John A. Buffington v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  07­1181  Opinion Delivered  JOHN A. BUFFINGTON  Petitioner  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Respondent  January 31, 2008  PRO SE MOTIONS FOR RULE ON  CLERK AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF  COUNSEL [CIRCUIT COURT OF HOT  SPRING COUNTY, CV 2007­193, HON.  CHRIS E. WILLIAMS, JUDGE]  MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK  TREATED AS MOTION FOR  BELATED APPEAL AND DENIED;  MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF  COUNSEL MOOT.  PER CURIAM  In 2007, while incarcerated in Hot Spring County, petitioner John A. Buffington filed in the  circuit court in that county a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been  sentenced illegally in 2005 for a 2003 conviction.  The circuit court entered an order on August 9,  2007, that dismissed the habeas petition.  On August 27, 2007, petitioner filed in the circuit court a  notice of appeal from an order entered on “August 20, 2007.”  As the record did not contain an order  entered on that date, the clerk of this court correctly declined to lodge the appeal when the record  on appeal was tendered to this court.  Now before us is petitioner’s pro se motion for rule on clerk under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2­2(b)  seeking to proceed with the appeal of the August 9, 2007, order.  He has also filed a pro se motion  for appointment of counsel.  As the notice of appeal filed in the trial court did not designate the  August 9, 2007, order, we treat the motion for rule on clerk as a motion for belated appeal.  See Johnson v. State, 342 Ark. 709, 30 S.W.3d 715 (2000) (per curiam); see also Muhammed v. State,  330 Ark. 759, 957 S.W.2d 692 (1997) (per curiam).  A petitioner has the right  to  appeal a ruling on a petition for postconviction relief which  includes the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664  S.W.2d 475 (1984) (per curiam).  However, along with that right goes the responsibility to follow  proper procedure.  The burden is on the petitioner to make a showing of good cause for the failure  to comply with proper procedure.  See Garner v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987) (per  curiam).  The fact that a petitioner is proceeding pro se in itself does not constitute good cause for  the failure to  conform to  the prevailing rules of procedure.  Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676  S.W.2d 460 (1984) (per curiam); see also Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990)  (per curiam).  Even if it could be said that petitioner merely erred in citing the correct date of the final order,  petitioner could not be successful on appeal.  Accordingly, we deny the motion for belated appeal and  the motion for appointment of counsel is moot.  An appeal from an order that denied a petition for  postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not  prevail.  Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324  Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam).  The record indicated that in 2003, appellant entered a plea of guilty to second­degree sexual  assault as part of a plea agreement and was sentenced by the Ouachita County Circuit Court to 120  months’ imprisonment.  On December 8, 2003, a judgment and commitment order was entered that  reflected the sentence he received.  An amended judgment and commitment order, entered on August  19, 2004, deleted the notation that appellant was on parole at the time of his conviction.  A second ­2­  1  amended judgment and commitment order was entered on August 15, 2005.  The 2005 judgment  included the requirement that appellant register as a sex offender and erroneously noted that appellant  entered his guilty plea on December 8, 2004, rather than the correct date of December 8, 2003.  Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus listed myriad bases for relief, including double  jeopardy, deprivation of due process and lack of jurisdiction by the trial court to modify a sentence  that  had been put  into  execution.  The gravamen of his complaint was that the second amended  judgment improperly included the requirement that he register as a sex offender, thereby illegally  modifying and increasing the sentence imposed in 2003.  He further maintained that  he  was not  apprised by the trial court as to the maximum sentence he could receive, which included registration  as a sex offender.  Appellant’s claim for relief was premised upon an incorrect assumption as to the nature and  application of the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, presently codified at Ark. Code Ann. §12­  12­901 – 12­12­923 (Supp. 2007).  Rather than being “sentenced” under the act, we have held that  the  registration  and  notification  components  of  the  act  are  regulatory  and  “not  a  form  of  punishment[.]”  Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep’t, 339 Ark. 274, 287, 5 S.W.3d 402, 410 (1999).  Further, under section  12­12­906(a)(1)(A), trial courts have been required to designate criminal  defendants who were convicted of certain crimes to register as sex offenders.  Here, appellant was convicted of second­degree sexual assault which was a designated crime  at the time appellant was sentenced.  Section 12­12­903(12)(A)(i)(d) (Supp. 2003).  The trial court  had no discretion as to the application of the act to appellant’s conviction and its failure to note the 1  Appellant’s pleading in this matter indicated that the first amended judgment was entered  after petitioner filed a second petition for relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1.  However, the record  did not contain a definitive explanation as to what prompted the judgment to be amended for  either the first or second time.  ­3­  requirement of appellant’s compliance with the act in the original judgment amounted to a clerical  error.  Furthermore, when the trial court entered the second amended judgment to correctly add the  statutorily­mandated requirement that appellant register as a sex offender for potential notification  purposes, the sentence of incarceration he received for sexual assault was not modified or increased.  Appellant failed to show that he was entitled to relief under any theory cited in his petition.  Motion  for  rule  on  clerk  treated  as  motion  for  belated  appeal  and  denied;  motion  for  appointment of counsel moot. ­4­ 

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