2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 3 - Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-3-1. Duty of Owner or Occupier of Land to Invitee

Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.

(Civil Code 1895, § 3824; Civil Code 1910, § 4420; Code 1933, § 105-401.)

- For article discussing property owner liability in "slip and fall" cases, see 14 Ga. St. B. J. 131 (1978). For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982). For annual survey of torts law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 291 (1983). For article, "Changes in Liability Standards for Owners and Occupiers," see 20 Ga. St. B. J. 41 (1983). For article, "Construction Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 173 (2001). For article, "Premises Liability for Criminal Attacks: Same Crimes, New Law," see 5 Ga. St. B. J. 54 (1999). For survey article on construction law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 59 (2008). For annual survey on law of torts, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (2009). For annual survey on torts, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (2012). For annual survey of tort law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 279 (2016). For article, "Premises Liability and Apportionment Following Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P.," see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2017). For annual survey on construction law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (2017). For annual survey on torts law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (2017). For note contrasting attractive nuisance doctrine in Georgia with that in California, see 22 Ga. B. J. 563 (1960). For note discussing Georgia's approach to social guests injured on the land of another, and advocating elevation of the expressly invited social guest to the status of invitee, see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 130 (1969). For note discussing landlord liability for crime in apartments, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 349 (1971). For note, "Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of Another," see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 361 (1984). For note, "Robinson v. Kroger: A Leveling of the Field or Fatal Fall for Summary Judgment?," see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 655 (1999). For note, "Don't Let the Bed Bugs Bill: Landlord Liability for Bed Bug Infestations," see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 479 (2018). For note, "Between Bystander and Insurer: Locating the Duty of the Georgia Landowner to Safeguard Against Third-Party Criminal Attacks on the Premises," see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1099 (1999). For comment on Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Graden, 79 Ga. App. 230, 53 S.E.2d 371 (1949), see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 130 (1949). For comment criticizing Plante v. Lorraine Mfg. Co., 78 R.I. 505, 82 A.2d 893 (1951), holding no implied invitation to youths despite defendant's excavation and exposed sand bank, see 14 Ga. B. J. 248 (1951). For comment on Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Franklin, 193 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1951), see 14 Ga. B. J. 498 (1952). For comment on Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957) wherein child accompanying customer parent into store had status of invitee, see 9 Mercer L. Rev. 375 (1958). For comment on Austin v. Smith, 96 Ga. App. 659, 101 S.E.2d 169 (1958), concerning gross negligence in relation to gratuitous automobile guest, see 20 Ga. B. J. 552 (1958). For comment on Baynes v. McElrath, 106 Ga. App. 805, 128 S.E.2d 348 (1962), finding passenger under car-pool arrangement as an invitee and not a guest, to whom driver owed ordinary care, see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (1963). For comment on Findley v. Lipsitz, 106 Ga. App. 24, 126 S.E.2d 299 (1962), see 25 Ga. B. J. 457 (1963). For comment on Kriess v. Allatoona Landing, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 427, 133 S.E.2d 602 (1963), see 26 Ga. B. J. 450 (1964). For comment discussing motel owner's duty of care to infants, in light of Waught v. Duke Corp., 248 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1966), see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 480 (1967). For comment on Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, 259 Iowa 542, 144 N.W.2d 870 (1966), as to business owners' duty to anticipate injury to customer due to ice on parking lot, see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 548 (1967). For comment on Cargill, Inc. v. Zimmer, 374 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1967), highlighting Georgia's narrow application of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 472 (1968). For comment on Nesmith v. Starr, 115 Ga. App. 473, 155 S.E.2d 24 (1967), see 4 Ga. St. B. J. 518 (1968). For comment on Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rep. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496 (Sup. Ct. 1968), applying a reasonable man test to the host in a personal injury suit brought by a social guest, rather than classifying plaintiff's status, see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 338 (1969). For comment on Ryckeley v. Georgia Power Co., 122 Ga. App. 107, 176 S.E.2d 493 (1970), see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 431 (1972). For comment, "A New Beginning for the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in Georgia," see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (1982).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Duty Owed to Children
• Carriers
• Commercial Sales Establishments
• Home, Apartment, and Landowners
• Independent Contractors
• Landlord Liability
• Master's Liability to Servant
• Public Accommodation Facilities
• Spectator Events and Facilities
• Miscellaneous

General Consideration

1. In General

- The liability of the owner of business premises depends upon whether the decedent, at the time the decedent suffered the fatal injury, was a trespasser, a licensee or an invitee (express or implied). Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2, the owner or proprietor of the premises is liable only for willful or wanton injury to a licensee, whereas under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-3, the landowner or occupier owes an invitee the duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. The duty owed to a trespasser is not to willfully and wantonly injure the trespasser. Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983).

