Kenneth James, Commissioner/Superintendent of Public Education of the State of Arkansas; The Arkansas State Board of Education et al. v. Clyde Williams and Alenora Williams on Behalf of Themselves and Their Minor Child, Clyde Williams, Jr. et al.

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­619  KENNETH  JAMES,  COMMISSIONER/  SUPERINTENDENT  OF  PUBLIC  EDUCATION  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ARKANSAS;  THE  ARKANSAS  STATE  BOARD OF EDUCATION; ET AL.,  APPELLANTS,  Opinion Delivered  1­10­08  APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT  OF  PULASKI  COUNTY,  ARKANSAS,  NO.  CV­2006­10401,  HON.  TIMOTHY  FOX, CIRCUIT JUDGE,  VS.  CLYDE  WILLIAMS  AND  ALENORA  W I L L I A M S   O N   B E H A L F   O F  THEMSELVES  AND  THEIR  MINOR  CHILD, CLYDE WILLIAMS, JR.; ET AL.,  APPELLEES,  DISMISSED.  ROBERT L. BROWN, Associate Justice  The appellants, Dr. Kenneth James, who is Commissioner/Superintendent of Public  Education of the State of Arkansas, and the Arkansas State Board of Education (“Board of  Education”),  appeal  the  denial  of  their  motion  to  dismiss  against  the  appellees,  Clyde  Williams  and  Alenora  Williams,  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  their  minor  child,  Clyde  Williams, Jr., et. al (together “Williams”).  We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject­matter  jurisdiction.  This  suit  arises  out  of  the  merger  of  the  Elaine  School  District  with  the  Marvell  School District in 2006.  The parties do not dispute that, by 2006, the Elaine School District  had fallen below an average daily membership of three­hundred and fifty students for each of the two preceding school years.  It was, therefore, subject to consolidation or annexation  under Arkansas law.  See Act 60 of the Second Extraordinary Session of 2003 (codified at  Ark. Code Ann. § 6­13­1602 (Supp. 2007)). The Elaine School District then filed a voluntary  petition to be annexed into the adjoining Marvell School District, as allowed by Arkansas  Code Annotated § 6­13­1603(a) (Supp. 2007).  The role, if any, of the Board of Education  and Dr. James in orchestrating and bringing about this annexation is disputed by the parties.  The annexation was eventually approved by the Board of Education and was set to take  effect during the 2006­2007 school year.  On June 26, 2006, Williams filed suit in Phillips County Circuit Court, seeking to  1  prevent  the  annexation  from  taking  place.  Dr.  James  and  the  Arkansas  Department  of  Education (“ADE”) were among the named defendants, but the Board of Education was not.  On  July  14,  2006,  Williams  followed  up  with  a  motion  for  a  preliminary  injunction  to  prevent the annexation from taking place before the resolution of the suit.  Dr. James and the  ADE, on the other hand, opposed the preliminary injunction and moved for dismissal of the  suit based, inter alia, on lack of subject­matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, lack of proper  venue, and failure to state facts upon which relief could be granted.  Eventually, the Phillips 1  Don Hamilton, Superintendent of Schools of Elaine, Arkansas School District No.  30,  the  Board  of  Education  of  the  Marvell  School  District  No.  ___,  and  Ulicious  Reed,  Superintendent of Schools of the Marvell School District No. ___, are also parties to this  suit.  They are not, however, parties to the current appeal.  The complaint also named the  Board of Education of the Barton­Lexa School District and Roy Kirkland, Superintendent  of Schools of the Barton­Lexa School District, as defendants.  The circuit court later granted  these defendants’ motion to dismiss, and they are not parties to the current appeal.  ­2­  07­619  County Circuit Court determined that Pulaski County  was the proper venue for the suit.  With the motion for a preliminary injunction and motion to dismiss still pending, an order  transferring the suit to Pulaski County Circuit Court was entered on August 22, 2006.  The  annexation  went  forward  for  the  2006­2007  school  year,  and  the  Elaine  School  District  ceased to exist.  Due to the annexation into the Marvell School District, Elaine High School  was closed.  On November 20, 2006, the Pulaski County Circuit Court held a hearing at the end  of which it allowed Williams twenty days to file an amended complaint containing numbered  paragraphs and adding any necessary and indispensable parties.  Williams responded by  filing an amended complaint with numbered  paragraphs on December 11, 2006.  In this  amended complaint, ADE was no longer named as a defendant.  The Board of Education,  however, was added as a defendant.  Although they are not mentioned in the caption, the  body of the complaint lists the individual members of the Board of Education as defendants.  