Cary Lee Carter and Shelley Carter, Husband and Wife, Individually et al. v. Georgia-Pacific Resins, Inc., a Delaware Corporation et al.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
05-1250
CARY LEE CARTER AND SHELLEY
CARTER, HUSBAND AND WIFE,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND CARY LEE
CARTER AS THE PARENT AND
NATURAL GUARDIAN OF BRETT
CARTER, A MINOR CHILD; BRADLEY
SLADE CHEEK AND TINA MICHELLE
CHEEK, HUSBAND AND WIFE,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND BRADLEY
SLADE CHEEK AS THE PARENT AND
NATURAL GUARDIAN OF HUNTER
SLADE CHEEK, A MINOR CHILD;
RAYMOND T. CHEEK AND CYNTHIA
GAIL CHEEK, HUSBAND AND WIFE,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND RAYMOND T.
CHEEK AS THE PARENT AND
NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SARAH
ELIZABETH CHEEK, JOSEPH
RAYMOND CHEEK, AND STEPHANIE
RENEE CHEEK, MINOR CHILDREN;
JESSE LEE COOKE AND DEBRA
DENISE COOKE, HUSBAND AND
WIFE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND JESSE
LEE COOKE AS THE PARENT AND
NATURAL GUARDIAN OF JESSICA
DENISE COOKE AND DRAYLON
O’BRYAN COOKE, MINOR
CHILDREN; MARK WAYNE
HIGGINBOTHAM AND TONYA
HIGGINBOTHAM, HUSBAND AND
WIFE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND MARK
WAYNE HIGGINBOTHAM AS THE
PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN
OF MARCUS BLAKE HIGGINBOTHAM
AND CHASE HIGGINBOTHAM,
MINOR CHILDREN; JAMES WOODS
Opinion Delivered November
9, 2006
APPEAL FROM THE ASHLEY COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CV2001-110-1,
HON. SAMUEL POPE, JUDGE,
DISMISSED.
AND TAMMIE S. WOODS, HUSBAND
AND WIFE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
JAMES WOODS AS THE PARENT AND
NATURAL GUARDIAN OF TARA L.
WOODS AND JOSHUA C. WOODS,
MINOR CHILDREN; ARMENDA
MORRISON MASON; AND THOMAS
RAY TURNER;
APPELLANTS,
vs.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC RESINS, INC., A
DELAWARE CORPORATION;
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
CHEMICAL DIVISION, A DELAWARE
CORPORATION; TEADIT N.A., INC., A
TEXAS CORPORATION;
CONVENTIONAL SEALING
MATERIALS, INC., A TEXAS
CORPORATION; TEADIT INDUSTRIA
E COMERCIO, LTDA, A BRAZILIAN
CORPORATION; PROAMIANTO
COMERCIO E EXPORTACAO, S.A., A
BRAZILIAN CORPORATION; AND
MONROE RUBBER & GASKET CO., A
LOUISIANA CORPORATION;
APPELLEES,
JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice
This appeal arises out of the dismissal of claims relating to alleged exposure to
asbestos at the workplace. In a suit filed in the Ashley County Circuit Court, the plaintiffs-2-
05-1250
appellants are divided into several separate but related groups. “Plaintiff employees” are
current and former employees of appellee Georgia-Pacific Resins, Inc. (G-P) at a plant in
Crossett, Arkansas. “Plaintiff family members” are the spouses, children, and other
household members of plaintiff employees. Appellees Teadit, N.A., Inc. and Monroe
Rubber & Gasket Co. are distributors of asbestos-containing gasket materials used by the
plaintiff employees in their work.
The plaintiffs allege multiple causes of action against multiple parties, some of which
are still pending in the circuit court. However, the circuit court entered an order dismissing
(1) all claims of the plaintiff employees against G-P, and all claims of any plaintiff that are
derivative of the plaintiff employees’ claims, on the basis that the claims arose out of and
in the course of employment with G-P, and are barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of
the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), and (2) plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Subsequently, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the circuit court
certified that the dismissals were final for the purposes of appeal. Although several
arguments are raised on appeal, we do not reach the merits of the arguments because we
must reverse the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction.
Here, the plaintiffs alleged that they were injured due to the plaintiff employees’
exposure to asbestos while working at G-P. In response to the plaintiffs’ complaint, G-P
argued that the Workers’ Compensation Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine
-3-
05-1250
the applicability of the WCA, and that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction. The circuit court disagreed, concluding that it had jurisdiction. We hold that
the circuit court erred.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105 (Repl. 2002) provides in relevant part:
(a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions
of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other
rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next
of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the
employer. . . .
In VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises, 334 Ark. 12, 16, 970 S.W.2d 810, 812
(1998), we held:
[T]he exclusive remedy of an employee or her representative on account of
injury or death arising out of and in the course of her employment is a claim
for compensation under § 11-9-105, and. . . the commission has exclusive,
original jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless
the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact but one of law,
such as an intentional tort. See Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 719, 945
S.W.2d 933 (1997) (citing Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 461, 692
S.W.2d 615 (1985) (explaining that, before an employee is free to bring a tort
action for damages against an employer, the facts must show that the employer
had a “desire” to bring about the consequences of the acts, or that the acts
were premeditated with the specific intent to injure the employee).
This rule has been consistently reaffirmed by this court. See Stocks v. Affiliated
Foods Southwest, Inc., 363 Ark. 235, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2005); Merez v. Squire Court Ltd.
P’ship, 353 Ark. 174, 114 S.W.3d 184 (2003); Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R., 352 Ark. 534,
104 S.W.3d 745 (2003); WENCO Franchise Mgmt., Inc. v. Chamness, 341 Ark. 86, 13
-4-
05-1250
S.W.3d 903 (2000). In adopting this rule, we have explained that the Commission has vast
expertise in this area, and that the goals of uniformity, speed, and simplicity would best be
achieved by granting the Commission the exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the
applicability of the WCA. See Johnson, 352 Ark. at 541, 104 S.W.3d at 748. See also
Stocks, supra, WENCO, supra.
We recognize that this case raises a constitutional issue. Nonetheless, this court has
stated that “even though the Workers’ Compensation Commission may not have the
authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, such constitutional issues should first be raised
at the Administrative Law Judge or Commission level because such issues often require an
exhaustive analysis that is best accomplished by an adversary proceeding, which can be done
only at the hearing level.” Ark. Health Servs. Agency v. Desiderata, Inc., 331 Ark. 144, 148,
958 S.W.2d 7, 8 (1998) (approving the rule adopted by the court of appeals in Hamilton v.
Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982)). See also Moses v. Hanna’s
Candle Co., ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (May 4, 2006).
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to determine
whether the employees’ injuries were covered under our Workers’ Compensation Act. That
determination lies exclusively with the Commission, as the facts presented below are not so
one-sided as to demonstrate that the WCA does not apply as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Stocks, supra. We dismiss the instant appeal, with leave for the parties to pursue a
-5-
05-1250
determination before the Commission. We wish to emphasize that our ruling applies only
to the issues certified pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b); the plaintiffs’ remaining claims in
the circuit court are not before us at this time.
Dismissed.
SPECIAL JUSTICE ROGER D. ROWE joins.
GLAZE, J., not participating.
-6-
05-1250
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.