Cedar Chemical Company, Zurich American Insurance Company, and Crawford and Company v. Jimmy T. Knight

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­307  CEDAR CHEMICAL COMPANY, ZURICH  AMERICAN  INSURANCE  COMPANY,  AND CRAWFORD AND COMPANY,  APPELLANTS;  Opinion Delivered JANUARY 31, 2008  APPEAL  FROM  THE  ARKANSAS  W O R K E R S ’   C O M P E N S A T I O N  COMMISSION [NO. F108608]  VS.  JIMMY T. KNIGHT,  APPELLEE,  W O R K E R S ’   C O M P E N S A T I O N  COMMISSION AFFIRMED; ARKANSAS  COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED.  DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice  This  is  an  appeal  from  a  decision  of  the  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  awarding  disability  benefits  to  Appellee  Jimmy  T.  Knight.    Appellants  are  Knight’s former employer, Cedar Chemical Company, and the employer’s insurance carriers,  1  Zurich American Insurance Company and Crawford and Company.  On appeal, Appellants  argue that the Commission erred in awarding Appellee benefits as there was insufficient  evidence to establish that he suffered a compensable injury.  This case is now before us on  a petition for review, see Cedar Chemical Co. v. Knight, 99 Ark. App. 162, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2007),  thus,  our  jurisdiction  is  pursuant  to  Ark.  Sup.  Ct.  R.  2­4(c)(2).    We  affirm  the  decision of the Commission.  The record reveals that on July 1, 2001, Appellee, who was working a twelve­hour  shift, was descending a flight of stairs when he noticed pain in his left knee.  According to  Appellee, it was approximately 11:00 a.m. when he noticed the pain, although he could not 1  The Death and Permanent Disability Fund, while a party below, did not file a brief on appeal.  identify any specific incident that caused the pain.  Appellee, who had been employed with  Cedar for approximately five years at the time of this incident, was responsible for various  job duties involved in formulating and manufacturing certain chemical products.  These job  duties required Appellee to ascend and descend up to three flights of stairs throughout the  day.  After  first  noticing  the  pain,  Appellee  continued  with  his  job  duties  until  approximately 2:00 p.m., when he took a thirty­minute lunch break.  At the end of his break,  Appellee tried to stand up and realized he could not put much weight on his left leg. Appellee  then called his supervisor, Jimmy Vincent, and reported that he had hurt his knee, could not  walk on it, and asked if he could go home.  Vincent asked him if he could stay until the end  of his shift, and Appellee agreed.  The next day, Appellee notified his supervisor that he remained in pain and was going  to see his family physician.  An X­ray was taken of his knee, and the radiologist’s report  stated: “Features consistent with gout and/or osteoarthritis with evidence for calcification  ligamentous structures with other features as described which may or may not be related to  trauma.  History is pain.”  Appellee’s physician referred him to an orthopedist, Dr. John  Wilson.  An MRI of his knee was performed on July 3, 2001.  The resulting report revealed:  “Probable  complete  disruption  of  the  anterior  cruciate  ligament.    Probable  tear  and  maceration of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus.” On July 5, 2001, Dr. Wilson noted  in Appellee’s chart, “The MRI revealed a posterior horn tear of the medial meniscus as well  as an anterior cruciate tear.  Mr. Knight needs an arthroscopy.” ­2­  07­307  Because Appellee was unsure whether he wanted to have surgery, he sought a second  opinion from Dr. Frederick Azar.  Initially, Dr. Azar recommended that Appellee engage in  exercise  and  physical  therapy  to  ease  the  pain.  After  two  weeks,  however,  Dr.  Azar  recommended  that  Appellee  undergo  an  arthroscopy.  Appellee  underwent  a  left  knee  arthroscopy  performed  by  Dr.  Herbert  Hahn  on  October  17,  2001.    Subsequent  to  his  surgery, Appellee developed a postoperative sepsis of his left knee with staph aureus.  The  postoperative infection required Appellee to be hospitalized from October 25, 2001, until  November 19, 2001, and also required him to undergo two surgical debridements.  Appellee sought workers’ compensation benefits as a result of his injury.  A hearing  on the issue of the compensability of Appellee’s claim was held before an Administrative  Law Judge on January 7, 2005.  The ALJ entered a written order, finding that Appellee’s  injury was idiopathic in nature and, as a result, there was  insufficient evidence to prove  Appellee sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his  employment.  Appellee  appealed  the  ALJ’s  decision  to  the  full  Commission.  On  March 14, 2006, the Commission entered an order reversing the decision of the ALJ.  In so  doing,  the  Commission  found  that  Knight’s  injury  had  resulted  from  a  specific  incident  arising out of and in the course of his employment with Cedar.  Appellants  appealed  the  decision  of  the  Commission  to  the  Arkansas  Court  of  Appeals.  