Wright v. Bradley

Wright v. Bradley (2005-467); 180 Vt. 383; 910 A.2d 893

2006 VT 100

[Filed 15-Sept-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 100

                                No. 2005-467


  Jodi Wright, on behalf of                      Supreme Court
                                                 Casandra Hood
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Washington Family Court


  Matt Bradley                                   May Term, 2006


  Walter M. Morris, Jr., J.

  Michael D. Blair of Law Office of Michael D. Blair, Barre, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Jon D. Valsangiacomo of Valsangiacomo, Detora & McQuesten, Barre, for
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.  Jodi Wright, on behalf of her daughter, Casandra
  Hood (plaintiff), appeals the dismissal of her complaint for relief from
  abuse from defendant, Matt Bradley.  The family court ruled that it did not
  have jurisdiction to sustain the order because plaintiff and defendant's
  relationship was not "of such substantiality" so as to be a "dating
  relationship" pursuant to 15 V.S.A.   1101(2).  Plaintiff contends the
  relationship was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant sexually
  assaulted her.  We do not address that claim here other than to note the
  allegations that form the basis for the complaint as drawn from plaintiff's
  affidavit.  In July 2005, defendant drove plaintiff and her friend to his
  parents' residence in Woodbury, Vermont, where he hosted a party.  After
  several hours, plaintiff wanted to leave and requested a ride home. 
  Defendant refused to drive plaintiff home and denied her access to his
  telephone.  Unable to leave, plaintiff slept on a couch in the living room
  where she remained until awakened by defendant, who then allegedly sexually
  assaulted her.  Immediately following the incident, plaintiff left the
  house with her friend and went to a hospital for treatment.  In the weeks
  that followed, plaintiff felt threatened by defendant and was afraid to
  return to the school they both attended without legal protection. 
  Accordingly, plaintiff's mother sought a relief from abuse order, the
  denial of which is the basis for appeal.  

       ¶  3.  Vermont's abuse prevention statute, 15 V.S.A.   1103, sets
  forth the process by which relief from abuse orders are issued.  Such
  orders may be issued only to family or household members against family or
  household members.  Id. § 1103(a).  Since plaintiff and defendant are not
  part of the same family, the court could issue a relief from abuse order
  only if they were household members at the time of the alleged abuse.  The
  statute defines household members as follows:  

    (2) "Household members" means persons who, for any period of time,
    are living or have lived together, are sharing or have shared
    occupancy of a dwelling, are engaged in or have engaged in a
    sexual relationship, or minors or adults who are dating or who
    have dated. "Dating" means a social relationship of a romantic
    nature.  Factors that the court may consider when determining
    whether a dating relationship exists or existed include:

        (A) the nature of the relationship;
        (B) the length of time the relationship has existed;
        (C) the frequency of interaction between the parties;
        (D) the length of time since the relationship was terminated, 
        if applicable.    

  Id.   1101(2).
           
       ¶  4.  Plaintiff sought an abuse prevention order in August 2005,
  and the court issued a temporary ex parte order.  The court held a hearing
  on September 8, 2005 on whether to issue a permanent order, and the focus
  was on whether plaintiff and defendant were "household members" because
  they had been in a dating relationship sufficient for issuance of the
  order. (FN1)  At the hearing, plaintiff testified on the issue as follows:

    Q.  [W]hat grade are you in?
    A.  11th.
    Q.  Okay.  How long have you known Matt Bradley?
    A.  For about two years, three years.
    Q.  During that two years, have you ever dated Matt Bradley?
    A.  Yes.
    Q.  And when did you date Matt?
    A.  Freshman year we went to a party together, and sophomore year
    I went to his house and we watched a movie together.
    Q.  Okay.  Since that time, have you continued to make contact
    with Matt?
    A.  Yeah, we talked on the phone and we had talked in school.
   
  Following this testimony, defendant's father testified and described the
  existence and nature of his son's serious dating relationship with another
  young woman during the time period referenced by plaintiff.  Defendant's
  father stated that during his son's eighteen-month relationship with the
  other woman, she had been at their house "at least once a day," and had
  developed a strong relationship with defendant's family.  In contrast,
  defendant's father stated that he had met plaintiff only once when the
  teens were together at his home to watch a movie.  

       ¶  5.  The family court concluded that the teens' past dating
  relationship was not substantial enough to allow it to issue a relief from
  abuse order and dismissed the complaint. (FN2)  The court relied on the
  language of the statute, which encourages consideration of the nature,
  frequency, and duration of interaction, when making its determination.  It
  considered plaintiff's sparse testimony in light of the factors in the
  statute and determined that plaintiff "failed to establish that the nature
  of the dating relationship in issue in this case is of such substantiality
  in light of the statutory criteria as to sustain her complaint for relief
  from abuse."  On appeal, plaintiff questions the family court's
  interpretation of 15 V.S.A.   1101(2), arguing that it overemphasized
  certain of the factors, particularly the requirement that the relationship
  be "romantic," and failed to consider the parties' age and maturity. 
   
