James Creed v. State of Arkansas

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR07­556  JAMES CREED  APPELLANT,  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS    APPELLEE,  Opinion Delivered January 31, 2008  AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT  COURT OF HOT SPRING COUNTY,  ARKANSAS, NO. CR­2006­195­2,  HONORABLE PHILLIP H. SHIRRON  AFFIRMED.  TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice  On November 1, 2002, Malvern police officers responded to a report of a rape.  The  victim told the police that she heard her doorbell ring and when she opened the door slightly,  an intruder rushed through.  She stated that the intruder held a knife with a long blade in one  hand and a rag with a strong chemical odor, which he tried to place over her face.  The  intruder placed the knife to the victim’s throat, forced her onto the floor of the laundry room,  and ordered her to disrobe.  After she removed her shirt, the intruder forced her to perform  oral sex in the presence of her children, who stood next to her crying.  The victim provided  police with a detailed description of the intruder’s physical appearance and clothing, but  stated that she did not recognize him.  A semen sample was collected from the crime scene  found on the laundry room floor.  Although the DNA profile prepared by the Arkansas State Crime Lab did not provide  a match for a suspect at that time, in October 2004, the Crime Lab notified the Malvern  Police Department that a DNA search had produced a positive match to an inmate named James Ray Creed at the Deerfield Correction Facility in Ionia, Michigan.  Following his  transport to Arkansas, a trial was held, and a jury convicted Creed of rape and sentenced him  to life in prison.  For his first point on appeal, Creed argues the trial court erred by denying his motions  for a continuance and for the appointment of additional experts.  We review a denial of a  motion for continuance under an abuse­of­discretion standard, see, e.g., Smith v. State, 352  Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003), and an appellant must demonstrate that the trial court’s  abuse of its discretion resulted in prejudice amounting  to a denial of justice. See Cherry v.  State, 347 Ark. 606, 66 S.W.3d 605 (2002).  Ark. R. Crim. P. 27.3 (2004) provides that  a  court shall grant a continuance "only upon a showing of good cause and only for so long as  necessary, taking into account not only the request or consent of the prosecuting attorney or  defense counsel, but also the public interest in prompt disposition of the case." Other factors  a trial court should take into consideration include: (1) the diligence of the movant; (2) the  probable effect of the testimony at trial; (3) the likelihood of procuring the attendance of the  witness in the event of a postponement; and (4) the filing of an affidavit, stating not only  what facts the witness would prove but also that the appellant believes them  to  be  true.  Stenhouse v. State, 362 Ark. 480, 488­89, 209 S.W.3d 352, 358 (2005).  The trial court issued an order granting Creed’s motion for a psychiatric evaluation  on  August  30,  2006,  and  clinical  psychologist  Ron  Faupel  performed  the  evaluation  on  September 20, 2006 — the same day the trial court granted Creed’s motion for substitution 2  CR07­556  of counsel.  On November 1, 2006, Creed filed a motion requesting  the  appointment of  psychiatric and DNA experts, and he filed another motion for a continuance on November  17, 2006, stating that he had “not had sufficient time to review the scientific material as well  as  the  facts  against  him.”  Creed  informed  the  court  that  he  had  been  in  contact  with  a  psychiatric expert in Little Rock, but the expert could not conduct an independent mental  evaluation before the trial date of December 1, 2006.  The trial court issued orders denying  Creed’s motion on November 22, 2006, following pre­trial hearings. On November 30, 2006,  the day before trial, Creed filed a renewed motion for a continuance, which the court denied.  In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Supreme Court held that where an  indigent defendant makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is  likely  to  be  a  significant  factor  at  trial,  the  State  must  provide  access  to  a  psychiatrist’s  assistance on the issue if the defendant cannot afford one.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­2­305 (Repl.  2006) provides the statutory procedures to be followed when the defense of mental disease  or defect is raised, and in Dirickson v. State, 329 Ark. 572, 576­77,  953  S.W.2d 55, 57  (1997), we addressed Ake and § 5­2­305, stating the following:  We have repeatedly held that a defendant’s right to examination  under Ake is protected by an examination by the state hospital  as provided by this statute.  An evaluation performed under this  section does not normally require a second opinion, and further  evaluation is discretionary with the trial court.  Stated simply,  the State is not required to pay for a defendant  to  shop from  doctor  to  doctor  until  he  finds  one  who  will  declare  him  incompetent  to  proceed  with  his  trial.  In  the  present  case, 3  CR07­556  appellant  was  examined  at  the  state  hospital,  and,  thus,  the  requirements under Ake were satisfied.  At the pre­trial hearing on November 20, 2006, the State objected to Creed’s motions  for continuances and argued that Creed should have selected another expert when he knew  the one he had selected was unavailable before the trial date.  The trial court addressed the  issue of an appointment of an additional expert for a mental evaluation and a continuance,  and said:  [T]he forensic examination is very thorough, well recognized  tests have been performed, Dr. Faupel sets out clearly not only  his tests, but his findings.  If at all, [Creed] falls in the range of  mild retardation, it’s not a defense.   