Darin Daniel and Dana Honeycutt-Daniel, on Behalf of Themselves and the Citizens, Residents, Taxpayers and Inhabitants of White County, Arkansas v. The Honorable Glen Jones, County Judge of White County, Arkansas et al.

Annotate this Case
Darin DANIEL and Dana Honeycutt-Daniel, On
Behalf of Themselves and the Citizens,
Residents, Taxpayers, and Inhabitants of
White County, Arkansas v. The Honorable Glen
JONES, County Judge of White County,
Arkansas, et al.

97-634                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 9, 1998


1.   Motions -- motion to dismiss -- trial court's duty. -- When considering
     an Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court
     must treat the facts as true and view them in the light most
     favorable to the party who filed the complaint; the trial
     court must not look beyond the complaint unless it is treating
     the motion as one for summary judgment; the trial court must
     not lend consideration to any factual conclusions reached
     through the arguments of counsel and exhibits and may not base
     its decision on allegations contained in the briefs and
     exhibits.

2.   Motions -- motion to dismiss -- treated as such by chancellor -- supreme
     court's duty on review. -- Where there were no questions of fact
     to be determined, the parties to the action having agreed upon
     and stipulated to the relevant facts and exhibits, thereby
     acknowledging the truth of the facts, the chancellor clearly
     treated appellees' motion as one to dismiss for failure to
     state facts upon which relief could be granted; thus, upon
     review, the supreme court was required to construe the
     complaint liberally, accepting the facts alleged as true and
     viewing them in a light most favorable to appellants.
3.   Constitutional law -- interpretation of Arkansas Constitution. -- When
     the language of a provision of the Arkansas Constitution is
     plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its plain,
     obvious, and common meaning; neither rules of construction nor
     rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and
     certain meaning of a constitutional provision. 

4.   Taxation -- intent of Ark. Const. art. 16,  11. -- The express intent
     of Article 16, section 11, of the Arkansas Constitution is for
     the object to be stated so that the tax revenues cannot be
     shifted to a use different from that authorized. 

5.   Taxation -- illegal exaction -- use of funds for different purpose
     constitutes. -- It is the use of tax funds for a different
     purpose that constitutes an illegal exaction; where a primary
     purpose of a tax cannot be accomplished, but the collection of
     the tax continues, an illegal exaction has occurred; when a
     tax is enacted by the General Assembly or approved by a vote
     of the people without the statement of a purpose, the
     resulting revenues may be used for general purposes; it is
     only when a diversion of tax revenues occurs from a specific
     purpose that has been authorized to an unauthorized purpose
     that an illegal exaction occurs; whether the governmental
     entity levying and collecting the tax intended to put the
     revenues to "good use" is of no consequence, so long as the
     funds are being spent on any purpose other than those
     specified on the ballot.

6.   Taxation -- court looks to levying ordinance to determine whether revenue
     expenditures whether authorized. -- For purposes of construing Ark.
     Const. art. 16,  11, the "law imposing the tax" is the
     levying ordinance; accordingly, the supreme court looks to the
     levying ordinance rather than the enabling legislation in
     determining whether expenditures of tax revenues were
     authorized.

7.   Elections -- ballot title -- source of information for voters. -- It is
     to the title of the ordinance and the ballot title that the
     electors have the right to look to ascertain what they are
     asked to approve; the ballot title is the final word of
     information and warning to which the electors have the right
     to look as to just what authority they are asked to confer.

8.   Elections -- ballot title -- purpose of. -- It has long been regarded
     as axiomatic that the majority of voters, when called upon to
     vote for or against a proposed measure at a general election,
     will derive their information about its contents from an
     inspection of the ballot title immediately before exercising
     the right of suffrage; this, indeed, is the purpose of the
     ballot title.
9.   Elections -- ballot title -- plain-language standard. -- Citizens are
     entitled to be informed by plain language about what they are
     voting, and the supreme court has long insisted on that
     standard. 

10.  Elections -- ballot title -- references to acts of legislature
     insufficient. -- Mere references to acts of the legislature in a
     ballot title are insufficient to inform voters about what it
     was they were voting because the voters do not have ready
     access to the acts of the legislature, and it cannot be
     presumed they know what repealing effects a later act may have
     on a former act.