Distinction between business invitees and licensees is permissible classification under equal protection guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions. Delk v. Sellers, 149 Ga. App. 439, 254 S.E.2d 446 (1979).

A business invitor owes a nondelegable duty to protect the business's invitees from injury. Moon v. Homeowners' Ass'n, 202 Ga. App. 821, 415 S.E.2d 654, cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 906, 415 S.E.2d 654 (1992).

Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to hold this section unconstitutional in order to abolish the common-law categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser and substitute the standard of reasonable care on the part of the occupier of premises in view of the probability of harm to entrants. Meyberg v. Dodson, 136 Ga. App. 324, 221 S.E.2d 200 (1975).

- The object and purpose of this section is to require the owner or occupier of the premises to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for an invitee. Irwin v. Torbert, 204 Ga. 111, 49 S.E.2d 70 (1948).

- Tort liability under either O.C.G.A. § 51-1-2 or O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 is barred when the plaintiff, with actual knowledge and subjective appreciation of the risk, undertakes an obvious danger from the employee's negligence. Sones v. Real Estate Dev. Group, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 507, 606 S.E.2d 687 (2004).

Distraction doctrine did not allow a homeowner to be held liable for an invitee's "trip and fall" injury suffered at the homeowner's home due to hazardous steps because: (1) the invitee saw and appreciated any hazard posed by the steps; and (2) under such circumstances, a mere distraction could not overcome summary judgment when the invitee had actual, prior knowledge of the hazard, so, even if the homeowner knew of the alleged hazard, the invitee could not recover due to the invitee's equal knowledge of the hazard. Benefield v. Vance, 315 Ga. App. 505, 726 S.E.2d 531 (2012).

Plaintiff knew there was a pothole in the area where the plaintiff parked and that the plaintiff could have seen the plaintiff was placing the plaintiff's foot in the pothole if the plaintiff had looked. Because the plaintiff's knowledge of the hazard that caused the plaintiff's fall and resulting injuries was at least equal to that of the landowner, the plaintiff could not recover. LeCroy v. Bragg, 319 Ga. App. 884, 739 S.E.2d 1 (2013).

In a premises liability action based on the injuries the plaintiff sustained in a four-wheeler accident caused by a chain installed between two trees on the defendant's property, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant as the plaintiff had equal or superior knowledge of the hazard of a chain; the plaintiff could see the chain well enough from a distance to observe whether the chain was up or down; and the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for the plaintiff's personal safety because, while the plaintiff did not see the chain at the time of the collision, that was the result of the plaintiff's own conduct, including the speed and the angle at which the plaintiff entered the lane. Seago v. Estate of Earle, 331 Ga. App. 699, 771 S.E.2d 397 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 512 (Ga. 2015).

- In an action by college students who were sexually assaulted while living in a dormitory, knowledge that the dormitory subjected the students to the unreasonable risk of criminal attack is a prerequisite to recovery under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, and may be demonstrated by evidence of the occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents. However, in light of the dearth of evidence of the occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents, the college was entitled to summary judgment. Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc. v. Roe, 261 Ga. 764, 409 S.E.2d 848 (1991).

- Liability under this section may arise from defective construction. Ross v. Jackson, 123 Ga. 657, 51 S.E. 578 (1905); Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S.E. 388 (1925).

Application of this section cannot be restricted to purely physical defects in real property or personal property located thereon. It must be interpreted to include risks upon the premises in the nature of vicious animal or ill tempered individuals likely to inflict harm upon invitees visiting upon the premises. Georgia Bowling Enters., Inc. v. Robbins, 103 Ga. App. 286, 119 S.E.2d 52 (1961); Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978); Beard v. Fender, 179 Ga. App. 465, 346 S.E.2d 901 (1986).

The presence of a mischievous human being on premises may constitute the danger against which the law requires of the occupant reasonable care to protect the invitee. Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937).

Generally, law does not require owner or possessor to anticipate presence of animals ferae naturae. Williams v. Gibbs, 123 Ga. App. 677, 182 S.E.2d 164 (1971).

