Tucker v. Lake View School Dist. No. 25
Annotate this Case
Jim Guy TUCKER, Governor, et al. v. LAKE VIEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 25 OF PHILLIPS COUNTY, et
al.
95-471 ___ S.W.2d ___
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered March 11, 1996
1. Appeal & error -- finality of judgments and orders --
jurisdictional requisite -- duty of appellate court to
determine. -- The appellate court was required to consider
whether the decision appealed from was a final, appealable
order; this was a jurisdictional requisite, which the
appellate court had a duty to determine.
2. Appeal & error -- finality of judgments and orders --
requirements. -- For a judgment to be final and appealable, it
must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from
the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in
controversy; to be final, an order must not only decide the
rights of the parties, but also put the court's directive into
execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it.
3. Appeal & error -- finality of judgments and orders --
requirements for finality not met. -- Where the chancellor
made a final determination that the school funding system was
unconstitutional but stayed the effect of her decision to
allow the General Assembly to implement a constitutional
system and consequently neither considered the
constitutionality of the individual elements of the system nor
addressed appellee school district's requests for injunctive
relief and mandamus, the chancellor's failure to grant the
specific relief requested by the prevailing parties was in
effect a deferral; the supreme court determined that appellee
school district's rights in the matter had not been concluded
and that they had no way to put the chancellor's directive
into execution without further proceedings before the trial
court; thus, the supreme court held that the requirements for
finality had not been met.
4. Courts -- subject-matter jurisdiction -- raised by appellate
court on its own motion. -- The issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction is one that the appellate court raises on its own
motion.
Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Annabelle C. Imber,
Chancellor; appeal dismissed.
Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by: Tim Humphries, Deputy Att'y
Gen., for appellant.
Mitchell, Blackstock & Barnes, by: Clayton R. Blackstock, for
amicus curiae Arkansas Education Ass'n.
Andree Layton Roaf, Justice. March 11, 1996.
*ADVREP9*
JIM GUY TUCKER, GOVERNOR, ET
AL.
APPELLANTS,
V.
LAKE VIEW SCHOOL DIST. NO. 25
OF PHILLIPS COUNTY, ET AL.
APPELLEES,
95-471
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. 92-5318,
HON. ANNABELLE C. IMBER,
CHANCELLOR,
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.
Appellants, Jim Guy Tucker, and others, appeal from an order
of the Pulaski County Chancery Court which declared that the public
school financing system then in effect violated the equal
protection and education provisions of the Arkansas Constitution.
Appellants raise two points on appeal: the trial court erred
by 1) misapplying the equal protection and education provisions of
the Arkansas Constitution; and 2) incorrectly applying statistical
measures of equity. As the ruling by the chancellor does not
constitute a final appealable order, we dismiss the appeal.
Facts
On September 19, 1994, appellees Lake View School District
("Lake View") and various of its students and patrons filed an
amended complaint against Governor Jim Guy Tucker, the State Board
of Education and its members, the State Treasurer, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Senate President Pro Tempore, and the
Director of the Department of Education ("the State"). The
complaint alleged that the system of school funding then in place
violated the Arkansas constitutional guarantees of equal protection
and of a general, suitable, and efficient system of education. The
complaint also asserted that the funding system violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Lake View sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, mandamus against the State to enact a
constitutional system of school funding and to increase funding for
public schools, nominal damages, attorney's fees, and costs.
After a trial on the merits before Chancellor Annabelle
Clinton Imber, involving numerous witnesses and exhibits, the
chancellor issued 147 findings of fact and eighteen conclusions of
law on November 9, 1994. She determined that the school funding
system was constitutional under the United States Constitution and
dismissed with prejudice Lake View's claims in that regard.
