Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, and Booneville Human Development Center v. Betty Storey

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­525  ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  AND  HUMAN  SERVICES,  AND  BOONEVILLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  CENTER,  APPELLANTS,  Opinion Delivered JANUARY 17, 2008  MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND  COSTS ON APPEAL  VS.  BETTY STOREY,  APPELLEE,  COSTS  ON  APPEAL  GRANTED;  ATTORNEYS’ FEES DENIED.  PER CURIAM  On December 13, 2007, we handed down Arkansas Department of Health and Human  Services v. Storey, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Dec. 13, 2007), affirming the circuit  court’s postjudgment order that Appellants would not be released from two judgments and  those judgments would not be deemed satisfied until the additional monies withheld as taxes,  plus  interest,  were  paid  to  Appellee  Betty  Storey.  Now,  Storey  has  filed  a  motion  for  attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the appeal of this case.  Specifically, she argues that, as  the  prevailing party on this appeal, she is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the  Arkansas Whistle­Blower Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 21­1­605(5) (Repl. 2004), and Ark. Sup.  Ct. R. 6­7(a).  Under Rule 6­7(a), where the order is affirmed, “[t]he appellee may recover brief  costs not to exceed $3.00 per page; total costs not to exceed $500.00.”  Here, Storey’s brief totaled thirty­one pages at a cost of $93.00.  As such, Storey’s motion for costs totaling  $93.00 is granted pursuant to our rules.  Additionally,  Storey  has  requested  attorneys’  fees  on  appeal  in  the  amount  of  $7,547.50 pursuant to section 21­1­605(5) of the Arkansas Whistle­Blower Act. Section 21­  1­605(5) provides, in pertinent part:  A court in rendering judgment under this subchapter may order any or  all of the following remedies:  . . . .  (5) The payment by the public employer of reasonable court costs and  attorney’s fees.  This court has consistently maintained that attorneys’ fees are only allowed when authorized  by statute.  See Running M Farms, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., Co., ___ Ark. ___, ___  S.W.3d ___ (Oct. 25, 2007).  Storey argues that, as the prevailing party on appeal, she is entitled to reasonable  attorneys’  fees  pursuant  to  section  21­1­605(5).  First,  we  point  out  that  Storey  is  not  “entitled” to these fees because the decision to award these fees is discretionary.  Second,  we are not authorized to issue attorneys’ fees in this case.  Section 21­1­605(5) clearly sets  forth that a court in rendering judgment under the Arkansas Whistle­Blower Act may order  the  public  employer  to  pay  reasonable  attorneys’  fees.  This  case  came  before  us  on  an  appeal from the circuit court’s postjudgment order finding that the judgments awarded in  Storey’s whistle­blower cause of action would not be deemed satisfied until the additional  monies withheld as taxes, plus interest, were paid by Appellants.  While the postjudgment ­2­  07­525  order appealed from was related to judgments entered pursuant to the Arkansas Whistle­  Blower Act, our judgment on appeal was not rendered under this act.  Rather, it was decided  based  primarily  upon  federal  and  state  income  tax  law.  As  such,  section  21­1­605  is  inapplicable and attorneys’ fees are not warranted.  Costs on appeal granted; attorneys’ fees denied. ­3­  07­525 

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