual  loss  is  too  speculative to prove damages.  However, the evidence presented on damages  for unjust enrichment has been clearly established. 3  5.  The Court now makes the determination that the correct measure of  damages on the issue of unjust enrichment is the fair market value of the trade  secrets.  This value represents the benefit that Nationwide has received by  avoiding the payment of this value in order to obtain this information.  In  the  instant  appeal,  Nationwide  again  maintains  as  its  first  point  that  this  court  lacked jurisdiction to remand the case in R.K. I for a determination of damages under the  Trade Secrets Act.  Nationwide recognizes that it made this same argument during a cross­  appeal in R.K. II but urges that although this court rejected Nationwide’s arguments in R.K.  II regarding waiver and election of remedies, it failed to address directly the issue of subject­  matter jurisdiction.  It argues once more that in the circuit court’s January 21, 2003 order,  the circuit court did not award any damages under the Trade Secrets Act, and TRS did not  file  a cross­appeal from that decision.  Nationwide points out that, as a result, TRS was  granted affirmative relief not asked for by cross­appeal.  Thus, Nationwide insists, neither  this court nor the circuit court had jurisdiction in R.K.I to award TRS damages under the  Trade Secrets Act or for unjust enrichment, and the circuit court’s subsequent orders are all  void ab initio.  We begin by discussing the law­of­the­case doctrine, which “prohibits  a court from reconsidering issues of law and fact that have already been decided in a prior  appeal.”  Byme, Inc. v. Ivy, 367 Ark. 451, 457, __ S.W.3d __, __ (2006).  This court has  explained that “[o]n second appeal, . . . the decision of the first appeal becomes the law of  the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former appeal, and  also of those which might have been, but were not, presented.”  Vandiver v. Banks, 331 Ark.  386, 391, 962 S.W.2d 349, 352 (1998) (quoting Mercantile First Nat’l Bank v. Lee, 31 Ark. 4  App. 169, 173, 790 S.W.2d 916, 919 (1990)).  Stated differently, “[t]he doctrine of the law  of the case . . . prevents an issue raised in a prior appeal from being raised in a subsequent  appeal unless the evidence materially varies between the two appeals.”  Vandiver, 331 Ark.  at 391­92, 962 S.W.2d at 352.  In R.K. II, the second appeal in this case, Nationwide raised the issue of this court’s  subject­matter jurisdiction on cross­appeal.  As already stated, Nationwide argued that this  court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case in R.K. I for a determination of damages under  the  Trade  Secrets  Act  because  the  circuit  court  did  not  award  damages  under  the  Trade  Secrets Act at trial and TRS did not cross­appeal from that ruling.  This is the same argument  that Nationwide now makes in the current appeal.  In R.K. II, this court rejected Nationwide’s argument and confirmed its decision by  continuing to assume jurisdiction in this matter and by remanding the case a second time for  further rulings by the circuit court.  Our decision on Nationwide’s jurisdictional point was  clear.  Because of this, we hold that the law­of­the­case doctrine bars Nationwide from now  making the same argument which this court has previously rejected.  Nationwide posits that  subject­matter jurisdiction can be raised more than once.  We disagree.  Once that issue has  been decided by this court, it cannot be raised again.  Were this not the case regarding issues  raised about subject­matter jurisdiction, this court could be called upon to decide the same  issue multiple times.  This we will not do. 5  Nationwide contends, as its second point, that the circuit court erred in awarding TRS  damages in the amount of $262,303 for unjust enrichment.  Nationwide maintains that the  circuit  court  simply  awarded  the  same  damages  to  TRS  for  unjust  enrichment  that  it  previously had awarded for conversion and that to use the same  measure of damages, which  was  fair  market  value,  was  error.  Nationwide  adds  that  the  fair  market  value  of  the  misappropriated items is not the appropriate measure for unjust enrichment as there was no  evidentiary correlation between the market value of the misappropriated items and the value  of the benefit gained or retained by Nationwide.  Nationwide insists that the circuit court  resorted to speculation and conjecture to reach the amount awarded as there was no evidence  presented at trial regarding the actual benefit.  Specifically, Nationwide contests the absence  of proof about the extent of time it used the items and the inclusion of the “costs” of these  items into the damages calculation.  Our standard of review for bench trials has been established by this court:  In bench trials, the standard of review on appeal is not whether there is  substantial evidence to support the finding of the circuit court, but whether the  judge’s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance  of the evidence. Omni Holding and Developing Corp. v. C.A. G. Investments,  Inc., __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (June 7, 2007).  A finding is clearly erroneous  when,  although  there  is  evidence  to  support  it,  the  reviewing  court  on  the  entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that an error has been committed.  Id.  Facts in dispute and determinations of credibility are within the province  of the fact­finder.  Id.  El Paso Prod. Co. v. Blanchard, __ Ark. __, __, __ S.W.3d __, __ (Dec. 6, 2007). 6  In R.K. II, this court held that the circuit court may look to the general law of unjust  enrichment when determining damages for unjust enrichment under the Trade Secrets Act.  In order to find unjust enrichment, “a party must have received something of value, to which  he or she is not entitled and which he or she must restore.”  El Paso Prod. Co., __ Ark. at  __, __ S.W.3d at __.  Furthermore, this court has explained that “an action based on unjust  enrichment is maintainable where a person has received money or its equivalent under such  circumstances that, in equity and good conscience, he or she ought not to retain.”  