This section refers to premises under control of owner or occupier, not to premises over which a person has a mere easement of passage, and which belong to another. Spindel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 100 Ga. App. 323, 111 S.E.2d 160 (1959).

- As between owner and customer, one who sustains injuries upon the property of the other, in order to recover, must show that two elements at least exist, fault on the part of the owner, and ignorance of danger on the part of the invitee. Barber v. Rich's, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 880, 90 S.E.2d 666 (1955).

- In a "slip and fall" premises case, an invitee's failure to exercise ordinary care for personal safety is not established as a matter of law by the invitee's admission that the invitee did not look at the site on which the invitee placed the invitee's foot or that the invitee could have seen the hazard had the invitee visually examined the floor before taking the step which led to the invitee's downfall; rather, the issue is whether, taking into account all the circumstances existing at the time and place of the fall, the invitee exercised the prudence the ordinarily careful person would use in a like situation. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997); Christensen v. Overseas Partners Capital, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 827, 549 S.E.2d 784 (2001).

Liability for injuries to invitees on premises of others depends on its own peculiar facts. This is more or less true as to all negligence cases and is especially applicable to actions based on this section. Lowe v. Atlanta Masonic Temple Co., 79 Ga. App. 575, 54 S.E.2d 677 (1949).

A guest of a tenant is an invitee upon the premises of the landlord when the guest is invited by the tenant and visits the tenant in such premises; the applicable standard of care is that prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Winchester v. Sun Valley-Atlanta Assocs., 206 Ga. App. 140, 424 S.E.2d 85 (1992).

- After the presence of a licensee is known, exactly the same acts of caution may be required of the owner to satisfy the legal duty as would be necessary if the licensee were invited. Cooper v. Corporate Property Investors, 220 Ga. App. 889, 470 S.E.2d 689 (1996).

The "equal knowledge rule" is the practical application of a rule that a knowledgeable plaintiff cannot recover damages if by ordinary care the plaintiff could have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence. Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga. App. 157, 342 S.E.2d 468 (1986).

Plaintiff's "equal knowledge" was not dispositive, since although the plaintiff knew as much if not more than the plaintiff's factory supervisor about the plaintiff's estranged spouse's propensities, it was equally clear that the plaintiff did not anticipate that the spouse would enter the factory and shoot the plaintiff in the head, and it was not clear whether the plaintiff could have avoided it in any case. Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga. App. 157, 342 S.E.2d 468 (1986).

In a negligence action by a parent against a child for injuries sustained when the child's store was robbed and the parent was shot, the evidence showed that both people knew about a previous robbery at that store that involved no shooting, but that only the child knew about a prior robbery and shooting at the store. The equal knowledge rule is not applicable in this case because liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 is founded upon the foreseeability of harm; the proprietor's liability is based on the proprietor's failure to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe for invitees. Lee v. Lee, 194 Ga. App. 606, 391 S.E.2d 654 (1990).

The "equal knowledge" rule did not apply when the plaintiff was injured by an employee who had earlier been fired for assaulting the plaintiff and who, without the plaintiff's knowledge, was permitted by the employer to return to the premises. Crapp v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 223 Ga. App. 902, 479 S.E.2d 101 (1996).

Victim's negligence claim for personal injuries suffered while traversing the owner's gas station parking lot was properly dismissed as the victim had actual knowledge of the allegedly hazardous condition, it was equal to the owner's knowledge, and therefore the distraction doctrine did not apply. Delk v. Quiktrip Corp., 258 Ga. App. 140, 572 S.E.2d 676 (2002).

When customer's knowledge of hazard is equal to owner's, customer's claim fails. Helms v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1993)(also finding that owner had exercised reasonable care).

The superior/equal knowledge rule is applicable in those cases when the proprietor allows a dangerous condition to exist, including cases when the alleged dangerous condition is one created by the activities of third persons, so long as the condition is one which the invitee can expect equally with the host, or come to know of, and therefore must anticipate the danger. In other words, the condition even if created by third parties must be such that the invitee can indeed have equal knowledge and either assumes the risk or can avoid the danger with ordinary care. Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga. App. 157, 342 S.E.2d 468 (1986).

Store owner had no duty to warn the store's customer of an icy condition in a parking lot, since the customer had knowledge at least equal to that of the store employees, and the customer had traversed ice and snow when going from the customer's van into the store. Favour v. Food Lion, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 750, 389 S.E.2d 22 (1989).

