H.G. Foster, Special Prosecutor and Jack McQuary, Special Prosecutor v. Honorable Victor L. Hill, Circuit Judge

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  07­1235  H.G.  FOSTER,  SPECIAL  PROSECUTOR  and  JACK  MCQUARY,  SPECIAL  PROSECUTOR,  PETITIONERS,  Opinion Delivered February 7, 2008  PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  VS.  HON. VICTOR L. HILL, CIRCUIT JUDGE,  RESPONDENT,  GRANTED.  JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice  This matter concerns investigation of possible criminal conduct arising from the death  1  of DeAunta Farrow.  Special Prosecuting Attorneys H.G. Foster and Jack McQuary petition  this court for a writ of prohibition, or in the alternative, a writ of certiorari, to quash an order  of the Circuit Court of Crittenden County, Civil Division (Division 6) calling a special grand  jury to investigate Farrow’s death.  We hold that Division 6 was without authority to enter  an order that a special grand jury investigate Farrow’s death when Division 3 had already  2  appointed  the  special  prosecutors  to  perform the  same  task.  Division  3  held  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  matters  pertaining  to  the  investigation  of  Farrow’s  death.  The  writ  of 1  DeAunta Farrow was shot and killed by West Memphis Police Officer Erik Sammis on  the night of June 22, 2007.  2  Pursuant to Ark. Const. amend. 21, all offenses in this state may be prosecuted by the  filing of an information by a prosecuting attorney or by indictment by a grand jury.  3  certiorari is granted.  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1­2(a)(3).  Farrow’s death occurred in Crittenden County, and pursuant to the PLAN OF THE  2ND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT adopted pursuant to this court’s Administrative Order 14, all  criminal  matters  arising  in  Crittenden  County  are  assigned  to  Divisions  3,  5,  and  8.  Following the plan, Second Judicial District prosecuting attorney Brent Davis filed a motion  in Division 3 on July 12, 2007, for the appointment of special prosecutors.  Mr. Davis had  a conflict because he had a “close professional association and working relationship” with  the West Memphis Police Department.  Foster and McQuary were appointed by Division 3  to investigate any criminal liability arising from the shooting death of Farrow.  Pursuant to  the  order  appointing  the  special  prosecutors,  their  commission  was  to  “expire  upon  4  completion of the above­stated investigation  and/or prosecution or until further order of this  Court.”  On November 20, 2007, in a report to Division 3, Foster and McQuary stated in part  as follows:  After extensive investigation by the Arkansas State Police, other agencies, Mr.  McQuary  and  myself,  it  is  our  opinion  that  there  does  not  exist  sufficient  evidence to charge Sgt. Sammis, or any member of the West Memphis Police  Department, with a crime under the Arkansas Criminal Code.  Additional language in the report states that, although the shooting of Farrow was a tragedy 3  Because we determine that the circuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction, a writ  of prohibition is not proper.  See Hyden v. Circuit Court, 371 Ark. 152, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2007).  A writ of certiorari is the proper remedy to quash irregular proceedings.  Jordan v. Circuit Court,  366 Ark 326, 235 S.W.3d 487 (2006).  4  According to the motion to appoint the special prosecutors, the issue to be investigated  was the shooting death of DeAunta Farrow.  ­2­  07­1235  of the highest order, it “does not present a prosecutable criminal case under the laws of the  State  of  Arkansas.”  Further,  the  special  prosecutors  stated  that  “should  credible  ‘new’  evidence appear at any time, it will be received and evaluated for possible further action.  This of course is true here as it is in any criminal investigation, closed or open.”  Both in oral  argument, and in their brief, petitioners indicated that new evidence has been received, that  the  investigation  is  not  closed,  and  that  they  are  still  acting  under  the  Division  3  order  appointing them.  Six days after petitioners’ November 20, 2007 report, a petition was presented to  Division  6  to  call  a  special  grand  jury  to  investigate  the  death  of  Farrow.    Thereafter,  Division 6 issued an order calling a special grand jury to investigate Farrow’s death.  Two  days later on November 28, 2007, Foster and McQuary filed the present petition for writ of  5  prohibition, or in the alternative, writ of certiorari.  The  question  presented  is  whether  Division  6  had  authority  to  enter  its  order  on  November 26, 2007.  We first consider the issue of subject­matter jurisdiction.  Pursuant to  Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 6(A), the circuit courts are established as the trial courts of original  jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned. Further, pursuant to Ark. Const.  amend. 