Kenneth Edwards, Jr. and the Estate of Kenneth Edwards, Sr. v. Richard Nelson, M.D., Radiologists, P.A., Thomas Kelly, M.D., St. Edward Mercy Medical Center, and Cooper Clinic, P.A.

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­48  KENNETH  EDWARDS,  JR.  AND  THE  ESTATE OF KENNETH EDWARDS, SR.,  APPELLANTS,  VS.  Opinion Delivered  February 7, 2008  APPEAL  FROM  THE  SEBASTIAN  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. CV­2004­271­G,  HON. J. MICHAEL FITZHUGH, JUDGE,  R I C H A R D   N E L S O N ,   M . D . ,  RADIOLOGISTS, P.A., THOMAS KELLY,  M.D., ST. EDWARD MERCY MEDICAL  CENTER, AND COOPER CLINIC, P.A.,  REVERSED AND REMANDED.  APPELLEES,  JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice  This  appeal  arises  from  an  order  of  the  Sebastian  County  Circuit  Court  granting  summary judgment in favor of Appellees Richard Nelson, M.D.; Radiologists, P.A.; Thomas  Kelly,  M.D.;  Cooper  Clinic,  P.A.  (“Cooper”);  and  St.  Edward  Mercy  Medical  Center  (“Mercy”).  We reverse and remand.  Kenneth Edwards, Sr. died after a lengthy hospitalization at Mercy on April 4, 2003.  On  November  10,  2003,  Kenneth  Edwards,  Jr.  (“Edwards”)  was  appointed  as  the  administrator of his father’s estate in Sebastian County Circuit Court, Probate Division, case  1  number PR­2003­101­G.  In his capacity as administrator of the estate, Edwards filed a 1  We note that the probate order is not in the record on appeal.  wrongful­death  action  against  the  appellees  in  Sebastian  County  Circuit  Court,  Civil  Division, case number CV­2004­271­G(V), claiming that their negligence caused his father’s  death.  An amended complaint was filed on November 24, 2004.  Appellees moved separately for summary judgment on July 27, 2006, July 28, 2006,  and August 1, 2006, on the grounds that Edwards was not qualified to serve as administrator  because he was a convicted felon.  Edwards responded, arguing that he was not a convicted  felon as of the date that he was appointed administrator because his guilty plea was taken  under Act 346, which was codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16­93­303 (Repl. 2006), and that  pursuant to the Act, there was never an adjudication or judgment of guilt entered.  Appellees  filed separate responses, denying that Edwards was sentenced pursuant to Act 346 because  “[t]he box to the right of Act 346 was not checked in the judgment and commitment order  entered . . . on August 20, 1996.”  On September 21, 2006, the circuit court held a hearing on the summary­judgment  motion, and on October 4, 2006, the circuit court entered an order of dismissal in favor of  the appellees.  In the order, the court found that Edwards was a convicted felon at the time  of his appointment as the personal representative of his father’s estate, and that in accordance  with the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 28­48­101(b)(3) (Repl. 2004), he was not qualified  to serve in that capacity.  The court based its finding on the Washington County Circuit  Court’s August 20, 1996 judgment and commitment order, which reflected that Edwards was  convicted  of  two  felony  offenses  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­4­ ­2­  301(d)(1) (Repl. 2006). In dismissing the wrongful­death action pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  §  16­62­102  (Repl.  2005),  the  circuit  court  declared  the  order  appointing  Edwards  as  administrator  to  be  void  and  ruled  that  the  wrongful­death  claims  were  barred  by  the  applicable statute of limitations.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 16­114­203 (Repl. 2006).  On October 5, 2006, Edwards filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit  court denied.  Edwards then filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the October 6, 2006,  and October 17, 2006 orders.  On December 19, 2007, we accepted certification from the  Arkansas Court of Appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1­2(b)(1)  (2007), as this case presents an issue of first impression.  Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note that the court of appeals certified  the  following  question  for  consideration:  whether  the  circuit  court’s  order  invalidating  Edwards’s appointment as a personal representative was an impermissible collateral attack  on the probate order appointing him.  Neither the appellants nor the appellees, however, have  raised the collateral­attack issue in their briefs.  Yet, for the reasons outlined below, we sua  sponte must raise a threshold jurisdictional matter: the issue of conflicts among circuit courts  exercising concurrent jurisdiction.  Under  Amendment  80  to  the  Arkansas  Constitution,  this  court  holds  general  superintending control over all courts of this state.  Harrison v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___  S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 15, 2007).  Thus, this court’s general superintending control of circuit  courts granted under Amendment 80 may be exercised under its original jurisdiction to direct ­3­  one of two circuit courts possessing subject­matter jurisdiction to exercise jurisdiction in the  disposition of one claim.  We cite with approval the language in Smith v. McCracken, 96  Ark. App. 270, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006), where the court of appeals explained:  Amendment  80  merged  in  Arkansas  what  were  once  chancery  and  circuit courts into circuit courts, so that any circuit court would thereafter have  jurisdiction  “over  all  matters  previously  cognizable  by  Circuit,  Chancery,  Probate, and Juvenile Courts.” See Amend. 