Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Tammy Briley and Charles Renley

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ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN  SERVICES v. Tammy BRILEY and Charles Renley  05­1278  ___ S.W.3d ___  Supreme Court of Arkansas  Opinion delivered June 1, 2006  1.  CONTEMPT – CIVIL CONTEMPT – SANCTIONS WERE REMEDIAL. – The contempt order  entered by the circuit court constituted civil contempt because the sanctions imposed  on appellant Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) were not punitive  and were remedial; DHHS could have purged itself of contempt by performing the  affirmative acts required by the circuit court: (1) paying appellee Briley’s out­of­  pocket expenses, and (2) submitting a written methodology for responding to future  staffing issues in the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit.  2.  CONTEMPT – CIVIL CONTEMPT – CONTEMPT ORDER WAS NOT CLEARLY AGAINST THE  PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. – Where DHHS’s only defense of its failure to  provide appellee Briley’s requested services was that, considering staffing shortages  and heavy caseloads assigned to the caseworkers, the agency was doing all it could  for appellee Briley and her family, the supreme court concluded that, based on the  evidence presented to the circuit court, the circuit court’s contempt order was not ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 2  clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  3.  CONTEMPT – CIVIL CONTEMPT – FINDING AFFIRMED. – The supreme court affirmed the  circuit  court’s  finding  of  civil  contempt;  the  required  specific  notice  was  present  where a specific charge was set forth in the attachment to the appellees’ petition for  contempt; where in her affidavit, appellee Briley attested that DHHS failed to provide  her random drug screens, home visitation, counseling, and transportation; and where  at the hearing, appellee Briley testified that DHHS never visited with her children.  4.  APPEAL & ERROR – PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL – ARGUMENT NOT PRESERVED.  –  Where  DHHS did  not  object  when  information  about  appellee  Briley’s  out­of­  pocket expenses was presented to the trial court at the contempt hearing, and where  the record contained no ruling on DHHS’s motion for reconsideration of the trial  court’s order, DHHS’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support  the $160 reimbursement fee was not preserved for appellate review.  5.  APPEAL & ERROR – PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL – ARGUMENT WAS PRESERVED  FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. – Because the trial court sua sponte and without notice to ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 3  either party imposed the requirement that DHHS submit a methodology report, DHHS  did not have an opportunity to object to the sanction; thus, no posttrial motion was  necessary to preserve the point for appellate review.  6.  CONTEMPT – CIVIL CONTEMPT – INAPPROPRIATE SANCTION. – Where the circuit court  had already closed the underlying protective­services case, where the circuit court  retained  jurisdiction  of  the  case  only  in  anticipation  of  a  request  for  sanctions  or  contempt, and where the sanction mandating a written report on future staffing issues  could not benefit appellee Briley because her case had been closed, the circuit court  imposed an inappropriate civil contempt sanction when it required appellant DHHS  to submit a written methodology report.  Appeal from Boone Circuit Court; Gary Isbell, Judge; affirmed in part; reversed in  part.  Office of Chief Counsel, Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, by:  Gray Allen Turner, for appellant.  Kimberly Johnson, for appellee.  Deanna S. Evans, Attorney ad Litem, for appellee. ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 4  ANNABELLE  CLINTON  IMBER,  Justice.  The  Arkansas  Department  of  Health  and  Human Services (DHHS) appeals the Boone County  Circuit Court’s order, which found  DHHS to be in civil contempt for failing to obey the court’s prior orders.  On appeal, DHHS  seeks reversal of the contempt order.  We affirm the circuit court’s order holding DHHS in  contempt, but hold that the circuit court erred in imposing a sanction that required DHHS to  submit a written report on “future staffing issues” after the protective­services case had been  closed.  Thus, while the written methodology report sanction must be reversed, the $160  reimbursement­fee sanction remains in force.  In  January  2005,  DHHS  participated  in  a  dependency­neglect  hearing involving  Appellee Tammy Briley.  According to the record, Briley’s children had been returned to  her, and the case was to be closed once several documents were received.  However, on  March 8, 2005, the circuit court conducted another review hearing.  In that hearing, Briley  informed the court that counseling services had not been regularly provided and home visits  had not been made.  The court ordered Briley to submit to a drug assessment and to random  drug screens at the request of DHHS and to follow the recommendations of and otherwise  cooperate with DHHS.  