Id.  In  R.K. II, this court described unjust enrichment as follows:  Unjust  enrichment  is  an  equitable  doctrine.  First  Nat’l  Bank  of  DeWitt v. Cruthis, 360 Ark. 528, 203 S.W.3d 88 (2005).  It is the principle that  one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense  of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for property or  benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that  such  restitution  be  made,  and  where  such  action  involves  no  violation  or  frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly.  366  Ark.  at  469,  237  S.W.3d  at  24  (quoting  Servewell  Plumbing,  LLC  v.  Summit  Contractors, Inc., 362 Ark. 598, 612, 210 S.W.3d 101, 112 (2005)).  In  its  March  20,  2007  order,  the  circuit  court  ruled  that  the  correct  measure  of  damages for unjust enrichment was the fair market value of the misappropriated trade secrets.  Now, Nationwide attacks that order for three reasons:  (1) that market value of the trade  secrets is not an appropriate measure of unjust enrichment; (2) that certain items included  in the unjust  enrichment calculation either were not trade secrets or Nationwide did not 7  benefit from having them; and (3) that Nationwide could not have had the benefit of the full  market value of the trade secrets because Nationwide retained the trade secrets for only one  month.   We disagree with each of Nationwide’s points.  Nationwide first asserts that the fair market value of the trade secrets is not a proper  measure of unjust enrichment.  The circuit court, however, ruled that the fair market value  of  the  items  misappropriated  represented  the  benefit  that  Nationwide  received  because  Nationwide was able to use the trade secrets without paying for them.  The circuit court had  found, in its original order, that Nationwide benefitted from the use of the misappropriated  trade secrets by generating substantial profits in a very short period of time.  Nationwide also  contends that several of the items included in the calculation for unjust enrichment damages  are  either  not  trade  secrets  at  all  or  that  Nationwide  never  gained  a  benefit  from  misappropriating the items.  Nationwide particularly disputes the inclusion of the cost of the  Staff Pro computer software, the cost of nursing lists purchased from the State Boards of  Nursing, the cost of labor for converting certain databases, and other historical development  costs.  We note initially on this point that the circuit court found in its original order that  these items were trade secrets.  The circuit court said “that the Staff Pro computer program  and the various lists, including the nurse list and the facility list, were developed for the  exclusive  use  for  TRS  and  were  trade  secrets  in  accordance  with  Arkansas  law.”    This 8  finding was then affirmed by this court in R.K. I, and the law­of­the­case doctrine precludes  Nationwide from now asserting that these items were not trade secrets.  Secondly, the circuit court found that these trade secrets benefitted Nationwide, as the  circuit court attributed Nationwide’s first­year’s profits to its use of the misappropriated  trade secrets.  Nationwide contends, in particular, that it received no benefit from its theft  of the computer program, Staff Pro.  It maintains that the program was only in its possession  for four business days and that it was never installed to be used on any of Nationwide’s  computers.  Despite this contention, the circuit court found in its first order that the computer  program was “a comprehensive computer program” that contained “contact information for  all the TRS nurses, information regarding facilities that TRS had contracts with, various  accounting  features,  methods  of  tracing  workers’  compensation  claims,  and  all  other  information necessary for the day to day operation of TRS.”  Even if Nationwide did not  install  the  program on  its  computers  for  actual  use,  we  cannot  say  that  the  circuit  court  clearly erred in ruling that Nationwide benefitted from having the program, if only for four  business days, because the program contained information that was highly beneficial and  highly accessible to Nationwide.  We further hold, regarding the development and labor costs for the various lists and  databases, that the circuit court did not err by including these costs in its calculation for  unjust­enrichment damages.  These costs are clearly part of the fair market value of the trade  secrets, and Nationwide gained a benefit by using these trade secrets without paying for their 9  development.  Because of this, Nationwide was unjustly enriched by its use of the various  lists  and  databases  without  having  to  contribute  to  the  time,  effort,  and  cost  of  their  development.  Therefore, the development and labor costs of the trade secrets were properly  included in the award of damages for unjust enrichment.  As a final point, Nationwide insists that it could not have gained the benefit of the full  market value of the misappropriated trade secrets because they were only in Nationwide’s  possession for approximately one month.  Nevertheless, as discussed above, the circuit court  attributed Nationwide’s first­year’s profits to its use of TRS’s trade secrets. The circuit court  clearly did not believe that the positive effects that the trade secrets had on Nationwide’s  business  lasted  for  only  one  month  but  rather  extended  throughout  the  early  life  of  Nationwide’s operations.  We disagree that Nationwide did not have the benefit of the full  market value of the trade secrets simply because they were only in Nationwide’s physical  possession for one month.  In sum, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in ruling that the fair market  value of the misappropriated trade secrets was an appropriate measure of unjust enrichment  and in awarding damages in the amount of $262,303.  Affirmed. 10 

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