2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-11. When Privity Required to Support Action; Product Liability Action and Time Limitation Therefore; Industry-Wide Liability Theories Rejected

Universal Citation: GA Code § 51-1-11 (2020)
  1. Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, no privity is necessary to support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract and except as provided in Code Section 11-2-318.
    1. The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his person or property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
    2. No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.
    3. A manufacturer may not exclude or limit the operation of this subsection.
  2. The limitation of paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section regarding bringing an action within ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of personal property shall also apply to the commencement of an action claiming negligence of a manufacturer as the basis of liability, except an action seeking to recover from a manufacturer for injuries or damages arising out of the negligence of such manufacturer in manufacturing products which cause a disease or birth defect, or arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property. Nothing contained in this subsection shall relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer.
  3. Irrespective of privity, a manufacturer shall not be held liable for the manufacture of a product alleged to be defective based on theories of market share or enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability.
  4. Irrespective of privity, a manufacturer of a product alleged to be defective shall not be held liable for a public nuisance based on theories of market share or enterprise, or other theories of industry-wide liability.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2899; Code 1868, § 2905; Code 1873, § 2956; Code 1882, § 2956; Civil Code 1895, § 3812; Civil Code 1910, § 4408; Code 1933, § 105-106; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1166, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2202, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2218, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2267, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 613, § 1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 625, § 1/SB 213.)

Cross references.

- Reports of insurers authorized to transact product liability insurance, § 33-3-22.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2009, p. 625, § 2/SB 213, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsections (d) and (e) shall apply to causes of action arising on or after May 4, 2009.

Law reviews.

- For article, "Georgia's New Statutory Liability for Manufacturers: An Inadequate Legislative Response," see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 538 (1968). For article, "Products Liability Law in Georgia: Is Change Coming?," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 353 (1974). For article discussing strict liability for defective products in Georgia, see 13 Ga. St. B. J. 142 (1977). For article discussing products liability and plaintiff's fault under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 373 (1978). For article discussing plaintiff conduct and the emerging doctrine of comparative causation of torts, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403 (1978). For article discussing the defenses to strict liability in tort, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (1978). For article advocating imposition of strict liability for defective products in accordance with reasonable human expectations, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978). For article critically analyzing the distinction in theories of recovery of damages caused by defective products between personal injuries cases and economic losses and suggesting a policy basis for deciding the latter, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 493 (1978). For article analyzing the roles of court decisions and public regulation in preventing and redressing product defect injuries to children, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 523 (1978). For article discussing comment K of § 402A Restatement of Torts (Second) pertaining to unavoidably unsafe products of societal benefit specifically in the drug and cosmetic field, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 545 (1978). For article advocating repudiation of the patent danger rule as a manufacturer's defense to personal injury suits resulting from product defects, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 583 (1978). For article discussing architect liability for product design and supervision of construction, and the statute of limitations, see 14 Ga. St. B. J. 164 (1978). For article discussing strict liability, see 17 Ga. St. B. J. 56 (1980). For article on the duty to warn users of products of product danger under § 51-1-11, see 18 Ga. St. B. J. 69 (1981). For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982). For article, "Statutes of Limitation: Counterproductive Complexities," see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1985). For article, "Federal Automotive Safety Standards and Georgia Products Liability Law: Conflict or Coexistence?," see 26 Ga. St. B. J. 107 (1990). For article, "Products Liability Law in Georgia Including Recent Developments," see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (1991). For annual survey article on tort law, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1998). For annual survey article on tort law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (2000). For survey article on tort law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 425 (2003). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 381 (2005). For annual survey of product liability law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (2006). For survey article on product liability law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (2007). For survey article on product liability law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 303 (2008). For annual survey on product liability, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2009). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (2009). For annual survey of law on product liability, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 243 (2010). For annual survey on product liability, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2012). For annual survey article on product liability, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 177 (2015). For annual survey on product liability, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2017). For article, "Do's and Don'ts When Handling a Product Liability Matter in Georgia," see 25 Ga. St. B.J. 17 (Aug. 2019). For note, "Products Liability in Georgia," see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 83 (1977). For note discussing admissibility of automobile recall letters as proof of defect in products liability case, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 611 (1978). For note discussing various state legislature's enactments restricting manufacturer's liability for injury resulting from product defects, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 619 (1978). For note, "Subsequent Remedial Measures in a Product Liability Case: The Fastest Spinning Wheel in Litigation," see 19 Ga. St. B. J. 89 (1982). For note, "Ogletree v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.: The Demise of the 'Open and Obvious Danger' Defense," see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 643 (1999). For note, "Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act Really Prohibit Design Defect Claims?: Examining Federal Preemption in Light of American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari," see 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 617 (2010). For note, "The Plaintiffs Keep Getting Richer, the Manufacturers Just Stay Poor: Design Defect Litigation in Georgia Post-Banks," see 49 Ga. L. Rev. 281 (2014). For note, "Amazon's Invincibility: The Effect of Defective Third-Party Vendors' Products on Amazon," see 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1215 (2019). For comment on Eades v. Spencer-Adams Paint Co., 82 Ga. App. 123, 60 S.E.2d 543 (1950), see 13 Ga. B. J. 343 (1951). For comment criticizing former privity restrictions in product liability suits in light of Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 103 Ga. App. 842, 120 S.E.2d 912 (1961), see 13 Mercer L. Rev. 425 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933 § 96-301). For comment on Capital Auto. Co. v. Shinall, 103 Ga. App. 695, 120 S.E.2d 351 (1961), see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 454 (1963). For comment on Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), as to privity requirement in implied warranty actions, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 318 (1965). For comment on Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976), see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 751 (1977). For comment discussing the prohibition of wrongful death suits under Georgia's strict liability in Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977), see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 649 (1978). For comment, "Strict Liability Actions - Which Statute of Limitations?," see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 773 (1980). For comment, "Proposed Solutions to an 'Obvious' Problem in Georgia Products Liability Law," see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 915 (1984). For comment discussing the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability actions, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1389 (1984). For comment, "Medical Expert Systems and Publisher Liability: A Cross-Contextual Analysis," see 43 Emory L.J. 731 (1994).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

  • General Consideration
  • Privity as Element of Action
  • Products Liability

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- Ten-year statute of repose barring strict product liability actions and applying to negligent product liability actions is not an unconstitutional denial of equal protection or access to the courts, nor does O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 violate the one-subject matter limitation of the state constitution. Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 449 S.E.2d 602 (1994).

Application of Florida law appropriate.

- Florida law was properly applied for a fraud claim brought by a lessee against a lessor's principal because both Georgia under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(a) and Florida recognized an exception to the economic loss rule for injuries occurring independently of a contract and, thus, the application of Florida law did not contravene Georgia public policy. Luigino's Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009)(Unpublished).

Former O.C.G.A.

§ 24-9-67 inapplicable. - Trial court was not required to consider a driver's expert affidavits under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707) in a products liability action because by the statute's terms former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707) applied to criminal cases, not civil cases. Udoinyion v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 313 Ga. App. 248, 721 S.E.2d 190 (2011).

Calculating date.

- Date to be used for calculating the beginning of the statute of repose under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2), and the conditions precedent for the imposition of strict liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) are not defined in the same terms because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) refers to the sale of the finished product to the consumer who is intended to receive the product as new. Campbell v. Altec Indus., 288 Ga. 535, 707 S.E.2d 48 (2011).

Cited in Reddick v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 206 S.E.2d 857 (1974); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975); Davis v. Fox Pool Corp., 136 Ga. App. 381, 221 S.E.2d 484 (1975); Fender v. Colonial Stores, 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 237 Ga. 554, 229 S.E.2d 379 (1976); Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Hertron Chem. Co., 139 Ga. App. 803, 229 S.E.2d 681 (1976); Dodge Trucks, Inc. v. Wilson, 140 Ga. App. 743, 231 S.E.2d 818 (1976); Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976); Beam v. Omark Indus., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 142, 237 S.E.2d 607 (1977); Patent Scaffolding Co. v. Etheridge, 143 Ga. App. 795, 240 S.E.2d 610 (1977); Vance v. Miller-Taylor Shoe Co., 147 Ga. App. 812, 251 S.E.2d 52 (1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 580 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hall, 152 Ga. App. 560, 263 S.E.2d 449 (1979); Tolar Constr. Co. v. GAF Corp., 154 Ga. App. 127, 267 S.E.2d 635 (1980); Daugherty v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 760, 287 S.E.2d 729 (1982); Buchanan v. Georgia Boy Pest Control Co., 161 Ga. App. 301, 287 S.E.2d 752 (1982); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224, 292 S.E.2d 911 (1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Whirlpool Corp. v. Hurlbut, 166 Ga. App. 95, 303 S.E.2d 284 (1983); Abee v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 169 Ga. App. 167, 312 S.E.2d 142 (1983); Lodge v. Champion Home Bldrs. Co., 170 Ga. App. 21, 315 S.E.2d 912 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470 (1984); Lorentzson v. Rowell, 171 Ga. App. 821, 321 S.E.2d 341 (1984); Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201, 326 S.E.2d 436 (1985); Folsom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 174 Ga. App. 46, 329 S.E.2d 217 (1985); American Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Williams, 183 Ga. App. 845, 360 S.E.2d 411 (1987); Continental Corp. v. DOT, 185 Ga. App. 792, 366 S.E.2d 160 (1988); Adair v. Baker Bros., 185 Ga. App. 807, 366 S.E.2d 164 (1988); White v. W.G.M. Safety Corp., 707 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1988); Browning v. Maytag Corp., 932 F.2d 1409 (11th Cir. 1991); Samuelson v. Lord, Aeck & Sergeant, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 568, 423 S.E.2d 268 (1992); Wright v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 685, 426 S.E.2d 214 (1992); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. J.I. Case Co., 209 Ga. App. 61, 432 S.E.2d 654 (1993); Lamb ex rel. Shepard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1993); DeLoach v. Rovema Corp., 241 Ga. App. 802, 527 S.E.2d 882 (2000); Dean v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., Inc., 246 Ga. App. 255, 540 S.E.2d 233 (2000); Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 236 F.3d 658 (11th Cir. 2000); Brookview Holdings, LLC v. Suarez, 285 Ga. App. 90, 645 S.E.2d 559 (2007); Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker, 295 Ga. App. 115, 670 S.E.2d 811 (2008); Coosa Valley Tech. College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 682 S.E.2d 187 (2009); Dixie Group, Inc. v. Shaw Indus. Group, 303 Ga. App. 459, 693 S.E.2d 888, cert. denied, No. S10C1241, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 659; cert. denied, No. S10C1302, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 730 (Ga. 2010); Anderson v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 324 Ga. App. 801, 751 S.E.2d 589 (2013).

Privity as Element of Action

1. In General

Subsection (a) is a codification of the common law. Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948).

Subsection (a) allows an action in tort without the necessity of privity. Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969); Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 585, 38 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1973).

Subsection (a) of former Code 1933, § 105-106 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11) purportedly limited the right of tort action based on the violation of a duty, itself the consequence of a contract, to a party or privy, except in cases when the party would have had a right of action for the injury done, independently of the contract or in cases covered by former Code 1933, § 109A-2--318 (see now O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318) of the Uniform Commercial Code extending the benefit of express or implied warranties to certain natural persons without regard to privity. Koppers Co. v. Parks, 120 Ga. App. 551, 171 S.E.2d 639 (1969); Shell v. Watts, 125 Ga. App. 542, 188 S.E.2d 269, rev'd on other grounds, 229 Ga. 474, 192 S.E.2d 265 (1972).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 states that no privity is necessary to support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases when the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract. Levine v. SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 740 S.E.2d 672 (2013).

Rule of privity in contract actions is made a statutory requirement by subsection (a).

- In actions based upon the breach of express or implied warranties, this requirement was subject only to the exception contained in former Code 1933, § 109A-2-318 (see now O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318). Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975).

Duty of care may be called for by contract and by tort law at same time, and when this is true the plaintiff requires no privity to maintain a tort action. Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121, aff'd sub nom. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Sims, 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61 (1974).

Parties to contract not necessarily confined to contractual remedies.

- When the petition was one in tort for a negligent injury committed upon the property of the joint plaintiffs, the right of action was not confined to the parties to the contract, the negligent performance of which resulted in the injury to the plaintiffs' property, since the right of action for the injury done inhered in the owners of the property independently of any obligation imposed by the contract. Monroe v. Guess, 41 Ga. App. 697, 154 S.E. 301 (1930).

Mere fact that the right or privilege of one which has been violated was acquired by virtue of a contract does not confine actions for the violation of the right to parties and privies to the contract. University Apts., Inc. v. Uhler, 84 Ga. App. 720, 67 S.E.2d 201 (1951).

Party to contract may maintain suit in tort with nonparty.

- Fact that one of the plaintiffs may have been a party to the contract, the negligent performance of which caused the injury, would not prevent a joint action by both of the owners of the damaged property for the tortious injury to their property independent of the contract, since independently of any duty under the contract, the law imposed upon the defendant the duty not to negligently and wrongfully injure and damage the property of another. Monroe v. Guess, 41 Ga. App. 697, 154 S.E. 301 (1930).

Action in tort cannot be maintained by third person not privy to the contract for breach of warranty which constitutes a mere contractual obligation between the defendant and the other contracting parties. Hand v. Harrison, 99 Ga. App. 429, 108 S.E.2d 814 (1959).