In that same order, the court ordered DHHS to “maintain a protective  services case under strict compliance with this court’s orders.”  The case plan of March 2005  designated the family services to be provided by DHHS: (1) random drug screens, (2) referral ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 5  to an aide for parenting safety issues, (3) regular visits with the family to monitor the home,  (4)  referral  and  contact  with  a  substance  abuse  provider  as  to  Briley’s  progress,  (5)  transportation as needed, and (6) referral for counseling and monitor of progress.  On June  14, 2005, the court held another review hearing.  During that hearing, Briley testified that  only minimal family services had been provided by DHHS since the March review hearing.  She testified that DHHS had failed to (1) help her with transportation to court­ordered AA  meetings, (2) conduct regular drug screens, and (3) provide counseling or assistance with  housing.  In  its  order  entered  following  the  June  14,  2005  hearing,  the  court  closed  the  protective­services case, finding that Briley should retain permanent custody of the children  who  were  no  longer  in  need  of  the  services  of  DHHS.  The  court,  however,  retained  jurisdiction of the case in anticipation of a request for sanctions or contempt arising out of  its finding that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to provide services to achieve the  goal of family preservation.  Immediately thereafter, Appellees Tammy Briley and Charles Renley filed a petition  for contempt.  The petition alleged that DHHS failed to provide court­ordered services to  Briley and requested that DHHS be held in contempt.  Briley also submitted an affidavit, in  which she asserted that DHHS did not provide the following court­ordered family services:  counseling, transportation, random drug screens, or home visitation. ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 6  On August 20, 2005, the circuit court held a show­cause hearing. Prior to the hearing,  DHHS filed a motion to dismiss the petition, contending that Appellees had failed to identify  which order the agency had violated.  The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss.  At the  hearing, several witnesses testified as to what actions the agency had taken during the case.  The  DHHS  county  supervisor,  Teresa  Head,  testified  that  because  her  caseload  totaled  eighty­five cases, she had difficulty completing all the services outlined in the case plan.  The circuit court subsequently entered an order finding DHHS in civil contempt, with  remediation to be the payment of $160 to Appellee Tammy Briley for her out­of­pocket  expenses  and  the  preparation  and  submission  within  sixty  (60)  days  “of  a  written  th  methodology  for  responding  to  future  staffing  issues  in  the  14  Judicial  Circuit  .  .  .  .”  Thereafter,  DHHS  filed  a  “motion  to  reconsider  and  to  modify  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions of law.”  From the contempt order, DHHS now appeals.  We have jurisdiction of this case in order to achieve fair allocation of the appellate  workload between this court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1­2(g)  (2006).  Our court recently set forth the standards for determining whether a contempt order  constitutes civil or criminal contempt.  In Omni Holding & Development Corp. v. 3D.S.A.,  Inc., 356 Ark. 440, 448­49, 156 S.W.3d 228, 234­35 (2004), we stated: ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 7  We begin by distinguishing civil and criminal contempt:  Contempt  is  divided  into  criminal  contempt  and  civil  contempt.  Johnson [v. Johnson, 343 Ark. at 197, 33 S.W.3d at  499.  Criminal  contempt  preserves  the  power  of  the  court,  vindicates  its  dignity,  and  punishes  those  who  disobey  its  orders.  Johnson,  343  Ark.  at  197,  33  S.W.3d  at  499.    Civil  contempt, on the other hand, protects the rights of private parties  by compelling compliance with orders of the court made for the  benefit of private parties.  Id.  This court has often noted that the  line between civil and criminal contempt may blur at times.  Id.  Our  Court  of  Appeals  has  given  a  concise  description  of  the  difference between civil and criminal contempt.  See Baggett v.  State,  15  Ark.  App.  113,  116,  690  S.W.2d  362,  364  (1985)  (“[C]riminal contempt punishes while civil contempt coerces.”  (emphasis in original)).  In  determining  whether  a  particular  action  by  a  judge  constitutes  criminal  or  civil  contempt,  the  focus  is  on  the  character  of  relief  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  proceeding.  Fitzhugh  v.  State,  296  Ark.  137,  138,  752  S.W.2d  275,  276  (1988).  Because  civil  contempt  is  designed  to  coerce  compliance with the court's order, the civil contemnor may free  himself or herself by complying with the order. See id. at 139,  752 S.W.2d at 276. This is the source of the familiar saying that  civil  contemnors  “carry  the  keys  of  their  prison  in  their  own  pockets.” Id. at 140, 752 S.W.2d at 277 (quoting Penfield Co. v.  S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 593 (1947)) (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F.  448,  461  (8th  Cir.1902)).  