Lammers v. State
Annotate this Case
Clint LAMMERS v. STATE of Arkansas
95-1264 ___ S.W.2d ___
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered April 22, 1996
1. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- burden of proof. -- A
defendant seeking a transfer has the burden of proof to show
a transfer is warranted under Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(e)
(Repl. 1993); if he or she meets the burden, then the transfer
is made unless there is clear and convincing countervailing
evidence to support a finding that the juvenile should remain
in circuit court; clear and convincing evidence is that degree
of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm
conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established.
2. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trial court not required to
give equal weight to each statutory factor -- violence
considered. -- In a juvenile-transfer case, the trial court is
not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory
factors; moreover, proof need not be introduced against the
juvenile on each factor; the serious and violent nature of an
offense is a sufficient basis for denying a motion to transfer
and trying a juvenile as an adult; no element of violence
beyond that required to commit the crime is necessary under
Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e)(1); however, that a crime is
serious without the use of violence is not a factor sufficient
in and of itself for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of
a juvenile.
3. Criminal law -- information can constitute sufficient evidence
that defendant is charged with serious and violent crime. --
An information can constitute sufficient evidence to establish
that the defendant is charged with a serious and violent
crime.
4. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- standard of review. -- The
supreme court applies the clearly erroneous standard in
reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to transfer a
criminal case to juvenile court.
5. Appeal & error -- argument not made to trial court cannot be
raised on appeal. -- An argument not made to the trial court
cannot be raised on appeal.
6. Criminal law -- accomplices -- accomplice is responsible for
activities of his cohort. -- An accomplice, even of minor age,
is responsible for the activities of his cohort.
7. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- introduction of evidence of
each statutory factor not required -- serious and violent
nature of crime sufficient to deny transfer. -- It was neither
necessary for the State to introduce evidence of each factor
under Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(e) nor necessary for the trial
court to give equal weight to each factor; the serious and
violent nature of the crime charged was sufficient, in and of
itself, for the trial court to deny the motion to transfer.
Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court; Russell Rogers, Judge;
affirmed.
Green, Henry & Green, by: J. Bradley Green, for appellant.
Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by: Sandy Moll, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.
Robert H. Dudley, Justice. April 22, 1996 *ADVREP4*
CLINT LAMMERS,
APPELLANT,
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE.
95-1264
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. 94-274,
HON. RUSSELL ROGERS, JUDGE,
AFFIRMED.
Robert H. Dudley, Justice.
This is another in the series of interlocutory appeals from a
circuit court's refusal to transfer a criminal case to juvenile
court. Appellant, a seventeen-year-old, is charged with capital
murder. He has a history of prior adjudications of delinquency in
juvenile court as a result of burglaries and criminal mischief, and
was on probation from juvenile court at the time he allegedly
committed capital murder. We affirm the order of the circuit court
refusing to transfer the case to juvenile court.
The law regarding motions to transfer to juvenile court is
well established:
A defendant seeking a transfer has the burden of proof to
show a transfer is warranted under Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-
318(e). Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944
(1995); Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768
(1995). "If he or she meets the burden, then the
transfer is made unless there is clear and convincing
countervailing evidence to support a finding that the
juvenile should remain in circuit court." Bradley v.
State, 306 Ark. 621, 623, 816 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1991);
Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(f) (Repl. 1993). "`Clear and
convincing evidence' has been defined by this Court as
`that degree of proof which will produce in the trier of
fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be
established.'" Cobbins v. State, 306 Ark. 447, 450, 816 S.W.2d 161, 163 (1991) (citation omitted).
The trial court is not required to give equal weight
to each of the statutory factors. Ring v. State, 320
Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995). "Moreover, proof need
not be introduced against the juvenile on each factor."
Davis v. State, 319 Ark. at 616, 893 S.W.2d at 769. "We
have often stated that the serious and violent nature of
an offense is a sufficient basis for denying a motion to
transfer and trying a juvenile as an adult." Sims v.