Since the provisions in an ordinance granting a power company the right to erect its lines along the public streets are contractual between the city and the power company, a breach of them would give rise to a cause of action between them only, unless it appears that the plaintiff injured would have a right of action for the plaintiff's injury independently of the contract. Crosby v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 114 Ga. App. 193, 150 S.E.2d 563 (1966).

No rights arise by indirect contract relation.

- One person cannot maintain an action against another for an injury to a third person on the ground that the wrong has also indirectly injured the plaintiff by reason of the plaintiff's contractual relations with the third person. Kokomo Rubber Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S.E. 783 (1924); East Tenn., V. & Ga. Ry. v. Herrman & Bros., 92 Ga. 384, 17 S.E. 344 (1893); Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-Hood Cotton Co., 35 Ga. App. 94, 132 S.E. 454 (1926); King Hdwe. Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S.E. 119 (1929); Dale Elec. Co. v. Thurston, 82 Ga. App. 516, 61 S.E.2d 584 (1950); Stuart v. Berry, 107 Ga. App. 531, 130 S.E.2d 838 (1963); Hayes v. Century 21 Shows, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 490, 157 S.E.2d 779 (1967); Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976); Sawyer v. Allison, 151 Ga. App. 334, 259 S.E.2d 721 (1979); Georgia-Carolina Brick & Tile Co. v. Brown, 153 Ga. App. 747, 266 S.E.2d 531 (1980).

Corporations not affected by abolition of privity requirement.

- Although the requirement of privity has been abolished for tort actions and actions against manufacturers of defective products brought by "any natural person . . .", no such change has been effected as to corporations damaged by defective products. Chem Tech Finishers, Inc. v. Paul Mueller Co., 189 Ga. App. 433, 375 S.E.2d 881 (1988).

Buyer corporation may be liable for torts of seller corporation.

- When a corporation that has manufactured a product is purchased by another corporation, the purchaser may be held liable for the torts of the seller under certain circumstances. Corbin v. Farmex, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 620, 490 S.E.2d 395 (1997), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Farmex Inc. v. Wainwright, 269 Ga. 548, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998), vacated on other grounds, 234 Ga. App. 180, 506 S.E.2d 406 (1998).

Policy considerations may override privity requirements.

- Exception to the rigid privity requirement will be implied when policy considerations weigh in favor of liability. Gulf Contracting v. Bibb County, 795 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1986).

Third party not in privity cannot rely on professional duty which might give rise to a negligence action had the injured party been in privity. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Party not in privity subject to action for procuring breach of contract.

- Person not party to contract may procure, without justification, its breach, and be liable therefor in tort; the mere failure of a party to a contract to carry out its terms will not give rise to a cause of action ex delicto in favor of a third person who has contracted with the opposite party to such contract, although in breaching the contract the party so failing may be charged with notice that the opposite party will not be able to perform its contract with such third person. First Mtg. Corp. v. Felker, 158 Ga. App. 14, 279 S.E.2d 451 (1981).

Liability for negligent misrepresentations by persons rendering professional services is limited to a foreseeable person or limited class of persons for whom the information was intended and who can show reasonable reliance on the false information, specifically that the information was given for the purpose of inducing their reliance. Gulf Contracting v. Bibb County, 795 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1986).

Exception to the privity requirement has been recognized in cases of negligent misrepresentation by a professional, reasonably relied upon by a foreseeable person or class of person. However, no similar exception has been carved out for a professional's alleged negligent failure to supervise a project. Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874, 389 S.E.2d 382 (1989).

2. Applicability to Specific Cases

No recovery for economic loss.

- If there exists no accident, and no physical damage to other property, and the only loss is a pecuniary one, through loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the cost of repairing or modifying the property, the court adheres to the rule that purely economic interests are not entitled to protection against mere negligence, and accordingly deny recovery. Bates & Assocs. v. Romei, 207 Ga. App. 81, 426 S.E.2d 919 (1993).

Only parties to contract of shipment may sue upon negligent performance.

- When the complaint is grounded upon negligence in performance of the duties imposed by a contract of shipment and, therefore, while not based upon the contract, but in tort, is necessarily founded and grounded upon the obligations assumed under the specific contract by the contracting parties thereto, the maker of the contract is the one to complain of negligence in its performance rather than some other person not a party to the agreement. Black v. Southern Ry., 48 Ga. App. 445, 173 S.E. 199 (1934).

Consignee of goods under bill of lading cannot maintain tort action without an interest in goods consigned.

- Consignee who actually is without any special or general property in goods consigned to him, and who therefore incurs no risk from their transportation, cannot maintain against the carrier an action ex delicto for loss or damage to the goods in transit. Black v. Southern Ry., 48 Ga. App. 445, 173 S.E. 199 (1934).

Consignee's ownership interest rebuttably presumed.

- Consignee of property delivered by another to a common carrier for shipment is presumed to be the owner, and presumptively a right of action exists in the consignee's favor for any injury or damage to the property in transit. This presumption, however, may be rebutted, and, when successfully done, the consignee cannot maintain an action ex delicto for the loss of or for any damage to the property. Black v. Southern Ry., 48 Ga. App. 445, 173 S.E. 199 (1934).

Consignee with special interest may sue even though not general owner.

- Though the consignee may not be the real owner, if the consignee has a special interest in the property shipped, the consignee may maintain action for the loss, or for any damage to such property in transit, and in such action may have a recovery of the full value of the property when lost, or full amount of damages to the property when the property is injured. The ownership may not be extensive, and an agent, factor, broker, bailee, or other person having rights in the property to be protected may maintain an action, and recover both for oneself and the general owner. Black v. Southern Ry., 48 Ga. App. 445, 173 S.E. 199 (1934).

Employees of purchaser do not have privity with manufacturer. Watkins v. Barber-Colman Co., 625 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1980).

Independent contractor owes an original duty not to endanger lives and limbs of others by negligent performance of contract, when the consequences of such conduct may be foreseen; the trial court erred in granting a motion to dismiss when the defendant garageman failed to repair brakes on the plaintiff's employer's truck, leading to the plaintiff's injury. Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948).

General contractor not in privity with contract between school district and agent.

- General contractor's negligence and breach of duty claims against an agent for a school district were barred by the economic loss rule, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(a); the contractor was essentially alleging negligent supervision of a school project, and the contractor was not in privity with the contract between the agent and the school district and did not assert any legal duty owed independently of the contract. J. Kinson Cook of Ga., Inc. v. Heery/Mitchell, 284 Ga. App. 552, 644 S.E.2d 440 (2007).

Independent contractor may be liable to third person after contractor has completed work when completed work product is inherently or intrinsically dangerous or so defective as to be imminently dangerous to third persons. This exception applies as between a designing engineer of a roof and a tenant who was damaged when the roof collapsed. Welding Prods. v. S.D. Mullins Co., 127 Ga. App. 474, 193 S.E.2d 881 (1972).

Landlord's duty not to willfully disturb possession rights not merely contractual duty.

- Duty on the part of the landlord not to willfully interfere with the plaintiff's right to occupy the apartment which she had a right to do in the right of her husband and not to interfere with her access to her clothing were not duties arising out of the contract of rental; they were duties owed by all persons to all persons, and the cause of action would have existed if there had been no contract of rental between the parties. University Apts., Inc. v. Uhler, 84 Ga. App. 720, 67 S.E.2d 201 (1951).

Telegraph company liable though privity absent.

- Privity of contract is not required when one sues a telegraph company for failure to transmit and deliver a message. Conyers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 92 Ga. 619, 19 S.E. 253, 44 Am. St. R. 100 (1893).

Architects and engineers liable for defects in plans relied on by those bidding for contract.

- When the defendants negligently failed to disclose the remaining subsurface debris in specifications, plans, drawings, plats, and surveys describing a construction job that the defendants prepared as architects and engineers, those specifications were obviously prepared for a limited class of persons, namely firms bidding for contracts to build all or a portion of the job and reliance on the specifications and other materials by such persons was also reasonable because the information therein was vital to the bidding process, the defendants could be liable to third parties such as the low bidder on the job for the defendants' failure to adequately describe construction requirements through the defendants' specifications and materials. Gulf Contracting v. Bibb County, 795 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1986).

Relationship between architectural firm and supplier and installer of materials.

- Architectural firm which entered a contract with a store to design a renovation owed no duty of care, as a professional, to the company hired to install the tile, or to the company which supplied the tile, which turned out to be defective, when there was no professional relationship existing between them nor any relationship approaching that of privity. R.H. Macy & Co. v. Williams Tile & Terrazzo Co., 585 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Surety's recovery from a party not in privity.

- As a surety, attempting to recover from a CPM based on a construction company's default, was not in privity with the CPM; did not allege willfulness, physical harm, or property damage; and failed to present exceptions to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11's strict privity rule other than negligent misrepresentation, personal professional negligence claims failed. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. R.L. Brown & Assocs., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2006).

Fall victim not third-party beneficiary of contract between shopping center and independent contractor.

- In a couple's slip and fall case, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of an independent contractor that had applied a de-icing mixture to the area on the night before the fall when there was no evidence that the injured plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the shopping center and the independent contractor and when there was no evidence that the independent contractor had been negligent. Davidson v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 640, 765 S.E.2d 783 (2014).

City contractor not in privity with city water customers.

- Because the only specific damages alleged by a city's water customers were overpayments to the city for which the customers sought a refund, and because the customers did not seek damages due to injury to the customers' persons or to the customers' real or personal property, the city's contractors did not owe the customers a duty independent of the customers' contracts with the city. City of Atlanta v. Benator, 310 Ga. App. 597, 714 S.E.2d 109 (2011), overruled on other grounds, FDIC v. Loudermilk, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 186 (Ga. 2019).

Members of distribution EMCs lacked privity to sue wholesale EMCs.

- Suits by classes of former and current members of distribution electric membership corporations (EMCs) seeking to recover millions of dollars in patronage capital from two wholesale EMCs were dismissed because the members lacked privity with the wholesale EMCs, and there was no legal duty under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-340(c) or the EMCs' bylaws requiring distribution of the patronage capital to the members. Walker v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 341 Ga. App. 647, 802 S.E.2d 643 (2017), overruled on other grounds, Hanham v. Access Mgmt. Group L.P., 305 Ga. 414, 825 S.E.2d 217 (2019).

Products Liability

1. In General

"Third-party tort-feasor" construed.

- Products liability claim pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11, against a general contractor in the contractor's capacity as designer and manufacturer of a new paper-making process, as opposed to the contractor's capacity as statutory employer, is not an action against a "third-party tort-feasor" which avoids the immunity provided under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11. Porter v. Beloit Corp., 194 Ga. App. 591, 391 S.E.2d 430 (1990).

Implied warranty of merchantability distinguished.

- Establishment of the implied warranty of merchantability as applied to a seller under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314 is not the same as the strict liability imposed on a manufacturer under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Buford v. Toys R' Us, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 565, 458 S.E.2d 373 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wheeler, 262 Ga. App. 607, 586 S.E.2d 83 (2003).

Removal to federal court.

- In an action against cigarette manufacturers and retail sellers, there was no possibility the plaintiff could recover against the retail defendants who were added to defeat diversity jurisdiction and, thus, the plaintiff's motion to remand after the manufacturers moved the action to federal court should be denied. Crooke v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 978 F. Supp. 1482 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Requirement for an expert affidavit did not apply to a strict products liability action against a manufacturer. SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Lowman, 223 Ga. App. 712, 479 S.E.2d 103 (1996).

Expert affidavit inadequate.

- Trial court did not err in determining that the affidavits of a driver's experts were inadequate under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702) to defeat summary judgment in favor of a manufacturer in the driver's products liability action because the affidavits did not describe the facts or data upon which the experts' opinions were based, did not explain the principles or methods the experts used to reach the experts' conclusions about the tire, and did not provide support for a conclusion that the experts had applied those principles and methods reliably in the experts' inspections of the tire. Udoinyion v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 313 Ga. App. 248, 721 S.E.2d 190 (2011).

Subsection (b) imposes strict liability for defective products.

- Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 570 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S. Ct. 350, 58 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1978).

Subsection (b) does not attach condition that defective product must be "unreasonably dangerous." Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).

Subsection (b) does not make manufacturer strictly liable for dangerous product absent a defect. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).

Strict liability applied only to manufacturers.

- These legislative enactments preclude any extension of strict liability by this court to parties other than the manufacturer. Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975).

Strict liability claim lies only against the manufacturer and not against the mere owner of a product. Williams v. City Ice Co., 190 Ga. App. 744, 380 S.E.2d 341 (1989).

Strict liability through implied warranty of fitness is not applicable to providers of service.

- Any imposition of strict liability through an implied warranty of fitness is applicable by statute to the manufacturers of new products, but is not applicable to the providers of services. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 172 Ga. App. 543, 323 S.E.2d 849 (1984).

Subsection (b) imposes tort liability under a breach of contract standard. Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976).

In contradistinction to law of negligence, law of warranty assigns liability on basis of product's lack of fitness; when machinery "malfunctions," it obviously lacks fitness regardless of the cause of the malfunction. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 585, 38 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1973).