Criminal  contempt,  by  contrast,  carries an unconditional penalty, and the contempt cannot be  purged. Fitzhugh, 296 Ark. at 139, 752 S.W.2d at 276­277.  Ivy v. Keith, 351 Ark. 269, 279­80, 92 S.W.3d 671, 677­78 (2002).  Moreover, in Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988),  this court quoted from the United States Supreme Court's decision of Hicks ex  rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988). In Feiock, the Court, in an attempt  to distinguish between the two contempts, said: ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 8  [T]he critical features are the substance of the proceeding  and the character of the relief that the proceeding will afford. “If  it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the  benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the  sentence  is  punitive,  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  the  court.”  Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418  (1911).  The  character  of  the  relief  imposed  is  thus  ascertainable  by  applying a few straightforward rules. If the relief provided is a  sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if “the defendant stands  committed  unless  and  until  he  performs  the  affirmative  act  required by the court's order,” and is punitive if “the sentence is  limited to imprisonment for a definite period.” Id., at 442. If the  relief  provided  is  a  fine,  it  is  remedial  when  it  is  paid  to  the  complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though a  fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the  defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the  affirmative act required by the court's order.  These distinctions  lead up to the fundamental proposition that criminal penalties  may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the  protections  that  the  Constitution  requires  of  such  criminal  proceedings,  including  the  requirement  that  the  offense  be  proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Gompers, supra,  at 444; Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M.  & O.R. Co., 266 U.S. 42 (1924). [Footnote omitted.]  485 U.S. at 631­32.  Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., 356 Ark. at 448­49, 156 S.W.3d. at 234­35.  In this case, the contempt order entered by the circuit court constitutes civil contempt  because  the  sanctions  imposed  on  DHHS  were  not  punitive;  rather,  the  sanctions  were  remedial.  DHHS could purge itself of contempt by performing the affirmative acts required ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 9  by  the  circuit  court  –  paying  Briley’s  out­of­pocket  expenses  and  submitting  a  written  methodology for responding to future staffing issues in the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit.  Our  standard of review in civil contempt proceedings is whether the finding of the circuit court  is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See Gatlin v. Gatlin, 306 Ark. 146, 811  S.W.2d 761 (1991).  For  its  first  point  on  appeal,  DHHS  claims  that  the  contempt  finding  should  be  reversed because the petition for contempt did not give DHHS sufficient notice of what court  orders had been violated.  We have observed that willful disobedience of a valid court order  is contemptuous behavior.  Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., supra.  However,  before one can be held in contempt for violating the court’s order, the order must be definite  in its terms and clear as to what duties it imposes.  Id.  In the instant case, DHHS complains  that it was not given proper notice of “why  it  was  being held in contempt.”  Moreover,  DHHS suggests that Appellees failed to give DHHS proper notice of what orders had been  violated “because the trial court never clearly articulated what DHHS had been ordered to  do in this case.”  Listing  a  gamut  of  directives  that  DHHS  failed  to  comply  with,  the  circuit  court  concluded in its order that “[DHHS] deliberately refused to comply with the orders of the  Court and failed, despite direct prompting by the Court, to remedy that situation after it had ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 10  persisted from March 2005, until the hearing on June 14, 2005.”  As a result, the court held  DHHS  in  civil  contempt.  In  imposing  sanctions,  the  court  ordered  DHHS  to  submit  a  “detailed methodology” explaining the training level of employees, travel and reasonable  response to the clients’ needs, hiring mechanisms, and assurance of compliance with court  orders  and  case  plan  requirements.    Moreover,  the  court  ordered  DHHS  to  pay  a  $160  reimbursement fee to Briley for her out­of­pocket expenses.    Again, we must affirm the  circuit  court’s  finding  of  civil  contempt  unless  its  finding  was  clearly  against  the  preponderance of the evidence.  See Gatlin v. Gatlin, supra.  The  record  reveals  that  in  March  2005  the  court  ordered  DHHS  to  maintain  a  protective­services case under strict compliance with the court’s orders, with the goal of the  case to be family preservation.  The order specifically required that Briley submit to random  drug testing at the request of DHHS, submit to a drug assessment, follow recommendations  of that assessment, and  cooperate with DHHS, including attendance at three to five AA  meetings  per  week.    