Jessie Goins v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

No. 05-142

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JESSIE GOINS

Respondent

v.

LARRY NORRIS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Petitioner

Opinion Delivered March 31, 2005

PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL OF ORDER [CIRCUIT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY, CV 2003-103-5, HON. FRED D. DAVIS, JUDGE]

MOTION TREATED AS MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK AND DENIED

PER CURIAM

Jessie Goins, who was incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction by virtue of conviction of a criminal offense, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court in the county in which he was in custody. The petition was denied, and petitioner Goins filed a timely notice of appeal on March 5, 2004. He did not tender the record to this court until February 7, 2005, which was not within the time limit set to tender a record pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Civil 5(a). The rule requires that the record be tendered within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal, unless the circuit court granted an extension of time to lodge the record. The ninetieth day in this case was June 3, 2004. The record tendered by petitioner reflects two orders extending the time to lodge the record but both were entered after June 3, 2004, and thus were not effective. In accordance with Ark. R. App. P.--Civ. 5(b), any order extending the time to lodge the record must be entered before the expiration of the period for filing the record with our clerk. Davis v. Williamson, 353 Ark. 225, 114 S.W.3d 216 (2003); Osburn v. Department of Human Services, 341 Ark. 218, 15 S.W.3d 673 (2000).

Now before us is Goins's motion for belated appeal of the order. As the notice of appeal was timely, we will treat the motion as a motion for rule on clerk to lodge the record. See Muhammed v. State, 330 Ark. 759, 957 S.W.2d 692 (1997).

It is the petitioner who is responsible for tendering the record within the time allowed by the prevailing rules of procedure. This court has consistently held that all litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating a good cause for not doing so. Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983). The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989).

Petitioner here attributes the late tender of the record to the circuit clerk's refusal to prepare the record until he paid the required fee. He asserts that he mailed the fee to the clerk on or about July 28, 2004, and that the fact that he had financial difficulties that prevented the timely tender of the record should not preclude his proceeding with the appeal. He offers no explanation for tendering the record with the instant motion on February 7, 2005, which was eleven months after the notice of appeal was filed.

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300(1982). It was not the responsibility of the circuit clerk or anyone other than petitioner to perfect the appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990); Bragg, supra. Petitioner failed to do so and has failed to state a good cause for not tendering the record in a timely manner. Motion for belated appeal treated as motion for rule on clerk and denied.