Vimy Ridge Municipal Water Improvement District No. 139 of Little Rock and The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A. v. J.A. Ryles; G.P. Ryles; Guy Maris; Rylwell, LLC; John Ryles; Whitwell, Inc.; and Mark Wilcox, Commissioner of State Lands State of Arkansas
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
07-1262
VIMY RIDGE MUNICIPAL WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 139
OF LITTLE ROCK and THE BANK OF
NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY, N.A.
APPELLANTS,
VS.
J.A. RYLES; G.P. RYLES; GUY MARIS;
RYLWELL, LLC; JOHN RYLES;
WHITWELL, INC.; and MARK
WILCOX, COMMISSIONER OF
STATE LANDS STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEES,
Opinion Delivered May 8, 2008
AN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, No.
CV-2004-10679, HONORABLE
WILLARD PROCTOR, CIRCUIT
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice
Appellants Vimy Ridge Municipal Water Improvement District 139 and The Bank of
New York Trust Company, (collectively, “Vimy Ridge”) appeal an order of the Pulaski
County Circuit Court that granted summary judgment in favor of appellees J.A. Ryles;
Rylwell LLC; John Ryles; Guy Maris; Whitwell Inc.; and Mark Wilcox, Land Commissioner
(collectively, “Ryles”). We affirm.
On October 1, 2004, Vimy Ridge filed a foreclosure action against Ryles and other
defendants, claiming that municipal improvement district taxes were delinquent. Ryles
argued that Vimy Ridge's foreclosure action was barred by a three-year statute of limitations
under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-28-1208 (Repl. 1998). At a hearing on summary-judgment
motions, Ryles argued that the Little Rock ordinance pertaining to the Vimy Ridge water
improvement district taxes did not specify when those taxes became delinquent, but under
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-86-1204 (Repl. 1998), when a district fails to specify the time of
delinquency, the special taxes become delinquent ninety days after those special taxes become
“due and payable.” Vimy Ridge countered that the ordinance adopted the same collection
method as used for general taxes under Title 26, which are due and payable from the first
business day of March through October 10, and did not become delinquent until October
10, 2001. Because Vimy Ridge filed its foreclosure action on October 1, 2004, it asserted its
action was filed nine days within the three-year statute of limitations.
The circuit court granted Ryles’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Ark.
Code Ann. § 26-36-201(a) (Repl. 1997 and Supp. 2007) was not applicable to the
improvement district’s special taxes at issue. Vimy Ridge appealed the circuit court’s ruling,
but this court held that there was no record of any disposition regarding defendants “G.P.
Ryles, Guy Maris, John Doe(s) and Jane Doe(s).” We dismissed the appeal without prejudice
because there was no final order. Vimy Ridge Mun. Water Imp. Dist. No. 139 v. Ryles, 369
Ark. 217, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). The trial court issued a final order on August 15, 2007,
and Vimy Ridge now repeats the arguments as to the merits it previously presented in its first
appeal.
As an initial matter, Ryles contends that this court lacks jurisdiction because Vimy
Ridge’s second notice of appeal does not reference the final order issued by the trial court on
August 15, 2007. Instead, the notice of appeal mentions the summary judgment order
entered May 19, 2006. However, the trial court’s August 15, 2007 order simply reiterated
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the previous disposition of the motions for summary judgment, and dismissed with prejudice
the defendants unaddressed by the previous order. Under these circumstances, Vimy Ridge’s
failure to designate the August 15 order in its notice of appeal is not fatal to this appeal. See
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Sudrick, 49 Ark. App. 84, 896 S.W.2d452 (1995).
See also Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Ark. Pulpwood Co., Inc., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999)
(explaining that an appellant's noncompliance with Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 3(e) does not render
the notice automatically void).
Turning to the merits of this case, we do so by reviewing the trial court's decision in
this tax case de novo, but will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. 711, 42 S.W.3d 496 (2001); Pledger v.
Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 316 Ark. 195, 871 S.W.2d 389 (1994). This court also reviews issues
of statutory construction de novo, because it is for this court to decide what a statute means.
City of Maumelle v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 353 Ark. 686, 120 S.W.3d 55 (2003). While this court
is not bound by the decision of the trial court, in the absence of a showing that the trial court
erred in its interpretation of the law, that interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal.
Barclay, supra.
The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as
it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.
Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003). An additional rule of statutory
construction in the area of taxation cases is that when the court reviews matters that involve
the levying of taxes, any and all doubts and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the
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taxpayer. Barclay, supra. Further, this court has stated that “it is blackletter law for statutory
construction to give effect to the specific statute over the general.” Id. at 730, 42 S.W.3d at
508 (citing Board of Trustees for City of Little Rock Police Dept. Pension & Relief Fund v. Stodola,
328 Ark. 194, 942 S.W.2d 255 (1997)).
The special tax provision for the Vimy Ridge improvement district is provided for in
Little Rock ordinance number 15-513. The relevant section of the ordinance reads as
follows:
the assessment . . . shall be collected by the County Collector
with the first installment of general taxes becoming due in the
year 1989 and annually thereafter with the first installment of
general taxes until the whole of the local assessment shall be paid.