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the Commission, finding that there  was substantial evidence to support  the  Commission’s decision that Appellee suffered a  compensable  injury.  Appellants  sought  rehearing,  and  an  en  banc  panel  affirmed  in  a ­3­  07­307  substituted  opinion.  Appellants  then  petitioned  this  court  for  review.  When  we  grant  a  petition for review, we treat the appeal as if it were filed in this court originally.  Tucker v.  Roberts­McNutt, Inc., 342 Ark. 511, 29 S.W.3d 706 (2000).  We now turn to the merits of  the present appeal.  On appeal, Appellants argue that there was no substantial evidence to support the  2  Commission’s determination that Appellee’s injury was a work­related compensable injury.  Specifically, Appellants argue that the evidence demonstrated that Appellee could point to  no  specific  incident  that  could  have  caused  the  injury  and,  moreover,  that  the  medical  evidence pointed to degenerative changes in the knee prior to July 1.  Thus, according to  Appellants, the Commission’s decision that Appellee’s injury was compensable was arbitrary  and capricious, and should be reversed.  Appellee counters that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s  finding of a compensable injury, as the evidence demonstrated that he had no prior problem  with his knee when he began his shift on July 1 and that the problem occurred only after he  ascended and descended the stairs at work several times.  Moreover, Appellee argues that  where a claimant suffers an unexplained injury at work, it is generally compensable.  In reviewing decisions from the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable  inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings, and  we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Jivan v. Economy Inn & 2  Originally, Appellee claimed that  his  injury was  compensable as  a gradual­onset  injury, but  he  subsequently withdrew such a claim.  ­4­  07­307  Suites, 370 Ark. 414, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  Substantial evidence exists if reasonable  minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion.  Id.  The issue is not whether the appellate  court might have reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could  reach the result found by the Commission, the appellate court must affirm the decision.  Id.  Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their  testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission.  Patterson v. Ark. Dep’t of  Health, 343 Ark. 255, 33 S.W.3d 151 (2000). When there are contradictions in the evidence,  it is within the Commission’s province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the  true facts.  Id.  The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or  any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of  the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id.  Thus, we are foreclosed from determining  the  credibility  and  weight  to  be  accorded  to  each  witness’s  testimony.  Arbaugh  v.  AG  Processing, Inc., 360 Ark. 491, 202 S.W.3d 519 (2005).  A compensable injury is defined, in part, as an accidental injury “arising out of and  in  the  course  of  employment.”  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4)(A)(i)  (Repl.  2002).    A  compensable injury does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at  a time when employment services were not being  performed.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­  102(4)(B)(iii)  (Repl.  2002).  This  court  has  held  that  an  employee  is  performing  “employment services” when he or she “is doing something that is generally required by his  or her employer.”  Kimbell v. Association of Rehab Indus., 366 Ark. 297, 301, 235 S.W.3d  499, 503 (2006) (quoting Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68, 72, 225 S.W.3d ­5­  07­307  361, 365 (2006)).  We must determine whether the injury occurred “within the time and  space boundaries of the employment, when the employee [was] carrying out the employer’s  purpose or advancing the employer’s interest directly or indirectly.”  Id. at 301­302, 235  S.W.3d at  503 (quoting Wallace, 365 Ark. at 72, 225 S.W.3d at 365).  As the claimant,  Appellee  bears  the  burden  of  proving  a  compensable  injury  by  a  preponderance  of  the  credible evidence.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(E)(i) (Repl. 2002).  In the hearing before the ALJ, Appellee testified that he began working for Cedar in  1996, and that at the time of this incident, he worked in a unit responsible for making a  chemical used in Stam and Propanyl.  He further explained that his unit consisted of three  levels, with steps leading to each level.  Appellee explained that he performed various job  duties, and that on a normal day, he would travel from the ground floor to the third floor  anywhere between five to eight times while working a twelve­hour shift.  Appellee testified  that  in  the  middle  of  May  2001,  he  was  walking  up  some  steps  when  he  felt  his  knee  hyperextend and pop and also felt pain in his back.  