- Department store manager, who was neither an owner or occupier of the store, could not be held liable for injuries to a customer who fell in the store. Adams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 Ga. App. 695, 490 S.E.2d 150 (1997).

- Because a painter failed to show that a homeowner's knowledge of an electrical wiring defect was superior to that of the painter, the homeowner was entitled to summary judgment as to the issue of the homeowner's liability. Schuessler v. Bennett, 287 Ga. App. 880, 652 S.E.2d 884 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0398, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 230 (Ga. 2008).

- When evidence showed the injured defendant took care to inspect the work area for possible hazards before starting to remove a roof, asked workers for the property owner to stay away from the area where the defendant was working and generally tried to keep the area safe, the defendant's claim should have survived summary judgment. Greenforest Baptist Church, Inc. v. Shropshire, 221 Ga. App. 465, 471 S.E.2d 547 (1996).

When a delivery person slipped and fell on loose telephone books at a hospital loading dock, the hospital was properly denied summary judgment; there was an issue of fact as to whether the hospital had constructive knowledge of the condition, the hospital did not show that the delivery person's knowledge of the hazard was equal or superior to its own, the voluntary departure rule did not apply because there was evidence that the route taken by the delivery person was an authorized one and was routinely used, and whether the delivery person was negligent in not watching where the delivery person stepped was for the jury to resolve. Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 285 Ga. App. 393, 646 S.E.2d 490 (2007).

- Trial court properly denied a store's motion for a directed verdict in a slip and fall case because the plaintiff presented evidence from which the jury could infer the store's constructive knowledge of the hazard based on water on the floor in the floral area being a recurrent problem and mats on the floor to catch the water were not in place on the day the plaintiff fell. The Kroger Co. v. Schoenhoff, 324 Ga. App. 619, 751 S.E.2d 438 (2013).

- When the worker who was knocked down, allegedly by the dog owners' dog, was unable to show that the dog had any dangerous propensities or that the dog owner knew about such propensities, the worker could not recover either under the dangerous animal liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, or the premises liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; however, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the dog owners as a genuine issue of material fact still existed regarding whether the one dog owner voluntarily undertook a duty to restrain the dogs on the owner's premises and, if so, whether that voluntary undertaking was negligently performed. Osowski v. Smith, 262 Ga. App. 538, 586 S.E.2d 71 (2003).

Because: (1) the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court was that a retailer had no knowledge of a hazard posed by a previously loaded BB gun placed on an open display shelf and accessible to children; and (2) a parent failed to show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the parent's child would take the gun and shoot the child's sibling, the trial court did not err in granting the retailer summary judgment as to the issue of its liability. Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 316, 651 S.E.2d 464 (2007).