The amended complaint alleges various detrimental effects that the annexation has  had on former Elaine students, including: (1) that former Elaine High School students are  now being taught in inferior Marvell High School facilities; (2) that former Elaine students  are being taught in hallways, the cafeteria, and closets; (3) that former Elaine High School  students are now sent to Marvell High School, which is on academic probation; (4)  that  former Elaine students would have access to better facilities and resources if Elaine had ­3­  07­619  merged with the adjoining Barton­Lexa School District instead of Marvell; (4) that former  Elaine students are subjected to long bus rides, up to five hours per day; (5) that some small  children are away from home for up to thirteen hours per day because of the transportation  being offered to them; (6) that the lengthy transit times make it more difficult for former  Elaine  students  to  participate  in  extracurricular  activities  and  to  complete  in­school  suspensions.  The gist of the amended complaint is that (1) former Elaine students  now  receive a less adequate and substantially equal education than they did before the annexation  and (2) former Elaine students receive a less adequate and substantially equal education than  they would have received if the annexation had been to the Barton­Lexa School District  rather than the Marvell School District.  The amended complaint asserts that the ADE effectively orchestrated the annexation  of the Elaine School District by the Marvell School District but used a process whereby it  appeared that the merger was at the impetus of the school districts themselves.  In so doing,  the amended complaint asserts, Dr. James and the Board of Education knowingly created a  supermajority African­American school district, despite the fact that the Board of Education  had  previously  denied  permission  for  the  Marvell  and  Lake  View  School  Districts  to  consolidate.  The  denial  of  the  Marvell/Lake  View  consolidation,  avers  the  amended  complaint,  was  based  on  the  fact  that  it  would  have  created  a  supermajority  African­  American school district.  The amended complaint also claims that the Arkansas Board of  Education has not taken action to secure federal court approval for the merger, despite the ­4­  07­619  fact that former Attorney General Mike Beebe issued an opinion stating that such approval  was necessary. Lastly, the amended complaint asserts that the Board of Education “has taken  no action to assure that the Elaine Marvell merger was equitable and/or in the best interest  of all students involved.”  The amended complaint does not expressly mention the Arkansas or United States  Constitution; nor is it clear precisely what the constitutional basis is  for  the relief being  asserted by Williams.  The amended complaint does assert, however, that former Elaine  students are not receiving an adequate or equal education, that former Elaine students are  being denied equal opportunity to be educated and to participate in after­school activities,  and that the actions of Dr. James and the Board of Education were arbitrary and capricious.  On December  29,  2006,  Dr. James and the Board of Education filed a motion to  dismiss Williams’s amended complaint, alleging, among other things, that the circuit court  did not have jurisdiction over Williams’s claims because (1) Dr. James and the Board of  Education were immune from suit under the sovereign­immunity provision of the Arkansas  Constitution  and (2) the issues that Williams sought to litigate were under the exclusive  subject­matter jurisdiction of this court due to  the recall of the Lake View mandate. The  motion also asserted that Dr. James was not a proper party to the lawsuit because he had no  power to grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs.  Williams  responded  that  sovereign  immunity  did  not  apply  in  suits  against  state  officials to enjoin ultra vires, bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious  actions,  and that the ­5­  07­619  circuit court had jurisdiction despite the recall of the Lake View mandate.  Williams further  maintained that Dr. James, as the director and supervisor of the ADE, was a necessary and  proper party to the suit.  On February 15, 2007, the circuit court entered an order denying  Dr. James and the Board of Education’s motion to dismiss.  It is from that order that Dr.  James and the Board of Education file this interlocutory appeal.  We first address the issue of subject­matter jurisdiction raised by Dr. James and the  Board  of  Education.    They  contend,  as  already  stated,  that  the  circuit  court  had  no  jurisdiction to hear this case because subject­matter jurisdiction rested solely with this court  due to the recall of the Lake View mandate.  They assert that Williams’s claims allege the  denial  of  the  adequate  and  substantially  equal  education  required  by  the  Arkansas  Constitution, the same issue that was raised in Lake View.  Because Williams and his co­  plaintiffs were all members of the class certified as part of the Lake View litigation, see Lake  View Sch. Dist. No 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 486, 10 S.W.3d 892,  895 (2000), Dr. James and the Board of Education urge that subject­matter jurisdiction over  these issues rested solely with this court until the Lake View mandate was reissued on May  31, 2007. Williams,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasizes  that  his  claims  stem  primarily  from  the  United States Constitution, not the Arkansas Constitution.  Moreover, he maintains that the  Lake View mandate was issued on May 31, 2007, thereby divesting this court of any subject­  matter jurisdiction it might have had over the case before us. ­6­  07­619  We note initially that the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure – Civil do not grant  the right of an interlocutory appeal based on lack of subject­matter jurisdiction.  