Cody Oldham v. David and Paula Morgan

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No. 07­315  CODY OLDHAM  Opinion Delivered January 17, 2008  APPELLANT,  VS.  DAVID AND PAULA MORGAN  APPELLEES,  APPEAL FROM CRAIGHEAD  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,  NO. DR­2004­0693,  HON. PAMELA BENITA  HONEYCUTT, JUDGE  REVERSED AND DISMISSED.  JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice  This appeal arises from the February 21, 2007, order of the Craighead County Circuit  Court granting grandparent visitation to Appellees David and Paula Morgan (“the Morgans”).  We reverse the circuit court’s order of grandparent visitation because the Morgans failed to  rebut the statutory presumption that a custodian’s decision denying or limiting visitation to  the petitioner is in the best interest of the child.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 9­13­103 (Supp.  2005).  Jaley Oldham was born on April 24, 2003, to Felicia Morgan and Appellant Cody  Oldham.  Felicia  and  Jaley  were  living  with  Appellant  until  January  2006  when  Felicia  moved to Missouri to take a better job.  On July 25, 2006, the Craighead County Circuit  Court established joint custody, awarding primary custody of Jaley to Felicia and awarding  visitation  to  Appellant.  Felicia  was  killed  in  a  car  accident  on  November  17,  2006.  Thereafter,  Jaley  began  living  with  Appellant.    On  December  1,  2006,  the  circuit  court  granted  full  custody  of  Jaley  to  Appellant.    On  December  20,  2006,  Jaley’s  maternal grandparents, the Morgans, filed a petition for grandparent visitation asking the circuit court  to establish specific visitation rights, specifically asking for the Revised Minimum Chancery  Court Visitation Schedule. In the petition, the Morgans asserted that granting them visitation  was in the best interest of Jaley.  On February 21, 2007, the circuit court found that, while Appellant was a fit parent,  it was in the best interest of Jaley to grant the Morgans grandparent­visitation rights.  The  circuit  court  awarded  the  Morgans  visitation  consisting  of  every  other  weekend  from  February 9, 2007, to July 2007.  The circuit court awarded them visitation on the second  weekend  of  every  month  beginning  in  August  2007.    The  circuit  court’s  order  further  provided that the Morgans were entitled to holiday visitation in accordance with the Revised  Circuit Court Visitation Schedule and summer visitation.  Appellant now brings this appeal.  For his sole point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in granting  the  Morgans  grandparent  visitation.    Specifically,  Appellant  asserts  that,  pursuant  to  Arkansas case law, a fit parent has a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to  be  free  from  state  intrusion  on  his  or  her  parenting  of  a  minor  child.    Appellant  further  contends that he allowed the Morgans to visit with Jaley, and that the Morgans only began  these proceedings because they wanted a structured schedule for the future.  The Morgans respond, arguing that the circuit court was correct in granting  them  visitation pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9­13­103 because they have had frequent contact  with Jaley throughout her life, seeing the child three to four times per week prior to her  mother’s move to Missouri, and at least one visit per month thereafter.  The Morgans further ­2­  assert that their visitation with Jaley is in the best interest of the child, especially given her  young age and the recent death of her mother.  As a rule, when the setting of visitation is at issue, we will not reverse the court absent  an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 248 Ark. 195, 451 S.W.2d 214 (1970).  Abuse of  discretion  is  discretion  applied  thoughtlessly,  without  due  consideration,  or  improvidently.  Carlew  v.  Wright,  356  Ark.  208,  148  S.W.3d 237  (2004).  However,  a  circuit court’s conclusion of law is given no deference on appeal. Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark.  153, 205 S.W.3d 767 (2005).  Appellant relies on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Linder v. Linder,  348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002), for his assertion that the circuit court erred in  interfering with his decisions concerning Jaley’s visitation with the Morgans. In Troxel,  a plurality  of  the United States Supreme Court held that the State of Washington’s  grandparent­visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied in that case due in large  part to its “breathtakingly broad” scope allowing “any person” to petition for visitation  “at any time.”  530 U.S. at 67.  The central problem with that statute, according to the  plurality, was that it failed to accord a fit parent’s decision “any presumption of validity  or weight whatsoever.”  Id.  