Richard Dickinson, III v. State of Arkansas

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­355  RICHARD DICKINSON, III,  APPELLANT;  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS,  Opinion Delivered JANUARY 10, 2008  APPEAL FROM  THE  DREW  COUNTY  CIRCUIT  COURT,  FIFTH  DIVISION;  NO. PR­85­71;  HON. TERESA FRENCH, JUDGE;  APPELLEE;  APPEAL DISMISSED.  DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice  The instant case is a no­merit appeal from a temporary civil­commitment order filed  by counsel for Appellant Richard Dickinson, III, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.  738 (1967).  The appeal was certified to this court by the Arkansas Court of Appeals for a  determination  of  whether  the  Anders  procedure  is  applicable  in  the  context  of  a  civil­  commitment order; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1­2(b)(1) and (5).  Because we hold that the order committing Dickinson for seven days is moot, we dismiss the  instant appeal.  On January 8, 2007, Gloria Dickinson, Dickinson’s mother, filed a petition in circuit  court, alleging that her son was addicted to drugs and needed to be committed to a treatment  facility.  According to the petition, Dickinson believed people were trying to kill him, had  a gun in his possession, and had checked himself into jail.  The petition further stated that  Dickinson  admitted  to  his  mother  that  he  used  crystal  methamphetamine.    Following  a preliminary hearing, an order for immediate detention for seventy­two hours was issued,  1  pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 20­47­210 (Repl. 2001).  In accordance with the procedures set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 20­47­209 (Repl.  2001), a seven­day commitment hearing was held on January 11, 2007.  Gloria testified at  the hearing that her son was paranoid and felt that there were people trying to kill him.  He  also believed that there were people in his attic who were putting poison in his vent.  As a  result, Dickinson covered his vent with duct tape.  At one point, he also believed that people  put a bomb in his room, so he tore apart his room’s sheetrock.  Gloria also testified that she  came home to find Dickinson on the roof with a gun and that after he came down from the  roof, he went into the backyard to find the “killers.”  Finally, Gloria stated that her son was  hospitalized  for  mental  problems  in  1985  and  was  subsequently  diagnosed  with  a  drug­  induced psychosis.  Dana  Williams,  a  therapist  with  Delta  Counseling,  testified  that  she  evaluated  Dickinson during his temporary detention to determine  whether he had a mental illness.  According to Williams, Dickinson exhibited signs of paranoia, showing her a list of people  who were after him, referring to the Da Vinci Code and the end of the world, and stating that  he was selling marijuana to the sheriff for money to help his family.  After determining there  was psychosis present, Williams diagnosed Dickinson as suffering from a psychotic disorder,  not otherwise specified.  She also recommended that he be hospitalized for a period of seven 1  No appeal was taken from this order.  ­2­  07­355  days so that he could be evaluated to determine whether he needed treatment.  A copy of  Williams’s report was introduced into evidence at the hearing.  Dickinson also testified at the hearing, stating that he did believe people were out to  get him and that he heard people in his attic.  He also stated that he believed himself to be  Jesus Christ and offered into evidence, over the objection of his counsel, several pages of  handwritten documents he claimed proved him to be Jesus.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled from the bench that Dickinson  was very paranoid and further evaluation was necessary.  The circuit court subsequently  entered a written order, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 20­47­207 (Supp. 2005), finding that  there was probable cause to believe that Dickinson suffered from a mental illness, disease,  or disorder that caused him to pose a clear and present danger to himself or others.  The  order further provided that Dickinson was to be involuntarily admitted to the Arkansas State  Hospital or other appropriate facility for a period of seven days so that an evaluation could  be performed to determine whether treatment for a mental illness was appropriate.  Counsel for Dickinson filed a notice of appeal from the January 11 commitment order  2  on  January  29,  2007.  He  then  simultaneously  filed  a  motion  seeking  to  be  relieved  as  counsel for Dickinson and a no­merit brief, utilizing the Anders procedures promulgated by  this court in Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4­3(j)  for  the withdrawal of counsel “for a defendant in a 2  Prior to counsel’s filing of the notice of appeal, the circuit court held a hearing on January 17, 2007,  pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 20­47­214 (Repl. 2001), to determine whether Dickinson needed to be held for  an additional period of forty­five days for purposes of treatment.  A written order involuntarily admitting  Dickinson to an appropriate treatment facility was filed of record on February 5, 2007.  