See Ark. R.  App. Pro.–Civ. 2(a). Nevertheless, subject­matter jurisdiction is an issue that can and indeed  must be raised by this court sua sponte.  Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp. v. Miller, 370 Ark.  190, 202, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (2007) (“Arkansas, of  course, provides no interlocutory  appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject­matter jurisdiction, although  this court can raise the issue sua sponte.”); Barclay v. Farm Credit Servs., 340 Ark. 65, 68,  8  S.W.3d  517,  518  (2000)  (“This  court  is  obligated  to  raise  issues  of  subject­matter  jurisdiction on its own, and we do so in this instance.”).  Therefore, the question of whether  the pending Lake View mandate divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over this matter must  be addressed, as a preliminary matter, by this court.  In our initial Lake View decision dealing with the constitutionality of the public school  funding  system,  this  court  held  that  the  school  funding  system  then  in  place  was  unconstitutional.  See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 351 Ark.  31, 96, 91 S.W.3d 472, 510 (2002) (Lake View I).  In that decision, this court decided to stay  the issuance of our mandate until 2004, noting:  Were we not to stay our mandate in this case, every dollar spent on public  education in Arkansas would be constitutionally suspect. That would be an  untenable  situation  and  would  have  the  potential  for  throwing  the  entire  operation of our public schools into chaos. We are strongly of the belief that  the  General  Assembly  and  Department  of  Education  should  have  time  to  correct this constitutional disability in public school funding and time to chart  a new course for public education in this state. ­7­  07­619  Id. at 97, 91 S.W.3d at 511.  The mandate was issued in early 2004 but was almost immediately recalled due to  legislative non­compliance.  Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee,  355  Ark.  617,  618,  142  S.W.3d  643,  644  (2004)  (Lake  View II).  Later  the  same  year,  however, the mandate was issued, and this court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter was  released.  Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 161,  189 S.W.3d 1, 17 (2004) (Lake View III).  That jurisdiction was reassumed on June 9, 2005,  Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 362 Ark. 520, 522, 210 S.W.3d  28, 30 (2005) (Lake View IV), and the mandate was not reissued until May 31, 2007, Lake  View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139, 146, ___ S.W.3d ___,  ___  (2007)  (Lake  View  V).  The  reissuance  of  the  mandate  was  after  the  circuit  court  rendered the order that is currently under appeal in the instant case.  This court retains jurisdiction over a case until it issues a mandate to the circuit court  instructing it to “recognize, obey, and execute” this court’s decision.  Barclay, 340 Ark. at  68­69, 8 S.W.3d at 519.  Before the issuance of the mandate, no party to the lawsuit can  obtain relief from the circuit court for any matter that is “so intertwined with the primary  litigation as to be part and parcel of it.”  Id. at 69, 8 S.W.3d at 519.  Hence, there are two  questions that must be answered to determine whether the circuit court had subject­matter  jurisdiction over William’s complaint before this court issued its mandate on May 31, 2007:  (1) whether Williams was a party to the Lake View litigation, and (2) whether the issues ­8­  07­619  raised in the present suit are “part and parcel” of the Lake View litigation.  Id.  We answer  both questions in the affirmative.  The  class  certified  in  the  Lake  View  litigation  included  “students  and  parents  of  students in all school districts.” Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee,  340 Ark. 481, 486, 10 S.W.3d 892, 895 (2000).  Accordingly, there is no question but that  Williams and his co­plaintiffs were parties to the Lake View suit.  Next, in determining whether the allegations of Williams’s complaint are within the  scope of the Lake View mandate, we must first determine whether Williams can rely on his  original complaint as well as his amended complaint.  This court has stated with approval the  “widely recognized doctrine that an amended complaint, unless it adopts and incorporates  the original complaint, supersedes the original complaint.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.  Cartwright, 323 Ark. 573, 577, 916 S.W.2d 114, 116 (1996).  Having failed to incorporate  the original complaint into the amended complaint by reference, Williams cannot now rely  on it.  We are, therefore, limited in our analysis to the terms in the amended complaint.  We note in support of this conclusion that one of the reasons Williams was required  to file an amended complaint was that the original complaint failed to comply with Rule  10(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “[a]ll averments of claim  or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be  limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances.”  