Laurie VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises
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Laurie VanWAGONER v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES
97-1355___ S.W.2d ___
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered July 2, 1998
1. Workers' compensation -- concurrent-jurisdiction rule abandoned --
administrative primary-jurisdiction rule adopted. -- The supreme court
abandoned its former rule that the circuit courts and the
Workers' Compensation Commission had concurrent jurisdiction
to determine the applicability of workers' compensation laws
to a given case and, instead, recognized the administrative
law rule of primary jurisdiction, allowing the Commission to
decide whether an employee's injuries are covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act.
2. Workers' compensation -- exclusive-remedy rule articulated. -- The
exclusive remedy of an employee or her representative on
account of injury or death arising out of and in the course of
her employment is a claim for compensation under Ark. Code
Ann. § 11-9-105 (Repl. 1996).
3. Workers' compensation -- Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
facts that establish jurisdiction -- prior inconsistent decisions
overruled. -- The supreme court held that the Workers'
Compensation Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction
to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless the
facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact
but one of law, such as an intentional tort; in so holding,the court overruled all prior inconsistent decisions; the
supreme court affirmed as modified the trial court's dismissal
with prejudice of appellant's complaint.
Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; John
G. Holland, Judge; affirmed as modified.
Walker, Shock & Harp, P.L.L.C., by: Eddie H. Walker, Jr., for
appellant.
Hardin, Dawson & Terry, by: J. Rodney Mills and J. Gregory
Magness, for appellee.
W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
Appellant Laurie VanWagoner appeals the judgment of the Fort
Smith District of Sebastian County Circuit Court dismissing with
prejudice her complaint against appellee Beverly Enterprises. The
circuit court dismissed her tort action on the ground that it was
barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl. 1996).
Thereafter, she filed an appeal with the Arkansas Court of Appeals,
which certified the case to this court under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(d)(2), as involving an issue of significant public interest or a
legal principle of major importance. Particularly, we are asked to
resolve the question of whether the circuit court or the Workers'
Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to determine whether theAct applies. We hold that the commission has exclusive, original
jurisdiction to determine the fact issues establishing its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the circuit court's decision as modified.
Ms. VanWagoner was employed as an administrative assistant at
Beverly on February 15, 1995, when she tripped and fell on a rug
while walking down a hallway at her place of employment. She filed
a notice of injury according to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-701 (Repl.
1996) on February 29, 1996. On October 15, 1996, Ms. VanWagoner
filed a claim for benefits with the commission, claiming that the
injuries to her hip resulted from a work-related injury.
Thereafter, Beverly controverted the claim, alleging that Ms.
VanWagoner's injuries were the result of a noncompensable
preexisting condition caused by a prior slip-and-fall accident and
a subsequent automobile accident. Beverly further alleged that Ms.
VanWagoner's claim was not compensable because she was not
performing employment services at the time of the alleged fall
under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Repl. 1996).
Particularly, Beverly contended that Ms. VanWagoner was not engaged
in employment services because she was on her way to the break room
when the fall occurred.
After a claim representative determined that Ms. VanWagoner's
claim was not compensable, a hearing before the Workers'
Compensation Commission on the issue of compensability was
scheduled for April 9, 1997. On April 3, 1997, Ms. VanWagoner'scounsel requested that the commission cancel the hearing. On May
15, 1997, Ms. VanWagoner filed suit against Beverly in circuit
court, alleging that Beverly's negligence in failing to maintain
its premises was the proximate cause of her injuries. Beverly
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the jurisdiction
resided exclusively in the commission. The circuit court agreed
and dismissed the complaint. Ms.VanWagoner appeals.
The Court of Appeals has asked us to decide whether the
commission or the circuit court should determine the applicability
of the Workers' Compensation Act. Along with the majority of
appellate courts that have addressed this issue, we have previously
adhered to the rule that the circuit courts and the commission have
concurrent jurisdiction to determine the applicability of workers'
compensation laws to a given case. See, e.g. Craig v. Taylor, 323
Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996); Lively v. Libbey Memorial Physical
Medical Ctr., Inc., 317 Ark. 5, 875 S.W.2d 507 (1994). This
approach, however, is fraught with weaknesses. One practical
result of this rule is that the party that acts first inevitably
decides which tribunal will resolve the jurisdictional question.
Conceivably, if every employee decided to file his or her claim in
circuit court, under our current rule, the commission might never
decide whether the rights and remedies of the Workers' Compensation
Act applied, despite the fact that our legislature has chosen to
entrust questions of compensation to its expertise:
(a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee
subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of
injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and
remedies of the employee, his legal representative,
dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from the employer....