No notice of appeal  was ever filed from the February 5 order.  ­3­  07­355  criminal or a juvenile delinquency case.”  Dickinson was given thirty days to file a pro se  response to the no­merit brief but failed to do so.  The State then submitted a letter to this  court’s  clerk  indicating  that  it  would  not  file  a  responsive  brief,  because  there  was  no  pleading to which it could respond.  The State also called into question counsel’s authority  to apply the Anders procedures to an appeal from a civil­commitment order.  As  previously  stated,  we  accepted  certification  of  this  case  in  order  to  determine  whether the Anders procedures are applicable in this case.  As a threshold matter, however,  we must first determine whether the appeal that is before us is moot.  As a general rule, the  appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot.  Kinchen v. Wilkins, 367  Ark. 71, 238 S.W.3d 94 (2006).  To do so would be to render advisory opinions and this we  will not do.  Id.  A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical  legal effect upon a then­existing legal controversy.  Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2007).  In  other  words,  a  moot  case  presents  no  justiciable  issue  for  determination by the court.  Id.; Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895  S.W.2d 535 (1995). Furthermore, this court has held that courts do not sit for the purpose of  determining  speculative  and  abstract  questions  of  law  or  laying  down  rules  for  future  conduct.  Tsann Kuen Enters. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003).  This court has recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, one of which  involves issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review.  See, e.g., Cotten v. Fooks,  346 Ark. 130, 55 S.W.3d 290 (2001).  The other mootness exception concerns issues that  raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future ­4­  07­355  litigation.  Id.  We hold that the instant appeal does not fall within either of the exceptions  to the mootness doctrine.  First, the issue presented here is whether the circuit court erred in entering the seven­  3  day involuntary commitment order.  This is not an issue that is capable of repetition yet  evading review.  Here, we have a notice of appeal from a seven­day commitment order filed  after the court held a forty­five day hearing and committed Dickinson for treatment.  There  was no appeal of the subsequent forty­five day commitment order, and the forty­five days  in  which  Dickinson  was  to  be  treated  have  passed.    Moreover,  the  temporary  order  committing Dickinson for seventy­two hours was also never appealed.  Based on the record  before us, no further action was taken by the circuit court after the passage of those forty­five  days. Under these facts, we cannot say that this case is capable of repetition yet evading  review.  Second, while the issue of whether Anders procedures should be utilized in appeals  from  commitment  orders  may  at  some  point  raise  considerations  of  substantial  public  interest, the posture of the present appeal does not lend itself to such a conclusion.  Even if  we assume that counsel filed the no­merit brief from the seven­day order because his client  instructed him to appeal that order, Dickinson never filed any response to the no­merit brief, 3  Even  though  this  court  accepted  certification  of  this  case  on  the  issue  of  whether  the  Anders  procedures should be extended to appeals from civil­commitment orders, we are precluded from addressing that  specific issue on appeal.  It is a well­settled principle of appellate law that this court will not consider an  argument unless it has been properly developed. Hanlin v. State, 356 Ark. 516, 157 S.W.3d 181 (2004).  Likewise, we do not make a party’s argument for him or her.  Id.  In the instant case, no party raises the issue  of whether the Anders procedure is applicable to this appeal.  Moreover, we do not have the benefit of a brief  from the State addressing such an issue.  ­5­  07­355  even though he was given thirty days in which to file a pro se brief.  Because no pro se brief  was ever filed, the State had no pleading to which it could respond.  Thus, the procedural  posture of this case is that counsel for Dickinson has assumed that Anders applies and seeks  4  to be relieved on the basis that his client has no meritorious basis for an appeal.  As a result,  the  issue  of  whether  the  Anders  procedures  should  be  extended  to  situations  involving  appeals from civil­commitment orders has not been properly addressed to this court by any  party.  Thus, the case as it is now before us does not present an issue of substantial public  interest.  Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal as moot.  The motion to be relieved as  counsel is also moot.  Appeal dismissed.  BROWN and IMBER, JJ., dissent.  IMBER, J., dissenting.  I respectfully, but strongly, disagree with the majority opinion.  In dismissing the instant appeal as moot, the majority refuses to address an important issue:  whether  the  right  to  counsel  of  persons  sought  to  be  involuntarily  committed  should  be  protected  by  the  Anders  procedures.  