Woodruff Thomas Sparacio v. State of Arkansas

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS  No.  CR07­1025  WOODRUFF T. SPARACIO,  APPELLANT,  VS.  STATE OF ARKANSAS.  APPELLEE,  Opinion Delivered January 10, 2008  MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK;  MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS  COUNSEL  MOTIONS  GRANTED.  PER CURIAM  This is the second motion for rule on clerk in this case.  Previously, attorney Thurman  Ragar filed a motion to be relieved as appellant Woodruff Thomas Sparacio’s attorney on  appeal.  Sparacio was convicted of two counts of rape in Crawford County on May 26, 2007.  On June 6, 2007, Sparacio’s trial attorney, Naif Khoury, moved to withdraw as counsel.  The  trial court granted that motion and appointed Ragar that same day.  Also on June 6, 2007,  Ragar filed a notice of appeal on Sparacio’s behalf.  Following the June 6 notice of appeal,  attorney Dana Reece filed a motion to set aside the order appointing Ragar as counsel.  The  trial court granted her motion on June 16, 2007.  When the record was tendered to this court, our clerk correctly declined to lodge it  because the lower court’s order extending the time to file the record did not comply with  Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 5.  On  October 3, 2007, Reece filed a motion for rule on clerk in this CR07­1025  court seeking to lodge the record, and on October 5, 2007, Ragar filed a motion to withdraw  as attorney on direct appeal.  On November 1, 2007,this court issued an opinion denying Reece’s motion for rule  on clerk on the grounds that, because the notice of appeal had already been filed, the trial  court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order relieving Ragar as counsel.  See Sparacio v. State,  ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 1, 2007) (per curiam).  In that opinion, we directed  Ragar, who remained attorney of record, to file a motion for rule on clerk on Sparacio’s  behalf; we also stated that we would hold Ragar’s motion to withdraw in abeyance until such  time as he filed a motion for rule on clerk.  Ragar has now filed the motion for rule on clerk.  In it, he acknowledges that the  record was untimely tendered due to an error on his part. This court clarified its treatment  of motions for rule on the clerk and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356  Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). There we said that there are only two possible reasons for  an appeal not being timely perfected: either the party or attorney filing the appeal is at fault,  or there is “good reason.”  McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891. We  explained:  Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney  filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was not  timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is therefore faced with  two options. First, where the party or attorney filing the appeal is at fault, fault  should be admitted by affidavit filed with the motion or in the motion itself.  There is no advantage in declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second,  where the party or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was CR07­1025  ­2­  not perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and this  court will decide whether good reason is present.  Id., 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this court no longer requires an affidavit  admitting fault before we will consider the motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault  where he has erred and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal.  See id.  In accordance with McDonald v. State, supra, Mr. Ragar has candidly admitted fault.  The motion for rule on clerk is, therefore, granted. A copy of this opinion will be forwarded  to the Committee on Professional Conduct.  Ragar also asks this court to grant him permission to withdraw as attorney of record.  In his original motion, Ragar noted that he was a full­time public defender with a full­time  state­funded  secretary  and  thus  not  eligible  to  be  compensated  for  appellate  work.  See  Jordan v. State, 354 Ark. 27, 120 S.W.3d 99 2003)(per curiam).  For that reason, he asked  to be relieved as counsel, and we now grant the motion to be relieved on that ground.  According to the record and motions filed by Ragar and Reece, Reece was retained  by Sparacio to represent him on appeal.  As a result, it appears that Sparacio is no longer  indigent at this time.  In our November 1, 2007, opinion, we said that Reece should file a  motion  for  appointment  of  counsel  if  she  wished  to  represent  Sparacio  as  an  appointed  attorney.  She  has  not  submitted  such  a  motion,  and,  as  Reece  was  apparently  paid  by CR07­1025  ­3­  Sparacio to represent him, we direct Reece to file within fifteen days an entry of appearance  1 so that the appeal may proceed.  1  If it is appellant Sparacio’s contention that he is indigent at this time and entitled  to appointment of counsel to represent him on appeal, it is his responsibility to submit to  this court a motion for appointment of counsel with his current affidavit of indigency  appended as required by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6­6.  CR07­1025  ­4­ 

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