The statements from the  Prosecutor  based  on  exigency  of  this  matter,  convinced  the  Court that the motion should be denied.  Dr. Diner can make  himself available.  If we need to transport [Creed] to Dr. Diner,  we’ll do that today, or tomorrow, or whatever is necessary, if  you’ll get me a transport order.  That’s the Court’s order.  At another pre­trial hearing held on November 22, 2006, the Court again denied Creed’s  motions for continuances, stating the following:  [T]he defendant has had ample time throughout this period from  the  time  of  his  arrest  and  he’s  had  counsel  since  August  beginning with Ms. Lemons and then passed off to you, your  firm, sometime between August and September, I believe ... I  told [Creed’s attorney of record] that if he wishes transport of  the defendant, if he’ll give me the transport order and if I can’t  be located, Judge Williams, either one of us can sign it and we  will help you get him there, provided—assuming that the doctor  couldn’t  come  down  here  and  couldn’t  get  off,  couldn’t  get  there, but we’ll work him in, we will get him in there for that  session.  We  find  no  abuse  of  discretion.  The  trial  court  denied  Creed’s  motion  for  the 4  CR07­556  appointment of an additional mental expert to conduct an independent evaluation because  the court­ordered evaluation was thorough and conformed with all the requirements of § 5­2­  305(d).  Further, the court repeatedly emphasized that it was willing to transport Creed to an  expert of his choice for an additional evaluation before trial.  Turning  to  the  issue  of  Creed’s  motion  for  appointment  of  a  DNA  expert  and  continuances  to  secure  a  DNA  expert,  we  closely  examine  such  denials  that  deprive  a  defendant the chance to have an independent review of a DNA analysis. Swanson v. State,  308 Ark. 28, 823 S.W.2d 812 (1992).  However, while the court carefully examines a denial  of a continuance to procure a DNA expert, this court will not reverse the denial when the  accused did not provide an expert’s name to the circuit court.  See Hill v. State, 321 Ark.  354, 902 S.W.2d 229 (1995).  In Munoz v. State, 340 Ark. 218, 9 S.W.3d 497 (2000), we  held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for continuance  where the State’s DNA results were available for almost four months before the trial date,  and Munoz had waited until almost a week before trial to request a DNA expert.  Although  Munoz had months to locate an expert witness and arrange for an independent review of the  evidence, he could not support his motion for a continuance with the name of a potential  1 expert, nor could he offer any prospects of securing such a witness in the near future.  1  Opposing Creed’s motion for appointment of a DNA expert at State expense, the  State argued that Creed was not indigent. Creed told the trial judge that he had recently  been granted an inheritance, although he was uncertain of the amount and time of  distribution of the estate.  At a pre­trial hearing  Creed’s counsel asked for the State to  pay for a DNA expert for Creed and suggested that Creed could reimburse the State after  his inheritance was settled.  Creed’s retained counsel could have as easily made a similar  5  CR07­556  Creed’s own argument admits that the State made it clear that DNA evidence would  be  an  issue  at  trial  when  the  State  requested  that  the  court  order  Creed  to  submit  DNA  samples in a hearing held on August 23, 2006.   Although Creed’s substitution of counsel  took place  on  September  20,  2006,  he  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  not  granting  a  continuance to “develop the evidence” and hire a rebuttal expert. Similar to the situation in  Munoz, supra, the trial court denied Creed’s motion for a continuance here after he had over  three months to secure a DNA expert. See also Swanson, supra; Hill, supra.  Finally,  Creed  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his  motions  for  continuances because he needed more time to locate alibi witnesses.  But Creed’s counsel  made  it  clear  at  the  pre­trial  hearing  on  November  20  that  there  was  little  likelihood  of  procuring  an  alibi  witness.  Accordingly,  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  denying Creed’s motions for appointment of experts and for continuances.  For his second point, Creed argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of  prior bad acts, such as: (1) testimony by Malvern police officer Chad Almond; (2) a letter  the  State  offered  as  an  exhibit  showing  Creed’s  last  known  address  as  the  “Deerfield  Correctional Facility”; (3) a document containing Creed’s statement admitting an attempted  sexual assault with intent of forcible oral penetration; and (4) documents showing Creed  guilty of an assault in 2001.  Any reference to a defendant’s prior convictions during the guilt phase of a criminal arrangement.  6  CR07­556  trial invariably results in some prejudice; however, “the trial court is granted a wide latitude  of discretion in granting or denying a motion for a mistrial, and  we  will  not reverse the  decision of the trial court except for an abuse of that discretion or manifest prejudice to the  complaining party.” Hamilton v. State, 348 Ark. 532, 541­42, 74 S.W.3d 615, 620 (2002).  During direct examination, Officer Almond stated that a letter from the Arkansas State  Crime Lab indicating it found a DNA match with Creed; the letter listed Creed’s last known  whereabouts as a correctional facility in Michigan.  The trial judge denied the motion for a  mistrial at that point as premature because he had already determined that evidence of the  particular crime for which Creed was incarcerated in Michigan would be allowed at trial  under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b).  Rule 404(b) allows evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admitted for the  purpose of showing “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or  absence  of  mistake  or  accident.”  