State, 320 Ark. 528, 536, 900 S.W.2d 508, 513 (1995)
(citing Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 678
(1995)). No element of violence beyond that required to
commit the crime is necessary under Ark. Code Ann 9-27-
318(e)(1). See Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832 S.W.2d 217 (1992), a case in which the underlying crime was rape
and we wrote, "Cobbins cannot be read to require that an
added element of violence must be shown under 9-27-
318(e)(1), and we believe it would be a perverted
interpretation to construe that provision in such a
manner." Id. at 511, 832 S.W.2d 219. However, that a
crime is serious without the use of violence "is not a
factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to
retain jurisdiction of a juvenile." Sebastian v. State,
318 Ark. 494, 498, 885 S.W.2d 882, 885 (1994).
Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 141, 913 S.W.2d 779, 781-82 (1996)
(quoting Holmes v. State, 322 Ark. 574, 911 S.W.2d 256 (1995)). An
information can constitute sufficient evidence to establish that
the defendant is charged with a serious and violent crime. Davis
v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995); Walker v. State, 304
Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502, reh'g denied 304 Ark. 402-A, 805 S.W.2d 80 (1991). This court applies the clearly erroneous standard in
reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to transfer. Sims
v. State, 320 Ark. 528, 900 S.W.2d 528 (1995).
The State alleges that appellant and two codefendants entered
a grocery store for the purpose of committing a robbery, and in the
course of the robbery, a codefendant shot and killed a store clerk.
Appellant allegedly searched for the victim's car keys so the three
of them could take her car, but they were unable to find the keys.
Appellant, who is now seventeen years old, but was fifteen at the
time of the alleged offense, has prior juvenile adjudications of
delinquency for burglaries and criminal mischief and was on
probation for those delinquency adjudications at the time this case
arose.
Appellant's first point of appeal is the trial court erred in
denying his motion to transfer because he was only an accomplice
and there was no evidence that he personally employed violence. A
review of the abstract reveals that this argument was not made
before the trial court. Since appellant did not make this argument
to the trial court, he cannot raise it on appeal. See Childress v.
State, 322 Ark. 127, 907 S.W.2d 718 (1995).
Even if this point were properly before this court, we would
have no hesitancy in affirming. In Bell v. State, 317 Ark. 289,
877 S.W.2d 579 (1994), we addressed the same argument in another
accomplice-murder case, and wrote:
Bell's main contention is that the circuit court
erred because the State failed to show any violent act by
him. While it is true that there was no proof that he
pulled the trigger, this does not alter the fact that he
is charged as an accomplice for his involvement in these
murders. An accomplice, even of minor age, is
responsible for the activities of his cohort. See Ashing
v. State, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20 (1986).
Id. at 292, 877 S.W.2d at 581.
Appellant's second and third points of appeal are addressed
together. His second point is that the State did not present
evidence of failed efforts to rehabilitate him; therefore, the
State did not prove that he was beyond rehabilitation under
existing rehabilitation programs. See Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-
318(e)(2). His third point is that the State did not present
evidence to rebut proof that he is immature. See Ark. Code Ann.
9-27-318(e)(3). It was neither necessary for the State to
introduce evidence of each factor under Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-
318(e) nor for the trial court to give equal weight to each factor.
See Macon v. State, 323 Ark. 498, 915 S.W.2d 273 (1996), and Davis
v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995). The serious and
violent nature of the crime charged was sufficient, in and of
itself, for the trial court to deny the motion to transfer. Bell
v. State, 317 Ark. 289, 877 S.W.2d 579 (1994).
The trial judge did not make specific findings of fact, but
only recited that he considered the pleadings, testimony, and
statements of counsel, and applied Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318 and the
decisions of the appellate courts of this State. In similar
circumstances, we have written:
We note that even though the trial judge was not required
to make specific findings of fact when reaching his
decision, to have done so would have been most helpful to
this court in determining whether or not his decision was
clearly erroneous.
Bell v. State, 317 Ark. 289, 293, 877 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1994).
Affirmed.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