However, she ruled that the funding system was in violation of the
equal protection provision of the Arkansas Constitution, "as it has
no rational bearing on the educational needs of the district," and
that the system also violated the education provision of the
Arkansas Constitution by "failing to provide a general, suitable,
and efficient system of free public education." The chancellor
stayed the effect of her decision for two years to allow the
General Assembly time to enact and implement appropriate
legislation in conformity with her opinion.
The General Assembly subsequently enacted new school funding
statutes, Acts 916 and 917 of 1995, which effectively repealed the
funding system at issue in this appeal.
There are three questions raised by the posture of this case
and by the chancellor's decree which would all have to be answered
in the affirmative for us to reach the merits of this case --
whether the order entered by the chancellor was a final, appealable
order, whether the chancellor had jurisdiction to hear the case,
and whether the enactment of a new school funding system renders
this matter moot. We conclude that there has been no final order
entered in this action.
Finality of Order
Because the chancellor stayed for two years the effect of her
decision finding the school funding system unconstitutional, and
declined to grant Lake View any of the specific remedies requested,
we must consider whether the decision is a final, appealable order.
This is a requisite for appellate jurisdiction, which we have a
duty to determine. See Walker v. Kazi, 316 Ark. 616, 875 S.W.2d 47
(1994); Chambers v. Manning, 315 Ark. 369, 868 S.W.2d 64 (1993).
We first note that the question of whether the chancellor can
stay the effect of her decision finding the statutes
unconstitutional is not before us. The State does not raise this
issue and Lake View has not filed a cross appeal or even a brief in
this case.
For a judgment to be final and appealable, it must dismiss the
parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude
their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Kelly v. Kelly,
310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992); Jackson v. Yowell, 307 Ark.
222, 818 S.W.2d 950 (1991). To be final, an order must not only
decide the rights of the parties, but also put the court's
directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part
of it. Kilgore v. Viner, 293 Ark. 187, 736 S.W.2d 1 (1987). See
also Bonner v. Sikes, 20 Ark. App. 209, 727 S.W.2d 144 (1987).
The case primarily relied upon by the parties and the trial
court on the questions of substantive law, Dupree v. Alma School
Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983), appears to be
precisely on point and was also tried before a chancellor.
However, the issue of finality was not presented by the
chancellor's award of declaratory relief in Dupree. There, eleven
school districts brought a class action suit against members of the
Arkansas State Board of Education, charging, as in the present
case, that the system of school financing then in effect violated
the Arkansas Constitution's guarantee of equal protection and its
requirement that the state provide a general, suitable and
efficient system of education. The trial court declared the system
to be in violation of the constitutional provisions in question,
and this Court affirmed that decision. The opinion in Dupree does
not indicate whether any further relief was sought by the appellee
school districts, however, the effect of the trial court's order
was not stayed, and the chancellor's decision granting declaratory
relief was a final order.
Here, as in Dupree, the chancellor made a final determination
that the school funding system was unconstitutional. However, she
stayed the effect of her decision to allow the General Assembly to
implement a constitutional system, and consequently did not
consider the constitutionality of the individual elements of the
system, nor did she address Lake View's requests for injunctive
relief and mandamus. The chancellor's failure to grant the
specific relief requested by the prevailing parties was in effect
a deferral; she provided in her decree that the two-year stay was
to "give the State of Arkansas time to enact and implement
appropriate legislation in conformity with this opinion." By the
terms of the decree, Lake View could request further hearings at
the end of two years to determine if the new funding system
conforms to the chancellor's ruling, or had the State failed to
take any action at all. Lake View's rights in this matter have not
been concluded and they have no way to put the chancellor's
directive into execution without further proceedings before the
trial court; the requirements for finality are thus not met.
Jurisdiction and mootness
Because we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final order, we
need not reach the issues of whether the chancellor had
jurisdiction to hear the case, or whether the enacting of a new
funding system has rendered this matter moot. However, we point
out that the matter of jurisdiction may again arise if further
proceedings before the trial court result in another appeal of this
case. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction, like that of
finality, is one that we raise on our own motion. Villines v. Lee,
321 Ark. 405, 902 S.W.2d 233 (1995). As to mootness, we note that
repeal of the funding system declared unconstitutional does not
become effective until July 1, 1996. Act 917 of 1995, 15(b).