11.  Elections -- voters' right to be fully informed is paramount. --
     Overruling its decision in City of Little Rock v. Waters, 303
     Ark. 363, 797 S.W.2d 426 (1990), to the extent that it
     conflicted with the present holding, the supreme court
     declared that the voters' right to be fully informed of the
     matter for which they are casting their votes is paramount; 
     where the General Assembly has established the right of the
     voters to approve the imposition of a tax, any consideration
     of the legislature's general power to tax is secondary to the
     voters' right to full disclosure of the nature of the tax and
     its proposed purposes.

12.  Taxation -- voters' right to full disclosure of how revenues would be
     spent outweighed consideration of legislature's authority to establish
     scheme of distribution. -- The supreme court concluded that the
     county's voters' right to full disclosure regarding how the
     tax revenues would be spent outweighed any consideration of
     the General Assembly's authority to establish the particular
     scheme of distribution of those revenues; both the levying
     ordinance and the ballot reflected five designated purposes
     for which the sales tax revenues would be used; the voters
     were not specifically informed, nor could they be presumed to
     have known, that the legislative act that empowered the county
     to levy the tax also provided that the cities would be given
     their per capita shares of the revenues and would be allowed
     to spend the money for purposes other than those designated on
     the ballot.    

13.  Taxation -- illegal exaction -- use of revenues for purposes not designated
     by levying ordinance and ballot constituted -- reversed and remanded. --
     Any use of the sales tax revenues for purposes other than
     those designated by the levying ordinance and the ballot was
     in violation of Article 16,  11, of the Arkansas Constitution
     and constituted an illegal exaction; the supreme court
     reversed and remanded the ruling of the trial court.  


     Appeal from White Chancery Court; Jim Hannah, Chancellor;
reversed and remanded.
     Nichols, Wolff, Ledbetter & Campbell, by: H. Gregory Campbell
and Mark W. Nichols, for appellants.
     Gill Law Firm, a professional association, by: C. Tad
Bohannon, for appellees (White County Judge and Quorum Court
Members).
     Lightle, Beebe, Raney, Bell & Hudgins, by: Mike Beebe and
Donald Raney; Williams & Anderson, by: Leon Holmes and J. Madison
Barker, for appellees (Mayors of White County Cities).
    
     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     This is a class-action suit claiming an illegal exaction. 
Appellants Darin Daniel and Dana Honeycutt-Daniel, on behalf of
themselves and the citizens, residents, taxpayers, and inhabitants
of White County, appeal the judgment of the White County Chancery
Court dismissing their claim against Appellees, the White County
judge, members of the quorum court, the county treasurer, the
mayors of the various cities in White County, and the State of
Arkansas.  Appellants' claim concerns a county ordinance passed by
a majority of voters that imposed a countywide one-percent (1%)
sales tax.  The ballot reflected that the revenues generated from
the sales tax would be used for five designated purposes.  It is
not disputed that the tax revenues are being used for purposes
other than those stated on the ballot.  On appeal, Appellants argue
that using the tax proceeds for purposes other than those
designated on the ballot violates Article 16,  11, of the Arkansas
Constitution of 1874 and Ark. Code Ann.  26-74-308 (Repl. 1997). 
Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(1) & (17)(vi), as the issues raised require our interpretation
of the Arkansas Constitution and acts of the General Assembly.  We
find merit to Appellants' argument and reverse.
     The relevant facts are not in dispute and were stipulated to
by all parties.  On July 19, 1989, the White County Quorum Court
adopted Ordinance No. 89-14 to set a special election to submit for
the voters' approval the levy of a one-percent (1%) countywide
sales tax.  Ordinance No. 89-14 provided in part:
     BE IT ENACTED BY THE QUORUM COURT OF THE COUNTY OF WHITE,
     STATE OF ARKANSAS:  AN EMERGENCY ORDINANCE TO BE
     ENTITLED:  AN ORDINANCE TO PLACE BEFORE THE VOTERS OF
     WHITE COUNTY A PROPOSAL FOR A COUNTY WIDE ONE PERCENT
     (1%) SALES TAX AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
          SECTION 1.
          That pursuant to Act 991 of 1981 the General
     Assembly of Arkansas empowered the various Quorum Courts
     of the respective Arkansas counties with the authority to
     call an election for the levy of a one percent (1%)
     county wide sales tax.  That said election shall be held
     within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the ordinance
     calling for the election.  ([Ark. Code Ann. ] 26-74-307)
          SECTION 2.
          That the County is in need of additional funding to
     maintain the present level of services now provided to
     the people of White County and to enable the County
     officials to plan for future growth and services and
     solid waste management.
          SECTION 3.
          That the ballot title shall be as follows:
          [  ] "For adoption of a one percent (1%) sales tax
               within White County."
          [  ] "Against adoption of a one percent (1%) sales
               tax within White County." 