Cited in Pacetti v. Central of Ga. Ry., 6 Ga. App. 97, 64 S.E. 302 (1909); Mattox v. Lambright, 31 Ga. App. 441, 120 S.E. 685 (1923); Bussell v. Dannenberg Co., 34 Ga. App. 792, 132 S.E. 230 (1925); Hickman v. Toole, 35 Ga. App. 697, 134 S.E. 635 (1926); Walker v. Central of Ga. Ry., 47 Ga. App. 240, 170 S.E. 258 (1933); Wardlaw v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 47 Ga. App. 595, 170 S.E. 830 (1933); Rogers v. McKinley, 48 Ga. App. 262, 172 S.E. 662 (1934); Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Wise, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63 (1940); Swope v. Farrar, 66 Ga. App. 52, 17 S.E.2d 92 (1941); Bryant v. S.H. Kress & Co., 76 Ga. App. 530, 46 S.E.2d 600 (1948); Kelley v. Black, 203 Ga. 589, 47 S.E.2d 802 (1948); Nabors v. Atlanta Biltmore Corp., 77 Ga. App. 730, 49 S.E.2d 688 (1948); Ludwig v. J.J. Newberry Co., 78 Ga. App. 871, 52 S.E.2d 485 (1949); Brigman v. Brenner, 206 Ga. 222, 56 S.E.2d 471 (1949); McCarthy v. Hiers, 81 Ga. App. 365, 59 S.E.2d 22 (1950); Hogg v. First Nat'l Bank, 82 Ga. App. 861, 62 S.E.2d 634 (1950); Peggy Ann of Ga., Inc. v. Scoggins, 86 Ga. App. 109, 71 S.E.2d 89 (1952); Howerdd v. Whitaker, 87 Ga. App. 850, 75 S.E.2d 572 (1953); Sheraton Whitehall Corp. v. McConnell, 88 Ga. App. 725, 77 S.E.2d 752 (1953); Dantos v. Community Theatres Co., 90 Ga. App. 195, 82 S.E.2d 260 (1954); United States v. Adams, 212 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1954); Wicker v. Roberts, 91 Ga. App. 490, 86 S.E.2d 350 (1955); Greyhound Corp. v. Stokes, 91 Ga. App. 674, 86 S.E.2d 804 (1955); Nunnally v. Shockley, 91 Ga. App. 767, 87 S.E.2d 115 (1955); Dawley v. Sheridan-Punaro Co., 93 Ga. App. 696, 92 S.E.2d 613 (1956); Shockley v. Nunnally, 95 Ga. App. 342, 98 S.E.2d 47 (1957); Golf Club Co. v. Rothstein, 97 Ga. App. 128, 102 S.E.2d 654 (1958); Pettit v. Stiles Hotel Co., 97 Ga. App. 137, 102 S.E.2d 693 (1958); Midland Properties Co. v. Farmer, 100 Ga. App. 8, 110 S.E.2d 100 (1959); Netherland v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 837, 115 S.E.2d 122 (1960); Robinson's Tropical Gardens, Inc. v. Sawyer, 105 Ga. App. 468, 125 S.E.2d 131 (1962); Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulsey, 106 Ga. App. 171, 126 S.E.2d 541 (1962); National Distrib. Co. v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 106 Ga. App. 475, 127 S.E.2d 303 (1962); YMCA of Metro. Atlanta, Inc. v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 130 S.E.2d 242 (1963); 670 New Street, Inc. v. Smith, 107 Ga. App. 539, 130 S.E.2d 773 (1963); Campbell v. Eubanks, 107 Ga. App. 527, 130 S.E.2d 832 (1963); Pulliam v. Walgreen Drug Stores, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 90, 131 S.E.2d 801 (1963); Atlanta Funtown, Inc. v. Crouch, 114 Ga. App. 702, 152 S.E.2d 583 (1966); Somers v. Tribble, 115 Ga. App. 282, 154 S.E.2d 620 (1967); Christian v. Vargas, 116 Ga. App. 359, 157 S.E.2d 308 (1967); Horton v. Nicholas, 117 Ga. App. 748, 162 S.E.2d 208 (1968); Murray Biscuit Co. v. Hutto, 119 Ga. App. 377, 167 S.E.2d 182 (1969); Millard v. AAA Electrical Contractors & Eng'rs, 119 Ga. App. 548, 167 S.E.2d 679 (1969); Washington v. Trend Mills, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 659, 175 S.E.2d 111 (1970); Nathan v. Oakland Park Supermarket, Inc., 126 Ga. App. 538, 191 S.E.2d 327 (1972); Gray v. Delta Air Lines, 127 Ga. App. 45, 192 S.E.2d 521 (1972); Rodriguez v. Newby, 131 Ga. App. 651, 206 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Burger Barn, Inc. v. Young, 131 Ga. App. 828, 207 S.E.2d 234 (1974); Chatmon v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 326, 211 S.E.2d 2 (1974); City of Macon v. Powell, 133 Ga. App. 907, 213 S.E.2d 63 (1975); Anderson v. Atlanta Univ., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 365, 214 S.E.2d 394 (1975); Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976); Keister v. Creative Arts Guild, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 67, 227 S.E.2d 880 (1976); Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc. v. Tucker, 139 Ga. App. 873, 229 S.E.2d 804 (1976); Guthrie v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 21, 232 S.E.2d 369 (1977); Thompson-Weinman & Co. v. Brock, 144 Ga. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 279 (1977); Hatcher v. City of Albany, 147 Ga. App. 843, 250 S.E.2d 537 (1978); Krystal Co. v. Bulter, 149 Ga. App. 696, 256 S.E.2d 96 (1979); Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979); Blackwell v. Taylor, 497 F. Supp. 351 (M.D. Ga. 1980); Powell v. United Oil Corp., 160 Ga. App. 810, 287 S.E.2d 667 (1982); Strickland v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 317, 291 S.E.2d 396 (1982); Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840, 303 S.E.2d 38 (1983); Wagner v. Casey, 169 Ga. App. 500, 313 S.E.2d 756 (1984); Tolbert v. Captain Joe's Seafood, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 26, 316 S.E.2d 11 (1984); Stouffer Corp. v. Henkel, 170 Ga. App. 383, 317 S.E.2d 222 (1984); Robinson v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 170 Ga. App. 812, 318 S.E.2d 235 (1984); Gregory v. Trupp, 171 Ga. App. 299, 319 S.E.2d 122 (1984); Pitts v. Ivester, 171 Ga. App. 312, 320 S.E.2d 226 (1984); Brownlow v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 171 Ga. App. 519, 322 S.E.2d 548 (1984); Begin v. Georgia Championship Wrestling, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 293, 322 S.E.2d 737 (1984); Bowman v. Richardson, 176 Ga. App. 864, 338 S.E.2d 297 (1985); Beard v. Fender, 179 Ga. App. 465, 346 S.E.2d 901 (1986); Willis v. Neal, 179 Ga. App. 732, 347 S.E.2d 700 (1986); Bishop v. Fair Lanes Ga. Bowling, Inc., 803 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1986); Stanger v. Cato, 182 Ga. App. 498, 356 S.E.2d 97 (1987); Burnsed v. City of Albany, 184 Ga. App. 297, 361 S.E.2d 275 (1987); Phillips v. Lindsey, 184 Ga. App. 728, 362 S.E.2d 491 (1987); Fulton-DeKalb County Hosp. Auth. v. Estes, 187 Ga. App. 120, 369 S.E.2d 262 (1988); Pennington v. Cecil N. Brown Co., 187 Ga. App. 621, 371 S.E.2d 106 (1988); D.J. Powers Co. v. Hendry, 190 Ga. App. 297, 379 S.E.2d 1 (1989); Fowler v. Campbell, 191 Ga. App. 872, 383 S.E.2d 163 (1989); Reed v. Ed Taylor Constr. Co., 198 Ga. App. 595, 402 S.E.2d 346 (1991); Swanson v. Smith, 199 Ga. App. 471, 405 S.E.2d 301 (1991); Wallace v. Pointe Properties, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 537, 414 S.E.2d 678 (1992); Hobson v. Kroger Co., 204 Ga. App. 417, 419 S.E.2d 492 (1992); Ashley v. Balcor Property Mgt., Inc., 205 Ga. App. 590, 423 S.E.2d 14 (1992); Barlow v. Brant, 206 Ga. App. 313, 425 S.E.2d 309 (1992); Collins v. Shepherd, 212 Ga. App. 54, 441 S.E.2d 458 (1994); Smith v. Housing Auth., 212 Ga. App. 503, 441 S.E.2d 847 (1994); Lowe v. Macerich Real Estate Co., II, 213 Ga. App. 299, 444 S.E.2d 389 (1994); Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235, 454 S.E.2d 507 (1995); Heffernan v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 226 Ga. App. 167, 486 S.E.2d 51 (1997); Bible v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 227 Ga. App. 882, 490 S.E.2d 553 (1997); Gill v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 231 Ga. App. 482, 499 S.E.2d 85 (1998); Johnson v. Loy, 231 Ga. App. 431, 499 S.E.2d 140 (1998); Freyer v. Silver, 234 Ga. App. 243, 507 S.E.2d 7 (1998); Lowery's Tavern, Inc. v. Dudukovich, 234 Ga. App. 687, 507 S.E.2d 851 (1998); Lee v. Food Lion, 243 Ga. App. 819, 534 S.E.2d 507 (2000); Medley v. Home Depot, Inc., 252 Ga. App. 398, 555 S.E.2d 736 (2001); Doe v. HGI Realty, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 181, 561 S.E.2d 450 (2002); Gilbert v. Auto. Purchasing Serv., 254 Ga. App. 770, 563 S.E.2d 906 (2002); Odister v. Leach, 257 Ga. App. 106, 570 S.E.2d 391 (2002); Barnes v. St. Stephen's Missionary Baptist Church, 260 Ga. App. 765, 580 S.E.2d 587 (2003); Thomas v. Exec. Comm. of the Baptist Convention, 262 Ga. App. 315, 585 S.E.2d 217 (2003); Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Walker, 270 Ga. App. 314, 605 S.E.2d 850 (2004); Norman v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., 277 Ga. App. 621, 627 S.E.2d 382 (2006); Saulsbury v. Wilson, 348 Ga. App. 557, 823 S.E.2d 867 (2019).