He continued to work and later told his  supervisor there was no need to file an  accident report as he was not in pain.  Appellee  reported  no  further  problems  following  this  incident.    Then,  on  July  1,  2001,  Appellee  reported  to  work  for  his  twelve­hour  shift  that  began  at  7:00  a.m.    At  approximately  11:00 a.m., Appellee noticed pain in his knee as he was going down some stairs at work.  He  continued to work until approximately 2:00 p.m., when he took a thirty­minute lunch break.  At the end of the break, Appellee stated that he was unable to put much weight on his leg and ­6­  07­307  had to use a bicycle to steady himself.  He reported the pain to his supervisor, but finished  his shift.  Shirley Knight, Appellee’s wife, testified that when her husband left for work on  July 1 everything was normal, but when he returned that evening, he needed assistance to  ascend the steps at their back door.  In granting Appellee benefits, the Commission opined as follows:  In the present matter, the claimant credibly testified that he experienced  an onset of pain in his knee while coming down the steps of his assigned unit  some time around 11:00 a.m. Thereafter, the claimant’s pain got progressively  worse, as he could hardly stand or get up from his seat after taking his lunch  break.    A  subsequent  MRI  revealed  that  the  claimant  had  preexisting  degenerative disease and a torn medial meniscus in his left knee.  In a letter  dated  October  16,  2002,  Dr.  Hahn  opined  that  the  claimant’s  torn  medial  meniscus resulted from his recent work injury.  Considering Dr. Hahn’s expert opinion and in light of the claimant’s  credible  account  of  the  incident,  the  Full  Commission  finds  that  there  is  insufficient  evidence  to  support  a  finding  that  the  injury  suffered  by  the  claimant was personal in nature, as it was caused while descending the steps  of his unit.  We therefore find that the claimant’s knee injury was not personal  in  nature  nor  did  it  result  due  to  his  degenerative  disease  but  was  a  compensable specific­incident workplace injury, which arose out of and in the  course of his employment.  Based on our de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission  finds that the claimant proved that he sustained a compensable injury to his  left  knee  on  July  1,  2001,  which  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment with the respondent.  Therefore, we reverse the opinion of the  administrative law judge.  Notably, the Commission found Appellee’s testimony credible that he had an onset  of pain while working his shift on July 1.  As previously stated, the Commission is the sole  arbiter of credibility.  In light of the Commission’s credibility determination and reliance on ­7­  07­307  Dr. Hahn’s expert opinion regarding Appellee’s acute injury, we cannot say that reasonable  minds could not have reached the same conclusion as the Commission.  We disagree with Appellants’ claim that Crawford v. Single Source Transportation,  87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004), relied upon by the Commission and Appellee,  is distinguishable.  There, the claimant was injured when he stepped out of his cement truck,  down two steep steps, and onto an oil field.  As his foot reached the ground, the appellant’s  knee gave way or buckled, causing the appellant to fall to the ground and to feel pain in his  knee.  The appellant subsequently had surgery on his knee that revealed he had a tear of the  medial meniscus and osteoarthritis in his knee.  The Commission denied benefits, but on  appeal  the  court  of  appeals  held  that  the  appellant’s  injury  was  neither  idiopathic  nor  unexplained, but rather was a specific­incident injury.  In so holding, the court of appeals  noted  that  the  injury  was  not  simply  personal  in  nature  where  it  was  caused  while  he  attempted to exit his employer’s vehicle from an elevated position and such employment  conditions  contributed  to  his  accident.  Id.  The  court  of  appeals  further  noted  that  the  appellant’s  injury  was  not  unexplainable  because  his  testimony  fully  explained  the  circumstances surrounding his fall.  Id.  Just as in Crawford, Appellee gave a detailed account of his actions preceding the  onset of his pain.  Specifically, he testified that he had traveled probably two times to the  third floor and six or eight times to the second floor before 11:00 a.m.  This was not a case  where Appellee had to occasionally walk up or down some steps, as Appellants suggest.  We  simply cannot say that the Commission erred in determining the injury was not personal in ­8­  07­307  nature to Appellee.  An idiopathic injury is one whose cause is personal in nature, or peculiar  to the individual.  See Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996); Little  Rock Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415 (1997).  This  court has recognized that injuries sustained due to an unexplained cause are different from  injuries where the cause is idiopathic.  ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark.  63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998).  