     On August 15, 1989, the county quorum court adopted Ordinance
No. 89-17 as an amendment to Ordinance No. 89-14.  Ordinance No.
89-17 reflected in pertinent part:
     Be it enacted by the Quorum Court of the County of White,
     State of Arkansas:  An Ordinance to be entitled:
     An Ordinance to designate the use of the revenue
     generated by the 1% sales tax that will appear on the
     Ballot during a Special Election Tuesday August 22, 1989.
          SECTION 6.  That it is the consenses [sic] of the
     White County Quorum Court, that revenues generated from
     the imposition of the tax be divided as follows:
          
               A.  50% County Road
               B.  25% County General
               C.   5% Volunteer Fire Departments
               D.  10% Non-Mandated Services
               E.  10% Capital Improvements

     A special election was held on August 22, 1989, wherein the
voters were presented with the ballot for Ordinance No. 89-17,
which read in pertinent part:
                        COUNTY SALES TAX
     An ordinance to adopt a one percent (1%) sales tax within
     White County.

     The sales tax money is to be used as follows:
          50%  for County Road
          25%  for County General
           5%  for Volunteer Fire Departments
          10%  for Capital Improvements
          10%  for Non-Mandated Services (includes Extension
               Office, Program for Aging, County Library and
               Veterans Office)
FOR adoption of a one percent (1%) sales tax within White County
AGAINST adoption of a one percent (1%) sales tax within White
County