Subsection (b) is directed to the manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property and not to the distributor. See Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 430, 208 S.E.2d 331 (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979); Holman Motor Co. v. Evans, 169 Ga. App. 610, 314 S.E.2d 453 (1984); Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 344 S.E.2d 418 (1986); English v. Crenshaw Supply Co., 193 Ga. App. 354, 387 S.E.2d 628 (1989); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

Subsection (b) creates liability only in cases of personal property sold after 1968. Watkins v. Barber-Colman Co., 625 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1980).

Subsection (b), by its specified terms, runs to the benefit of natural persons only. American San. Servs. v. EDM of Tex., Inc., 139 Ga. App. 662, 229 S.E.2d 136 (1976); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977); A.J. Kellos Constr. Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 495 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ga. 1980).

Strict liability claims under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) by plaintiff insured, as subrogee of a contractor, against the defendants, the seller of a school fire protection system and the designer and manufacturer of the system's controller, failed because the insurer and its insured, as corporations, were not "natural persons" within § 51-1-11(b)(1). ACE Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. v. ALC Controls, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. May 27, 2008).

Subsection (b) not retroactively applied.

- Provisions of subsection (b) created a new cause of action which was in derogation of the common law, and it follows that under former Code 1933, § 102-104 (see now O.C.G.A. § 1-3-5), which forbids the retroactive application of laws, former Code 1933, § 105-106 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11) may not be given retroactive effect. Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979).

Subsection (b) should be strictly construed because it is in derogation of common law. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 178 Ga. App. 438, 343 S.E.2d 715, aff'd, 256 Ga. 255, 347 S.E.2d 568 (1986).

Subsection (b) is in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms. Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 304 S.E.2d 383 (1983).

Georgia's strict liability doctrine is legislatively enacted, and it will be strictly construed. Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 353 S.E.2d 340 (1987).

Exception to 10 year liability limit.

- As a general rule, tort claims against a manufacturer are barred by O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) after 10 years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury; under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c), however, the legislature crafted an exception to the 10-year limit providing that nothing contained in that subsection shall relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer. Hunter v. Werner Co., 258 Ga. App. 379, 574 S.E.2d 426 (2002).

When a product is sold to a particular group or profession, a manufacturer has no duty to warn against the risks generally known to that group or profession. Argo v. Perfection Prods. Co., 730 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1991).

Failure to warn may constitute defect.

- Manufacturer's failure to warn of the dangers in using a product may constitute a defect in the product for purposes of strict liability. Pepper v. Selig Chem. Indus., 161 Ga. App. 548, 288 S.E.2d 693 (1982).

Absence of safety device.

- Product is not rendered defective by the patent absence of a specific safety device which would serve to guard against a common danger connected with the limited use of a product, which danger the ultimate user can personally recognize and otherwise guard against. Fortner v. W.C. Cayne & Co., 184 Ga. App. 187, 360 S.E.2d 920 (1987).

Absence of passive restraints or airbags in an automobile could not be considered a defective condition so as to establish a breach of duty on the part of the manufacturer. Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414, 376 S.E.2d 379 (1988).

Safety belts rather than airbags in automobiles would not be a defect within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414, 376 S.E.2d 379 (1988).

Doctrine of attractive nuisance by its terms applies only against a possessor of land; and, thus, it would appear to be inherently inapplicable to product liability cases. Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541 (1982).

Product defectively designed.

- In determining whether a product was defectively designed, the trier of fact may consider evidence establishing that at the time the product was manufactured, an alternative design would have made the product safer than the original design and was a marketable reality and technologically feasible. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

In a products liability action arising from the death of a nine-year-old child who died after eating rat poison thinking it was candy, a risk-utility analysis should have been applied in determining whether the design of the rodenticide was defective. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Plaintiff failed to prove defective product design.

- In an action arising from the crash of a helicopter, because the plaintiff failed to show that the crash was proximately caused by a defect in the helicopter and to rebut the manufacturer's argument that the cause was the failure to have an inlet screen in place, the plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law. Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490 (11th Cir. 1997).

In an action arising from the electrocution of the plaintiffs' decedent while the decedent was installing a washer/dryer unit in an apartment complex, summary judgment for the seller and manufacturer was proper because there was no evidence that the failure to place a rejection feature in the terminal block to prevent mis-wiring constituted a defective design. Moore v. ECI Mgmt., 246 Ga. App. 601, 542 S.E.2d 115 (2000).

2. Legislative Intent

Public policy on product liability.

- Former Code 1933, § 105-106 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11) as well as former Code 1933, § 109A-2--318 (see now O.C.G.A. § 11-2-318) were recent expressions of the legislature establishing but also limiting the public policy of this state in the area of product liability. Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975).

Intent to exclude builders of real property from product liability law.

- It was the intention of the legislature in using the phrase "personal property" to eliminate from the operation of the statute the sale of buildings by those who might with respect to them be regarded as manufacturers, and thereby to retain with respect to the sale of real property the rules requiring fraud to overcome the normal rule of caveat emptor. Garrett v. Panacon Corp., 130 Ga. App. 641, 204 S.E.2d 354 (1974).

3. Definitions

Loss of bargain not "injury" within subsection (b).

- "Injury," within the strict liability context of subsection (b) does not include damages stemming from loss of the benefit of one's bargain. The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977).

Electricity is a "product" within the meaning of subsection (b). Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 267 Ga. 26, 471 S.E.2d 854 (1996).

"Manufacturer" defined.

- Entity which assembles component parts and sells them as a single product under its trade name is a "manufacturer". Pierce v. Liberty Furn. Co., 141 Ga. App. 175, 233 S.E.2d 33 (1977).

Corporation which engaged another corporation to construct a prototype of a particular machine, which inspected the machine and offered suggestions for improvements, but which did not actually design or build the machine, did not assemble any component parts into a single product, nor sell or represent the machine as its own product, was not the "manufacturer" of the machine, such as to make it liable when it allowed an employer to use the machine and an employee was injured. Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

When an installer did not sell either a vehicle or an auger under its own trade name, the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the installer was not a "manufacturer" of the equipment within the meaning of subsection (b)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 and thus could not be held strictly liable for its performance. Yaeger v. Stith Equip. Co., 185 Ga. App. 315, 364 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 364 S.E.2d 48 (1987).

Retailer which affixed the retailer's label to a nightgown manufactured by another firm was the ostensible "manufacturer" of the product, and therefore subject to liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 693 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 700 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Soft drink franchisor, who manufactured and sold syrup to licensed bottling companies who then mixed it with other ingredients, was not liable as a "manufacturer" of the finished beverage product, which was sold by the bottlers for their accounts. Tyler v. Pepsico, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 223, 400 S.E.2d 673 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 899, 400 S.E.2d 673 (1991).

"Not merchantable" defined.

- Term "not merchantable and reasonably suited for the use intended," under subsection (b) means that the manufacturer's product when sold by the manufacturer was defective. A defective condition obtains only when the product is, at the time the product leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15 (1978).

Term "not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended" as used in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 means "defective." Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 299 S.E.2d 897 (1983).

"Personal property" defined.

- Designation "personal property" as used in subsection (b) includes all items manufactured as personal property regardless of whether such item has been affixed to or incorporated into real property after manufacture. Garrett v. Panacon Corp., 130 Ga. App. 641, 204 S.E.2d 354 (1974).

There is no reason for distinguishing between product itself and container in which it is supplied. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).

Stream of commerce

- Sale is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding that a product has been placed in the stream of commerce for purposes of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 267 Ga. 26, 471 S.E.2d 854 (1996).

In determining whether electricity had been placed in the stream of commerce for purposes of strict liability, the relinquishment of control over the electricity and/or the marketable condition of that electricity were essential factors. Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 267 Ga. 26, 471 S.E.2d 854 (1996).

Supply of blood by hospital not sale of property within subsection (b).

- Hospitals supplying blood to patients do so as part of the rendering of medical "services," rather than as a "sale" of blood, and thus only negligence and not strict products liability is available to the injured patient. McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977).

Product.

- Engineering company that designed an allegedly defective reinforcing safety net that was installed in the soil above a combined sanitary and storm sewer, and which failed to prevent a hole from developing, could have been found liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 as the reinforcing safety net could have been considered a product under a theory of products liability. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 267 Ga. App. 45, 598 S.E.2d 815 (2004).

4. Applicability of Subsection (b)

Manufacturer of defective article, which is inherently dangerous, is liable in tort for damages to any person injured by the manufacturer's negligence, though there is no privity of contract. Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118, 20 Am. St. R. 324, 5 L.R.A. 612 (1889); Woodward v. Miller, 119 Ga. 618, 46 S.E. 847, 100 Am. St. R. 188, 64 L.R.A. 932 (1904).

Manufacturer is liable if product, when sold, was not merchantable and reasonably suited to use intended and the product's condition when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 does not apply to distributors. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 796 F.2d 1427 (11th Cir. 1986).

Electricity is a product or "personal property sold as new property" when it is in the hands of and under the control of the consumer, intended to be available to the customer at a usable voltage. Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 219 Ga. App. 460, 465 S.E.2d 508 (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 26, 47 S.E.2d 854 (1996).

After the decedent was killed by electricity that was not transformed or intended to be transformed for use at the customer's facility, there was no basis for a claim against the electric company under paragraph (b)(1) O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 219 Ga. App. 460, 465 S.E.2d 508 (1995), aff'd, 267 Ga. 26, 47 S.E.2d 854 (1996).

Product seller not a manufacturer.

- In an action by an employee for injuries suffered using a paper cutter, when the complaint did not allege any facts showing that the defendant company was a manufacturer under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11, or that the defendant sold the product as "new property," the defendant could not be strictly liable. Mullins v. M.G.D. Graphics Sys. Group, 867 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

Corporation which purchased the assets of a manufacturer and sold, but did not manufacture, a product of the design manufactured by its predecessor, was a "product seller" under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.1, not a "manufacturer" subject to strict liability under paragraph (b)(1) O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Farmex Inc. v. Wainwright, 269 Ga. 548, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998).

When an alleged injured party asserted product liability claims against several retailers for injuries incurred when a plastic gas container being used near a fire exploded, strict liability claims could not survive; market-share liability had been rejected in Georgia, the retailers were not "manufacturers," and there was no issue regarding the duty to warn. Williamson v. Walmart Stores, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2015).

"First sale" not applicable to person injured.

- When a spinal plate was first sold for use or consumption in 1972, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 barred a patient's medical product liability claim based on use of the plate in 1988. Pafford v. Biomet, 210 Ga. App. 486, 436 S.E.2d 504 (1993), modified on other grounds, 244 Ga. 540, 448 S.E.2d 347 (1994).

Vehicle not manufactured by defendant.

- Defendant used-car dealer could not be held liable under a complaint alleging that the plaintiffs' decedent was killed while driving a used car purchased from the defendant which was defective when manufactured and that the car was covered by an express warranty of merchantability, issued by the defendant at the time of purchase, when the vehicle in question was not manufactured by the defendant. Ryals v. Billy Poppell, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 787, 386 S.E.2d 513 (1989).

Proof of defect at time of sale or lease.

- Failure of the brakes was not evidence that the brakes were defective at the time plaintiff leased the truck because there were several plausible explanations for the brake failure, including negligent brake repair or excessive trailer weight. Jenkins v. GMC, 240 Ga. App. 636, 524 S.E.2d 324 (1999).

Offering for sale or lease, marketing, or placing in stream of commerce, invokes section.

- When a manufactured item designed to be sold as new merchandise is initially offered for sale or lease, or otherwise marketed or placed in the stream of commerce, the coverage of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 is invoked. Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 867, 348 S.E.2d 55 (1986), aff'd, 256 Ga. 744, 353 S.E.2d 340 (1987).

Evidence of wilful, reckless, or wanton conduct.

- In a negligence action based on the sale of an automobile with an allegedly defectively-designed seat belt retractor mechanism, evidence pertaining to an earlier design was insufficient as a matter of law to establish wilful, reckless, or wanton misconduct since the design had subsequently been modified and there was no evidence to suggest that the modifications were ineffective or failed to correct the earlier problems. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994).

In the absence of evidence showing that any defendant acted with a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property, the willful misconduct exception to the statute of repose was inapplicable in an action based on the claim that the defendants were liable for failing to install an alarm on a truck which would have warned bystanders when the truck was moving backwards. Vickery v. Waste Mgmt. of Ga., Inc., 249 Ga. App. 659, 549 S.E.2d 482 (2001).

Failure to warn.

- Claims based on negligent failure to warn of the danger arising from a defectively-designed seat belt were not barred by the statute of repose. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994).

Statute of repose does not apply to "failure to warn" claims. Daniels v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 237 Ga. App. 828, 516 S.E.2d 848 (1999).

Repairer of machine was not a manufacturer under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 because, although the repairer may have assembled component parts, the repairer did not do so for the purpose of having the machine sold as new property under the repairer's own trade name. Barry v. Stevens Equip. Co., 176 Ga. App. 27, 335 S.E.2d 129 (1985).

Product must be defective when sold.

- In order to impose strict liability on the manufacturer of a product, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer's product when sold by the manufacturer was defective. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

Test in products liability is whether the product was merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended as determined at the time the product is sold and when a product is alleged to be "defective" for lack of safety devices, the manufacturer is entitled to have the "defectiveness" of the manufacturer's product considered in the context of the overall original design of the item; this is especially true when the alleged defect in a product is the absence of safety features on a component of the product which would prevent injury in the event another component fails. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Product is not in defective condition when the product is safe for normal handling and consumption. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).

