Rodney Williams v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

No. CR 83-94

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

RODNEY WILLIAMS

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

Opinion Delivered November 3, 2005

PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION IN CIRCUIT COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS AND A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, CR 82-834]

PETITION DENIED

PER CURIAM

Rodney Williams was found guilty by a jury in 1983 of aggravated robbery and murder in the first degree. We affirmed. Williams v. State, 281 Ark. 91, 663 S.W.2d 700 (1983), cert. den., 469 U.S. 980 (1984). He subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief in this court pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1. The petition was denied. Williams v. State, CR 83-94 (January 13, 1986). Williams now asks that this court reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis and a petition for writ of habeas corpus.1

The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error coram nobis is necessary because the circuit court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001). As to petitioner's desire to proceed with a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it is not necessary for a petitioner to seek leave from this court before proceeding with such a petition.

Petitioner, more than twenty-one years after he was convicted, asserts that he is entitled to proceed in the trial court, on two grounds. He first contends that various police officers conspired to convict him by coercing his statements and then lying to the court about the circumstances under which the statements were given. He further contends that the prosecution knew the officers' testimony was untrue and withheld the testimony of two other officers who could have offered testimony favorable to the defense at the hearing on his motion to suppress the statements. He argues that the withholding of the witnesses amounted to withholding exculpatory evidence and violated the right to due process guaranteed by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). As his second ground to proceed in the trial court, petitioner alleges that erroneous evidence was used to establish that he was as a habitual offender.

A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than its approval. State v. Larimore, 341 Ark.397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). We have held that a writ of error coram nobis was available to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: insanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per curiam). For the writ to issue following the affirmance of a conviction, the petitioner must show a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Larimore v. State, 327 Ark. 271, 938 S.W.2d 818 (1997). Coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 428, citing Troglin v. State, 257 Ark. 644, 519 S.W.2d 740 (1975).

There is no specific time limit for seeking a writ of error coram nobis, but due diligence is required in making an application for relief, and in the absence of a valid excuse for delay, the petition will be denied. Echols v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (January 20, 2005) ("Echols Error Coram Nobis II" or "Echols ECN II"). Due diligence requires that (1) the defendant be unaware of the fact at the time of trial; (2) he could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, presented the fact at trial; or (3) upon discovering the fact, did not delay bringing the petition. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is appropriate only when an issue was not addressed or could not have been addressed at trial because it was somehow hidden or unknown and would have prevented the rendition of the judgment had it been known to the trial court; Echols ECN II, at ____, ___ S.W.3d at ___; Brown v. State, 571, 670 S.W.2d 4 330 Ark. 627, 955 S.W.2d 901 (1997); Penn, supra.

Here, it is abundantly clear that petitioner was aware at the time of trial that certain police officers had testified concerning his statements at the suppression hearing and at his trial but other officers had not. Even if the prosecution had somehow hidden the fact of the other officers' existence, petitioner does not explain why he could have not learned about the officers at the time of trial or, with diligence, produced the issue without a delay of more than twenty years. He was also fully aware at the time of trial of the evidence put forth by the prosecution to establish that he was as a habitual offender.

Petitioner does not allege any new facts that were unknown, or that could not have been or were not presented at trial, and he has failed to show a fundamental error that was unknown and could not have been addressed at trial and on the record on appeal. Petitioner has therefore failed to show grounds for reinvesting jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis.

Petition denied.

1 For clerical purposes, the instant petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis was assigned the same docket number as the direct appeal of the judgment.