The ordinance does not specify the date the special taxes are delinquent, and § 14-86-1204
states that when an improvement district fails to specify the date its special taxes become
delinquent by ordinance, the delinquency date is ninety days after they first become due and
payable.
Vimy Ridge presents two arguments. First, Vimy Ridge asserts that § 26-36-201(a)
should be applied to the question of when the improvement taxes become delinquent. That
section states that general taxes become delinquent on October 10; therefore, Vimy Ridge
argues that the special taxes established in the ordinance also became delinquent on October
10. Vimy Ridge’s second argument is that the ordinance does not address what is “due and
payable” and that the only specification for the payment of special taxes is, under Ark. Code
Ann. § 14-90-801(a) (Repl. 1998), annual special tax assessments are first collected as specified
by the ordinance, and subsequent annual installments of the special tax “shall be paid” with
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the first installment of general taxes. Vimy Ridge argues that it follows that “due and
payable” is a period of time, not a single day, and that under the installment plan for general
taxes found in § 26-35-501(a)(1) (Repl. 1997 and Supp. 2007), that period of time does not
end until October 10.
Both of Vimy Ridge’s arguments err by attempting to apply provisions for the payment
of general taxes found in Title 26 of the Arkansas Code to the special taxes of improvement
districts under Title 14. In Quapaw Central Business Improvement District v. Bond-Kinman, Inc.,
315 Ark. 703, 706, 870 S.W.2d 390, 391-92 (1994), the court pointed out that municipal
improvement districts “constitute a separate and distinct species of taxing districts as
contradistinguished from counties, municipal corporations and school districts.”
Looking to provisions for general or ad valorem taxes, § 26-36-201(a) reads as follows:
(a)(1) All taxes levied on real estate and personal property for the county courts
of this state . . . shall be deemed to be due and payable at the county collector's
office any time from the first business day of March to and including October
10.
(2) All taxes unpaid after October 10 shall be considered as delinquent.
Section 26-35-501(a) allows for these annual general or ad valorem taxes to be paid in
quarterly installments, and provides:
(a)(1) All ad valorem taxes levied on real and personal property by the county
courts of the state when assembled for the purpose of levying taxes . . . shall be
due an payable on and from the first business day in March to and including
October 10 in the year succeeding the year in which the levy is made.”
(2)(A) Every taxpayer other than a utility or carrier shall have the option to pay
the taxes on real property of the taxpayer in installments as follows:
(i) The first installment of one-fourth of the amount of the taxes shall be
payable on and from the third Monday in February to and including the third
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Monday in April;
(ii) A second installment of one-fourth ( 1/4 ) or a first installment of one-half
if no payment was made before the third Monday in April shall be payable on
and from the third Monday in April to and including the third Monday in July;
and
(iii) The third installment of one-half ( 1/2 ) shall be payable on and from the
third Monday in July to and including October 10.
Clearly, the General Assembly has provided that general taxes may be paid in installments
under the schedule provided in § 26-35-501(a) that extend until October 10, and that the
general taxes do not become “delinquent” until October 10 under § 26-36-201(a).
However, these provisions for general taxes under Title 26 would only apply to
municipal improvement district taxes if they specifically adopted the installment scheme by
ordinance. Section 14-90-801(b)(2)(emphasis added) states that:
The municipality may provide in the ordinance that, after payment of the initial
installment, the annual assessment of benefits may be paid in quarterly
installments along with the quarterly installments of ad valorem taxes at the
election of the taxpayer.
This section allows a municipality to provide, by ordinance, for the taxpayer
in the improvement district to pay their special taxes in installments and on the
same schedule as the general or ad valorem taxes.
The Little Rock ordinance at issue provides that the water improvement district assessment
“shall be collected by the County Collector with the first installment of general taxes
becoming due in the year 1989 and annually thereafter with the first installment of general
taxes until the whole of the local assessment shall be paid.” By the ordinance’s plain language,
the improvement district tax becomes due and payable at the same time as the first installment
of the general taxes provided for in § 26-35-501(a) — “the third Monday in February to and
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including the third Monday in April.”
Although the Little Rock ordinance did specify that the special taxes were to be
collected “annually [ ] with the first installment of general taxes,” the ordinance did not adopt
the subsequent quarterly installment provisions for general taxes under Title 26, which
improvement districts “may” adopt by ordinance as provided by §14-90-801(b)(2). Without
such adoption, and without specifying the date the special taxes are delinquent, the specific
statute dealing with when special improvement taxes become delinquent applies (§ 14-861204), and the delinquency date is ninety days after the special taxes are due and payable.
Therefore, because the Little Rock ordinance specifies that the special districts are to be
collected annually, “with the first installment of general taxes,” and § 26-35-501(a) specifies
that the first installment of the general taxes “shall be payable on and from the third Monday
in February to and including the third Monday in April,” the three-year statute of limitations
began to run ninety days after the third Monday in April, 2001, well before Vimy Ridge filed
its foreclosure action on October 1, 2004. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding
that the statute of limitations barred Vimy Ridge’s foreclosure action for the 2001 delinquent
improvement district taxes.
Affirmed.
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