Under  our  prior  case  law,  the  instant  appeal  fits  squarely into both recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine; thus, this case should be  decided on its merits. 4  Additionally troubling is the fact that there is no order in the record before us finding Dickinson  indigent or appointing counsel to represent him.  The only indication that counsel was in fact appointed and  not retained is counsel’s statement in his motion to be relieved as counsel that he was appointed to represent  Dickinson at the seven­day commitment hearing.  ­6­  07­355  We have stated that the choice of mootness is ours to make.  Owens v. Taylor, 299  Ark. 373, 772 S.W.2d 596 (1989).  Where considerations of public interest or prevention of  future litigation are present, we may elect to settle an issue, even though moot.  Id.  We have  been faced many times with the question of whether to review a case in spite of the fact that  the appellant can be afforded no relief based on our decision.  In those situations, we have  faithfully applied the two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, at least until the majority’s  opinion today.  For example, we have reviewed expired temporary guardianships on the basis that  such orders are capable of repetition yet evade review.  See Von Luce v. Rankin, 267 Ark.  34, 588 S.W.2d 445 (1979).  We cited as our rationale the likelihood of such incidents being  repeated and the unlikelihood that a decision can be reached on appeal before a temporary  guardianship is terminated.  Id.  We have furthermore chosen to review a case in which an  elected official challenged his removal from office due to his felony convictions, despite the  fact that not only had his criminal appeal run its course, but he had also been defeated in a  subsequent election.  See Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 570, 781 S.W.2d 14 (1989).  We held  that the appeal fell under both mootness exceptions and stated that “when the case involves  the public interest, or tends to become moot before litigation can run its course, or a decision  might avert future litigation, we have, with some regularity, refused to permit mootness to  become the determinant.”  Id. at 572, 781 S.W.2d at 15.  Even  more  troubling  than  the  majority’s  refusal  to  apply  our  general  mootness  exceptions to the present case is the fact that we have applied mootness exceptions several ­7­  07­355  times to appeals from temporary civil­commitment orders like the one at issue here.  The  majority chooses to ignore those decisions.  Our justification was set forth in an appeal from  an expired forty­five­day commitment order:  This case “is moot in the sense that we cannot now afford appellant any relief,  but it is not moot in the sense that it is important to decide a practical question  of great public interest.”  As appellant points out, the involuntary commitment  statutes provide for only short term involuntary commitment such that most  persons committed under these statutes will have been released before their  appeals can be decided.  Whether a person can be held involuntarily when the  petition for involuntary commitment is not filed within the time provided in  the statute is a practical question of great public interest.  For that reason, we  address appellant’s substantive argument.  Campbell  v.  State,  311  Ark.  641,  643­644,  846  S.W.2d  639,  640­641  (1993)  (internal  citations omitted) (quoting Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 570, 572, 781 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1989)).  This rationale was cited in another appeal from an expired forty­five­day commitment order,  where we further noted, “Persons committed under a forty­five­day civil commitment order  would never be able to appeal those orders because they will likely have been released from  the order before their appeals can reach this court.”  Chatman v. State, 336 Ark. 323, 326,  985 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1999).  We also applied the exceptions in Buchte v. State, 337 Ark.  591, 990 S.W.2d 539 (1999), another appeal from an expired forty­five­day commitment  order.    I  know  of  only  one  case  in  which  this  court  has  declined  to  apply  the  mootness  exceptions to a temporary civil­commitment order, but we did so because the issues were not  preserved for appellate review.  Smedley v. Smedley, 319 Ark. 421, 892 S.W.2d 273 (1995).  The majority offers no persuasive reasoning for declining to regard this case law as  controlling or for refusing to apply the well­settled exceptions to the instant appeal.  With ­8­  07­355  regard to the exception for issues that are capable of repetition but evade review, the majority  seems to say that the exception is inapplicable because Dickinson failed to appeal both the  seventy­two­hour commitment order and the forty­five­day commitment order.  In response,  I point to the cases cited above that have permitted appeals of forty­five­day commitment  orders  and  note  that  the  rationale  applies  even  more  fittingly  to  appeals  of  seven­day  commitment orders.  