80 § 19(B)(1). Amendment 80 §  6(A) provides that circuit courts are established as the trial courts of original  jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to the  Arkansas  Constitution.  Section  6(B)  of  this  same  amendment  allows  the  division of the circuit court into subject­matter divisions and provides that any  judge within the circuit may sit in any division.  In other words, a circuit court may now exercise any act of jurisdiction that either a court of  law or equity could have exercised prior to Amendment 80, and further, the designation of  an action as a specific type of action does not prevent a circuit court from hearing any matter  within the court’s jurisdiction that is properly raised to the court.  See First Nat’l Bank of  Dewitt v. Cruthis, 360 Ark. 528, 203 S.W.3d 88 (2005); Amend. 80, § 19(B)(1).  While Amendment 80 clearly converted chancery, probate, and juvenile courts into  circuit courts with concurrent jurisdiction, it did not speak to the issue of conflicts among  courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction.  To resolve that issue, we look to our case law.  In  Askew v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 225 Ark. 68, 279 S.W.2d 557 (1955), we stated:  It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction  acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of a case, its authority continues,  subject  only  to  the  appellate  authority,  until  the  matter  is  finally  and  completely disposed of, and that no court of coordinate authority is at liberty  to interfere with its action. ­4­  Id. at 71­72, 279 S.W.2d at 560 (citation omitted).  Without such a principle, courts with  concurrent jurisdiction could bog in the mire of endlessly overruling each other.  We alluded  to such a practice in Askew:  The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the  laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial  comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but  is  enforced  to  prevent  unseemly,  expensive,  and  dangerous  conflicts  of  jurisdiction and of process.  If interference may come from one side, it may  from the other also, and what is begun may be reciprocated indefinitely.  Id. at 72, 279 S.W.2d at 560 (citation omitted).  Likewise, our court reiterated the governing  jurisdictional principle:  Where two actions between the same parties on the same subject, and  to  test  the  same  rights,  are  brought  in  different  courts  having  concurrent  jurisdiction,  the  court  which  first  acquires  jurisdiction,  its  power  being  adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and  may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate power is at  liberty to interfere with its action.  This rule rests on comity and the necessity  of avoiding conflict in the execution of judgments by independent courts, and  is a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to perpetual  collision and be productive of most calamitous results.  Id. at 72­73, 279 S.W.2d at 560­61 (citation omitted).  See also Patterson v. Isom, 338 Ark.  234, 239­40, 992 S.W.2d 792, 795 (1999).  The present case is similar to Helena Regional Medical Center v. Wilson, 362 Ark.  117, 207 S.W.3d 541 (2005).  In Wilson, Trina Wilson was appointed by the probate court  as the administratrix of her daughter’s estate.  Later, in her capacity as administratrix, she  filed  a  malpractice  action  against  the  hospital  and  doctors,  who  then  proceeded  to  file  motions to intervene in the probate case.  In support thereof, the medical providers argued ­5­  that Wilson was not legally competent to serve as administratrix under the Arkansas Probate  Code, Ark. Code Ann. § 28­48­101 (Repl. 2004), because she had previously admitted to a  felony conviction.  The circuit court ruled that the medical providers were not interested  parties as defined by the Arkansas Probate Code, Ark. Code Ann. § 28­1­102(11) (Repl.  2004),  and  therefore  lacked  standing  to  question  the  issuance  of  the  court’s  order.    We  reversed  and  remanded,  holding  that,  under  Ark.  R.  Civ.  P.  24,  the  medical  providers  properly filed motions to intervene, and the circuit court failed to undertake any analysis  under Rule 24. We reversed and remanded for the circuit court to address the merits of the  requested intervention.  Id.  Here, the appellees challenged the validity of Edwards’s appointment as personal  representative in the wrongful­death action pending in one division of circuit court.  That  division of circuit court, however, was not the first court to acquire jurisdiction over the  probate matter.  Thus, it had no original jurisdiction to decide the validity of an appointment  order,  which  was  entered  by  the  circuit  court  that  acquired  jurisdiction  over  the  administration of the decedent’s estate, “to the exclusion of any other court.”  Patterson, 338  Ark. at 241, 992 S.W.2d at 796.  In sum, we conclude that the civil division of circuit court  usurped the authority of the probate division of circuit court by its ruling that Edwards’s  appointment as personal representative of his father’s estate was void.  Accordingly, we  reverse the circuit court’s summary­judgment order of dismissal, and we remand for further  proceedings in accordance with this opinion. ­6­  Reversed and remanded. ­7­ 

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