80, § 6(B), under this court’s superintending control, we issued Administrative Order  14 directing that each judicial circuit set up divisions for criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, 5  Activity was still ongoing in Division 3 as indicated by an order entered in Division 3 on  December 3, 2007, regarding redaction of the investigative file in preparation for disclosure under  the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.  ­3­  07­1235  and domestic­relations matters.  However, any sitting circuit judge may sit in any division.  See Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 6(B).  This court’s Administrative Order 14 also provides that  while each circuit may set up divisions, “[t]he creation of divisions shall in no way limit the  powers  and  duties  of  the  judges  to  hear  all  matters  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  circuit  court.”  Thus, Division 6 had subject­matter jurisdiction on November 26, 2007, when it  entered  the  order  calling the  special  grand  jury.    Administrative  Order  14  provides  that  subject­matter jurisdiction remains in all circuit courts, and this allows a practice discussed  by respondent in oral argument.  It permits a judge in a different division in the circuit to act  in the absence of the judge handling the case.  Administrative Order 14 has thus furthered  justice,  accommodated  the  needs  of  litigants,  and  addressed  the  practicalities  faced  by  judicial circuits where there are great distances between courthouses.  However, we have  before us a wholly different matter.  Here, Division 3 was available at the time the parties  petitioned Division 6.  The parties all agree that no one ever presented the question of a  grand jury to Division 3.  We must consider whether Division 6 could act when Division 3  in accordance with the 2nd Judicial Circuit Plan, had already exercised jurisdiction on the  issue and remained available to all who had an interest in the matter.  There are two grounds wholly unrelated to subject­matter jurisdiction that deprived  Division 6 of authority to issue its order on November 26, 2007.  The first ground is the  common law rule on concurrent jurisdiction.  “Where concurrent jurisdiction is vested in  different tribunals, the first exercising jurisdiction rightfully acquires control to the exclusion  of, and without interference of, the other.” Patterson v. Isom, 338 Ark. 234, 239, 992 S.W.3d ­4­  07­1235  792, 796 (1999) (quoting Tortorich v. Tortorich, 324 Ark. 128, 131, 919 S.W.2d 213, 214  6  (1996)).  “[W]hen  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  acquires  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the  matter is finally and completely disposed  of, and no coordinate authority is at liberty to  interfere with its action.”  Askew v. Murdock, 225 Ark. 68, 71­72, 279 S.W.2d 557, 560  (1955) (quoting 14 Am. Jur. Courts § 243 (1938)).  This court has warned that permitting attempts by courts to exercise jurisdiction on  an issue upon which another court has already acted would “paralyze justice.”  Jones v.  Garratt, 199 Ark. 737, 739, 135 S.W.2d 859, 859 (1940).  “If interference may come from  one  side,  it  may  come  from  the  other  also,  and  what  is  begun  may  be  reciprocated  indefinitely.”  Askew, 225 Ark. at 72, 279 S.W.2d at 560 (quoting 14 Am. Jur. Courts § 243  (1938));  Dunbar  v.  Bourland,  88  Ark.  153,  163,  114  S.W.  467,  472  (1908)  (quoting  MacLean v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 52 Mich. 257, 259, 18 N.W. 396, 397 (1884)).  Thus,  while both divisions had subject­matter jurisdiction, under the common law on concurrent  jurisdiction, Division 3 held exclusive jurisdiction on November 26, 2007; as of that date,  Division 6 and the other divisions were without authority to call a special grand jury to  investigate  when  Division  3  had  already  acted  by  appointing  special  prosecutors  to  investigate. 6  This has long been the law.  See Bradley v. State, 32 Ark. 722, 725 (1878) (“In the case  of concurrent jurisdiction in different tribunals, the one first exercising jurisdiction rightfully  acquires the control to the exclusion of the other.”).  ­5­  07­1235  The second ground denying Division 6 the authority to act in this matter on November  26, 2007, is the superintending control of this court exercised over the courts of this state.  Arkansas Constitution Amendment 80, § 4 specifically provides that this court exercises  superintending control over  all  the  courts of the state.  Further, the highest court in any  common law state has inherent superintending control over lower courts; it is an inherent  power available to enable the court to fulfill its role as the court of last resort in the state.  State v. Jerrell, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W. 2d 110 (2005).  It is derived from the common  law  of  England  for  purposes  of  effective  administration  of  justice  within  the  court’s  jurisdiction.  Sidell v. Hill, 357 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962) (citing 14 Am. Jur. Courts  § 264­74 (1938)).  Superintending jurisdiction is one of three types of jurisdiction held by courts of last  resort that also includes appellate and original jurisdiction.  Cohen v. State, 732 So. 2d 867  7  (Miss. 1998).  Original and superintending control are most often enforced through issuance  of  writs.  Id.  