If an appellant cannot pursue an appeal of a forty­five­day commitment  order because he or she will be released from the order by the time an appeal is heard, then  he or she surely cannot appeal a seven­day commitment order.  Thus, the issue will always  evade review.  Moreover, the issue presented here – whether an attorney who believes an  appeal from a civil­commitment order would be without merit should be able to rely on the  Anders procedures – is capable of repetition in future cases.  The requirement that the issue  be capable of repetition does not insist on the potential for repetition in the same case; rather,  it insists on the potential for repetition in similar  future  cases.  See Von Luce v. Rankin,  supra.  The majority declines to apply the exception to issues that are of substantial public  interest, noting that Dickinson failed to file a pro se brief and that the State had no pleading  to which it could respond.  I fail to see how the procedural posture of this appeal makes the  issue presented any less important.  The distinction articulated by the majority merely seems  to be a means to avoid a decision on the question of whether the Anders procedures should  apply to civil­commitment proceedings. The United States Supreme Court decided to require  no­merit  briefs  in  an  attempt  to  “assure  penniless  defendants  the  same  rights  and ­9­  07­355  opportunities on appeal – as nearly as is practicable – as are enjoyed by those persons who  are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel.”  Anders  v.  California,  386  U.S.  738,  745  (1967).    This  goal,  in  the  context  of  involuntary  commitments, is surely one of substantial public interest.  As  for  the  majority’s  contention  that  the  issue  of  the  applicability  of  the  Anders  procedures has not been properly developed, I point out that this court did not hesitate to  address  the  issue  in  the  context  of  a  similar  situation,  in  Linker­Flores  v.  Ark.  Dep’t  of  Human Servs., 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004).  In Linker­Flores, we were faced with  the question of whether the Anders procedures should be applied to counsel for indigent  parents in termination­of­parental­rights appeals.  Id.  However, we did not come to address  the  issue  as  a  result  of  it  being raised  by  the  parties.  Instead,  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted an unaccompanied motion to be relieved as counsel on the basis that she could  find no meritorious grounds for appeal.  See Linker­Flores v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,  356 Ark. 369, 149 S.W.3d 884 (2004) (per curiam).  This court denied the motion because  the appellant was entitled to representation on appeal and, on our own motion, ordered the  parties to brief the issue of whether counsel representing a parent in a termination proceeding  should be required to file a no­merit brief comparable to that required under Anders where  there appears to be no meritorious ground for reversal.  Id.  In the instant case, counsel for  the appellant has submitted a motion to be relieved as counsel, in addition to a no­merit brief.  Whether we choose to proceed on our own or require the parties to brief the issue of Anders ­10­  07­355  applicability, we should decide this case on its merits.  The fact that the parties have not yet  argued the issue to this court is not dispositive.  Finally, I underline the point that the United States Supreme Court has characterized  involuntary commitment as a “massive curtailment of liberty,” Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.  504, 509 (1972), for which due process protection is required.  See Addington v. Texas, 441  U.S. 418 (1979).  To hold that the instant appeal and other procedurally similar cases are  moot  would  obliterate  the  right  to  appeal,  and  to  suggest  that  the  statutory  procedure  providing  for  a  subsequent,  forty­five­day  commitment  somehow  inoculates  restrained  persons from any harm imposed by the seven­day commitment would be to deny due process  protection.  A restraint on liberty is no less offensive or harmful simply because it lasts only  for seven days.  The seven­day commitment order is appealable by statute.  Ark. Code Ann. § 20­47­  217  (Repl.  2001).    Yet,  an  appeal  cannot  possibly  be  resolved  within  seven  days’  time.  Thus, the majority’s opinion completely eliminates the statutorily­guaranteed right to an  appeal.  Because the issues presented in an appeal from a seven­day commitment order are  capable of repetition but evade review, we should hear such appeals pursuant to our well­  settled exception to the mootness doctrine.  Furthermore, the instant appeal presents an issue  of  substantial  public  interest  –  whether  the  right  to  counsel  of  persons  sought  to  be  involuntarily committed should be protected by the Anders procedures. For the above­stated  reasons, I firmly believe that the majority has erred in dismissing this appeal as moot when  the case should be decided on its merits.  I respectfully dissent. ­11­  07­355  BROWN, J., joins this dissent. ­12­  07­355 

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