Product is not in a defective condition when the product is safe for normal handling. If injury results from abnormal handling, the manufacturer is not liable. Argo v. Perfection Prods. Co., 730 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1991).

Manufacturer's duty to make product safe.

- If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which the machine is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if the machine's functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands. Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15 (1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 595 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1979).

Product must reach consumer without substantial change.

- One of the conditions for imposition of strict liability against a manufacturer of "defective" products is that the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Determination of whether a component manufacturer is insulated from liability depends upon the extent to which the product is altered by the assembler before the product reaches the ultimate user. Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 299 S.E.2d 897 (1983).

Product offered on trial basis.

- When a manufacturer in the business of marketing the manufacturer's product to an intended consumer offers the use of the product on a trial basis in order to make a sale, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 can be applied in a suit for an alleged injury occurring during the trial use. Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 353 S.E.2d 340 (1987).

Paragraph (b)(2) operates retroactively.

- Paragraph (b)(2) O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 will operate retroactively to bar claim of a plaintiff injured several months after the limitation period went into effect. Weeks v. Remington Arms Co., 733 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1984).

Effects of alteration in product.

- When a manufacturer is sued under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 for injuries proximately resulting from a defect in the design of the manufacturer's product existing at the time of sale, obviously if the design of that product has been independently altered, eliminated, and replaced by a third party after the sale and injuries then result, those injuries cannot be traced to or be the proximate result of the manufacturer's original design which did not exist at the time of injury; at the time of the tragic accident, the thing being used was not the thing sold. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Manufacturer may show alteration.

- When the alleged defect in a product is the absence of safety features, a manufacturer is entitled to demonstrate that this alleged defect is ultimately based upon the failure of an integral part of the overall product, the original design of which component has been independently eliminated and replaced by another and that there is thus no causal connection between any defect in the product existing at the time of sale and the injury. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

As to product-design duty of manufacturer, standard which courts have established is traditional one of reasonable care. A manufacturer or a seller does not have the status of an insurer as respects products design. Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15 (1978).

In designing a product, a manufacturer's duty is one of reasonable care, under the circumstances. Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 321 S.E.2d 353 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 201, 326 S.E.2d 436 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Manufacturer is under no duty to guard against injury from patent peril or from source manifestly dangerous, nor is there a duty on the manufacturer or seller to warn of obvious common dangers connected with the use of a product. Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15 (1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 595 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1979).

Manufacturer is not an insurer. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).

Neither a manufacturer nor a seller is an insurer that their product is, from a design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury. Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 321 S.E.2d 353 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 201, 326 S.E.2d 436 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Vendor has no general duty to test articles for defects prior to sale.

- It is the general rule that a vendor or dealer who is not the manufacturer is under no obligation to test an article purchased and sold by the vendor or dealer for the purpose of discovering latent, or concealed defects, and that when the vendor or dealer purchases and sells an article in common and general use, in the usual course of trade, without knowledge of its dangerous quality, and with nothing tending reasonably to call the vendor's or dealer's attention thereto, the vendor or dealer is not negligent in failing to exercise care to determine whether it is dangerous or not. The vendor or dealer may assume that the manufacturer has done his duty in properly constructing the article and in not placing upon the market a commodity which is defective and likely to inflict injury. Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 430, 208 S.E.2d 331 (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975).

If seller has reason to anticipate that danger may result from particular use seller may be required to give adequate warning of the danger, and a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Duty to warn extends only as to foreseeable uses of product.

- Duty to warn of danger in the use of a product extends only to the use of the product in the manner reasonably contemplated and anticipated by the manufacturer; when the use to which a product was being put at the time of injury is not that originally intended by the manufacturer, the determination of whether strict liability may be asserted as a viable theory of recovery or whether the manufacturer is insulated from liability because the use of the product was "abnormal" and intervening depends, initially, upon the foreseeability that the product would be put to that use. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Duty to warn of danger in use of product extends only to use of product in manner reasonably contemplated and anticipated by manufacturer, and dumpster manufacturer could not be held to reasonably foresee that a small child would be permitted to play in a dumpster. Greenway v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 163 Ga. App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541 (1982).

No duty to warn as to effects of improper uses of product.

- There is no duty to warn that a redesign and replacement of the integral and ultimately injurious component of a product will destroy the original design and may result in an essentially different product with new "dangerous propensities"; the consumer's conscious decision not to use the product as the product was originally manufactured and designed creates a danger readily apparent even without a warning. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

There is no duty to warn of the obvious danger of using a manufacturer's product as the mere foundation from which a redesigned instrumentality will be produced. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Adequacy of warning.

- Strict liability is not imposed under subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 merely because a product may be dangerous. If products are properly prepared, manufactured, packaged, and accompanied with adequate warnings and instructions, the products cannot be said to be defective. Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 284 (11th Cir. 1994).

Since the defendant marketed the defendant's lacquer thinner solely to professionals, and the product carried a warning of the hazards connected with the product's use, which was reasonably calculated to reach the average user and contained clear and simple language, the defendant did not breach the defendant's duty to warn of nonobvious foreseeable dangers from the normal use of the defendant's product. Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 284 (11th Cir. 1994).

Latent design defect must be shown.

- Since the appellant was using a bulldozer manufactured by the appellees for the purpose of clearing felled trees from a construction site, when a tree jumped over the bulldozer blade and struck the appellant in the chest, the appellant's injuries arose not from a latent design defect, but from an obvious one, the lack of a protective metal cage surrounding the driver's seat, and such alleged defect was not actionable. Stodghill v. Fiat-Allis Constr. Mach., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 183 (1982).

Absence of lawn mower safety device not a defect.

- Absence of a "deadman device" that would automatically turn a lawn mower motor off once the operator left the driver's seat did not, in and of itself, render a lawn mower "defective" and, therefore, as a matter of law, the manufacturer could not be held strictly liable for the injury suffered by the plaintiff when the plaintiff fell off the mower, which continued to operate, eventually injuring the plaintiff's leg. Pressley v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 738 F.2d 1222 (11th Cir. 1984).

Failure to install deadman control on rototiller.

- Finding that the alleged defect of failing to install a deadman control on the rototiller's forward gear was open and obvious, liability is barred under each of the plaintiff's theories of recovery: strict liability, negligence, and inadequate warning. Smith v. Garden Way, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 12 F.3d 220 (11th Cir. 1993).

Black bicycle helmet was not defective since the helmets lack of conspicuity was observable from a simple visual inspection. Berkner v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 9 F.3d 121 (11th Cir. 1993).

Firearm is not inherently defective merely because its firing resulted in the death of an innocent bystander. Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51, 325 S.E.2d 465 (1984).

Manufacturer of spermicide.

- In a products liability action against a corporation which manufactured and marketed a spermicide, to recover damages arising from multiple birth defects suffered by an infant, the corporation knew or should have known of the potential danger that its product might cause birth defects because various studies suggesting this risk were available well before the infant's mother first obtained the product. This potential danger required a warning, and the absence of such a warning constituted a defect in the product. Wells ex rel. Maihafer v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd in part sub nom. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950, 107 S. Ct. 437, 93 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1986).

Manufacturer of automobile.

- Vehicle owner's negligent design claim did not fall within the statute of repose exception under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) because no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the manufacturer's conduct was willful and wanton; the vehicle performed well on tests that were designed to evaluate rollover propensity. Ivy v. Ford Motor Co., 646 F.3d 769 (11th Cir. 2011).

Manufacturer of vaccine.

- Drug manufacturer was not liable for injuries to a child born after the mother had been injected with a measles-mumps-rubella vaccine for which the manufacturer had taken all precautions necessary to warn of any potential injury to an unborn fetus, and the injection was received from a licensed practical nurse who was aware of the risks and had read and understood a circular accompanying the vaccine. Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1987).

Motor vehicle striking fallen electric wire.

- Strict liability provided for in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 is not applicable to make a power company liable for injuries sustained when a motor vehicle struck a fallen electric wire since the accident did not involve any "personal property sold as new property." Georgia Power Co. v. Collum, 176 Ga. App. 61, 334 S.E.2d 922 (1985).

Doughnut fryer functioned properly for the fryer's intended use and was not defective as a matter of law, since the danger attendant to its use was patent and a doughnut shop employee's injuries did not result from any malfunction due to product design but instead occurred when another person dislodged the fryer from the fryer's position on a table. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dawn Food Prods., 186 Ga. App. 201, 366 S.E.2d 792, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 792 (1988).

Propane heater and valve incorporated into the heater as a component part were not defective products when manufactured, and the manufacturers could not have reasonably foreseen that the automatic safety shut-off switch on the valve would be taped down by an industrial user so as to defeat the valve's safety function. Argo v. Perfection Prods. Co., 730 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1991).

Manufacturer of chemical known as methyl ethyl ketone provided adequate warnings of the product's potential danger, since the label affixed to the outside of its container clearly and graphically advised that the chemical was both flammable and explosive and that it should not be exposed to sparks. Copeland v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 537, 373 S.E.2d 629, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 911, 373 S.E.2d 629 (1988).

Fireman's Rule.

- Fireman's Rule prevents a fireman injured in the course of his duties from bringing an action for negligence against the manufacturer of a product whose explosion during the fire causes the fireman's injury. White v. Edmond, 971 F.2d 681 (11th Cir. 1992).

Access and egress system on a "skidsteer loader" used to knock down and transport molten glass waste did not constitute a design defect, since the machine included a system which provided for emergency exit in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. Foskey v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F. Supp. 1088 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1990).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-28 bars a claim for defective blood O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11. Timms v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 520 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Joint tort-feasors.

- Theoretical basis of strict liability is in tort, and when a manufacturer is guilty in strict liability and another party is found to be negligent, they are deemed joint tort-feasors. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980).

Recovery in strict liability in tort cannot be had solely for property damage to the allegedly defective property itself. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976); Henderson v. GMC, 152 Ga. App. 63, 262 S.E.2d 238 (1979).

Cause of action in negligence for property damage to defective personal property itself is cognizable. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976).

Corporations lack standing to bring action.

- Georgia courts and the federal district courts have continually disallowed actions in strict liability brought by corporations because under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 a corporation has no standing to bring such an action. Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Consortium action in connection with products liability.

- Wife may maintain an action for loss of consortium in connection with a products liability action for injury to the husband. Timms v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 520 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Wrongful death action based on product liability.

- Spouse has the right to recover for the wrongful death of their spouse, in a product liability action. Timms v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 520 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Determining timing of product liability for defective truck lift cylinder.

- In order to determine whether product liability claims involving an allegedly defective truck lift cylinder were timely under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2), it was necessary to certify a question to the Georgia Supreme Court as to whether the statute began to run when the lift cylinder was assembled or tested, when the truck was assembled, or when the truck was delivered to the truck's initial purchaser. Campbell v. Altec Indus., 605 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2010).

5. Design Defect Cases

Risk-utility analysis.

- In product liability design defect cases, a risk-utility analysis - a balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product design are weighed against the utility or benefit derived from the product - is the appropriate test for reaching the legal conclusion that a product's design specifications were partly or totally defective. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Risk-utility analysis incorporates the concept of "reasonableness," i.e., whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in choosing a particular product design, given the probability and seriousness of the risk posed by the design, the usefulness of the product in that condition, and the burden on the manufacturer to take the necessary steps to eliminate the risk. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

General factors considered in a risk-utility analysis include: the usefulness of the product; the gravity and severity of the danger posed by the design; the likelihood of that danger; the avoidability of the danger, i.e., the user's knowledge of the product, publicity surrounding the danger, or the efficacy of warnings, as well as common knowledge and the expectation of danger; the user's ability to avoid danger; the state of the art at the time the product is manufactured; the ability to eliminate danger without impairing the usefulness of the product or making it too expensive; and the feasibility of spreading the loss in the setting of the product's price or by purchasing insurance. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Manufacturer's proof of compliance with industry-wide practices, state of the art, or federal regulations does not eliminate conclusively the manufacturer's liability for the manufacturer's design of allegedly defective products. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Alternative safe design factors include: the feasibility of an alternative design; the availability of an effective substitute for the product which meets the same need but is safer; the financial costs of the improved design; and the adverse effects from the alternative. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

In regard to the benefits aspect of the balancing test, factors that could be considered include the appearance and aesthetic attractiveness of the product; its utility for multiple uses; the convenience and extent of its use, especially in light of the period of time it could be used without harm resulting from the product; and the collateral safety of a feature other than the one that harmed the plaintiff. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Parents' wrongful death claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 pertaining to an unclipped rear seat failed on summary judgment because the unclipped seat did not contribute to their child's fatal skull fracture, and there was thus no evidence showing proximate causation under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) between the unclipped seat and the child's death; the parents also did not assert a survival action in order to permit recovery for pain and suffering in that such damages were not permitted under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1 and51-4-1. Davenport v. Ford Motor Co., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2007).

Impossible to determine presence of design defect.

- In an action arising from a head on collision at high speed, the design of the fuel and seat systems of one of the vehicles could not be found to be defective in light of the extreme impact, speed, and resulting forces. Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 982 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d 22 (11th Cir. 1998).

No defect in design of truck cap shown.

