2021 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-3. Extraordinary Diligence and Slight Negligence Defined

In general, extraordinary diligence is that extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful persons exercise under the same or similar circumstances. As applied to the preservation of property, the term "extraordinary diligence" means that extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful persons use in securing and preserving their own property. The absence of such extraordinary diligence is termed slight negligence.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2035; Code 1868, § 2036; Code 1873, § 2062; Code 1882, § 2062; Civil Code 1895, § 2899; Civil Code 1910, § 3472; Code 1933, § 105-202.)

- For article, "The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench," see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 85 (1992). For comment on Planter's Elec. Membership Corp. v. Bulse, 98 Ga. App. 380, 105 S.E.2d 787 (1958), see 22 Ga. B. J. 249 (1959).

This section applies to persons as well as to property. Alabama M. Ry. v. Guilford, 119 Ga. 523, 46 S.E. 655 (1904).

- In determining what very prudent and thoughtful persons would do under certain circumstances, the situation and surrounding facts, including the existence of an emergency if there was one, are to be considered. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co., 135 Ga. 113, 68 S.E. 1039 (1910).

Common carrier of passengers for hire is bound to exercise extraordinary care and diligence in transportation of its passengers. Even slight neglect on the part of the carrier's employee, resulting in personal injury to one lawfully upon one of the carrier's vehicles, may entail liability on the part of the carrier. Georgia Stages, Inc. v. Young, 73 Ga. App. 2, 35 S.E.2d 552 (1945).

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, a common carrier, in exercising extraordinary care, did not have to utilize the most approved pattern of an escalator in use up to the time of an injured party's accident. MARTA v. Rouse, 279 Ga. 311, 612 S.E.2d 308 (2005).

Streetcar company is bound to exercise extraordinary care and precaution to prevent injuring the company's passengers, and slight negligence on the company's part, when the company was the proximate cause of the alleged injury, might render the company liable, provided the passenger personally could not have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care. Leslie v. Georgia Power Co., 47 Ga. App. 723, 171 S.E. 395 (1933).

Airport shuttle train or people mover providing free transportation inside the secured area of the airport has the same status of public transportation as escalators and elevators, requiring the exercise of extraordinary diligence in the transportation of passengers. Saltis v. Benz, 243 Ga. App. 603, 533 S.E.2d 772 (2000).

Owner of an office building owes duty of extraordinary diligence to elevator passengers, cannot delegate this duty to an independent contractor engaged in elevator repair, and is liable for slight negligence. Gaffney v. EQK Realty Investors, 213 Ga. App. 653, 445 S.E.2d 771 (1994).

- Acts and facts constituting the diligence defined in this section under all the circumstances of the case are questions for determination by the jury. Stiles v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 65 Ga. 370 (1880); Richmond & D.R.R. v. White & Co., 88 Ga. 805, 15 S.E. 802 (1892).

- Failure to define the term "extraordinary diligence" in an instruction on the law pertaining to the duty a carrier owes to the carrier's passengers was not harmful error because the term is comprised of words of ordinary understanding and is self-explanatory. Adams v. MARTA, 246 Ga. App. 698, 542 S.E.2d 130 (2000).

Questions of negligence and diligence, even of gross negligence and slight negligence, being questions of fact and not of law, are as a rule to be determined by a jury. Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613, 181 S.E. 142 (1935).

Intermediate court erred in overruling Darlington v. Finch, 113 Ga. App. 825 (1966), as a common carrier, in exercising extraordinary care, has to stay informed of safety advances in product design, but is not held to a per se rule that requires the carrier to buy and incorporate those safety advances into previously-purchased, non-defective products; Darlington is reinstated. MARTA v. Rouse, 279 Ga. 311, 612 S.E.2d 308 (2005).

Cited in Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App. 202, 136 S.E. 96 (1926); Tucker v. Andrews, 51 Ga. App. 841, 181 S.E. 673 (1935); Cain v. State, 55 Ga. App. 376, 190 S.E. 371 (1937); Southern Ry. v. Skinner, 74 Ga. App. 57, 38 S.E.2d 756 (1946); Hines v. Bell, 104 Ga. App. 76, 120 S.E.2d 892 (1961); Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Hines, 138 Ga. App. 746, 227 S.E.2d 489 (1976); Sneider v. Crider, 148 Ga. App. 385, 251 S.E.2d 315 (1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 57A Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, §§ 5 et seq., 218 et seq., 239.

- 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 4 et seq.

- Duty of carrier to guard young children against danger of falling from car, 28 A.L.R. 1035.

Liability for damages by explosives transported along highway, 31 A.L.R. 725; 44 A.L.R. 124.

Liability of carrier for injury to passenger from car window, 45 A.L.R. 1541.

Liability of hotel, motel, or similar establishment for damage to or loss of guest's automobile left on premises, 52 A.L.R.3d 433.

Liability for injury on or in connection with escalator, 63 A.L.R. 6th 495.