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl. 1996) (emphasis added). See
also Cherry v. Tanda, 327 Ark. 600, 616, 940 S.W.2d 457, 462
(1997), quoting Helms v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty, 281 Ark.
450, 664 S.W.2d 870 (1984) ("[O]ther statutes must yield to the
Workers' Compensation Act because it is in the interest of the
public policy to give that act priority as an exclusive remedy.").
In addition to creating a race to file, the concurrent-jurisdiction approach can lead to duplicative litigation, that is,
the simultaneous pursuit of claims in both the commission and in
circuit court. See, e.g. Riverside Furniture Corp. v. Rogers, 295
Ark. 452, 749 S.W.2d 664 (1988). According to one commentator, an
even more fundamental problem with this rule is that "it may lead
to nonuniform decisions in employee injury cases involving similar
facts." Daniel Keating, Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or
Boards Decide Whether Workers' Compensation Laws Apply?, 53 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 258, 271 (1986). Because juries are more likely than
commission officials to be sympathetic to injured plaintiffs in
resolving factual issues pivotal to the jurisdictional question,
the commentator explains, similar cases may lead to different
results. Id.
We believe that the better rule is to recognize the
administrative law rule of primary jurisdiction and to allow theWorkers' Compensation Commission to decide whether an employee's
injuries are covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. This rule is
consistent with the purpose of the Act, and is supported by the
teachings of Professor Larson:
The soundest result in these cases, both as a matter of
law and as a matter of practical experience would be a simple
recognition of board priority in all cases, except those in
which the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer
one of fact but one of law.
The legal rationale goes back to the fundamental
administrative law rule of primary jurisdiction, enunciated by
the Supreme Court in [Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907)]. In the particular area of workers'
compensation, this broad principle is strongly reenforced by
the legislative intent to entrust questions of compensation
coverage to an expert commission. . . .
. . .
When it is remembered that one of the primary original reasons
for adoption of the workers' compensation system was to
achieve simplicity and speed in the disposition of cases, it
is obvious that this objective is best served by a
straightforward policy of primary jurisdiction.
6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law
§ 67.60, at 12-205 (1997 and Cum. Supp. 1998). See generally Daniel
Keating, Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or Boards Decide
Whether Workers' Compensation Laws Apply?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 258,
274-278 (1986)(advocating the primary jurisdiction approach as
advancing the interests of applying the workers' compensation laws
uniformly, taking advantage of agency expertise, and eliminating
wasteful duplicative litigation). See also Hannah v. Mallinckrodt,
Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723 (Mo.banc. 1982); and Grillo v. National Bank
of Washington, 540 A.2d 743 (D.C.App. 1988) (adhering to theprimary-jurisdiction rule in workers' compensation cases).
We hold that the exclusive remedy of an employee or her
representative on account of injury or death arising out of and in
the course of her employment is a claim for compensation under §
11-9-105, and that the commission has exclusive, original
jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction,
unless the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one
of fact but one of law, such as an intentional tort. See Angle v.
Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 719, 945 S.W.2d 933 (1997)(citing Miller
v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 461, 692 S.W.2d 615 (1985)(explaining
that, before an employee is free to bring a tort action for damages
against an employer, the facts must show that the employer had a
"desire" to bring about the consequences of the acts, or that the
acts were premeditated with the specific intent to injure the
employee). In so holding, we overrule all prior decisions to the
extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.
Affirmed as modified.
Newbern and Imber, JJ., concur.
Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring. The majority has
forged new ground by holding that a circuit court no longer has
jurisdiction to determine whether it or the Workers' Compensation
Commission has jurisdiction to hear a case. Because I concur
with the result but not this departure from our well-established
law, I must write separately.
As we recently acknowledged in Stapleton v. M.D. Limbaugh
Constr. Co., 333 Ark. 381, S.W.2d (1998), pursuant to
Article 5, Section 32, of the Arkansas Constitution, the Workers'
Compensation Commission has jurisdiction only when there is an
employment relationship between the litigants. In other words,
an employment relationship is a condition precedent to the
Commission's jurisdiction.