Likewise,  the  March  2005  case  plan  designated  the  services  to  be  provided  by  DHHS,  including random drug screens,  regular  visits  to  monitor  the  home,  transportation, and referral for counseling.  As to the issue of compliance with the circuit court’s prior order, the hearings and  pleadings before the circuit court revealed the following: ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  •  Page 11  DHHS only  went to Briley’s house two times between February 2005 and  September 2005.  •  Briley expected DHHS to provide transportation to and from counseling and  AA  meetings  and  to  organize  counseling  for  one  of  the  children.  DHHS,  instead, never offered counseling.  Briley, however, accessed counseling on  her own and with her own resources, and she attested that one of her children  went to counseling solely because of her efforts.  •  DHHS only requested three random drug screens from Briley throughout the  life of the case.  Briley stated that she called DHHS numerous times to ask  about drug tests, but she was told that offering to submit to a drug screen did  not make it a random test.  •  Despite  Briley’s  request,  DHHS  never  provided  transportation  for  job  interviews. In fact, DHHS did not provide any type of transportation for the  children either.  •  DHHS never visited the children.  •  DHHS conducted only one home visit.  •  DHHS failed to review the updated case plan as of March 2005.  When questioned about DHHS’s failure to provide Briley’s requested services, Teresa Head, ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 12  the county supervisor, explained that she was the only experienced worker with a caseload  of eighty­five cases.  In other words, DHHS’s only defense was that, considering staffing  shortages and heavy caseloads assigned to the caseworkers, the agency was doing all it could  for Briley and her family.  Yet, based on the evidence presented to the court, we cannot say  that the court’s contempt order was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  In contending that the court erred in holding the agency in contempt, DHHS relies  upon this court’s decision in Edwards v. Jameson, 283 Ark. 395, 677 S.W.2d 842 (1984).  That case, however, is clearly distinguishable.  In Edwards, the only written accusation in  the petition was that Edwards violated the court’s “lawful orders.”  In other words, there was  no charge of a particular violation of the court’s orders.  We held that the absence of the  1  required specific notice invalidated the court’s finding of contempt.  Id.  In contrast, the  instant case involves a specific charge set forth in the attachment to Appellees’ petition for  contempt.  In her affidavit, Briley attested that DHHS failed to provide her random drug  screens, home visitation, counseling, and transportation.  Moreover, at the hearing, Briley  testified, among other things, that DHHS never visited with her children.  Thus, the facts  here are clearly different from those at issue in the Edwards case.  We therefore affirm the 1  The Edwards case involved a criminal contempt sanction.  ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 13  circuit court’s finding of civil contempt.  See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark.  561,  810  S.W.2d  331  (1991)(upholding  the  trial  court’s  finding  of  contempt  and  its  imposition of a $250 fine based upon the failure of DHS to comply with the court’s prior  order directing that agency to provide bus tokens and cash assistance to the family).  For its second and last point on appeal, DHHS contends that the sanctions imposed  by the circuit court were improper.  As mentioned earlier, the court sanctioned DHHS with  a $160 reimbursement fee to be paid to Briley for her out­of­pocket expenses, and the circuit  court required DHHS to prepare a written methodology report.  Before addressing the merits  of DHHS’s last argument on appeal, we must first determine whether the argument has been  preserved for appellate review.  Following the entry of the court’s contempt order on September 26, 2005, DHHS filed  a “motion to reconsider and to modify findings of fact and conclusions of law” on October  19, 2005.  In that motion, DHHS presented its first and only challenge to the propriety of the  sanctions imposed by the court.  On the same day, DHHS filed a notice of appeal from the  contempt order entered on September 26, 2005.  The record does not reflect that the circuit  2 court ruled on DHHS’s motion for reconsideration.  2  The motion is not deemed denied under Ark. R. App. P. – Civ. 4(b)(1) (2006)  because DHHS did not file the motion within ten (10) days after entry of the contempt  ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 14  In the context of Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 (2006), we have specifically addressed the issue  of whether posttrial motions are required in order to preserve a point for appellate review.  Pursuant  to  Ark.  R.  Civ.  P.  59(f),  if  a  party  has  already  properly  preserved  an  error  concerning any of the grounds listed in Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a), that party is not required to  make a motion for new trial in order to argue those grounds on appeal.  