     The voters approved the measure.  White County began levying
and collecting the sales tax on October 1, 1989, and is currently
doing so.  Since October 1, 1989, the State of Arkansas has
received the tax monies collected and remitted the funds to the
county and its cities on a per capita basis.  White County receives
a check each month from the State Treasurer for approximately
45.50% of the sales tax collected.  Upon receipt of the county's
share of the revenues, the county treasurer prepares a report
allocating those funds as set out in the foregoing ballot.  The
remaining 54.50% of the sales tax monies, however, is distributed
by the State Treasurer among the cities on a per capita basis.  The
cities then use their shares of the tax proceeds for their own
purposes.  Neither Ordinance No. 89-14, Ordinance No. 89-17, nor
the actual ballot disclosed to the voters that the cities within
the county would receive a portion of the sales tax proceeds, or
that such proceeds would be used for purposes other than those
designated in Ordinance No. 89-17 and the ballot.  Nor do the
ballot and ordinances reveal the method by which the sales tax is
to be collected and distributed to the various governmental
entities.  The ordinances and the ballot further do not mention
that the State Treasurer would deduct the sum of three percent (3%)
from the sales tax collected as a service fee, pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann.  26-74-313 (Repl. 1997).  
     On June 22, 1995, Appellants filed their complaint pursuant to
Article 16,  13, of the Arkansas Constitution, requesting that the
trial court declare the levy and collection of the one-percent (1%)
sales tax an illegal exaction.  Appellants requested further that
the trial court grant an injunction to prevent county officials
from collecting the sales tax and a mandatory injunction ordering
the refund and return of taxpayer monies illegally exacted, after
apportionment of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Ark. Code
Ann.  26-35-902 (Repl. 1997).  Subsequent amended complaints were
filed, wherein Appellants claimed, among other things, that the
sales tax monies were being levied and collected in violation of
Article 16,  11, of the Arkansas Constitution and section 26-74-
308.  Specifically, they contended that because the ballot and
Ordinance No. 89-17 declared particular uses for the revenues
generated from the sales tax, all such revenues must be spent only
for those designated purposes, and for nothing else.  They claimed
that because the ballot and ordinances failed to disclose that
portions of the sales tax proceeds would be distributed to the
cities, it was illegal to give them any share of such proceeds.  
     Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaints pursuant to
ARCP Rule 12(b)(6), insisting that the sales tax was being
collected in accordance with Arkansas law and that Appellants had
failed to state sufficient facts upon which relief could be
granted.  They asserted that Act 991 of 1981, now codified at Ark.
Code Ann.  26-74-301 to -314 (Repl. 1997), requires that portions
of the sales tax collected be distributed to the cities within the
county levying the tax.  They contended that Act 991 does not
contain any exceptions to the State Treasurer's statutory duty to
distribute portions of the tax to the cities, and that the county
imposing the tax has no responsibility or control over the
distribution of the proceeds.  Additionally, Appellees asserted
that Act 991 provides that cities within the county may spend their
shares of the tax revenues for any purpose for which their general
funds or the county's general funds may be used.  They argued
further that the designation on the ballot of how the revenues
generated from the tax would be spent referred only to the way in
which the county's share of those revenues would be spent, and that
this should have been evident to the voters by the fact that the
ballot referred to such uses as "County Road" and "County General." 
     The trial court agreed with Appellees and granted their motion
to dismiss.  The trial court ruled that Act 991 is the authority by
which this sales tax was implemented, and that just as the Act
enables the county to levy such a tax, it also limits the power of
the county to undertake such action.  The court found that Act 991
directs the State Treasurer to distribute the sales tax collected
to the county and the cities on a per capita basis after the State
Treasurer deducts a three-percent (3%) service charge.  See section
26-74-313.  The trial court found further that the State Treasurer
had fulfilled such statutory duties in this particular instance. 
The trial court ruled that the designation on the ballot by the
quorum court of the proposed uses of the tax revenues, as provided
in section 26-74-308(c), pertained only to the county's share of
the revenues, and that the designation by the county as to its
intended uses of the revenues could not bind the cities as to how
they must use their shares of the revenues.  To allow the county to
control the cities' shares, the trial court reasoned, would empower
the counties beyond that authority specifically delegated to them
by the General Assembly.  
     The trial court also found that section 26-74-308(c), included
in Act 278 of 1983, makes no reference to the cities or state and
speaks in terms of proceeds derived from the tax, rather than
revenues collected.  Accordingly, the trial court reasoned that
such a reference is applicable only to the revenues received by the
county after the State has deducted its appropriate percentage and
the cities have received their respective portions.  The trial
court found that Act 991, as amended and reenacted, is the later
enactment of law and that it controls as to any conflict with Act
278.  The trial court ruled that there was no violation of Article
16,  11, as the White County sales tax is being distributed
according to statute in pursuance of law.  
     Appellants now contend that the trial court erred in
dismissing their claim, as they assert that the collection of the
county sales tax revenues and their distribution to the cities for
purposes other than those designated on the ordinances and ballot,
violates Article 16,  11, of the constitution and section 26-74-
308.  Appellants argue that the voters of White County who approved
the sales tax were entitled to rely upon that information provided
on the ballot as the final word of how the revenues would be spent. 
We agree.
     Before reaching the particular arguments raised by Appellants,
we must determine whether the chancellor's order was in fact a
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or a grant of summary judgment as
provided in Rule 56.  When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the trial court must treat the facts as true and view them
in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. 
Oldner v. Villines, 328 Ark. 296, 943 S.W.2d 574 (1997).  The trial
court must not look beyond the complaint unless it is treating the
motion as one for summary judgment.  Id.  The trial court must not
lend consideration to any factual conclusions reached through the
arguments of counsel and exhibits and may not base its decision on
allegations contained in the briefs and exhibits.  Id.  Here, there
were no questions of fact to be determined.  The parties to the
action agreed upon and stipulated to the relevant facts and
exhibits, thereby acknowledging the truth of such facts.  The
chancellor clearly treated the motion as one to dismiss for failure
to state facts upon which relief could be granted.  Thus, upon
review, we also must construe the complaint liberally, accepting
the facts alleged as true and viewing them in a light most
favorable to Appellants.  Brown v. Tucker, 330 Ark. 435, 954 S.W.2d 262 (1997).  
     Act 991 is a comprehensive delegation by the General Assembly
to the county quorum courts of the authority to impose a countywide
one-percent (1%) sales tax.  Sections 26-74-307 and -308 provide
for the precise method of calling for an election to levy such a
sales tax and the required form of the ballot.  Section 26-74-
308(c) provides:
          (c) The ballot may also indicate designated uses of
     the revenues derived from the sales tax and, if the tax
     is approved, the proceeds shall only be used for the
     designated purposes.  [Emphasis added.]

     Section 26-74-313 provides in pertinent part:

          (b) . . . any sales tax collected by the director
     under this subchapter on behalf of any county shall be
     deposited with the State Treasurer in trust and shall be
     kept in a separate suspense account. 

          . . . . 