Superintending  control  is  an  extraordinary  power  that  is  hampered  by  no  specific rules or means.  Id.  By virtue of the jurisdiction, the court may “invent, frame, and  formulate new and additional means, writs and processes.”  Id. (quoting State v. Roy, 40  N.M. 397, 422­23, 60 P.2d 646, 662 (1936)).  The court is bounded only by the exigencies  that call for its exercise.  Cohen, supra.  However, the jurisdiction is used with caution and  forbearance to further justice and to secure order and regularity in judicial proceedings where 7  See also Olsen v. Koppy, 593 N.W.2d 762 (N.D. 1999).  ­6­  07­1235  no ordinary remedies are adequate.  Spence v. North Dakota Dist. Ct., 292 N.W.2d 53 (N.D.  1980).  In adopting the administrative plan in the Second Judicial Circuit, all eleven circuit  court judges signed and agreed to the procedure for the orderly assignment of the circuit  court cases filed and distributed to the judges who make up the Second Judicial Circuit.  They  agreed  that  criminal  matters  arising  in  Crittenden  County  would  be  handled  by  Divisions  3,  5,  and  8.    That  plan  was  approved  by  this  court  as  provided  for  under  Administrative Order 14.  As noted, Division 3 was never asked to convene a grand jury.  Division 6 could not convene a special grand jury in this matter because it was not assigned  criminal matters arising in Crittenden County.  Under our superintending control, we cannot  allow  coordinate  divisions  of  a  single  circuit  to  compete  for  control  of  processes  investigating possible criminal acts.  Division 3 assumed jurisdiction first and held exclusive  jurisdiction.  Division 3 was assigned jurisdiction under the administrative plan.  Division  3 is where any interested parties  should have sought redress for any concerns about the  investigation into Farrow’s death.  If the interested parties present their concerns to Division  3 and then believe that Division 3 fails to follow the proper course, then redress is by petition  to this court under its original jurisdiction, not by resort to a coordinate circuit court.  The  deeply held concerns expressed by all the parties to this matter are quite understandable  given the grave tragedy involved.  It is imperative to both justice and to society’s perception  of justice that this matter be expeditiously, thoroughly, and decisively handled.  Petition for writ of certiorari granted. ­7­  07­1235  CORBIN  and BROWN, JJ., concurring.  CORBIN,  J.,  concurring.  While  I  agree  with  the  majority  that  Division  6  of  the  Crittenden County Circuit Court lacked authority to intervene in the investigation of the  shooting death of DeAunta Farrow where the matter was properly assigned to and on­going  in  Division  3  of  that  circuit,  I  must  write  separately  to  highlight  two  issues  that  greatly  trouble me.  First, while Respondent Honorable Victor L. Hill was without authority to consider  a  matter  pending  in  another  division  of  his  circuit,  after  listening  to  both  parties  at  oral  argument, I understand to a degree why Judge Hill chose to act.  The order that was entered  by Division 3 appointing the special prosecutors stated that their commissions would “expire  upon completion of the above­stated investigation and/or prosecution or until further order  of this Court.”  (Emphasis added.)  The use of the disjunctive “or” coupled with the fact that  the special prosecutors submitted a report finding that there was no evidence of criminal  wrongdoing on the part of Officer Erik Sammis clearly caused confusion as to whether the  matter was settled in Division 3.  The current confusion could have been avoided, however,  if Judge Hill had conferred with the judge in Division 3 or his administrative judge in order  to determine the status of the case.  In any event, once Judge Hill learned that the matter was  on­going in Division 3, he should have exercised his discretion and terminated his actions.  While I agree with Judge Hill that judges, such as himself, who travel throughout the circuit  have the jurisdiction to hear all types of matters, we simply cannot have judges competing ­8­  07­1235  over the same case; otherwise, chaos would reign.  Second, I want to highlight the concluding part of the majority’s opinion that if the  parties present concerns to Division 3, but believe that Division 3 is failing to act  in  an  expeditious or proper manner, then a proper party may seek redress by petition to this court.  Moreover, I would add that once this matter is closed in Division 3, if a party were to obtain  new evidence germane to this case, that party could seek redress in one of the divisions of  circuit court assigned to handle criminal matters.  The  death  of  a  child  is  against  the  natural  order  of  things,  and  in  the  case  of  the  shooting of young DeAunta, it is understandable that people want to know that justice is  being served.  At the same time, the system that dispenses that justice must be allowed to  work in an orderly and efficient manner.  For the above­stated reasons, I concur.  BROWN, J., joins.  BROWN, J., concurring.  I join Justice Corbin’s concurrence but add these additional  observations.  