Stacks v. Jones, 323  Ark. 643, 916 S.W.2d 120 (1996).  However, if a party has failed to properly preserve any  of the grounds listed in Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a), a posttrial motion is necessary to preserve the  point  for  appellate  review.  In  this  case,  DHHS  did  not  object  when  information  about  Briley’s out­of­pocket expenses was presented to the trial court at the contempt hearing.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  DHHS  challenged  the  evidentiary  basis  of  the  $160  reimbursement fee in its motion for reconsideration, the record contains no ruling on that  3  motion.  Thus, DHHS’s argument on appeal regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to  support the $160 reimbursement fee has not been preserved for appellate review.  Hurst v.  Dixon, 357 Ark. 439, 182 S.W.3d 102 (2004): Stacks v. Jones, supra.  With regard to the second sanction, however, DHHS did not have an opportunity to order.  3  Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (2006), the circuit court lost jurisdiction to rule  on the motion ninety days after entry of the contempt order.  ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 15  object to the sanction because the trial court sua sponte and without notice to either party  imposed a requirement that DHHS submit a methodology report. Under such circumstances,  where the appellant has no notice or opportunity to object to the court’s sanction until after  entry of the contempt order, a posttrial motion is not necessary to preserve the point for  4  appellate review.  Thus, proceeding to the merits on this point, we must conclude that the  circuit court erred in imposing the second sanction.  In so doing, the court required that  DHHS prepare and submit within sixty (60) days “a written methodology for responding to  th  future staffing issues in the 14  Judicial Circuit . . . .”  Civil contempt is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits  and  to  compel  obedience  to  orders  and  decrees  made  for  the  benefit  of  those  parties.  Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).    Here, the court had already  closed the underlying protective­services case, finding that Briley and her children were no  longer in need of the services of DHHS.  The court retained jurisdiction of the case only in  anticipation of a request for sanctions or contempt.  The sanction mandating a written report  on “future staffing issues” could not benefit Briley because her case had been closed.  Thus,  the court imposed an inappropriate civil contempt sanction in this case when it required 4  The rationale set forth in Stacks v. Jones, supra, would not apply where the trial  court sua sponte and without notice to either party imposes a contempt sanction.  ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 16  DHHS to submit a written methodology report.  Affirmed in part; reversed in part.  HANNAH, C.J., and GUNTER, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.  I concur in part and dissent in part.  I agree that the finding of civil contempt was  proper.  However, I disagree that the circuit court erred in mandating further actions by the  Department of Human Services such as the written report on “future staffing issues.” While  this appeal is framed in terms of contempt in the case concerning Tammy Briley and Charles  Renley, contempt in the pending case is only part of what is at issue.  Although the court was  convinced that sufficient improvement had been achieved by Briley to warrant closing the  present case on her child prosecuted under the juvenile code, the circuit court decided to  address  DHHS’s  failure  to  adequately  perform,  a  matter  that  is  certainly  relevant  to  the  integrity of the proceedings before the court. The integrity of the proceedings is a matter that  must be addressed by the circuit court whenever the issue arises to assure fair administration  of justice both in this case and in the many other cases before the circuit court involving  neglected children. This case presents an abject failure of DHHS to perform its statutory  duties.  It also involves a failure to comply with the circuit court’s orders.  The circuit court  has the inherent authority to control parties who appear before it, especially parties such as  DHHS who appear repeatedly in court on many different cases. ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 17  Further, Briley suffered as a consequence of DHHS’s failure to perform. She brought  her concerns to the attention of the circuit court.  Even though her case came to an end,  Briley continued to pursue her complaints about DHHS’s failure to perform.  There seems  to be little doubt that Briley benefitted from the sanctions in knowing that DHHS would  perform adequately in assisting others in the future.  Further still, while one is certainly  hopeful that Briley will not find herself back under court supervision with respect to her  child, repetition in these matters is not uncommon.  In that way as well Briley may benefit  in knowing that in the future should she find herself back under court supervision, she will  receive the assistance ordered by the court.  The record in this case clearly shows that the circuit court was attempting to assure  that all neglected children receive assistance from DHHS as ordered by the circuit court.  