The Court recognized the presumption that a fit parent acts  in the best interest of his or her child.  530 U.S. at 68.  In light of this presumption, the  court  held  that  a  court  that  reviews  a  fit  parent’s  decision  regarding  grandparent  visitation “must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination,” ­3­  but did not elaborate on the nature or extent of that “weight.”  530 U.S. at 70.  See also  Robinson v. Ford­Robinson, 362 Ark. 232, 208 S.W.3d 140 (2005).  In Linder, we reviewed the constitutionality of Arkansas’s grandparent­visitation  statute in light of the holding in Troxel, and held that it was unconstitutional as applied.  Like the statute reviewed in Troxel, our statute failed to give any presumptive or special  weight to a parent’s decision that grandparent visitation was not in the best interest of  the  child.  Further,  our  statute  required  that  the  court  issue  written  findings  when  denying visitation, but not when granting visitation, implicitly placing the burden of  proof on the  parent,  in  direct  contravention  of Troxel.  The  trial  court  had  already  determined  that  the  mother  in  Linder  was  a  fit  parent  for  all  purposes  except  determining visitation. Applying a strict­scrutiny standard, we held that the Fourteenth  Amendment right of due process attached and special weight should have been accorded  to the mother’s decision.  However, we declined to rewrite our Grandparent Visitation  Act (GPVA), stating that such a task was best left to the General Assembly.  The  Arkansas  General  Assembly  rewrote  the  GPVA,  adding  a  statutory  presumption that the parent’s decision to deny or limit visitation is in the best interest  of the child.  See Act 652 of 2003.  This revised statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 9­13­103,  provides:  (a) For purposes of this section:  (1) “Child” means a minor under the age  of  eighteen (18) of whom the ­4­  custodian has control and who is:  (A) The grandchild of the petitioner; or  (B) The great­grandchild of the petitioner;  (2) “Counseling” means individual counseling, group counseling, or other  intervention method;  (3) “Custodian” means the custodial parent of the child with the authority  to grant or deny grandparental visitation;  (4) “Mediation service” means any formal or informal mediation; and  (5) “Petitioner” means any individual who may petition for visitation rights  under this section.  (b) A grandparent or great­grandparent may petition a circuit court of this  state for reasonable visitation rights with respect to his or her grandchild  or  grandchildren or great­grandchild or great­grandchildren under this  section if:  (1)  The  marital  relationship  between  the  parents  of  the  child  has  been  severed   by death, divorce, or legal separation;  (2) The child is illegitimate and the petitioner is a maternal grandparent  of the illegitimate child; or  (3) The child is illegitimate, the petitioner is a paternal grandparent of the  illegitimate  child,  and  paternity  has  been  established  by  a  court  of  competent jurisdiction.  (c)(1)  There  is  a  rebuttable  presumption  that  a  custodian’s  decision  denying or limiting visitation to the petitioner is in the best interest of the  child.  (2)  To  rebut  the  presumption,  the  petitioner  must  prove  by  a  preponderance of the evidence the following:  (A) The petitioner has established a significant and viable relationship with  the child for whom he or she is requesting visitation; and  (B) Visitation with the petitioner is in the best interest of the child. ­5­  (d) To establish a significant and viable relationship with the child, the  petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following:  (1)(A) The child resided with the petitioner for at least six (6) consecutive  months with or without the current custodian present;  (B) The petitioner was the caregiver to the child on a regular basis for at  least six (6) consecutive months; or  (C) The petitioner had frequent or regular contact with the child for at  least twelve (12) consecutive months; or  (2) Any other facts that establish that the loss of the relationship between  the petitioner and the child is likely to harm the child.  (e) To establish that visitation with the petitioner is in the best interest of  the child, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the  following:  (1) The petitioner has the capacity to give the child love, affection, and  guidance;  (2) The loss of the relationship between the petitioner and the child is likely  to harm the child; and  (3) The petitioner is willing to cooperate with the custodian if visitation  with the child is allowed.  (f)(1) An order granting or denying visitation rights to grandparents and  great­grandparents shall be in writing and shall state any and all factors  considered by the court in its decision to grant or deny visitation under this  section.  Id.  