Thus, we have consistently held throughout the last thirty-six years that the circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Commission to make the threshold determination as to whetheran employment relationship exists between the parties such that
the merits of the case must be resolved by the Workers'
Compensation Commission. Nucor Holding Corp. v. Rinkines, 326
Ark. 217, 931 S.W.2d 426 (1996); Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363,
915 S.W.2d 257 (1996); Rankin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co.,
319 Ark. 26, 888 S.W.2d 657 (1994); Nucor-Yamato Steel Co. v.
Circuit Court of Mississippi County, 317 Ark. 493, 878 S.W.2d 745
(1994); Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard County, 292 Ark. 13, 727 S.W.2d 840 (1987), overruled on other grounds, 315 Ark. 333, 869 S.W.2d 6 (1994); Campbell v. Waggoner, 235 Ark. 374, 360 S.W.2d 124 (1962); Co-Ark. Const. Co. v. Amsler, 234 Ark. 200, 352 S.W.2d 74 (1961).
The distinction between jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction and jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case
cannot be overemphasized. In the cases mentioned above, we have
upheld the circuit court's concurrent jurisdiction to determine
whether an employment relationship exists, upon either a motion
to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment when the facts are
undisputed or there is no material issue of fact, or at trial
when there are material issues of fact regarding the employment
relationship. If the circuit court decides that an employment
relationship exists between the litigants, then it must dismiss
the case because resolution of the merits of the case belongs
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation
Commission. In none of these cases have we held, as the majority
concludes, that the circuit court does not have jurisdiction tomake the initial jurisdictional determination regarding the
existence of an employment relationship.
In this case, it was undisputed that an employment
relationship existed between Ms. VanWagoner and Beverly
Enterprises. The only disputes were whether her injury occurred
during the scope of her employment, and whether a preexisting
condition contributed to her injuries. Similarly, in Rankin v.
Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., supra, the employee argued that he
was entitled to seek damages in circuit court because the
employer controverted his claim for workers' compensation by
asserting that his injury did not occur in the course and scope
of his employment. We held such an argument to be without merit
because an "employer is immune from liability for damages in a
tort action brought by an injured employee." Id. (citing Fore v.
Circuit Court of Izard County, supra). Thus, according to our
well-established precedent, the circuit court correctly dismissed
Ms. VanWagoner's tort claim because it was clear that the merits
of the case (whether she was acting within the scope of her
employment and whether she had a preexisting condition) fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation
Commission.
Hence, I agree with the majority's decision to affirm the
trial court's dismissal, but not with its reasoning.
Specifically, I disagree with the majority's decision to abandon
our well-established rule of concurrent jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction in favor for Professor Larson's rule that theWorkers' Compensation Commission has "exclusive, original
jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction
. . .unless the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no
longer one of fact but one of law." I cannot agree with the
majority's decision in this respect for several reasons.
First, the majority claims that we must discard our prior
rule of concurrent jurisdiction because it is "fraught with
weakness." No such weakness is present in this case. Ms.
VanWagoner tried to circumvent the Commission's jurisdiction by
filing her action in the circuit court. Once the circuit court
determined that there was an employment relationship between Ms.
VanWagoner and Beverly Enterprises, it correctly ruled that the
complaint fell within the Commission's jurisdiction and dismissed
the complaint. In other words, the circuit court correctly
retained jurisdiction only to the extent necessary to determine
that it did not have jurisdiction over the merits of Ms.
VanWagoner's claim. There simply is no reason in this case to
abandon our well-established precedent in favor of a different
jurisdictional rule.
Second, we refused to adopt Larson's approach only two years
ago in Craig v. Traylor, supra. Nothing has changed in the last
two years that would require us to reconsider that holding.
Third, the majority claims that we must abandon our prior
jurisdictional rule because concurrent jurisdiction is
unworkable. Yet, the new rule adopted by the majority retains
concurrent jurisdiction when "the facts are so one-sided that theissue is no longer one of fact but one of law." The new rule
does not abolish concurrent jurisdiction, and the alleged
weaknesses associated with it, but merely changes the basis on
which it exists.
Finally, we have consistently held that an employee may file
before the Commission or the circuit court a claim for damages
arising out of injuries caused by the employer's deliberate and
intentional conduct. Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993); Sontag v. Orbit Valve, Co., 283 Ark. 191, 672 S.W.2d 50 (1984); Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark.
350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950). As I understand the majority opinion,
the circuit court still has jurisdiction to determine whether the
facts in an intentional-tort case are "so one-sided that the
issue is no longer one of fact but one of law." In sum, the new
rule adopted by the majority, creates more questions than
answers.
For these reasons, I agree with the majority's decision to
affirm the dismissal of VanWagoner's tort claim, but would do so
based on our established precedent instead of the new rule
adopted by the majority.
Newbern, J., joins this concurrence.
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