Tommy D. Hall v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No.
CR 06-192
Opinion Delivered
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
TOMMY D. HALL
Petitioner
April 20, 2006
PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL
[CIRCUIT COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, CR
2001-319-1, HON. JOE E. GRIFFIN, JUDGE]
v.
MOTION DENIED
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Respondent
PER CURIAM
In 2003, petitioner Tommy D. Hall entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and was placed on probation for a period of 120 months. In 2004,
the state filed a petition to revoke probation.
Petitioner retained attorney David L. James to represent him in the revocation proceeding.
After a hearing on August 24, 2005, the petition was granted, and petitioner was sentenced to 300
months’ imprisonment. On September 16, 2005, the judgment reflecting the revocation of probation
and the imposition of sentence was entered of record.
No appeal was taken from the September 16, 2005, order, and petitioner filed the instant pro
se motion to proceed with a belated appeal of the judgment pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 2(e),
which permits a belated appeal in a criminal case in some instances. Petitioner contends in the
motion that he asked James to appeal but James refused.1
It is the practice of this court when a pro se motion for belated appeal is filed and the record
does not contain an order relieving trial counsel to request an affidavit from the trial attorney in
1
Petitioner further notes that he filed a pro se “timely direct of appeal,” which he appears to
have intended to be in the nature of a pro se notice of appeal. The pleading filed September 23,
2005, was entitled “Motion to Appeal Probation Revocation Hearing.” It consisted of allegations
of error in the revocation proceeding and did not conform to procedural rules governing the
content of a notice of appeal.
response to the allegations in the motion. The affidavit is needed to act on a motion for belated
appeal because Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 16(a) provides in pertinent part that trial counsel, whether
retained or court appointed, shall continue to represent a convicted defendant throughout any appeal,
unless permitted by the trial court or the appellate court to withdraw in the interest of justice or for
other sufficient cause. Nevertheless, a defendant may waive his right to appeal by his failure to
inform counsel of his desire to appeal within the thirty days allowed for filing a timely notice of
appeal under Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 4(a). Jones v. State, 294 Ark. 659, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988) (per
curiam).
In his affidavit James avers that he was retained to represent petitioner in the revocation
proceeding only and not for appeal. He appended to the affidavit an order of the court entered
September 7, 2005, relieving him as counsel. As James was relieved in accordance with Rule 16(a)
before petitioner filed the pro se notice of appeal, James was not obligated to represent petitioner
on appeal.
Petitioner argues in his response to counsel’s affidavit that James did not afford him effective
assistance of counsel in the revocation proceeding. A motion for belated appeal, however, is not a
substitute for a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1,
which is the appropriate remedy in this state for raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Carrier v. State, 278 Ark. 542, 647 S.W.2d 449 (1983) (per curiam).
Petitioner makes the statement that the trial court did not appoint other counsel when it
relieved James, suggesting that the court was obligated to appoint an attorney for him to pursue an
appeal. To the contrary, the obligation to appoint counsel did not arise because James was a retained
attorney, and Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. Rule 16(b) provides that the court will appoint counsel when
it relieves an appointed attorney. See Wrenn v. State, 355 Ark. 558, 141 S.W.3d 362 (2004) (per
curiam).
Once counsel was relieved, the burden was on petitioner, if he was incapable of proceeding
pro se on appeal and desired representation by counsel, to retain other counsel. If he had become
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indigent since retaining James, it was his responsibility to file in the trial court a motion for
appointment of counsel with his affidavit of indigency appended. He neither retained other counsel
nor sought appointment of counsel, and he has failed to establish that there was good cause for his
failure to perfect the appeal. A belated appeal will not be allowed absent a showing by the pro se
petitioner of good cause for the failure to comply with proper procedure. See Garner v. State, 293
Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987) (per curiam). Accordingly, the motion for belated appeal is
denied.
Motion denied.
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