This revised statute gives the parent’s decision presumptive or special weight in  deciding whether grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the child as required ­6­  by Troxel and Linder.  The statute also now requires the trial court to state its reasons  for denying or granting grandparent visitation.  Next, we must decide whether the grandparent visitation granted by the circuit  court in the present case is allowed under § 9­13­103.  According to § 9­13­103(b)(2),  there is a presumption that Appellant’s decision in denying or limiting visitation to the  Morgans  is  in  the  best  interest  of  Jaley.    In  order  to  rebut  this  presumption,  the  Morgans must prove that they have established a significant and viable relationship with  Jaley and that visitation with them is in Jaley’s best interests.  Pursuant to subsection  (d)(1)(C), the Morgans can establish a significant and viable relationship with Jaley by  proving  that  they  have  had  frequent  or  regular  contact  with  her  for  at  least  twelve  consecutive months.  Appellant does not dispute that the Morgans have a significant and  viable relationship with Jaley.  At the hearing, the Morgans testified that before Jaley  moved to Missouri, they saw her three or four times a week.  Jaley often spent the night  with  them  and  went  to  church  with  them  on  Sundays.    After  Jaley  and  her  mother  moved, the Morgans saw her at least once a month, and they spoke  with  her on the  phone at least every other day. Therefore, pursuant to § 9­13­103(d)(1)(C), the Morgans  do have a significant and viable relationship with Jaley.  In order to establish that grandparent visitation is in Jaley’s best interest, the  Morgans  must  prove  that  (1)  the  Morgans  have  the  capacity  to  give  the  child  love,  affection, and guidance; (2) the loss of the relationship between the Morgans and Jaley ­7­  is likely to harm Jaley; and (3) that the Morgans are willing to cooperate with Appellant  if visitation with Jaley is allowed.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­13­103(e).  As Justice O'Connor  noted in Troxel, grandparental visitation has no historic roots in the common law but  rather is a legislated creature of the late twentieth century. See Linder, supra (citing  Troxel,  530  U.S.  at  96­97  (plurality  opinion)).  Because  the  grandparent­visitation  statute  is  in  derogation  of  or  at  variance  with  the  common  law,  it  must  be  strictly  construed.  See Recinos v Zelk, 369 Ark. 7, __ S.W.3d __ (2007).  The  circuit  court  found  that  it  was  in  the  best  interest  of  Jaley  to  allow  grandparent visitation with the Morgans.  At the hearing the circuit court stated, “it’s  in the best interest of this child, considering her age, the circumstances of her mother’s  death, and the fact that during the last year or two of her life she was primarily with her  mother and grandparents.  I think it would be very stressful for her not to have some  structured visitation.”  While clearly focusing on Jaley, the circuit court never actually  made a finding that the loss of the relationship between Jaley and the Morgans would  likely result in harm to Jaley.  Even if the court had, the testimony at trial does not  support such a finding.  Mrs. Morgan testified at trial that she had seen Jayley seven  times from November  17, 2006 to January 29, 2007, including four overnight visits.  There was no evidence presented at trial that the relationship between the Morgans and  Jaley had been lost or would be lost.  Further, Mrs. Morgan testified at the hearing:  [A]t the moment, [Appellant] is very willing to work with me and ­8­  let me have [Jaley] as much as I want her.  But I do know that people get  remarried and it does affect that relationship.  I just want to know that in  five years time, if he should remarry, that I have a chance to still see her.  It is kind of more of a safeguard for the future.  Right now he has been  more than willing to let me have her when I need her and want to see her.  Here, no one disputes that Appellant was allowing the Morgans to see Jaley before the  filing of the petition for grandparent visitation.  According to Mrs. Morgan’s testimony  at the hearing, the petition was only filed to ensure that the Morgans would continue to  see Jaley in the future.  Therefore, the petition for grandparent visitation in this case  was premature.  Because the Morgans did not prove a loss of the relationship between them and  Jaley that would likely harm Jaley, they failed to establish that court­ordered visitation  was in Jaley’s best interest and therefore  failed to rebut the statutory presumption.  Thus, the circuit court abused its discretion in granting grandparent visitation to the  Morgans.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order for grandparent visitation.  Reversed and dismissed. ­9­ 

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