- In a product liability action, the manufacturer of a truck cap installed over the bed of a pickup truck was properly granted summary judgment because the product was not defective for purposes of the design defect or failure to warn claims because the sole cause of the harm suffered was the unforeseeable misuse of the product that occurred when the fire department installed a truck bed extender product and damaged a gas strut that supported the truck cap door that subsequently hit the injured party. Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, 345 Ga. App. 887, 815 S.E.2d 205 (2018).

Failure to warn based on need to change brake fluid.

- In a product liability action, the defendants' motion for directed verdict was properly denied on the negligent failure to warn claim as there was evidence to support a finding that the defendants should have known of a defective design in the brake cylinder that might interfere with the functioning of the front brake, and that corrosion might not have been prevented by diligently changing the brake fluid according to the maintenance schedule. Suzuki Motor of America, Inc. v. Johns, 351 Ga. App. 186, 830 S.E.2d 549 (2019), cert. granted, No. S19C1478, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 36 (Ga. 2020), cert. denied, No. S19C1530, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 27 (Ga. 2020).

Impossible to determine product liability case.

- In this products liability case, summary judgment to the defendants was appropriate since: (1) the opinions of the plaintiff's experts as to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries and the death of the plaintiff's daughter were based on speculation, the opinions would not provide an adequate basis to survive summary judgment even if the opinions were admitted into evidence; and (2) other than the expert testimony proffered by the plaintiff, there was no evidence in the record that the container on the front porch of the mobile home actually exploded or likely exploded on the day of the accident or, if the container did, that the explosion of the container caused the plaintiff's injuries or the death of the plaintiff's daughter. Walker v. Blitz United States, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

No intervening cause in product liability action.

- In a product liability action, the defendants' motion for directed verdict was properly denied on the design defect claim as the jury could reject the defendants' position that there was an intervening cause because the defendants knew that the defect in the brake cylinder produced corrosion debris; and the defendants were unable to conclusively determine that the corrosion would not occur even if customer maintenance was properly preformed. Suzuki Motor of America, Inc. v. Johns, 351 Ga. App. 186, 830 S.E.2d 549 (2019), cert. granted, No. S19C1478, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 36 (Ga. 2020), cert. denied, No. S19C1530, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 27 (Ga. 2020).

No defect in design of heating pad shown.

- In a product liability action, the grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer was affirmed because the record evidence allowed for only an inference that the heating pad caused the fire, which inference did not extend to the cause being the result of a design defect. Sheffield v. Conair Corporation, 348 Ga. App. 6, 821 S.E.2d 93 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0437, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 467 (Ga. 2019).

Dealer's liability for a failure to warn.

- While O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) limited strict liability in tort for product design defects to manufacturers, a dealer could be liable for a failure to warn of a car's stability issue or that the car did not have a stability system that the dealer knew had been developed by the car manufacturer to remedy a design defect. Thayer v. GMC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2005).

Motorcycle helmet.

- In the absence of expert testimony that a design defect cause a motorcycle operator's helmet to fog up and that anti-fogging features used in snowmobile helmets could safely be used in street helmets, the operator had no evidence to show that the fogging, which was a common problem in all helmets, was due to a design defect that the helmet manufacturer could have remedied with a feasible alternative design, and, thus, the operator's O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 design defect claim failed; the operator's injury was not a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for concluding that the helmet was defective. Mize v. HJC Corp., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2006).

Summary judgment was properly granted in an O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) products liability case as, while identification of a specific defect was not required, it was not sufficiently shown that a boat's gimbal housing deviated from a properly made housing; the existence of a manufacturing defect was not the only plausible explanation for how the housing broke. Graff v. Baja Marine Corp., 310 Fed. Appx. 298 (11th Cir. 2009)(Unpublished).

Hip prosthesis.

- Because the district court excluded an expert's testimony due to unreliability under Daubert and Fed. R. Evid. 702, the court properly granted summary judgment to the manufacturer of an allegedly defective hip prosthesis on all claims, including the plaintiffs' strict liability claim. Sumner v. Biomet, Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. July 15, 2011)(Unpublished).

Manufacturing defect in medical device.

- Because the plaintiff, a surgical patient, did not show that a medical device, a surgical wrap, that was implanted in the plaintiff's stomach did not perform as intended, which required the plaintiff to show how the device was intended to function, the plaintiff did not produce evidence, expert or otherwise, from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the device contained a manufacturing defect to meet the standard set forth in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) and, thus, summary judgment was appropriately granted to the defendant, the manufacturer of the product. Williams v. Mast Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).

Design defect in drug case.

- Plaintiff alleged a prima facie case for design defect against a brand name drug manufacturer because the plaintiff pled that the drug in question at the time the drug was sold was unreasonably dangerous due to the drug's inherent risks, and the decedent suffered from SJS/TEN as a result of the drug, which eventually resulted in the decedent's death. Frazier v. MYLAN Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2012).

6. Strict Liability

Negligence not element of strict liability under subsection (b).

- Strict liability imposed under subsection (b) is not based on negligence. While negligence on the part of the manufacturer may happen to be involved as a matter of fact in a given situation, it is not necessarily so, and the statute imposes liability irrespective of negligence. Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977); Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

Lack of merchantability or suitability.

- If a court should construe an action as being a tort action under subsection (b) because of the failure of the product to be merchantable, or not suitable to the use intended, the action, though in tort, would be based not on negligence, but on the ground that the proximate causes of the plaintiff's injuries were the lack of merchantability or the lack of suitability to the use intended of the product purchased, which are identical to the factors of an action on an implied warranty. Evershine Prods., Inc. v. Schmitt, 130 Ga. App. 34, 202 S.E.2d 228 (1973).

Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 does not apply to negligence claims as well as strict liability claims. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 344 S.E.2d 418 (1986) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.

Privity of contract not required for action under subsection (b).

- Action is in tort and privity of contract is not necessary nor can the manufacturer avail itself of the usual contract or warranty defenses. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

Manufacturer responsibility for infection following penile implant.

- In an action against the manufacturer of a penile implant which had to be surgically removed after an infection developed, the court erred in granting summary judgment to the manufacturer on the plaintiff's claim of strict liability since there was some evidence that the device did not operate as intended and caused the infection which required removal of the implant since the plaintiff's physician's post-operative report noted that there was a disconnection of tubing between the reservoir and cylinder, causing the reservoir fluid to leak into the scrotal compartment, thereby causing infection. Williams v. American Med. Sys., 248 Ga. App. 682, 548 S.E.2d 371 (2001).

"Enhanced injury" caused by seat belt or air bag failure.

- Injured party was not required to show the extent of the "enhanced injury" caused by the failure of a seat belt or air bag as the party claimed only that the manufacture of the seat belt and air bag were defective; the injured party did not claim that the design of the seat belt and air bag were defective. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

Strict liability is imposed for injuries which are proximate result of product defects, not for the manufacture of defective products; unless the manufacturer's defective product can be shown to be the proximate cause of the injuries, there can be no recovery. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Basis of judgment in strict liability.

- Manufacturer has the absolute right to have the manufacturer's strict liability for injuries adjudged on the basis of the design of the manufacturer's own marketed product and not that of someone else. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Failure to identify specific defect was not fatal to claim.

- Because the plaintiff patient's expert testified that medical device's wires were cut when it was removed in a third surgery, the resulting failure to identify a specific defect was not fatal to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) strict liability claim, and the defendant manufacturer's motion for summary judgment was denied. Trickett v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Ga. 2008).

Identity of manufacturer.

- Construction worker's O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) strict liability claim against a boom manufacturer failed because there was no evidence that the manufacturer produced the boom that struck the worker, which the worker had been unable to identify, nor was there any evidence that the boom had a defect or that any such defect was the proximate cause of the worker's injuries. McBride v. JLG Indus., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2005).

Construction worker's O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1) strict liability claim against a boom manufacturer failed because there was no evidence that the manufacturer produced the boom that struck the worker, which the worker had been unable to identify, nor was there any evidence that the boom had a defect or that any such defect was the proximate cause of the worker's injuries. Mosley v. JLG Indus., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2005).

In a personal injury and products liability action when the seller of an engine had no active participation in the design of an alleged defective wood chipper, and the seller's only input into the design was limited to saying in essence that the particular engine would perform adequately in such a chipper, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the seller since the seller did not qualify in any manner as a manufacturer of the alleged defective chipper. Davenport v. Cummins Alabama, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 666, 644 S.E.2d 503 (2007).

Strict liability did not attach as defendants did not manufacture chemicals.

- Plaintiffs sued the defendants, a chemical plant and a laboratory, alleging the plaintiffs were injured due to chemical fires at the laboratory's facility. As the complaint did not allege that the defendants manufactured the chemicals that caused the harm, the complaint did not state a claim for strict liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(1), and the defendants were properly granted summary judgment on that claim. Smith v. Chemtura Corp., 297 Ga. App. 287, 676 S.E.2d 756 (2009).

No inadequate warning on mouthwash.

- When a consumer alleged that mouthwash caused temporary tooth discoloration and taste impairment, the inadequate warning component of the consumer's strict liability claim failed because the consumer had the opportunity to read the label, but failed to do so. Silverstein v. P&G Mfg. Co., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2009).

7. Pleading and Practice

Pleading defect in machinery.

- In tort actions based on the malfunctioning of machinery, it is sufficient if the petition alleges that the machine was in such a condition that the machine produced certain definite described results (the injury), which the machine would not have produced had the machine not been defective and had the machine functioned properly. Vickers v. Georgia Power Co., 79 Ga. App. 456, 54 S.E.2d 152 (1949).

Virginia law inapplicable to Georgia action.

- When the plaintiff, injured while driving in Virginia, brought an action in Georgia against the car manufacturer under a strict liability theory, Virginia products liability law did not apply since it did not recognize recovery on the basis of strict liability and was contrary to the public policy of Georgia. Alexander v. GMC, 267 Ga. 339, 478 S.E.2d 123 (1996).

Failure to communicate warning label change preempted.

- Trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims based on failure to communicate warning label change information to the healthcare community as those claims were preempted by federal law. PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App. 398, 780 S.E.2d 735 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0503, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 234 (Ga. 2016).

Self-destruction as prima-facie evidence of defect.

- When a defect cannot be directly observed, that fact does not prevent a plaintiff from establishing a prima-facie case against a manufacturer if the product has a defect which causes its own destruction. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. King, 145 Ga. App. 840, 244 S.E.2d 905 (1978).

Existence of manufacturing defect in products liability case may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. King, 145 Ga. App. 840, 244 S.E.2d 905 (1978).

Statute of repose.

- "First sale for use or consumption" of a spinal plate did not occur when the manufacturer sold the plate to the hospital but took place when the plate was removed from the hospital's inventory and sold to the patient for its actual intended purpose of placement in the patient's back. Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540, 448 S.E.2d 347 (1994).

Liability is not imposed upon a manufacturer by the provisions of paragraph (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11, but by the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of § 51-1-11; paragraph (b)(2) merely sets an ultimate limit on which injuries shall be actionable. Thus, if a spinal plate was not defective when the plate was sold to the hospital and subsequently became defective only as the result of remaining in the hospital's inventory for more than ten years, the patient would have no viable claim against the manufacturer. Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540, 448 S.E.2d 347 (1994).

While the original complaint against the car distributor was filed after the expiration of the 10-year statute of repose, which presented an absolute defense to the plaintiffs' claims of strict liability and negligent manufacture and design, the statute of repose did not provide an absolute bar to the plaintiffs' claims for negligent failure to warn against the car manufacturer as O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c) removed the negligent failure to warn claims from the ambit of the statute of repose. Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 258 Ga. App. 876, 575 S.E.2d 673 (2002).

Because the statute of repose in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) had expired when the parents filed their products liability complaint against an automobile manufacturer, and because the parents failed to make the required foundational showing of substantial similarity, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer because the exception in § 51-1-11(c) did not apply. Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 294 Ga. App. 112, 668 S.E.2d 554 (2008).

Trial court properly applied the Georgia statute of repose pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 rather than the longer statute in Texas in a product liability action as the statute of repose involved remedial rather than substantive rights and under the Georgia choice of law rules, Georgia's procedural and remedial provisions governed the matter; the matter involved a vehicle accident that occurred in Texas, although the action was brought in Georgia. Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co., 297 Ga. App. 835, 678 S.E.2d 489 (2009).

Because a power company was the intended consumer of an assembled bucket truck and the truck's component parts, an employee's suit had to be filed against any manufacturer under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) within ten years of the date of the sale of the finished product to the power company; the statute of repose found in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) begins to run when a finished product is sold as new to the intended consumer who is to receive the product. Campbell v. Altec Indus., 288 Ga. 535, 707 S.E.2d 48 (2011).

Statute of repose bars any lawsuit brought more than 10 years after the sale to the first consumer. Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

Phrase "use or consumption" in paragraph (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 means that the statute of repose begins to run when the product first enters the stream of commerce. Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

Error to dismiss claim

- In a products liability action stemming from an automobile accident, because a question of fact existed regarding whether the manufacturer's actions constituted a "willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for property or life," it was error to dismiss the plaintiffs' design defect claim. Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).

Statute of repose did not apply.

- In a products liability action stemming from an automobile accident, the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim was not merely a restatement of the plaintiff's design defect claim and therefore was not subject to the statute of repose. Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).

Date action filed, not date of injury, determines applicability of statute of limitations.