          (d)(1) The State Treasurer shall transmit to the
     treasurer or financial officer of each city and county
     their per capita share, after deducting the amount
     required for claims, overpayments, and bad checks, as
     certified by the director. 
          . . . . 
          (3) Transmittals shall be made at least quarterly in
     each fiscal year.  Funds so transmitted may be used by
     the cities and counties for any purpose for which the
     city's general funds or county's general funds may be
     used.  Before transmitting these funds, the State
     Treasurer shall deduct three percent (3%) of the sum
     collected as a charge by the state for its services
     specified in this subchapter[.]  [Emphasis added.]

     Appellants rely on section 26-74-308(c), as well as Article
16,  11, of the constitution, for their argument that the tax
currently being levied by White County is an illegal exaction; they
contend that because the ballot reflected only five designated
purposes for the tax revenues, any other use of the revenues is in
conflict with that section and the constitution.  
     Appellees contend that sections 26-74-308(c) and 26-74-313 can
be read harmoniously, if we adopt the reasoning of the trial court
that the designated uses or purposes that may be declared on the
ballot, as provided in section 26-74-308(c), refer only to the
county's use of its share of the tax revenues, not to the whole of
the sales tax collected.  They contend that the legislature has
permitted the county to designate specific purposes on the ballot,
but that it has nonetheless required the State Treasurer to
distribute the tax revenues to the county and its cities on a per
capita basis.  To accept Appellants' reading of the statutory
provisions, Appellees urge, would completely defeat the entire
taxation scheme designed by the General Assembly. 
     We initially turn to the issue of whether the sales tax
currently being levied and collected is an illegal exaction in
violation of Article 16,  11, of the Arkansas Constitution.  For
purposes of interpreting our constitution, we have made clear that
when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous, each
word must be given its plain, obvious, and common meaning.  Oldner,
328 Ark. 296, 943 S.W.2d 574.  "Neither rules of construction nor
rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain
meaning of a constitutional provision."  Foster v. Jefferson County
Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 108, 901 S.W.2d 809, 810 (1995). 
Article 16,  11, provides:
          No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law,
     and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the
     object of the same; and no moneys arising from a tax
     levied for one purpose shall be used for any other
     purpose.  [Emphasis added.]

     In Oldner, we stated that the express intent of that
constitutional provision "is for the object to be stated so that
the tax revenues cannot be shifted to a use different from that
authorized."  328 Ark. at 305, 943 S.W.2d  at 579.  It is the use of
the funds for a different purpose that constitutes an illegal
exaction.  Id. (citing Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989); Bell v. Crawford County, 287 Ark. 251, 697 S.W.2d 910,
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1985)).  Where a primary purpose of
the tax could not be accomplished, but the collection of the tax
was continued, this court held that an illegal exaction had
occurred.  Hasha v. City of Fayetteville, 311 Ark. 460, 845 S.W.2d 500 (1993).  Similarly, in Oldner, we held:
     When a tax is enacted by the General Assembly or approved
     by a vote of the people without the statement of a
     purpose, the resulting revenues may be used for general
     purposes.  We fail to see how the voting public could be
     misled on this point.  It is only when a diversion of tax
     revenues occurs from a specific purpose that has been
     authorized to an unauthorized purpose that an illegal
     exaction occurs.  We have no doubt that that is the evil
     ought to be remedied by Article 16,  11.

328 Ark. 305, 943 S.W.2d 579 (emphasis added).  Whether the
governmental entity levying and collecting the tax intended to put
the revenues to "good use" is of no consequence, so long as the
funds are being spent on any purpose other than those specified on
the ballot.  Hartwick, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531.  
     Here, there is no dispute that the revenues collected from the
sales tax are being spent by the cities of White County for
purposes other than those five uses designated on the ballot. 
There is no allegation that the county has applied any of its share
of the revenues to any other purposes other than those designated
on the ballot.  The question then becomes whether the voters were
otherwise put on notice of the fact that the cities, as well as the
State, would receive their portions of the revenues as set out in
section 26-74-313.  
     Appellees contend that the cities' portions of the revenues
are being spent in accordance with the purposes set out in section
26-74-313(d).  They argue that this court should look to that
section, as well as the remainder of Act 991, to determine whether
the tax revenues are being spent appropriately pursuant to Article
16,  11.  We disagree with this argument.  
     We held in Oldner, 328 Ark. 296, 943 S.W.2d 574, that for
purposes of construing Article 16,  11, the "law imposing the tax"
is the levying ordinance.  Accordingly, we look to the levying
ordinance, rather than the enabling legislation, in determining
whether the expenditures of the tax revenues are authorized.  Here,
the levying ordinance, Ordinance No. 89-17, declared five specific
purposes for the tax revenues, the same five purposes that were
subsequently designated on the ballot.  The voters of White County
were entitled to rely upon the information provided to them in the
levying ordinance and the ballot when casting their votes; hence,
any use of the revenues for purposes other than those provided
constitutes an illegal exaction.  This conclusion is consistent
with this court's long-held position that the ballot title is the
final, definitive statement to the voters as to that which they are
being asked to decide.  
     In Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. City of Rector, 214 Ark.
649, 654, 217 S.W.2d 335, 337 (1949), this court held that it is to
the title of the ordinance and the ballot title "that the electors
had the right to look to ascertain what they were asked to
approve[.]"  This court held further that "[t]he ballot title is
the final word of information and warning to which the electors had
the right to look as to just what authority they were asked to
confer[.]"  Id.  Correspondingly, in Christian Civic Action Comm.
v. McCuen, this court observed:
     It has long been regarded as axiomatic that the majority
     of voters, when called upon to vote for or against a
     proposed measure at a general election, will derive their
     information about its contents from an inspection of the
     ballot title immediately before exercising the right of
     suffrage.  This, indeed, is the purpose of the ballot
     title.  