Where a claimant suffers an unexplained injury at work, it is  generally  compensable.  Pack,  60  Ark.  App.  82,  959  S.W.2d  415.  Simply  because  Appellee’s injury is unexplained does not render it noncompensable.  We also disagree with Appellants’ assertion that this case is analogous to Hapney v.  Rheem Manufacturing Co., 342 Ark. 11, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000).  In that case, this court  rejected a claimant’s contention that her neck injury was compensable as a specific­incident  injury  under  section  11­9­102(4)(A)(i).  In  rejecting  her  claim,  this  court  noted  that  the  claimant, in her deposition, did not know how she was injured nor could she recall anything  specific happening that caused the injury. In addition, this court pointed out that the claimant  never reported to her physician that her pain was associated with any particular, specific  incident.  Again, here, we have a case where Appellee described in detail his job duties and the  events surrounding the onset of his pain.  The Commission determined this testimony to be  credible. In addition, there was an expert opinion from Dr. Hahn that Appellee’s acute injury  was responsible for more than fifty percent of Appellee’s impairment. ­9­  07­307  Finally,  we  are  mindful  that  the  court  of  appeals  recently  addressed  the  issue  of  whether a claimant had proven that he suffered a compensable injury under section 11­9­  102(4)(A)(i) in Weaver v. Nabors Drilling USA, 98 Ark. App. 161, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  In Weaver, the claimant was “mixing mud” while at work when he started to feel his hands  “tingling” or “burning.”  A couple of days later, the claimant sought medical treatment.  An  MRI revealed mild disc herniation at C5­6 interspace and C6­7 interspace.  The claimant  sought compensation benefits for a specific­incident injury.  The Commission denied his  claim on the basis that he failed to present proof of a specific incident that caused the tingling  or burning in his hands.  In affirming the Commission, the court of appeals held:  While we may have reached a different conclusion if we tried the facts,  we must affirm the Commission’s decision if substantial evidence supports it,  and in this case it does.  Weaver failed to prove his case.  He only proved that  he had an injury and that he felt pain while at work – he failed to show that a  specific incident occurred at work.  He asks this court to infer that his injury  was caused by his employment – something we are not permitted to do.  Id. at 163­64, ___ S.W.3d at ___.  Weaver, however, is not applicable to the present case.  First, the procedural posture  of Weaver was completely different upon appellate review.  Here, we have a case where the  Commission, as the sole arbiter of credibility, determined Appellee’s testimony in favor of  a finding of compensability to be credible.  Also notable is the fact that Appellee’s testimony  regarding his job duties and the requirement that he ascend and descend multiple flights of  stairs repeatedly over the course of a twelve­hour shift was much more detailed and supports ­10­  07­307  a conclusion that his injuries were  compensable as a specific­incident workplace injury.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Commission.  Commission affirmed; court of appeals affirmed.  IMBER, J., dissents.  IMBER, J., dissenting. The majority’s decision that Knight suffered a specific­incident  compensable  injury  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  our  prior  case  law  on  the  subject.    By  concluding  that  Knight’s  onset  of  pain,  which  was  not  accompanied  by  an  identifiable  accident,  was  an  incident­specific  injury,  the  majority  ignores  the  statutory  distinction  between incident­specific injuries and gradual onset injuries.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­  102 (Repl. 2002).  Moreover, the majority’s futile attempt to distinguish our case law is not  persuasive.  Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.  Arkansas Code Annotated § 11­9­102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2002) defines a “compensable  injury” as,  An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body or  accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, including eyeglasses, contact lenses,  or hearing aides, arising out of and in the course of employment and which  requires  medical  services  or  results  in  disability  or  death.  An  injury  is  “accidental” only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by  time and place of occurrence.  Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in accordance with the plain language of the statutory provision,  this court and the court of appeals have concluded that an injury is “accidental” only if it is  caused by a specific incident of trauma.  See, e.g., Kimbell v. Assoc. Of Rehab Indus. & Bus.  