Arnold R. Wells v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 06­191 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  Opinion Delivered        March 16, 2006  ARNOLD R. WELLS  Petitioner  v.  PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL OF  ORDER [CIRCUIT COURT OF BRADLEY  COUNTY, CR 2004­39­1, HON. SAMUEL B.  POPE, JUDGE]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Respondent  MOTION DENIED  PER CURIAM  Arnold R. Wells, an inmate incarcerated in Colorado, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas  corpus in the circuit  court  of Bradley County.  The  petition  was denied by an order entered on  November 2, 2005.  Mr. Wells filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 2005, and has now filed a  motion in this court requesting leave to file a belated appeal of the order denying habeas corpus  relief. A petitioner has the right  to appeal a ruling on a petition for postconviction relief, which  includes the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664  S.W.2d 475 (1984) (per curiam).  However, along with that right, goes the responsibility to file a  timely notice of appeal within thirty days of the date the order was entered in accordance with Ark.  R. App. P.–Civ. 4 (a).  Here, petitioner’s notice of appeal was required to be filed by December 2,  2005, and the notice was filed six days late.  If a petitioner fails to file a timely notice of appeal, a belated appeal will not be allowed absent  a showing by the petitioner of good cause for the failure to comply with proper procedure.  Garner  v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987) (per curiam).  Petitioner asserts that he delivered the  petition for mailing within the thirty­day period for filing, and that his failure to file within the period  was justified either due to his lack of legal training combined with the trial court’s failure to make a ruling on a motion for appointment of counsel that he had filed, or simply due to the failure to have  counsel appointed, as a separate issue.  To the extent that petitioner argues we should apply the mail­box rule that is accepted in some  courts, and which provides that a pro se inmate files his or her petition at the time the petition is  placed in the hands of prison officials for mailing, we note that we have previously declined to adopt  that rule.  See, e.g,. Hamel v. State, 338 Ark. 769, 1 S.W.3d 434 (1999).  An item tendered to a court  is considered tendered on the date it is received and file marked by the clerk, not on the date it may  have been placed in the mail.  Petitioner is solely  responsible for filing his brief with the clerk.  As to petitioner’s lack of legal training, we cannot find that as good cause for the delay.  All  litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of  procedure.  Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986) (per curiam);  Walker v. State,  283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d  424 (1983) (per curiam).  See  also Tarry v. State, 353 Ark. 158, 114 S.W.3d 161 (2003) (per  curiam).  The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal.  Eliott v. State, 342 Ark.  237, 27 S.W.3d 432 (2000).  See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989).  Nor is the fact that petitioner was not appointed counsel, either in combination with his lack  of knowledge or as an individual issue, good cause for the delay.  There is no constitutional right to  an attorney in state postconviction proceedings.  Hardin v. State, 350 Ark. 299, 86 S.W.3d 384  (2002)  (per  curiam).  Right  to  counsel  ends  in  this  state  after  the  direct  appeal  of  the  original  judgment  of  conviction  is  completed,  and  the  State  is  not  obligated  to  provide  counsel  in  postconviction proceedings.  Id. at 301, 86 S.W.3d at 385.  The mere fact that petitioner had not  received a ruling from the court on his motion for appointment of counsel did not excuse his failure  to comply with our procedure.  The motion was moot, in any case, upon the court’s denial of relief.  Because petitioner has failed to show good cause for his failure to file his notice of appeal within the  thirty­day period required by Rule 4(a), we deny the motion for belated appeal.  Motion denied. ­2­ 

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