Appeal dismissed.
Glaze, J., concurs, and Brown, J., dissents.
*ADVREP9A*
JIM GUY TUCKER, GOVERNOR, ET
AL.,
APPELLANTS,
V.
LAKE VIEW SCHOOL DIST. NO. 25
OF PHILLIPS COUNTY, ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
95-471
Opinion Delivered: 3-11-96
CONCURRING OPINION
TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice
I concur. The chancellor's decree clearly runs afoul of Ark.
R. App. P. 2, and is not an appealable order. The chancellor
declared the Arkansas school funding system (School Finance Act of
1984) unconstitutional under Article II, 2,3, 18 and Article
XIV, 1 of the Arkansas Constitution, but she never put her
directives into execution. The plaintiff school district filed
suit, asking the trial court to declare Arkansas's statutory
funding structure unconstitutional and requesting the State Board
of Education be enjoined from implementing that unlawful funding
structure. Although the chancellor decreed Arkansas's educational
funding laws were unconstitutional, she denied plaintiffs any
remedies, and instead stayed the effect of her decision for two
years to give the General Assembly time to implement a school
funding system in conformity with her opinion. The chancellor
further stated the following:
The court has declared the Arkansas school funding
"system" unconstitutional. At this point in time, the
court will not consider the constitutionality of the
individual elements of the "system." (Emphasis added.)
Exactly where the chancellor's decree left the prevailing
plaintiffs is unclear, since plaintiffs were unable to enforce
their rights under the trial court's declaration. Apparently,
plaintiffs must wait two years at which time the chancellor would
decide if the General Assembly had adopted and implemented a school
funding system which complied with her decision. Apparently, when
the two-year period ends, another hearing would be required to
review any new law to determine if conformity was achieved.
Our court has held that, to be final and appealable, a trial
court's order, decree or judgment must dismiss the parties from the
court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to
the subject matter in controversy. Estate of Hastings v. Planters
and Stockmen Bank, 296 Ark. 409, 757 S.W.2d 546 (1988). This court
also related the rule that a final judgment or decision is one that
finally adjudicated the rights of the parties, putting it beyond
the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their
original positions. It must be such a final determination as may
be enforced by execution or in some other appropriate manner.
Here, the chancellor's decree meets none of the foregoing
requirements, since the parties are still before the trial court,
and the plaintiffs must wait to enforce their rights. That being
so, I would dismiss this appeal, because no final order exists.
In conclusion, I take exception to the majority opinion
wherein it concludes the question of whether the chancellor can
stay the effect of her decision is not before this court. Sure it
is. The chancellor's action staying its decision for two years is
part of the reason why the judgment is not final and failed to
grant any remedies. In addition, I would state the subject matter
jurisdiction issue is not clear to me, especially since mandamus
was requested by the plaintiffs and that relief must be sought in
circuit court. Thus, I reserve my opinion on this issue.
Concerning the mootness issue, however, I see no merit. I merely
point out that the School Finance Act of 1984 which the chancellor
declared unconstitutional (effective in two years) is not, as yet,
repealed. In fact, Act 917 of 1995 (the Equitable School Finance
System Act) mentioned in the majority opinion does not repeal the
1984 Act until July 1, 1996. Nor is it clear at this juncture
whether Act 917 cures those constitutional infirmities that the
chancellor says exist in the 1984 Act. In sum, the parties have
not benefited us with a comparison of these laws or offered an
argument that Act 917 caused this litigation to be moot. Based on
what is before this court now, mootness is not shown.
I respectfully join in the result reached by the majority on
the finality issue and find it reason enough to dismiss.