Companion Prop. & Cas., 366 Ark. 297, 235 S.W.3d 499 (2006) (claimant fell from a porch ­11­  07­307  while talking to a client of the center); Swaim v. Wal­Mart Assoc., Inc., 91 Ark. App. 120,  208 S.W.3d 837 (2005) (claimant felt a pop in his foot while he was pulling a heavily loaded  pallet);  Crawford  v.  Single  Source  Transp.,  87  Ark.  App.  216,  189  S.W.3d  507  (2004)  (claimant  experienced  a  flexion  of  his  knee  while  he  was  descending  from  his  truck).  In  subsection  (ii)  of  section  11­9­102(4)(A),  the  Arkansas  General  Assembly  expressly  designates  as  compensable  certain  types  of  injuries  not  caused  by  a  specific  incident, or not identifiable by time and place of occurrence.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­  102(4)(A) (Repl. 2002).  Such gradual onset injuries are compensable only if the injury is  (a) caused by rapid repetitive motion, (b) a back or neck injury, or (c) hearing loss.  See Ark.  Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(A)(ii).  Again, there is no ambiguity in the statutory language.  The  only  injuries  that  have  been  defined  as  compensable  by  the  legislature  are  as  follows:  accidental injuries, gradual injuries of three specific types, mental illness, cardiovascular  disease, hernias, and adverse reactions experienced by certain employees to vaccinations for  smallpox.  See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4) (Repl. 2002).  While there may be  a  category  of  injury  which  has  not  been  included  in  the  statutory  definition  of  compensability, such as, a non­back, non­hearing­loss, non­repetitive­motion injury that is  not  caused  by  a  specific  incident  but  that  is  otherwise  identifiable  by  time  and  place  of  occurrence, the Commission and the courts are mandated to construe the provisions of the  Worker’s  Compensation  Act  strictly.    Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­704(c)(3)  (Repl.  2002).  Moreover, the legislature has expressly declared that: ­12­  07­307  [T]he  extent  to  which  any  physical  condition,  injury  or  disease  should  be  excluded from or added to coverage . . . shall be addressed by the General  Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers’  Compensation Commission, or the courts.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­1001 (Repl. 2002).  By construing the statute strictly it is clear that the legislature intended to differentiate  between accidental injuries, which involve a specific incident, and gradual onset injuries that  are compensable even though “not caused by a specific incident” or “not identifiable by time  and place of occurrence.”  See Ark. Code Ann. §11­9­102(4)(A)(ii)(b)&(c).  This distinction  was illustrated by our court’s decision in  Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing, 342 Ark. 11, 26  S.W.3d 777 (2000).  The claimant in that case was an assembly­line worker who suffered  from  a  herniated  disc  in  her  cervical  spine  that  she  claimed  was  an  incident­specific,  workplace  injury.  Id.  The  claimant’s  job  required  her  to  attach  metal  plates  to  air  conditioning units, and she testified that she had to bend her neck six times with each unit,  resulting in her bending almost 1,800 times during a shift.  Id.  The claimant alleged that  while she was performing her job duties, she began to feel pain in her neck and right arm,  but  she  was  able  to  complete  her  shift.  Id.  The  pain  progressively  worsened  and  the  claimant sought medical treatment. Id.  Although the claimant contended that her injury was  the result of a specific incident at work, she admitted that she did not know how she was  injured and she did not recall anything specific happening.  Id.  Accordingly, we held that  the claimant’s own words belied her argument that the injury  was  caused by a specific,  identifiable incident.  Id. ­13­  07­307  Likewise, in the recent case of Weaver v. Nabors Drilling USA, 98 Ark. App. 161,  ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2007),  the  Arkansas  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  a  denial  of  worker’s  compensation benefits when the claimant asserted that his spinal injury was linked to his  work.  Id.  In that case, the claimant began complaining of pain in his hands while he was  “mixing mud” at work but was unable to define a specific incident that caused his condition.  See id.  In doing so, the appellate court specifically rejected the claimant’s argument that  while  he could not prove a specific incident, his work was the only logical cause of his  injury.  See id.  Again, as in Hapney, the court concluded that the claimant had only proven  that  he  felt  pain  while  at  work  but  had  not  shown  evidence  of  a  specific  incident  that  3  occurred at work and resulted in his injury.  Id.  Despite the majority’s statement to the contrary, the instant case is indistinguishable  from Hapney and Weaver.  Here, Knight testified that he began feeling pain while he was  descending the stairs as part of his job duties.  He was able to continue working, but his pain  gradually  increased  until  he  felt  unable  to  work  and  sought  medical  attention.    