- Subsection (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 is a complete bar to strict liability actions filed more than 10 years after the "date of the first sale for use or consumption of" the product regardless of whether the underlying injury occurred within the ten-year period. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 344 S.E.2d 418 (1986).

Since an injury occurred less than ten years after the first sale of the product, but suit was not filed more than ten years after the first sale of the product, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 barred a strict liability claims based on an alleged defect in the product causing the injury. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 796 F.2d 1427 (11th Cir. 1986).

Applicability of limitation period.

- In a case involving a strict liability claim, since paragraph (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 was enacted both before the injury and before the complaint was filed, but after the first sale occurred, the ten-year limitation will be given appropriate application. LFE Corp. v. Edenfield, 187 Ga. App. 785, 371 S.E.2d 435, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 371 S.E.2d 435 (1988).

Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 cannot be applied retroactively when both the injury and the filing of the original complaint preceded the effective date of its enactment. LFE Corp. v. Edenfield, 187 Ga. App. 785, 371 S.E.2d 435, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 371 S.E.2d 435 (1988).

Homeowners' suit alleging that three corporations, which provided home security and monitoring services, were strictly liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 for damages to the homeowners' residence that were caused by fire that was not detected by the homeowners' security system was time-barred under a one-year limitations period in the parties' contract; that period was enforceable because it was not unreasonable and had been agreed to by the homeowners when the homeowners entered the contract. Jacobs v. ADT Sec. Servs., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2006).

Paragraph (b)(2) operates retroactively.

- Paragraph (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 will operate retroactively to bar a claim of a plaintiff injured several months after the limitation period went into effect. Weeks v. Remington Arms Co., 733 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1984).

Time limitation not traditional statute of limitations.

- In the 1978 amendment to subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11, the General Assembly expressly placed time restrictions on the bringing of a cause of action under the subsection, but it was not a traditional statute of limitations, which typically declares that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action unless brought within a specified period after the right accrued. Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 304 S.E.2d 383 (1983).

Application of general statute of limitations.

- Since subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 must be strictly construed, the 1978 amendment thereof was not intended to preclude the application of a general statute of limitations, such as O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, which would otherwise apply, or to suggest that no general statute of limitations applied to strict products liability actions under subsection (b) prior to the 1978 amendment. Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 304 S.E.2d 383 (1983).

Two-year statute of limitations provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies to products liability actions. Smith, Miller & Patch v. Lorentzson, 254 Ga. 111, 327 S.E.2d 221 (1985).

Subsection (c) not applied retroactively.

- Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 cannot be applied to bar products liability actions based on negligence when the cause of action accrued before the subsection's effective date, July 1, 1987. Browning v. Maytag Corp., 261 Ga. 20, 401 S.E.2d 725 (1991).

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply when there is any intervention of an intermediary cause which produces or could produce the sustained injury. Molden v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 175 Ga. App. 298, 333 S.E.2d 175 (1985).

Plaintiff failed to state claim for strict liability.

- Plaintiff's allegations against drug manufacturers failed to state a claim for strict liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) because the plaintiff failed to allege any specific design or manufacturing defect in the products and the court could not draw the reasonable inference that a design or manufacturing defect caused the decedent's injuries. Moore v. Mylan Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2012).

Summary judgment denied.

- Operator of airport passenger conveyance was properly denied summary judgment after the operator failed to submit any evidence rebutting the passenger's assertion that the conveyance's lack of seats and its deceleration rate for emergency stops constituted defects in design. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Williams, 173 Ga. App. 118, 325 S.E.2d 460 (1984), aff'd, 183 Ga. App. 845, 360 S.E.2d 411 (1987).

Summary judgment granted.

- Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' product liability claims, since plaintiffs failed to show that the rollover accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle's design, and failed to rebut the defendants showing that the accident was caused by the vehicle being driven off the roadway after the driver fell asleep. Jonas v. Isuzu Motors Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a manufacturer in a driver's products liability action because the manufacturer presented evidence disproving the existence of a defect through the opinion of the manufacturer's expert witness, and the driver failed to point to any competent evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact. Udoinyion v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 313 Ga. App. 248, 721 S.E.2d 190 (2011).

Loss of product.

- Since the plaintiffs' claim against the manufacturer of turnbuckles was based on the unfitness of thousands of turnbuckles for the purpose intended, as opposed to some idiosyncratic defect affecting only a lost turnbuckle, loss of the product did not impair either the plaintiffs' ability to show the defect claimed or the defendant's ability to present a defense to the claim. Chicago Hdwe. & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 236 Ga. App. 21, 510 S.E.2d 875 (1999).

No exception under subsection (c).

- Language of subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 provides an exception to the statute of repose for negligence actions claiming failure to warn and disease causation, but does not create an exception for these theories under strict liability claims. Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999).

Purely economic losses, such as the loss of the use of the property or the cost of repairing the property, are not compensable under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 when no personal injury or physical damage has occurred except to the allegedly defective product itself. Busbee v. Chrysler Corp., 240 Ga. App. 664, 524 S.E.2d 539 (1999).

Dentist as expert witness.

- In a consumer's suit alleging strict products liability, the consumer's failure to identify a treating dentist as an expert witness under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) was harmless because the defendants had adequate notice that the dentist could be called as a witness and, in fact, already took the dentist's deposition. Silverstein v. P&G Mfg. Co., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2009).

Amended complaint properly denied.

- Individual's motion for leave to file an amended complaint was denied since the individual's additional allegations failed to demonstrate that a pharmaceutical manufacturer's affiliate was the manufacturer of the drug that allegedly caused the individual's injuries or that the drug included a design or manufacturing defect, and as a result the individual's O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) claim would have been subject to dismissal. Henderson v. Sun Pharms. Indus., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2011).

Lex loci delicti did not apply.

- Public policy exception to lex loci delicti applied and Georgia law should have been applied in a design defect products liability case because Georgia recognized strict liability in such cases, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11, whereas Indiana law required a showing that the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. Bailey v. Cottrell, Inc., 313 Ga. App. 371, 721 S.E.2d 571 (2011).

8. Defenses

Discovery of defect by product user.

- If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, but nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product, the user or consumer is barred from recovery. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15 (1978).

In most product liability cases, the manufacturer's defense will be that the plaintiff assumed the risk that the defect in the product would produce the injury sustained by using the product with actual knowledge of the defect. Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 299 S.E.2d 704 (1983).

Injured party's admission that the installation of an x-ray machine was itself the consequence of the contract rendered the nonperformance of a contract obligation, within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(a), and, consequently, the injured party's negligence claims were barred. Kidd v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 346, 629 S.E.2d 58 (2006).

If injury results from abnormal handling, the seller is not liable. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).

Manufacturer may demonstrate in defense that the product was in fact merchantable and fit for the purpose intended, or that if there was a deficiency in such regard there was no causal connection between the breach and the damages sued for, or that some other factor was the sole proximate cause of the damage. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

Application of bare metal defense.

- Summary judgment was warranted in favor of manufacturer of valves on grounds of insufficient evidence of product identification and causation pertaining to the valves because, in applying the bare metal defense, the record did not sufficiently show that the decedent's asbestos exposure stemmed from a product manufactured by the defendant. Thurmon v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 2014).

Defense of assumption of risk, although not the defense of contributory negligence, is applicable in a product liability case. Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 299 S.E.2d 704 (1983).

Assumption of the risk is applicable to product liability cases if the user or consumer discovers the product's defect and is aware of the danger emanating from that defect, but nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product. Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 321 S.E.2d 353 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 201, 326 S.E.2d 436 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).

Obvious danger is complete defense.

- Open and obvious danger rule is a complete defense to claims based upon negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn. The plaintiff, not the defendant, bears the burden of proof for demonstrating that the peril causing the injury is latent, or not patent. Morris v. Clark Equip. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 129 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997).

Open and obvious danger did not preclude action.

- Summary judgment was precluded in an action by a consumer alleging that the manufacturer's lemon-scented bleach was unmerchantable and unsuitable for its intended use, since the Material Safety Data Sheet prepared for the lemon-scent additive warned that the scent was incompatible with strong oxidizing agents and since, while the manufacturer's label identified the bleach as a "strong oxidizer," under a risk utility analysis an open and obvious danger did not preclude an action, because this is but one factor to be considered in determining whether a product is defective. Zeigler v. Clowhite Co., 234 Ga. App. 627, 507 S.E.2d 182 (1998).

Action not untimely.

- Plaintiff's 1986 strict liability action for injuries sustained in 1970 when the plaintiff's nightgown caught fire was not untimely, since the gown had been purchased sometime after July, 1968, and the plaintiff did not reach majority age until 1986. Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 700 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Expert testimony not required.

- Whether someone suffers greater injuries in a car wreck when a seat belt does not work to restrain the individual and an air bag does not inflate between the individual and the steering wheel, windshield, and mirror are not issues requiring the expert testimony of a trauma physician or engineer, but are matters not of science but of skill and experience. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

Whether a seat belt engaged properly or an air bag deployed are not matters of science and issues requiring the expert testimony of an engineer or a metallurgist, but are matters of skill and experience. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

9. Jury Questions

Whether product is defective is jury question.

- Question under the strict liability theory is whether the product was defective in that there was a failure to adequately warn of the product's dangerous propensities. If so, the jury should look to the evidence to see whether the plaintiff knew these facts and nevertheless assumed the risk of the product's use in the manner in which the product was used, so as to bar the plaintiff from recovery. Parzini v. Center Chem. Co., 136 Ga. App. 396, 221 S.E.2d 475 (1975); Stokes v. Peyton's, Inc., 526 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1976).

In a strict liability case brought by a driver against a tire manufacturer, the questions for jury resolution were whether there was a defect in the tire and, if so, whether the driver's injuries were the proximate result of that defect or of the driver's own acts in causing the crash; the question was whether the driver's acts were the sole proximate cause of the driver's injuries, not whether the driver's acts which proximately caused the driver's injuries were acts of negligence. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

In some cases it may be a jury question as to whether the product's original design has been merely slightly or somewhat modified; in such cases, the jury must determine whether the original manufacturer's design was defective and, if so, whether the proximate cause of the injuries sustained was the original defective design or the subsequent modification. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).

Injured party presented a triable issue as to a claim that the truck's safety systems were defective and that a manufacturer was strictly liable as a repair technician testified in detail about how the air bags were supposed to deploy, how it worked, and how the sensor failed when the weld attaching it to the frame broke; the technician also testified that the seat belt would not catch, and even demonstrated that fact at a deposition. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

Defect held not found.

- Evidence that a patron of a self-service gasoline station slipped on a clearly distinguishable oil stain on the driveway and fell was insufficient to show a defect in the manufacture of the concrete used on the driveway. Griffin v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Co., 171 Ga. App. 534, 320 S.E.2d 383 (1984).

Whether injuries compounded.

- Injured party presented a triable issue as to whether the party suffered greater injuries in an accident because the seat belt and air bag did not work properly as: (1) a repair technician testified that the rear-view mirror had been knocked off the windshield and had hair stuck to it and that the steering wheel was "folded over"; (2) the injured party's spouse testified that the injured party broke glasses, had a black eye, a knot on the head, and a bruised sternum; (3) the injured party testified that the party hit the mirror, the windshield, and the steering wheel because the seat belt did not catch and the air bag did not deploy; and (4) the treating physician testified that the injured party suffered a nasal fracture that caused pain after the wreck, blocked the tear duct and caused swelling and infection until the break was corrected surgically. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

Jury instruction on failure to recall error.

- Legislature showed in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 that the legislature knew how to impose a continuing duty to warn on product manufacturers. There was no corresponding continuing duty to recall an allegedly defective vehicle seatback, and a jury instruction allowing a jury to find negligence based on a failure to recall was reversible error. Ford Motor Co. v. Reese, 300 Ga. App. 82, 684 S.E.2d 279 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0186, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 161 (Ga. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Torts, § 56.

Defective Mobile Home, 17 POF2d 213.

Formaldehyde Fumes Emitted by Building Materials, 3 POF3d 225.

Defective Design of an All-Terrain Vehicle, 6 POF3d 93.

Defective Design of Golf Cart, 7 POF3d 225.

Defective Forklift Truck, 8 POF3d 615.

Defective Automobile Child Safety Restraint, 21 POF3d 115.

Proof of Automobile Design Defect, 59 POF3d 73.

C.J.S.

- 86 C.J.S., Torts, §§ 11, 39.

ALR.

- Liability for injuries by breaking or bursting of container in which goods are sold, 4 A.L.R. 1094.

Automobiles: effect of defective brakes on liability for injury, 14 A.L.R. 1339; 63 A.L.R. 398; 170 A.L.R. 611.

Liability of manufacturer or packer of defective article for injury to person or property of ultimate consumer, who purchased from a middleman, 17 A.L.R. 672; 39 A.L.R. 992; 63 A.L.R. 340; 88 A.L.R. 527; 105 A.L.R. 1502; 111 A.L.R. 1239; 140 A.L.R. 191; 142 A.L.R. 1490.

Res ipsa loquitur in case of electric shock from electrical household appliance, 34 A.L.R. 31.

Liability of seller of article not inherently dangerous to third person for injury or death due to dangerous condition of article sold, 42 A.L.R. 1243; 60 A.L.R. 1054.