Evidence  is  not  admissible  under  Rule  404(b)  if  it  is  offered to show a defendant’s bad character traits and to show that he acted in conformity  with  those  traits  in  committing  crimes  presently  charged.  The  evidence  must  be  independently relevant, which means that it has the tendency to make the existence of any  fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would  be  without  the  evidence.  Williams  v.  State,  343  Ark.  591,  36  S.W.3d  468  (2001).    Any  circumstance that links a defendant to the crime or raises a possible motive for the crime is  independently relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b).  Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 7  CR07­556  197 S.W.3d 468 (2004).  Like other evidentiary determinations, balancing of the probative  value  of  evidence  against  prejudicial  effect  is  a  matter  left  to  the  trial  judge’s  sound  discretion. Id.  Other recent cases before this court involving similar circumstances and Rule 404(b)  issues are instructive here.  In Morris v. State, 367 Ark. 406, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006), we  held that the testimony of a witness about her rape by the defendant was sufficiently similar  to  another  victim’s  allegations  of  rape  to  be  admissible  as  proof  of  motive,  intent,  preparation, plan, and scheme pursuant to Rule 404(b).  In Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207  S.W.3d 498 (2005), the court ruled that testimony by a previous rape victim showing similar  circumstances surrounding both rapes was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it showed  the defendant’s motive, intent, and plan to rape the victim there. See also Davis v. State, 362  Ark. 34, 207 S.W.3d 474 (2005) (evidence that youth minister made sexual advances toward  a church member was admissible to show that his forced sexual interaction with another  church member was not consensual); Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351  (2000) (evidence of similarities in way rape of first victim was perpetrated was admissible  to show similar scheme and intent when rape of second victim was committed); Sasser v.  State, 321 Ark. 438, 902 S.W.2d 773 (1995) (testimony of first victim, a convenience store  clerk,  regarding  defendant's  rape  and  attempted  murder  of  her  was  admissible  to  prove  defendant's intent to kill a second convenience store clerk several years later).  Here, the trial judge ruled that a redacted version of the Michigan Department of 8  CR07­556  Correction Presentence Investigation was admissible because it contained Creed’s statement  admitting his attempt to commit a rape similar to he rape he was alleged to have committed  in Arkansas.  Creed said:  I was watching her at the lake and I watched her all day and my  dick got hard and I thought to talk to her but I wanted a blow job  so I came to her and say suck my cock and I was going to make  her put oral sex on me but I ran and her family hold me down  till the police go there than [sic] I went to jail.  Based on our prior rulings finding evidence showing similarities between rapes as  admissible under Rule 404(b) to show similar scheme and intent, motive, preparation, and  plan, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of Creed’s  Michigan presentence report showing similarities to the present rape in Arkansas.  Further,  because this evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court did not err in denying  Creed’s motion for a mistrial when Officer Almond stated that the letter from the Arkansas  State Crime Lab reflected Creed’s residence was at the Deerfield Correctional Facility.  Creed also argues that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence an order from  the  Juvenile Division of the Hot Spring Circuit Court, indicating that Creed pled guilty to  a  charge  of  attempted  kidnapping,  reduced  to  assault  in  2001.  However,  the  order  was  admitted into evidence without Creed’s objection, and his failure to make a contemporaneous  objection prevents him from asserting any error on the part of the trial court. See McClain  v. State, 361 Ark. 133, 205 S.W.3d 123 (2005).  Finally,  Creed  asserts  that  even  if  the  redacted  Michigan  presentence  report  was 9  CR07­556  relevant,  the  trial  court  erred  in  admitting  it  over  his  objection  because  it  was  unfairly  prejudicial under Ark. R. Evid. 403. When reviewing a circuit court’s ruling under Rule 403,  this  court  applies  an  abuse­of­discretion  standard.  Flanery  v.  State,  362  Ark.  311,  208  S.W.3d 187 (2005).  Reviewing a trial court’s ruling under Rule 403, we have noted that “it  is likely that evidence offered by the state will be prejudicial to the accused, or it probably  would not be offered”; however, the evidence should not be excluded unless the accused can  show that the evidence lacks probative value in view of the risk of unfair prejudice to the  defendant.  Beed  v.  State,  271  Ark.  526,  542,  609  S.W.2d  898,  909  (1980).    Although  admission  of  the  Michigan  presentence  report  was  prejudicial  to  Creed,  the  similarities  between  the  rape  there  and  the  rape  at  issue  here  were  sufficient  to  make  this  evidence  probative on the issue of Creed’s motive, intent, preparation, plan, and scheme.  Based on  the broad discretion of the circuit court in weighing the probative value of the  evidence  against its prejudicial effect, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed this  evidence under Rule 403.  Accordingly, we find no error.  In accordance with Rule 4­3(h) of the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules, the record has  been reviewed for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party, which were  decided adversely to Creed, and no prejudicial error has been found.  Affirmed. 10  CR07­556  11 CR07­556 

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