318 Ark. 241, 245, 884 S.W.2d 605, 607 (1994) (citations omitted). 
In Ragan v. Venhaus, 289 Ark. 266, 711 S.W.2d 467 (1986), upon
which Appellants rely, this court held that "[t]he citizens are
entitled to be informed by plain language about what they are
voting, and this court has long insisted on that standard."  Id. at
271, 711 S.W.2d  at 469.  Mere references to acts of the legislature
in a ballot title were insufficient to inform voters about what it
was they were voting, as "[t]he voters do not have ready access to
the acts of the legislature, and we cannot presume they know what
repealing effects a later act may have on a former act."  Id.
(emphasis added).
     We are thus not persuaded by Appellees' argument that the
White County voters could have known, ostensibly from an inspection
of the statutory law, that the cities would receive their per
capita shares of the tax revenues as set out in section 26-74-313. 
Appellees rely on this court's holding in City of Little Rock v.
Waters, 303 Ark. 363, 797 S.W.2d 426 (1990), in support of this
argument.  At issue in that case was Act 31 of 1987, which provided
that in all counties where the voters had approved a sales tax,
pursuant to Act 991 of 1981 or Act 26 of the First Extraordinary
Session of 1981, a use tax of equal rate would be imposed
automatically, without requiring the approval of the voters.  This
court upheld the imposition of the use tax on the grounds that the
General Assembly has the inherent authority to impose a tax and
that there is no fundamental right of the citizens to vote on that
issue.  Appellees argue that the holding in Waters is applicable
here, as they contend that in both cases, the complaint is that the
voters who approved the sales tax were not informed of the
implications of corresponding legislative enactments.    
     We decline to follow the reasoning of Waters.  Instead, we
conclude that the holding in Waters is incorrect, and we overrule
that decision to the extent that it conflicts with our holding
today.  We now embrace the reasoning expressed by the dissent in
that case, namely that the voters' right to be fully informed of
the matter for which they are casting their votes is paramount.  In
other words, where the General Assembly has established the right
of the voters to approve the imposition of a tax, any consideration
of the legislature's general power to tax is secondary to the
voters' right to full disclosure of the nature of the tax and its
proposed purposes.  "[T]he General Assembly only authorizes the
imposition of the tax.  It is imposed by a vote of the people who
will pay it."  Waters, 303 Ark. at 373, 797 S.W.2d  at 432 (Newbern,
J., dissenting).  
     Applying such reasoning to the present case, we conclude that
the White County voters' right to full disclosure as to how the tax
revenues would be spent outweighs any consideration of the General
Assembly's authority to establish the particular scheme of
distribution of those revenues.  Both the levying ordinance and the
ballot reflected five designated purposes for which the sales tax
revenues would be used.  The voters were instructed by the ballot
that if the one-percent (1%) sales tax was approved, all the
revenues generated would be spent in those five areas.  The voters
were not specifically informed, nor could they be presumed to have
known, that the legislative act that empowered the county to levy
such a tax also provided that the cities would be given their per
capita shares of the revenues and would be allowed to spend the
money for purposes other than those designated on the ballot. 
     Accordingly, any use of the sales tax revenues for purposes
other than those designated by the levying ordinance and the ballot
is in violation of Article 16,  11, of the Arkansas Constitution
and constitutes an illegal exaction.  We thus reverse the ruling of
the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.