Associate Justice Robert L. Brown
March 11, 1996 *ADVREP9B*
JIM GUY TUCKER, GOVERNOR, ET
AL,,
APPELLANTS,
V.
LAKE VIEW SCHOOL DIST. NO. 25
OF PHILLIPS COUNTY, ET AL,
APPELLEES,
95-471
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. 92-5318,
HON. ANNABELLE C. IMBER, JUDGE,
DISSENTING OPINION.
This case involves approximately $1 billion in Minimum
Foundation Program Aid funds for education. About 435,000 students
in Arkansas are affected. The chancellor's judgment declaring the
school funding program unconstitutional, as it existed in 1994, was
entered November 9, 1994. That declaratory judgment was
immediately appealed by the State. Now, almost a year and a half
later the majority declines to entertain the appeal because it
concludes that the declaratory judgment was not a final order. The
majority further suggests that jurisdiction in chancery court may
be faulty, but it makes no decision on that point.
I would hold that jurisdiction of this matter properly lies in
chancery court and that the declaratory judgment is final for
purposes of appeal and for this court's review. For that reason,
I dissent.
I. Final Order
It is statutory law in Arkansas that declaratory judgments
shall have the effect of a final judgment:
(a) Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed.
....
(2) The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect and declarations shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
Ark. Code Ann. 16-111-103(a)(2) (1987). (Emphasis added.)
The Commentary to the Declaratory Judgment Act supports this
notion:
The Declaratory Judgment may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect; it may determine some
right, privilege, power or immunity in the plaintiff, or
some duty, no-right, liability or disability in the
defendant. The judgment is not based on any wrong
already done or any breach committed. It is not required
to be executed, as it orders nothing to be done. It
simply declares rights and duties so that parties may
guide themselves in the proper legal road, and, in fact,
and in truth, avoid litigation.
Prefatory Note to Ark. Code Ann. 16-111-101 et seq. (Repl. 1995).
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the chancellor declared the school funding formula
unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Arkansas Constitution. That declaration of rights had the force
and effect of a final judgment. The chancellor then refrained from
granting any supplemental relief to execute the judgment for two
years in order to give the General Assembly a chance to come into
compliance with her order. In staying the effect of her order, she
cited as authority Helena Elementary School Dist. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412, 413 (Mont. 1990); Carrollton-Farmers v. Edgewood Indep.
School Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); and Edgewood Indep.
School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989). The reason
for doing this is obvious. Had she immediately enjoined an
expenditure of State funds under the program, public education
would have come to an abrupt halt absent an appeal.
What the chancellor did in declaring rights and staying her
order is precisely what virtually every other jurisdiction has done
when considering a similar issue. In none of these cases has the
appellate court dismissed the matter for lack of finality. For
example, the District Court which invalidated Texas's school
finance system in 1971 allowed the legislature two years to take
corrective action. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). A California trial court also set a period of six years
from the date of judgment as a reasonable time to rectify an
unconstitutional school funding system, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d. 728, 135 Cal.
Reptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1977), cert. denied sub. nom. Clowes v.
Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
Likewise, in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273
(1973), cert. denied sub. nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976
(1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that a period of time was necessary to allow the legislature an
opportunity to come into compliance with constitutional mandates.
A specific deadline for compliance was fixed by the court.
Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973) (per curiam),
cert. denied sub. nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). In
the first Robinson case, the court made the case for a stay:
We agree with the trial court that relief must be
prospective. The judiciary cannot unravel the fiscal
skein. Obligations incurred must not be impaired. And
since government must go on, and some period of time will
be needed to establish another statutory system,
obligations hereafter incurred pursuant to existing
statutes will be valid in accordance with the terms of
the statutes.