Like  the  claimants in Hapney and Weaver, Knight admitted in his own testimony before the ALJ that  he did not know the cause of his injury, and he could not identify a specific incident that  resulted  in  his  injury.  Although,  as  the  majority  points  out,  Knight  gave  a  specific  description of his activities at the time he felt pain in his knee, namely he was walking up 3  The majority tries to distinguish Weaver by pointing out that the Commission denied benefits to the  claimant in Weaver, and, thus, the appellate court simply had to affirm the commission’s findings under our  deferential  standard  of  review.  While  the  Commission  may  be  insulated  to  a  certain  degree,  it  may  not  arbitrarily disregard evidence that supports the denial of a claim.  See Kimbell v. Assoc. of Rehab Indus. &  Bus. Companion Prop. & Cas., supra.  ­14­  07­307  and  down  stairs  at  work,  he  could  not  specify  an  incident  that  occurred  while  he  was  descending  the  stairs  that  day.  Specifically,  he  admitted  that  he  neither  tripped  or  fell  preceding the pain, nor did he feel a pop or flexion in his knee, or anything else identifiably  related to the onset of his pain.  The majority also relies upon our past holding that  unexplained injuries are compensable.  As a general principle, this proposition is correct, but  the majority’s reasoning in applying it to the instant case is flawed.  What the majority fails  to recognize is that the “unexplained” injuries in those cases had an unexplainable root cause,  but the claimants in those cases still experienced specific, identifiable incidents that occurred  at work and ultimately resulted in their injuries.  See, e.g., Kimbell v. Assoc. of Rehab Indus.  &  Bus.  Companion  Prop.  &  Cas.,  supra.  (claimant  fell  from  porch  due  to  unexplained  dizziness); Little Rock Convention and Visitors Center v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d  415 (1997)(claimant fell while caulking a walkway); Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 22  Ark. App. 21, 732 S.W.2d 496 (1987) (claimant fell and blacked out after stepping off a  forklift).  In the instant case, however, Knight did not experience an “unexplained” injury  that resulted from a specific incident; rather, he simply experienced an onset of pain while  at work and did not offer any proof that it was related to a specific incident.  Moreover, the majority contends that Crawford v. Single Source Transp., 87 Ark.  App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004), controls the outcome of this case. I disagree.  In that case,  the claimant described an incident where he stepped from his truck, his knee buckled, he fell  to  the  ground,  and  then  he  felt  pain  in  his  knee.  See  id.  The  only  similarity  between  Crawford and the instant case is that the Crawford claimant was descending from his truck ­15­  07­307  and  Knight  was  descending the  stairs  immediately  preceding  the  onset  of  pain.  See  id.  While the claimant in Crawford was able to identify a specific incident that lead to his injury,  namely, his knee buckled as he stepped from the truck, the claimant here failed to identify  any specific incident that caused his injury.  Actually,  the  outcome  of  this  case  should  be  governed  by  Whitten  v.  Edward  Trucking/Corp. Solutions, 87 Ark. App. 112, 189 S.W.3d 82 (2004), a case in which the  court  of  appeals  held  the  claimant’s  injury  to  be  idiopathic.    The  claimant  in  Whitten  suddenly felt a pain in his back as he was ascending the stairs to his supervisor’s office.  Id.  As  the  court  of  appeals  stated,  “[h]e  neither  tripped  or  stumbled,  nor  was  he  carrying  anything heavy at the time of the fall.”  Id. at 115, 189 S.W.3d at 84.  A medical examination  of the claimant revealed that he suffered from three pre­existing injuries, which could have  caused his pain.  Id.  Accordingly, the Worker’s Compensation Commission determined that  his injury was idiopathic in nature.  Id.  Here, Knight was descending the stairs when he felt  pain in his knee, and like the claimant in Whitten, he did not trip or stumble, and he was not  carrying anything heavy.  Also like the claimant in Whitten, Knight had suffered a previous  injury to his knee; whereas the claimant in Crawford had not sustained any prior injuries.  I simply cannot accept the majority’s strained attempt to distinguish our case law,  when Knight wholly failed to prove that his injury resulted from a specific incident.  The  majority’s decision today jettisons strict construction as mandated by the legislature and  completely ignores the statutory provision that “[a]n injury is ‘accidental’ only if it is caused  by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and space of occurrence.”  Ark. Code Ann. ­16­  07­307  § 11­9­102(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  For the first time, this court holds that the onset of  pain is a specific­incident injury under Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102.  For the above stated  reasons, I respectfully dissent. ­17­  07­307 

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