The circuit  court required an amended complaint so that the defendants could effectively respond to each ­9­  07­619  numbered claim and so that Williams could add any necessary party defendants.  It was, as  a result, Williams’s obligation to lay out all of his claims in the numbered paragraphs of the  amended complaint and to include all necessary parties.  We now turn to an examination of what claims are included in the amended complaint  when it is read in the light most favorable to Williams.  This task is complicated by the fact  that, though Williams argues constitutional issues in his brief on appeal, he has failed to cite  expressly to either the Arkansas or United States Constitution in his amended complaint.  What he does assert in his amended complaint is that former Elaine students are not receiving  an adequate and substantially equal education.  That is what this court has held the Arkansas  Constitution  requires.  See  Lake  View  III,  358  Ark.  at  155,  189  S.W.3d  at  13  (“[T]he  overarching constitutional principle is that an adequate education must be provided to all  school  children  on  a  substantially  equal  basis  with  regard  to  curricula,  facilities,  and  equipment.”).  There is, of course, no federal constitutional right to an adequate education.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course,  is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do  we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).  Williams’s claim to lack of an  adequate and substantially equal education is, therefore, limited to the Arkansas Constitution.  Nor  does  the  amended  complaint  expressly  allege  any  violation  of  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  United  States  Constitution  or  Article  2,  §  3  of  the  Arkansas  Constitution.  It does reference “disparate burdens” that were knowingly placed on former ­10­  07­619  Elaine students and that these students were being “denied equal opportunity to be educated  and to participate in programs and activities.”  But the only allegation of any actions that  were  undertaken  on  the  basis  of  the  student’s  race  are  against  the  superintendent  of  the  2  Barton­Lexa School District and not Dr. James and the Board of Education.  Furthermore,  Arkansas jurisprudence  requires a complaint to state facts, “not mere conclusions, in order  to entitle the pleader to relief.” Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 450, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___  (2007).  In the instant case, Williams failed to state even a conclusion that Dr. James and the  Board of Education discriminated against former Elaine School District students on the basis  of race or any other protected classification.  In  Lake  View  I,  this  court  found  both:  (1)  that,  in  violation  of  the  Arkansas  Constitution, Arkansas children were not being provided a general, suitable, and efficient  school­funding system, 351 Ark. at 72, 91 S.W.3d at 495, and (2) that unequal educational  opportunities  were  being  provided  to  certain  children  who  were  taught  a  “barebones”  curriculum and suffered under “dire facility and equipment needs,” id. at 75, 91 S.W.3d at  497­98.  Williams’s claims as set out in his amended complaint fall squarely under the latter  constitutional infirmities.  The matters raised by this suit are, therefore, part and parcel of 2  The amended complaint does assert that Dr. James and the Board of Education have  allowed the creation of a supermajority African American school district in contravention  of the policy set by the Department of Education.  Nevertheless, even read in the light most  favorable to Williams, this does not allege that the students were discriminated against based  on  their  race  so  as  to  raise  equal­protection  implications  but  only  that  the  Board  of  Education’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.  ­11­  07­619  the Lake View litigation, and the circuit court had no subject­matter jurisdiction to hear this  case until after this court issued its mandate and released its Lake View jurisdiction on May  31, 2007. In deciding Lake View I, this court noted that it was not the role of the judiciary to  prescribe specific  remedies to cure the unconstitutionality of the school­funding system.  Rather, “[d]evelopment of the necessary educational programs and the implementation of the  same  falls  more  within  the  bailiwick  of  the  General  Assembly  and  the  Department  of  Education.”  351 Ark. at 91, 91 S.W.3d at 507­08.  This court went on to say that, “[t]he trial  court’s role and this court’s role . . . are limited to a determination of whether the existing  school­funding system satisfies constitutional dictates and, if not, why not.”  Id.  During the  pendency of this court’s  jurisdiction over the Lake View litigation, certain constitutional  inadequacies  over  the  funding  of  Arkansas  public  schools  were  to  be  remedied  by  the  General Assembly. Williams’s amended complaint touches on these same issues that formed  the  essence  of  the  Lake  View  case.    In  short,  when  the  circuit  court  issued  its  order  on  February  17,  2007  denying  the  motion  to  dismiss  filed  by  Dr.  James  and  the  Board  of  Education, it had no jurisdiction to do so because this court still retained jurisdiction over ­12­  07­619  3  the Lake View case.  