2022 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-11. When Privity Required to Support Action; Product Liability Action and Time Limitation Therefore; Industry-Wide Liability Theories Rejected

1. Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, no privity is necessary to support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract and except as provided in Code Section 11-2-318.
2. 1. The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his person or property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
   2. No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.
   3. A manufacturer may not exclude or limit the operation of this subsection.
3. The limitation of paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section regarding bringing an action within ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of personal property shall also apply to the commencement of an action claiming negligence of a manufacturer as the basis of liability, except an action seeking to recover from a manufacturer for injuries or damages arising out of the negligence of such manufacturer in manufacturing products which cause a disease or birth defect, or arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property. Nothing contained in this subsection shall relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer.
4. Irrespective of privity, a manufacturer shall not be held liable for the manufacture of a product alleged to be defective based on theories of market share or enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability.
5. Irrespective of privity, a manufacturer of a product alleged to be defective shall not be held liable for a public nuisance based on theories of market share or enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability.

History. Orig. Code 1863, § 2899; Code 1868, § 2905; Code 1873, § 2956; Code 1882, § 2956; Civil Code 1895, § 3812; Civil Code 1910, § 4408; Code 1933, § 105-106; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1166, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2202, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2218, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2267, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 613, § 1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 625, § 1/SB 213.

Cross references.

Reports of insurers authorized to transact product liability insurance, § 33-3-22 .

Editor’s notes.

Ga. L. 2009, p. 625, § 2/SB 213, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsections (d) and (e) shall apply to causes of action arising on or after May 4, 2009.

Law reviews.

For comment on Eades v. Spencer-Adams Paint Co., 82 Ga. App. 123 , 60 S.E.2d 543 (1950), see 13 Ga. B. J. 343 (1951).

For comment criticizing former privity restrictions in product liability suits in light of Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 103 Ga. App. 842 , 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961), see 13 Mercer L. Rev. 425 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933 § 96-301).

For comment on Capital Auto. Co. v. Shinall, 103 Ga. App. 695 , 120 S.E.2d 351 (1961), see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 454 (1963).

For comment on Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), as to privity requirement in implied warranty actions, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 318 (1965).

For article, “Georgia’s New Statutory Liability for Manufacturers: An Inadequate Legislative Response,” see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 538 (1968).

For article, “Products Liability Law in Georgia: Is Change Coming?,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 353 (1974).

For article discussing strict liability for defective products in Georgia, see 13 Ga. St. B.J. 142 (1977).

For note, “Products Liability in Georgia,” see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 83 (1977).

For comment on Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31 , 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976), see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 751 (1977).

For article discussing products liability and plaintiff’s fault under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 373 (1978).

For article discussing plaintiff conduct and the emerging doctrine of comparative causation of torts, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403 (1978).

For article discussing the defenses to strict liability in tort, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (1978).

For article advocating imposition of strict liability for defective products in accordance with reasonable human expectations, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978).

For article critically analyzing the distinction in theories of recovery of damages caused by defective products between personal injuries cases and economic losses and suggesting a policy basis for deciding the latter, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 493 (1978).

For article analyzing the roles of court decisions and public regulation in preventing and redressing product defect injuries to children, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 523 (1978).

For article discussing comment K of § 402A Restatement of Torts (Second) pertaining to unavoidably unsafe products of societal benefit specifically in the drug and cosmetic field, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 545 (1978).

For article advocating repudiation of the patent danger rule as a manufacturer’s defense to personal injury suits resulting from product defects, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 583 (1978).

For article discussing architect liability for product design and supervision of construction, and the statute of limitations, see 14 Ga. St. B.J. 164 (1978).

For note discussing admissibility of automobile recall letters as proof of defect in products liability case, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 611 (1978).

For note discussing various state legislature’s enactments restricting manufacturer’s liability for injury resulting from product defects, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 619 (1978).

For comment discussing the prohibition of wrongful death suits under Georgia’s strict liability in Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657 , 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977), see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 649 (1978).

For article discussing strict liability, see 17 Ga. St. B. J. 56 (1980).

For comment, “Strict Liability Actions — Which Statute of Limitations?,” see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 773 (1980).

For article on the duty to warn users of products of product danger under § 51-1-11 , see 18 Ga. St. B. J. 69 (1981).

For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982).

For note, “Subsequent Remedial Measures in a Product Liability Case: The Fastest Spinning Wheel in Litigation,” see 19 Ga. St. B. J. 89 (1982).

For comment, “Proposed Solutions to an ‘Obvious’ Problem in Georgia Products Liability Law,” see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 915 (1984).

For comment discussing the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability actions, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1389 (1984).

For article, “Statutes of Limitation: Counterproductive Complexities,” see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1985).

For article, “Federal Automotive Safety Standards and Georgia Products Liability Law: Conflict or Coexistence?,” see 26 Ga. St. B.J. 107 (1990).

For article, “Products Liability Law in Georgia Including Recent Developments,” see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (1991).

For comment, “Medical Expert Systems and Publisher Liability: A Cross-Contextual Analysis,” see 43 Emory L.J. 731 (1994).

For annual survey article on tort law, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1998).

For note, “Ogletree v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.: The Demise of the ‘Open and Obvious Danger’ Defense,” see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 643 (1999).

For annual survey article on tort law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (2000).

For survey article on tort law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 425 (2003).

For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 381 (2005).

For annual survey of product liability law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (2006).

For survey article on product liability law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (2007).

For survey article on product liability law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 303 (2008).

For annual survey on product liability, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2009).

For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (2009).

For annual survey of law on product liability, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 243 (2010).

For note, “Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act Really Prohibit Design Defect Claims?: Examining Federal Preemption in Light of American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari,” see 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 617 (2010).

For annual survey on product liability, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2012).

For note, “The Plaintiffs Keep Getting Richer, the Manufacturers Just Stay Poor: Design Defect Litigation in Georgia Post-Banks,” see 49 Ga. L. Rev. 281 (2014).

For annual survey article on product liability, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 177 (2015).

For annual survey on product liability, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2017).

For article, “Do’s and Don’ts When Handling a Product Liability Matter in Georgia,” see 25 Ga. St. B.J. 17 (Aug. 2019).

For note, “Amazon’s Invincibility: The Effect of Defective Third-Party Vendors’ Products on Amazon,” see 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1215 (2019).

For article with annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 73 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (2021).