Because  the  circuit  court  held  the  matter  over  for  a  hearing  after  closing  the  protective  services case on appellees, it is apparent that what was at issue was more far­reaching than  what had or had not occurred during the pendency of the action against Briley and Renley.  The difficulties that the court experienced with DHHS in the present case were also being  experienced in other dependency­neglect cases.  The circuit court stated in its order that it  “recognizes that the events of this case demonstrate an organizational failure to properly  prepare  for  and  respond  to  massive  local  department  staff  layoffs  or  leaving.”    In  other ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 18  words, what the circuit court is concerned about is not only the events of the case involving  Briley and Renley, but rather it is concerned about all cases in the judicial district involving  DHHS.  The circuit court went on in the order to state that “[t]he court finds this remedy is  necessary to avoid the placing of clients in the precarious position of not receiving services,  to avoid unnecessary delays that caused foster care placement at the outset.”  Obviously, the  circuit court was attempting to put in place a system designed to assure DHHS’s performance  in future cases, which benefits all children over whom the court has jurisdiction rather than  just the child at issue in this case.  This is the court’s duty.  Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9­27­302(1) (Repl. 2002) provides:  This subchapter shall be liberally construed to the end that its purposes may  be carried out:  (1) To assure that all juveniles brought to the attention of the courts receive the  guidance, care, and control, preferably in each juvenile’s own home when the  juvenile’s health and safety are not at risk, which will best serve the emotional,  mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the best interest of the state.  . . .  The courts hold the primary responsibility and supervisory control to see that the children  of this state receive the assistance dictated by the statutes and the care and protection dictated  by the judiciary’s inherent obligation to serve justice.  If DHHS does not fulfill its duty under  the statutes, the circuit court  cannot  fulfill its duty.  In Arkansas Department of Human ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 19  Services v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998), this court found that the circuit court  is empowered to order family services, including ordering DHHS to fulfill its duty.  In that  case, this court affirmed an order that DHHS pay to restore utilities.  As the court of appeals noted in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Gruber,  5  39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992),  it is DHHS’s duty to cooperate with, assist, and  solicit  the  cooperation  and  assistance  of  all  public  or  private  agencies  or  organizations  involved in or dedicated to providing services.  The court of appeals further noted that the  court cannot fulfill its statutory responsibility without DHHS’s full cooperation with the  juvenile courts throughout the state.  A circuit court has the inherent authority to protect the integrity of the court in actions  before it. Valley v. Phillips County Election Comm’n, 357 Ark. 494, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1994).  Moreover,  the  circuit  court  has  the  inherent  authority  to  protect  the  integrity  of  the  proceedings  and  to  safeguard  the  rights  of  the  litigants  before  it.  City  of  Fayetteville  v.  Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).  I believe that the circuit court was within  its inherent authority to order DHHS to provide assurance that it would and could carry out 5  While in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112,  839 S.W.2d 543 (1992), the issue concerned specifically youth services, the services due  all children are naturally just as vital.  ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5  ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. v. BRILEY  Cite as 36_ Ark. ___ (2006)  Page 20  its obligations. Further, the use of the contempt power was appropriate.  “A court’s contempt  power may be wielded to preserve the court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of  the court’s orders, and to preserve and enforce the parties’ rights.” Hart v. McChristian, 344  Ark. 656, 670, 42 S.W.3d 552, 562 (2001).  Accordingly, the circuit court was also well  within its authority to use the contempt power to assure compliance.  Otherwise, a circuit  court  is  left  with  no  meaningful  ability  to  assure  that  the  children  in  need  receive  the  attention and services the circuit court is bound to provide under the statutes.  The courts  have no staff available to provide the services the statutes impose on DHHS.  In light of  DHHS’s apparent failure to perform its duties, I  would affirm the circuit court’s decision  to mandate that DHHS report to the circuit court its fitness to perform its statutorily required  function.  GUNTER, J., joins. ___________________________  IMBER, J. ­ 5 

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