303 A.2d at 298.
State appellate courts have also modified trial court orders
to provide for stays to give legislatures time to act in comparable
situations. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989) (withheld finality of judgment until 90 days after the
adjournment of the General Assembly at its regular session);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1980), cert. denied sub. nom. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (court
ordered that the conversion be in effect and underway not later
than July 1, 1982); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en banc) (opinion deemed all acts taken
under existing statute valid until July 1, 1981); Horton v.
Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (stayed judicial
intervention to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to take
appropriate legislative action).
By dismissing this appeal, the constitutionality of school
funding is placed in limbo with nothing resolved. Presumably, as
of November 9, 1996, the chancellor's opinion will be final in the
majority's eyes. What happens then? The State could refile the
same appeal, but a considerable period of time will have been lost
in reviewing the chancellor's order.
II. Mootness
The General Assembly has passed school-funding legislation
since the chancellor's order. See Act 917 of 1995. We have said
that when one act has been superseded by a second act, we generally
dismiss an appeal from a declaratory judgment action construing the
first act for mootness. Nathaniel v. Forrest City School Dist. No.
7, 300 Ark. 513, 780 S.W.2d 539 (1989). The Nathaniel case was an
election matter, and we went on to say in our opinion that when an
issue is capable of repetition, even though moot, we will entertain
it. We concluded that Nathaniel presented such a case, and we
addressed the merits. We have further stated:
[W]hen the case involves the public interest, or tends to
become moot before litigation can run its course, or a
decision might avert future litigation, we have, with
some regularity, refused to permit mootness to become the
determinant (citing authority).
Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 570, 572, 781 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1989).
Thus, when matters of great public interest are involved that might
arise in the future, we have decided them even though the precise
matter on appeal is moot. Dotson v. Ritchie, 211 Ark. 789, 202 S.W.2d 603 (1947).
The matter presently before us is arguably moot because the
General Assembly has passed a new school funding law in the form of
Act 917. However, the issue that remains is whether the chancellor
was correct in her analysis of what a school funding formula must
provide to pass constitutional muster. That issue is before this
court in this appeal, and it is left hovering in the air by today's
decision. There may well be a second lawsuit by the Lake View
School District to decide whether Act 917 complies with the
chancellor's order. (Compliance of Act 917 with the chancellor's
order has not been raised in this appeal.) However, a second
lawsuit on compliance would necessarily have to include whether the
chancellor's reasoning in her declaratory judgment was right. I
would decide that issue in this appeal.
Education receives high priority status under the Arkansas
Constitution, as it should:
Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of
liberty and the bulwark of a free and good government,
the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and
efficient system of free public schools and shall adopt
all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages
and opportunities of education.
Ark. Const. art. 14, 1. I would treat this case as the matter of
high public interest that it is and review the merits of the
chancellor's decision. To do otherwise runs the risk of causing
delay and fomenting uncertainty and instability in the educational
system.
III. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in chancery court has been questioned by the
majority opinion, but no resolution of the matter has been made.
I believe that chancery court had jurisdiction of this case.
Mandamus is clearly a legal remedy, but it is supplemental relief,
as already discussed. A declaration of rights concerning an
illegal application of State funds and injunctive relief fall
readily in chancery's domain. See, e.g., Hartwick v. Thorne, 300
Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989); DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No.
30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983). The upshot of today's
opinion is to place in doubt chancery's jurisdiction over this case
while leaving a decision on the matter to another day. Having not
addressed the jurisdictional point in connection with the present
appeal, it would be unfair in the extreme to dismiss a subsequent,
related appeal emanating from chancery court for lack of
jurisdiction.
IV. Summary
To summarize, I would hold that the jurisdiction of this
matter appropriately lies in chancery court. I would further view
the declaratory judgment as final for purposes of our review. And,
lastly, though superseding legislative action in 1995 may have
rendered the constitutionality of the previous formula moot, the
chancellor's analysis is the polestar against which Act 917 of 1995
must ultimately be measured. I would decide whether that analysis
missed the mark or correctly assessed constitutional mandates. For
that reason, I respectfully dissent.
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