The problem with this case is that a factual dispute looms large as to whether  the investigation by the special prosecutors was closed when they issued their report to Judge  Burnett on November 20, 2007.  The case certainly seemed to be over.  The prosecutors said:  In October alleged “new” evidence was announced to have been in the  possession of Mr. J. Bailey, Attorney, to include a “chip” bag and a “soda”  container,  recovered  by  Mr.  Bailey’s  team  at  the  scene,  and  the  names  of  several “new” witnesses who gave various statements to those working with  Mr. Bailey.  As of the date of this report, despite efforts by the ASP to obtain  said evidence, it has not been provided to us.  Given the description of the  “evidence” provided by Mr. Bailey on television and over the telephone to ­9­  07­1235  Foster,  it  does  not  appear  to  adequately  contradict  the  vast  weight  of  the  statements given by witnesses who have spoken with law enforcement or the  physical evidence recovered by law enforcement at the scene the night of the  shooting, or thereafter; consequently the decision has been made to close the  investigation despite the current absence of actual “evidence” alleged to be  in Mr. Bailey’s possession.  It should be noted here that should credible “new”  evidence appear at any time, it will be received and evaluated for possible  further action.  This of course is true here as it is in any criminal investigation,  closed or open.  A review of the investigative file will show the photos taken  at the scene the night of the shooting and the absence of any chip bags or drink  containers.  (Emphasis  added.)    At  the  end  of  the  report,  the  special  prosecutors  concluded  that  the  shooting did not “present a prosecutable criminal case.” Judge Burnett subsequently released  the redacted criminal investigative file of the special prosecutors to the public.  The reason this is important is that the appointment of the special prosecutors was to  “expire upon completion of the above­stated investigation and/or prosecution or until further  orders of this Court.”  Hence, it is clear that when the investigation by the special prosecutors  is concluded, that is one basis upon which the appointment by the judge ends.  At oral argument before this court, Special Prosecutor H. G. Foster announced that  new information had been presented to him since his report, including a DVD relating to the  investigation.  In light of this, he contended that his investigation was continuing.  Mr. Foster  further maintained that his role as special prosecutor should go on as long as there is new  evidence to consider.  Judge Hill stated at oral argument that he did not believe that the investigation by Mr.  Foster  and  Mr.  McQuary  was,  in  fact,  continuing.    He  also  disagreed  with  the  special  prosecutors’ decision not to charge Officer Sammis. ­10­  07­1235  This court, as a result, is called upon to decide a credibility question of whether the  investigation by the special prosecutors was concluded in DeAunta’s death, which meant the  special prosecutors were discharged.  In my judgment, we must take the special prosecutors  at their word, as we presume public officials perform their duties correctly.  See Dilday v.  State, 300 Ark. 249, 778 S.W.2d 618 (1989).  Nor should this court interfere with the duties  of the prosecutors, as that would be a violation of the separation­of­powers doctrine.  See  State  v.  Murphy,  315  Ark.  68,  864  S.W.2d  842  (1993).  Because  of  this,  I  resolve  the  credibility issue in favor of the special prosecutors.  Judge  Hill’s  principal  argument  in  opposition  to  the  issuance  of  the  writ  is  that  Arkansas law authorizes the circuit court to empower a special grand jury.  He cites to the  following statute:  (a)  At  any  time  a  grand  jury  is  not  in  session,  the  court,  in  its  discretion, by order entered of record, may impanel a special grand jury.  (b)  When impaneled, the special grand jury shall have all the powers  and proceed in all respects as provided by law for the conduct of regular grand  juries.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  16­85­517  (Repl.  2005).  The  majority  opinion  does  not  address  this  argument for Judge Hill’s actions, but clearly this power must yield to that of a circuit judge  who  has  already  assumed  jurisdiction  over  a  case,  which,  according  to  the  special  prosecutors, is still ongoing.  See Patterson v. Isom, 338 Ark. 234, 992 S.W.2d 792 (1999).  Were this not the case, our judicial system would quickly fall into disorder with individual  circuit judges vying for jurisdiction over individual cases.  See id.  That would, clearly, be ­11­  07­1235  an untenable situation.  Nevertheless, because of the history of this case, it is imperative that the investigation  regarding the new evidence be handled with diligence and dispatch.  What we do not decide in this case is what might transpire in the future in the form  of additional investigative action, once the current investigation is concluded.  With these comments, I agree to the issuance of a writ of certiorari to halt the grand  jury called for by Judge Hill.  CORBIN, J., joins this concurrence. ­12­  07­1235 

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