Liability of one undertaking to repair automobile for injury to third person, 52 A.L.R. 857.

Reliance on dealer's or manufacturer's assurance that article is not dangerous as affecting question of contributory negligence, 55 A.L.R. 1047.

Liability of seller of article not inherently dangerous for personal injuries due to the defective or dangerous condition of the article, 74 A.L.R. 343; 168 A.L.R. 1054.

Duty of manufacturer or seller to warn of latent dangers incident to article as a class, as distinguished from duty with respect to defects in particular article, 86 A.L.R. 947.

Liability for injury or death from refrigerating machinery or apparatus, 117 A.L.R. 1425.

Joinder of manufacturer or packer and retailer or other middleman as defendants in action for injury to person or damaged property of purchaser or consumer of defective article, 119 A.L.R. 1356.

Mistake as to chemical or product furnished or misdescription thereof by label or otherwise as basis of liability for personal injury or death resulting from combination with other chemical, 123 A.L.R. 939.

Implied warranty of reasonable fitness of food for human consumption as breached by substance natural to the original product and not removed in processing, 143 A.L.R. 1421.

Negligence and contributory negligence in respect of delivery of petroleum products, 151 A.L.R. 1261.

Manufacturer's liability for injury or damage as affected by his test, or by his failure to test, for defects, 156 A.L.R. 479.

Intervening purchaser's knowledge of defects in or danger of article, or failure to inspect therefor, as affecting liability of manufacturer or dealer for personal injury or property damage to subsequent purchaser or other third person, 164 A.L.R. 371.

Manufacturer's liability for negligence causing injury to person or damage to property, of ultimate consumer or user, 164 A.L.R. 569.

Liability of person furnishing, installing, or maintaining burglar alarm for loss from burglary, 165 A.L.R. 1254.

Presumption of negligence from foreign substance in food, 171 A.L.R. 1209.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground of liability for damage or injury to third person, 6 A.L.R.2d 284.

Liability of manufacturer or wholesaler for injury caused by third person's use of explosives or other dangerous article sold to retailer in violation of law, 11 A.L.R.2d 1028.

Seller's or manufacturer's liability for injuries as affected by buyer's or user's allergy or unusual susceptibility to injury from article, 26 A.L.R.2d 963.

Recovery by contractor or artisan, suing for breach of warranty, of damages for loss of good will occasioned by use in his business of unfit materials, 28 A.L.R.2d 591.

Presumption or prima facie case of negligence based on presence of foreign substance in bottled or canned beverage, 52 A.L.R.2d 117.

Liability of landlord to tenant or member of tenant's family, for injury by animal or insect, 67 A.L.R.2d 1005.

Privity of contract as essential to recovery in negligence action against manufacturer or seller of product alleged to have caused injury, 74 A.L.R.2d 1111.

Privity of contract as essential to recovery in action based on theory other than negligence, against manufacturer or seller of product alleged to have caused injury, 75 A.L.R.2d 39.

Statements in advertisements as affecting manufacturer's or seller's liability for injury caused by product sold, 75 A.L.R.2d 112.

Manufacturer's or seller's duty to give warning regarding product as affecting his liability for product-caused injury, 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 53 A.L.R.3d 239.

What law governs liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by product sold, 76 A.L.R.2d 130.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by food or food product sold, 77 A.L.R.2d 7.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by beverage sold, 77 A.L.R.2d 215.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by automobile or other vehicle, aircraft, boat, or their parts, supplies, or equipment, 78 A.L.R.2d 460; 5 A.L.R.4th 483.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by industrial, business, or farm machinery, tools, equipment, or materials, 78 A.L.R.2d 594; 8 A.L.R.4th 70.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by paint, cement, lumber, building supplies, ladders, small tools, and like products, 78 A.L.R.2d 696.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by toys, games, athletic or sports equipment, or like products, 78 A.L.R.2d 738.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by drug or medicine sold, 79 A.L.R.2d 301.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by medical and health supplies, appliances, and equipment, 79 A.L.R.2d 401.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of hair preparations, cosmetics, soaps and other personal cleansers, and the like, for injury caused by the product, 79 A.L.R.2d 431.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by domestic or industrial soaps, detergents, cleansers, polishes, and the like, 79 A.L.R.2d 482.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by firearms, explosives, and flammables, 80 A.L.R.2d 488; 94 A.L.R.3d 291; 15 A.L.R.4th 909; 18 A.L.R.4th 206.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by household and domestic machinery, appliances, furnishings, and equipment, 80 A.L.R.2d 598.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by clothing, shoes, combs, and similar products, 80 A.L.R.2d 702.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of product sold in container or package for injury caused by container or packaging, 81 A.L.R.2d 229; 36 A.L.R.4th 419.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of container (bottle, barrel, drum, tank, etc.) or other packaging material for injury caused thereby, 81 A.L.R.2d 350; 36 A.L.R.4th 419.

Liability for injury from defective condition or improper operation of lift bridge or drawbridge, 90 A.L.R.2d 105.

Products liability: manufacturer and dealer or distributor as joint or concurrent tortfeasors, 97 A.L.R.2d 806.

Products liability: manufacturer's responsibility for defective component supplied by another and incorporated in product, 3 A.L.R.3d 1016.

Contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense to action for personal injury, death, or property damage resulting from alleged breach of implied warranty, 4 A.L.R.3d 501.

Statute of limitations: when cause of action arises on action against manufacturer or seller of product causing injury or death, 4 A.L.R.3d 821.

Seller's duty to test or inspect as affecting his liability for product-caused injury, 6 A.L.R.3d 12.

Manufacturer's duty to test or inspect as affecting his liability for product-caused injury, 6 A.L.R.3d 91.

Liability of corporation for torts of subsidiary, 7 A.L.R.3d 1343.

Products liability: strict liability in tort, 13 A.L.R.3d 1057; 46 A.L.R.3d 240; 52 A.L.R.3d 121.

Liability for warranties and representations in connection with the sale of air-conditioning equipment, 15 A.L.R.3d 1207.

Privity of contract as essential in action against remote manufacturer or distributor for defects in goods not causing injury to person or to other property, 16 A.L.R.3d 683.

Products liability: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer or seller under "long-arm" statutes, 19 A.L.R.3d 13.

Liability of builder-vendor or other vendor of new dwelling for loss, injury, or damage occasioned by defective condition thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 383.

Products liability: right of manufacturer or seller to contribution or indemnity from user of product causing injury or damage to third person, and vice versa, 28 A.L.R.3d 943.

Application of rule of strict liability in tort to person rendering services, 29 A.L.R.3d 1425; 100 A.L.R.3d 1205.

Products liability: extension of strict liability in tort to permit recovery by a third person who was neither a purchaser nor user of product, 33 A.L.R.3d 415.

Surveyor's liability for mistake in, or misrepresentation as to accuracy of, survey of real property, 35 A.L.R.3d 504.

Aviation: helicopter accidents, 35 A.L.R.3d 707.

Malpractice: attending physician's liability for injury caused by equipment furnished by hospital, 35 A.L.R.3d 1068.

Liability in connection with fire or explosion of explosives while being stored or transported, 35 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Liability for injury caused by spraying or dusting of crops, 37 A.L.R.3d 833.

Right of member of armed forces to recover from manufacturer or seller for injury caused by defective military material, equipment, supplies, or components thereof, 38 A.L.R.3d 1247.

Liability of product endorser or certifier for product-caused injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 181.

Liability of one selling or distributing liquid or bottled fuel gas, for personal injury, death, or property damage, 41 A.L.R.3d 782.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of power lawn mower for injuries to user, 41 A.L.R.3d 986.

Products liability: alteration of product after it leaves hands of manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for product-caused harm, 41 A.L.R.3d 1251.

Liability of manufacturer, seller, or distributor of motor vehicle for defect which merely enhances injury from accident otherwise caused, 42 A.L.R.3d 560.

Products liability: admissibility of evidence of other accidents to prove hazardous nature of product, 42 A.L.R.3d 780.

Rescue doctrine: applicability to situation created by breach of warranty, 44 A.L.R.3d 473.

Attorney's liability, to one other than his immediate client, for consequences of negligence in carrying out legal duties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181; 61 A.L.R.4th 464; 61 A.L.R.4th 615.

Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense under doctrine of strict liability in tort, 46 A.L.R.3d 240.

Liability of public accountant to third parties, 46 A.L.R.3d 979.

Liability for injury or death of pallbearer, 48 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Products liability: proof of defect under doctrine of strict liability in tort, 51 A.L.R.3d 8.

Products liability: necessity and sufficiency of identification of defendant as manufacturer or seller of product alleged to have caused injury, 51 A.L.R.3d 1344.

Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of warranty, where instruction on strict liability in tort is given in products liability case, 52 A.L.R.3d 101.

Failure to warn as basis of liability under doctrine of strict liability in tort, 53 A.L.R.3d 239.

Products liability; strict liability in tort where injury results from allergenic (side-effect) reaction to product, 53 A.L.R.3d 298.

Strict liability in tort: liability of seller of used product, 53 A.L.R.3d 337.

Liability of hospital or medical practitioner under doctrine of strict liability in tort, or breach of warranty, for harm caused by drug, medical instrument, or similar device used in treating patient, 54 A.L.R.3d 258.

Products liability: product as unreasonably dangerous or unsafe under doctrine of strict liability in tort, 54 A.L.R.3d 352.

Liability of water supplier for damages resulting from furnishing impure water, 54 A.L.R.3d 936.

Products liability: proof, under strict tort liability doctrine, that defect was present when product left hands of defendant, 54 A.L.R.3d 1079.

Premises liability insurance: coverage as extending to liability for injuries or damage caused by product sold or rented by the insured and occurring away from the insured premises, 62 A.L.R.3d 889.

Liability of installer or maintenance company for injury caused by failure of automatic elevator to level at floor, 63 A.L.R.3d 996.

Liability for injury caused by fall of person into shaft, or by abrupt drop, sudden movement, or stopping between floors, of automatic passenger elevator, 64 A.L.R.3d 950.

Liability of installer or maintenance company for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 64 A.L.R.3d 1005.

Tort liability of project architect for economic damages suffered by contractor, 65 A.L.R.3d 249.

Promises or attempts by seller to repair goods as tolling statute of limitations for breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 A.L.R.3d 315.

Admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs or other remedial measures in products liability cases, 74 A.L.R.3d 1001; 38 A.L.R.4th 583.

Statements on container that enclosed toy, game, sports equipment, or the like, is safe as affecting manufacturer's liability for injury caused by product sold, 74 A.L.R.3d 1298.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defective tire, 81 A.L.R.3d 318.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defect in snowmobile or other recreational-purpose vehicle, 81 A.L.R.3d 394; 66 A.L.R.4th 622.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defect in mobile home or trailer, 81 A.L.R.3d 421.

Liability of manufacturer, seller, or installer for personal injury caused by door glass, 84 A.L.R.3d 877.

Products liability: admissibility, against manufacturer, of product recall letter, 84 A.L.R.3d 1220.

Products liability: drain cleaners, 85 A.L.R.3d 727.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for personal injury or property damage caused by television set, 89 A.L.R.3d 210.

Products liability: what statute of limitations governs actions based on strict liability in tort, 91 A.L.R.3d 455.

Products liability insurance coverage as extending only to product-caused injury to person or other property, as distinguished from mere product failure, 91 A.L.R.3d 921.

Statute of limitations: running of statute of limitations on products liability claim against manufacturer as affected by plaintiff's lack of knowledge of defect allegedly causing personal injury or disease, 91 A.L.R.3d 991.

Products liability: stoves, 93 A.L.R.3d 99.

Prospective buyer's release of prospective seller from liability for injuries resulting from trial use or inspection of product for sale, 93 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by failure to warn regarding danger in use of vaccine or prescription drug, 94 A.L.R.3d 748.

Promotional efforts directed toward prescribing physician as affecting prescription drug manufacturer's liability for product-caused injury, 94 A.L.R.3d 1080.

Products liability: toys and games, 95 A.L.R.3d 390.

Products liability: defective vehicular gasoline tanks, 96 A.L.R.3d 265.

Products liability: forklift trucks, 95 A.L.R.3d 541.

Products liability: duty of manufacturer to equip product with safety device to protect against patent or obvious danger, 95 A.L.R.3d 1066.

Products liability: modern cases determining whether product is defectively designed, 96 A.L.R.3d 22.

Products liability: defective vehicular gasoline tanks, 96 A.L.R.3d 265.

Liability of packer, foodstore, or restaurant for causing trichinosis, 96 A.L.R.3d 451.

Architect's liability for personal injury or death allegedly caused by improper or defective plans or design, 97 A.L.R.3d 455.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in aircraft or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 97 A.L.R.3d 627.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in motorcycle or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 98 A.L.R.3d 317.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in braking system in motor vehicle, 99 A.L.R.3d 179.

Liability of telephone company for injury by noise or electric charge transmitted over line, 99 A.L.R.3d 628.

When is person "engaged in the business" for purposes of doctrine of strict tort liability, 99 A.L.R.3d 671.

Products liability: manufacturer's or seller's obligation to supply or recommend available safety accessories in connection with industrial machinery or equipment, 99 A.L.R.3d 693.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in steering system in motor vehicle, 100 A.L.R.3d 158.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in drive train system in motor vehicle, 100 A.L.R.3d 471.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in suspension system in motor vehicle, 100 A.L.R.3d 912.