       ¶  6.  Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo
  review.  McAlister v. Vermont Property and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2006 VT
  85, ¶ 11, 17 Vt. L. Wk. 254.  Thus, our review of whether the Legislature
  intended for a dating relationship to be "substantial" in order for a
  relief from abuse order to be imposed is de novo.  In construing a statute,
  we first look at the language.  If the language is clear, we apply the
  statute in accordance with its plain meaning.  Travelers Ins. Co. v. Henry,
  2005 VT 68, ¶ 11, 178 Vt. 287, 882 A.2d 1133.  In this case, we do not
  see a determinative plain meaning.  The opening language of the statute
  provides that minors "who have dated" are household members and, therefore,
  subject to the jurisdiction of the court.  15 V.S.A. § 1101(2).  That
  language alone could cover the circumstances present here because plaintiff
  and defendant arguably dated on two occasions in the past.  On the other
  hand, the statute goes on to state that the court can consider certain
  factors to determine "whether a dating relationship . . . existed."  Id. 
  The factors-nature of the relationship, length of the relationship,
  frequency of interaction, time since the relationship was
  terminated-indicate that the Legislature wanted the court to consider more
  than the fact that past dating had occurred and to judge the strength and
  recency of the relationship between the parties.  

       ¶  7.  In construing a statute, our goal is to implement the intent of
  the Legislature.  In re 232511 Invs., Ltd., 2006 VT 27, ¶ 7, 17 Vt. L. Wk.
  98, 898 A.2d 109.  In circumstances where the language of the statute has
  no plain meaning, 

    we must ascertain legislative intent through consideration of the
    entire statute, including its subject matter, effects and
    consequences, as well as the reason and spirit of the law . . . .
    All relevant parts of the applicable statutory scheme are to be
    construed together to create, if possible, a harmonious whole.

  In re Estate of Cote, 2004 VT 17, ¶ 10, 176 Vt. 293, 848 A.2d 264 (internal
  citations omitted).  In applying these principles to this statute, we
  conclude that the Legislature intended to require more than past
  dating-that is, it intended a dating relationship that was substantial.  We
  reached a comparable conclusion with respect to brothers-in-law who "shared
  occupancy of a dwelling" for eleven nights over a thirteen-year period. 
  See Embree v. Balfanz, 174 Vt. 560, 562, 817 A.2d 6, 9 (2002) (mem.) ("It
  is much too slender a reed to support the application of the Family Abuse
  Act to the parties in this case[.]").  Similarly here, the language shows
  that the Legislature did not intend for all "dating" relationships to
  permit the imposition of relief from abuse orders; otherwise the
  four-factor criteria set forth at § 1101(2) would be superfluous.  See In
  re Margaret Susan P., 169 Vt. 252, 263, 733 A.2d 38, 47 (1999) (rejecting
  statutory construction rendering part of statutory language superfluous). 

       ¶  8.  In view of the statutory language taken as a whole, we hold
  that plaintiff was required to show a substantial dating relationship to
  support her request for an abuse prevention order and the family court had
  discretion in determining whether that relationship existed.  Two decisions
  from other states with similar statutes provide some guidance on where the
  limits of the concept lie.  In Andrews v. Rutherford, 832 A.2d 379, 384-86
  (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003), the court found a dating relationship
  where the parties were together very frequently over five months, were
  affectionate with each other and had a sexual relationship.  By comparison,
  the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found no substantial dating
  relationship based on statutory factors similar to those in Vermont where
  the only evidence was that defendant had "been over to [plaintiff's] house
  and he ha[d] taken [plaintiff] to the movies."  C.O. v. M.M., 815 N.E.2d 582, 588-89 (Mass. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 

       ¶  9.  Consideration of the factors outlined in § 1101(2) for
  determining whether a "dating" relationship exists-factors which the court
  "may" consider in its discretion-necessarily involves a case-by-case
  application.  See 15 V.S.A. § 1101(2); C.O., 815 N.E.2d  at 587. 
  Accordingly, we afford deference to the family court in applying these
  factors to the facts of a particular case, and reverse only for abuse of
  the court's statutory discretion.  See Begins v. Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 301,
  721 A.2d. 469, 471 (1998) (given family court's unique position to assess
  credibility, we will not set aside factual findings if supported by
  evidence).  We must uphold the court's conclusions if supported by its
  findings.  Id.   
   
       ¶  10.  Here, the trial court's conclusion is supported by the sparse
  evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing.  All of the statutory
  factors pointed against a dating relationship.  The two occasions relied
  upon-the party and the movie-happened in prior, and distinct, school years. 
  Any alleged dating between plaintiff and defendant was infrequent and
  episodic at best.  There was no evidence of the nature of the relationship,
  including whether or not it was "romantic" and to the exclusion of others. 
  Plaintiff contends that the trial court should have considered fundamental
  differences between teenagers and adults when making its determination, and
  that it employed an unrealistic threshold in evaluating plaintiff's
  relationship with defendant.  Although we doubt that plaintiff's
  perspective would lead to a different conclusion, we stress that we are not
  deciding here what conclusion the family court could have reached.  We hold
  only that it did not abuse its discretion in reaching the conclusion it
  did. 

       Affirmed.  


                                       FOR THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Associate Justice



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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Plaintiff did not argue that, alternatively, the "relationship"
  requirement of § 1101(2), which expressly includes a current or previous
  "sexual relationship," could be met by the single alleged act of sexual
  assault.

FN2.  In addition to the requisite relationship, the court also must find
  that defendant abused the plaintiff in order to grant relief.  15 V.S.A. §
  1103(c).  The parties do not dispute that the allegations were sufficient
  to satisfy the abuse requirement.