Because the circuit court had no subject­matter jurisdiction to hear this  case, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject­matter jurisdiction.  See Barclay, 340  Ark. at 69, 8 S.W.3d at 519. The lack of subject­matter jurisdiction in circuit court cannot  be retroactively cured by the subsequent issuance of the mandate in Lake View.  Appeal dismissed.  HANNAH, C.J., concurs.  HANNAH,  C.J.,  concurring.  I  concur  in  the  decision  reached  by  the  majority  but  conclude that this case must be dismissed on different grounds.  I note first, as the majority  states, that “an amended complaint, unless it adopts and incorporates the original complaint,  supersedes the original complaint.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Cartwright, 323 Ark. 573,  577, 916 S.W.2d 114, 116 (1996).  The amended complaint did not incorporate the original  complaint.  Therefore, the amended complaint defines this action. 3  This  court  is  mindful  of  the  fact  that,  on  July  19,  2006,  the  Arkansas  Board  of  Education and Arkansas Department of Education filed a petition for writ of prohibition or  certiorari with this court and requested that we lift a temporary restraining order issued by  the  Pulaski  County  Circuit  Court  enjoining  the  Arkansas  State  Board  of  Education  and  Arkansas Department of Education from closing Paron High School.  The Bryant School  District filed a similar petition for writ of prohibition or certiorari with this court.  This court  dissolved the temporary restraining order due to the failure to join Bryant School District,  which was a necessary party to the litigation.  Arkansas State Bd. of Educ. v. Moody, 367  Ark. 181, 182, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (2006).  Subject­matter jurisdiction was not raised by  any party in the Paron matter; nor did this court raise it on its own, though we clearly had  the right to do so.  The lack of subject­matter jurisdiction in the circuit court was specifically  raised as an issue in the instant interlocutory appeal.  ­13­  07­619  The plaintiffs assert in the amended complaint that the students at issue are being  “deprived of adequate and equal education opportunities which will severely limit their life  options. . . .”  While that might be thought to at least imply that plaintiffs are suing for a  4  failure  to  provide  a  “general,  suitable  and  efficient  system  of  free  public  schools,”  the  amended complaint simply does not state that cause of action.  Instead the complaint seeks  review of a decision of a state agency.  Therefore, the discussion by the majority of Lake  View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 10 S.W.2d 892 (2000), is irrelevant. Lake  View concerned whether the public school system established by the General Assembly met  constitutional requirements.  Whether the mandate in Lake View had been recalled has no  effect on the issues in this case.  Plaintiffs assert that “the State actions allowing or requiring the merger of the Marvell  and  Elaine  School  Districts”  are  “arbitrary  and  capricious  and  in  violation  of  the  rules  established for merger by the State Board of Education.”  According to plaintiffs, laws and  procedures adopted in 2004 are at issue.  Thus, what is at issue is whether an administrative  agency reached the correct decision.  The Board of Education made a decision merging the school districts.  The Board of  Education is an administrative agency, and any judicial review of that decision is governed  by the Administrative Procedures Act.  See, e.g., Arkansas State Bd. of Educ. v. Purifoy, 292  Ark. 526, 731 S.W.2d 209 (1987).  Under Ark. Code Ann. § 25­15­212 (b)(1) (Repl. 2002), 4  See Ark. Const. art. 14, §1.  ­14­  07­619  plaintiffs had thirty days from the date the decision of the Board was served to file a petition  5  in circuit court seeking judicial review of the decision.  Service of the Board’s order was  made on March 21, 2006.  The complaint was not filed until June 26, 2006.  Even if we were  to consider the complaint as a valid petition under the Administrative Procedures Act, it was  not timely, and on that basis alone the case must be dismissed.  However, plaintiffs did not file a petition under the Administrative Procedures Act  and,  as such, the suit is one against the State of Arkansas.  Under article 5, section 20 of the  Constitution  of  Arkansas,  the  State  shall  never  be  made  defendant  in  any  of  her  courts.  Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit.  Department of Human Servs. v.  Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21, 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990).  Plaintiffs’ remedy, if any, was under the  Administrative Procedures Act.  The case must be dismissed. 5  Arkansas Code Annotated section 25­15­212(b)(1) (Repl. 2002) provides that the petition  must be filed within thirty days from service on the petitioner.  Plaintiffs were not parties to the action  before the Arkansas State Board of Education and naturally were not served.  However, the facts  show they had actual notice, and in any event, ninety­seven days passed from the date of service of  the order to the date that plaintiffs filed their complaint.  ­15­  07­619 

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