Products liability: flammable clothing, 1 A.L.R.4th 251.

Products liability: liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death caused by defect in boat or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 1 A.L.R.4th 411.

Products liability: defective heating equipment, 1 A.L.R.4th 748.

Products liability in connection with prosthesis or other product designed to be surgically implanted in patient's body, 1 A.L.R.4th 921.

Products liability: industrial accidents involving conveyor belts or systems, 2 A.L.R.4th 262.

Products liability: diethylstibestrol (DES), 2 A.L.R.4th 1091.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of snowthrower for injuries to user, 2 A.L.R.4th 1284.

Products liability: defective vehicular windows, 3 A.L.R.4th 489.

Products liability: farm machinery, 4 A.L.R.4th 13.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in electrical system in motor vehicle, 5 A.L.R.4th 662.

Products liability: swimming pools and accessories, 6 A.L.R.4th 492.

Products liability: clothes dryers, 6 A.L.R.4th 1262.

Products liability: glue and other adhesive products, 7 A.L.R.4th 155.

Products liability: elevators, 7 A.L.R.4th 852.

Products liability: industrial presses, 8 A.L.R.4th 70.

Applicability of comparative negligence doctrine to actions based on strict liability in tort, 9 A.L.R.4th 633.

Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 A.L.R.4th 854.

Products liability: fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, fungicides, weedkillers, and the like, or articles used in application thereof, 12 A.L.R.4th 462.

Allowance of punitive damages in products liability case, 13 A.L.R.4th 52.

Products liability: cranes and other lifting apparatuses, 13 A.L.R.4th 476.

Preemption of strict liability in tort by provisions of U.C.C. Article 2, 15 A.L.R.4th 791.

Products liability: cement and concrete, 15 A.L.R.4th 1186; 60 A.L.R.5th 413.

Products liability; tire rims and wheels, 16 A.L.R.4th 137.

Products liability: firefighting equipment, 19 A.L.R.4th 326.

What statute of limitations applies to actions for personal injuries based on breach of implied warranty under UCC provisions governing sales (UCC sec. 2-725(1)), 20 A.L.R.4th 915.

"Concert of activity," "alternative liability," "enterprise liability," or similar theory as basis for imposing liability upon one or more manufacturers of defective uniform product, in absence of identification of manufacturer of precise unit or batch causing injury, 22 A.L.R.4th 183; 63 A.L.R.5th 195.

Products liability: mechanical or chain saw or components thereof, 22 A.L.R.4th 206.

Recovery, under strict liability in tort, for injury or damage caused by defects in building or land, 25 A.L.R.4th 351.

Products liability: application of strict liability in tort doctrine to agency merely financing sale or lease-purchase of personal property, 28 A.L.R.4th 326.

Products liability: animal feed or medicines, 29 A.L.R.4th 1045.

Bystander recovery for emotional distress at witnessing another's injury under strict products liability or breach of warranty, 31 A.L.R.4th 162.

Successor products liability: form of business organization of successor or predecessor as affecting successor liability, 32 A.L.R.4th 196.

Validity and construction of "sistership" clause of products liability insurance policy excepting from coverage cost of product recall or withdrawal of product from market, 32 A.L.R.4th 630.

Strict products liability: liability for failure to warn as dependent on defendant's knowledge of danger, 33 A.L.R.4th 368.

Products liability: stud guns, staple guns, or parts thereof, 33 A.L.R.4th 1189.

Products liability: household appliances relating to cleaning, washing, personal care, and water supply, quality and disposal, 34 A.L.R.4th 95.

Products liability: household equipment relating to storage, preparation, cooking, and disposal of food, 35 A.L.R.4th 663, superseding §§ 31, 37, 39 [b, g, i, m] of, 80 A.L.R.2d 598.

Products liability: modern status of rule that there is no liability for patent or obvious dangers, 35 A.L.R.4th 861.

Products liability: equipment and devices directly relating to passengers' standing or seating safety in land carriers, 35 A.L.R.4th 1050.

Products liability: home and office furnishings, 36 A.L.R.4th 170.

Products liability: modern cases on explosion or breakage of beverage bottles, 36 A.L.R.4th 419.

Products liability: Admissibility of evidence of postinjury warning measures undertaken by defendant, 38 A.L.R.4th 583.

Products liability: duty of manufacturer or seller of component part incorporated in another product to warn of dangers, 39 A.L.R.4th 6.

Products liability: inhalation of asbestos, 39 A.L.R.4th 399.

Products liability: automobile manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by repairs made under manufacturer's warranty, 40 A.L.R.4th 1218.

Products liability: inconsistency of verdicts on separate theories of negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability, 41 A.L.R.4th 9.

Validity and construction of products liability statute precluding or limiting recovery where product has been altered or modified after leaving hands of manufacturer or seller, 41 A.L.R.4th 47.

Products liability: alcoholic beverages, 42 A.L.R.4th 253.

Products liability: construction materials or insulation containing formaldehyde, 45 A.L.R.4th 751.

Products liability: liability of manufacturer or seller as affected by failure of subsequent party in distribution chain to remedy or warn against defect of which he knew, 45 A.L.R.4th 777.

Products liability: perfumes, colognes, or deodorants, 46 A.L.R.4th 1185.

Products liability: perfumes, colognes, or deodorants, 46 A.L.R.4th 1197.

Products liability: admissibility of defendant's evidence of industry custom or practice in strict liability action, 47 A.L.R.4th 621.

Future disease or condition, or anxiety relating thereto, as element of recovery, 50 A.L.R.4th 13.

Negligence in preparing abstract of title as ground of liability to one other than person ordering abstract, 50 A.L.R.4th 314.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning athletic, exercise, or recreational equipment, 50 A.L.R.4th 1226.

Products liability: admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 1186.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning wearing apparel, 52 A.L.R.4th 276.

Attorneys' fees in products liability suits, 53 A.L.R.4th 414.

Products liability: personal soap, 54 A.L.R.4th 574.

Duty and liability of subcontractor to employee of another contractor using equipment or apparatus of former, 55 A.L.R.4th 725.

Products liability: pertussis vaccine manufacturers, 57 A.L.R.4th 911.

Commercial renter's negligence liability for customer's personal injuries, 57 A.L.R.4th 1186.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning food, drugs, and other products intended for ingestion, 58 A.L.R.4th 7.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning cosmetics and other personal care products, 58 A.L.R.4th 40.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning paint, cleaners, or other chemicals, 58 A.L.R.4th 76.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning gas and electric appliances, 58 A.L.R.4th 131.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning bottles, cans, storage tanks, or other containers, 58 A.L.R.4th 160.

Products liability: toxic shock syndrome, 59 A.L.R.4th 50.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning ladders and scaffolds, 59 A.L.R.4th 73.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning weapons and ammunition, 59 A.L.R.4th 102.

Products liability: polyvinyl chloride, 59 A.L.R.4th 129.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning agricultural implements and equipment, 60 A.L.R.4th 678.

Products liability: electricity, 60 A.L.R.4th 732.

Products liability: overhead garage doors and openers, 61 A.L.R.4th 94.

Products liability: building and construction lumber, 61 A.L.R.4th 121.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning building components and materials, 61 A.L.R.4th 156.

Products liability: "fireman's rule" as defense, 62 A.L.R.4th 727.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to support product misuse defense in actions concerning automobiles, boats, aircraft, and other vehicles, 63 A.L.R.4th 18.

Products liability: mascara and other eye cosmetics, 63 A.L.R.4th 105.

Live animal as "product" for purposes of strict products liability, 63 A.L.R.4th 127.

Products liability: product misuse defense, 65 A.L.R.4th 263.

Strict products liability: product malfunction or occurrence of accident as evidence of defect, 65 A.L.R.4th 346.

Products liability: sudden or unexpected acceleration of motor vehicle, 66 A.L.R.4th 20.

Liability of manufacturer of oral live polio (Sabin) vaccine for injury or death from its administration, 66 A.L.R.4th 83.

Liability for injury incurred in operation of power golf cart, 66 A.L.R.4th 622.

Products liability: injury caused by product as a result of being tampered with, 67 A.L.R.4th 964.

Products liability: personal jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer of component incorporated in another product, 69 A.L.R.4th 14.

Products liability: what is an "unavoidably unsafe" product, 70 A.L.R.4th 16.

Strict products liability: recovery for damage to product alone, 72 A.L.R.4th 12.

Products liability: motor vehicle exhaust systems, 72 A.L.R.4th 62.

Products liability: industrial refrigeration equipment, 72 A.L.R.4th 90.

Products liability: scaffolds and scaffolding equipment, 74 A.L.R.4th 904.

Products liability: tractors, 75 A.L.R.4th 312.

Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense in negligence action based on failure to provide safety device for product causing injury, 75 A.L.R.4th 443.

Products liability: contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense in action for strict liability or breach of warranty based on failure to provide safety device for product causing injury, 75 A.L.R.4th 538.

Forum non conveniens in products liability cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 22.

Products liability: bicycles and accessories, 76 A.L.R.4th 117.

Products liability: exercise and related equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 145.

Products liability: trampolines and similar devices, 76 A.L.R.4th 171.

Products liability: competitive sports equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 201.

Products liability: skiing equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 256.

Products liability: general recreational equipment, 77 A.L.R.4th 1121.

Products liability: mechanical amusement rides and devices, 77 A.L.R.4th 1152.

Burden of proving feasibility of alternative safe design in products liability action based on defective design, 78 A.L.R.4th 154.

Products liability: lubricating products and systems, 80 A.L.R.4th 972.

Products liability: all-terrain vehicles (ATV's), 83 A.L.R.4th 70.

Liability of auctioneer under doctrine of strict products liability, 83 A.L.R.4th 1188.

Products liability: hair straighteners and relaxants, 84 A.L.R.4th 1090.

Products liability: cutting or heating torches, 84 A.L.R.4th 1123.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by spoilage or contamination of beverage, 87 A.L.R.4th 804.

Consequential loss of profits from injury to property as element of damages in products liability, 89 A.L.R.4th 11.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by foreign substance in beverage, 90 A.L.R.4th 12.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by foreign object in food or food product, 1 A.L.R.5th 1.

Products liability of endorser, trade association, certifier, or similar party who expresses approval of product, 1 A.L.R.5th 431.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by spoilage, contamination, or other deleterious condition of food or food product, 2 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by food product containing object related to, but not intended to be present in, product, 2 A.L.R.5th 189.

Product liability: roofs and roofing materials, 3 A.L.R.5th 851.

Product liability: prefabricated buildings, 4 A.L.R.5th 667.

Products liability: application of strict liability doctrine to seller of used product, 9 A.L.R.5th 1.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground for liability to third party, 13 A.L.R.5th 289.

Products liability: failure to provide product warning or instruction in foreign language or to use universally accepted pictographs or symbols, 27 A.L.R.5th 697.

Validity and construction of statute terminating right of action for product-caused injury at fixed period after manufacture, sale, or delivery of product, 30 A.L.R.5th 1.

Products liability: cigarettes and other tobacco products, 36 A.L.R.5th 541.

Presumption or inference, in products liability action based on failure to warn, that user of product would have heeded an adequate warning had one been given, 38 A.L.R.5th 683.

Products liability: defective motor vehicle air bag systems, 39 A.L.R.5th 267.

Liability under state law for injuries resulting from defective automobile seatbelt, shoulder harness, or restraint system, 48 A.L.R.5th 1.

Causes of action governed by limitations period in UCC § 2-725, 49 A.L.R.5th 1.

Products liability: recovery for injury or death resulting from intentional inhalation of product's fumes or vapors to produce intoxicating or similar effect, 50 A.L.R.5th 275.

Third-party beneficiaries of warranties under UCC § 2-318, 50 A.L.R.5th 327.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 54 A.L.R.5th 1.

Modern status of rules regarding tort liability of building or construction contractor for injury or damage to third person occurring after completion and acceptance of work; "foreseeability" or "modern" rule, 75 A.L.R.5th 413.

Products liability: ladders, 81 A.L.R.5th 245.

Products liability: firearms, ammunition, and chemical weapons, 96 A.L.R.5th 239.

Products liability: Household equipment relating to storage, preparation, cooking, and disposal of food, 122 A.L.R.5th 515.

Federal pre-emption of state common-law products liability claims pertaining to motor vehicles, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 853.

Federal pre-emption of state common-law products liability claims pertaining to tobacco products, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 890.

Federal pre-emption of state common-law products liability claims pertaining to drugs, medical devices, and other health-related items, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 124.

Federal pre-emption of state common-law products liability claims pertaining to pesticides, 101 A.L.R. Fed. 887.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in motorcycle or its parts or equipment, 14 A.L.R.7th 7.

Products liability and negligence claims arising from use of stud guns, staple guns, nail guns, or parts thereof, 12 A.L.R.7th 5.

Products liability: clothes dryers, 1 A.L.R.7th 4.

Products liability: exercise, fitness, and related equipment, 76 A.L.R.6th 395.

Products liability: sudden or unexpected acceleration of motor vehicle, 76 A.L.R.6th 465.

Disclaimer: These codes may not be the most recent version. Georgia may have more current or accurate information. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or the information linked to on the state site. Please check official sources.
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