2. Determining Invitee Status

"Invitee" defined.

- When one enters the premises of another for purposes connected with the owner's business conducted on such premises such person is an invitee, and the owner is liable in damages to the invitee for failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932); United Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Carpenter, 68 Ga. App. 438, 23 S.E.2d 189 (1942); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Jones v. West End Theatre Co., 94 Ga. App. 299, 94 S.E.2d 135 (1956); Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958); Abney v. London Iron & Metal Co., 152 Ga. App. 238, 262 S.E.2d 505 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

When a person induces or leads another to come upon the person's premises for any lawful purpose, the person is liable in damages to such person for a failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944).

A person is an invitee when at the time of the injury the person had present business relations with the owner of the premises which would render that person's presence of mutual aid to both. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

When one is on the premises of another at the latter's request and for the sole benefit of the latter, one is an invitee to whom the latter owes the duty of extraordinary care to avoid injury to that person. Abney v. London Iron & Metal Co., 152 Ga. App. 238, 262 S.E.2d 505 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

- Injured party was a licensee when the injured party entered into the lobby of a radio station just to be with the injured party's child, who was being interviewed, and had no other business at the station; the station did not obtain a benefit by virtue of the injured party's visit and did not impliedly invite the public at large into the station's lobby. Howard v. Gram Corp., 268 Ga. App. 466, 602 S.E.2d 241 (2004).

- Summary judgment should have been granted in favor of a store and employees on a tortious misconduct claim in a parent's action arising out of the employees' claim that the parent's child stole from the store because the child did not meet the legal definition of an invitee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; the child had to be regarded as a licensee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2(a)(3) because the child entered the store only to use bathroom and had no intention of shopping there. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

- Mere permission to enter the premises creates the relation of licensee, but an invitee is one who comes upon the premises by an express or implied invitation. An owner is not liable to a licensee, unless the owner wilfully causes the licensee to be harmed. Mandeville Mills v. Dale, 2 Ga. App. 607, 58 S.E. 1060 (1907).

The general test as to whether a person is an invitee or licensee is whether the injured person at the time of the injury had present business relations with the owner of the premises which would render the person's presence of mutual aid to both, or whether the person's presence on the premises was for the person's own convenience, or on business with others than the owner of the premises. Cobb v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 Ga. App. 160, 198 S.E. 111 (1938); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Pries v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 66 Ga. App. 464, 17 S.E.2d 902 (1941); Brown v. Hall, 81 Ga. App. 874, 60 S.E.2d 414 (1950); Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983); Burkhead v. American Legion, Post Number 51, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 56, 332 S.E.2d 311 (1985); Lee v. Myers, 189 Ga. App. 87, 374 S.E.2d 797 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 374 S.E.2d 797 (1989).

The determining question as to whether a visitor is an invitee by implication or a licensee is whether or not the owner or occupant of the premises will receive some benefit, real or supposed, or has some interest in the purpose of the visit. Anderson v. Cooper, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958); Dawson v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 266, 173 S.E.2d 424 (1970).

- When the plaintiff was injured while swimming in a lake on the defendant's property, neither implied permission nor recreational use enhanced the defendant's duties owed to the plaintiff beyond those owed to a plaintiff beyond those owed to a licensee. Nye v. Union Camp Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1988).

- When an owner of property leases the property to be used in the conduct of a business, those coming upon the premises in connection with the conduct of the business are invitees of the owner and proprietor alike. N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Madison, 176 Ga. App. 451, 336 S.E.2d 574 (1985).

Mutuality of interest does not mean that there must be commercial business transaction between the parties, but merely that each party is moved by a lawful purpose or interest in the object and subject matter of the invitation; the enterprise must be mutual to the extent that each party is lawfully interested therein, or that there is a common interest or mutual advantage involved. Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944).

While there must be at least some mutuality of interest in the subject matter to which the visitor's business relates, it is not necessary that the particular subject of the visit be for the benefit or profit of the occupant. Davis v. Garden Servs., Inc., 155 Ga. App. 34, 270 S.E.2d 228 (1980).

- The guests of invitee tenants, those coming on the leased premises for business purposes beneficial to the tenant, and those doing business with the tenant are there by the tenant's invitation and stand in the tenant's shoes insofar as they suffer injury due to the negligence of the owner or occupier of the premises. Davis v. Garden Servs., Inc., 155 Ga. App. 34, 270 S.E.2d 228 (1980).

One invited to premises of another as personal favor to the invitee, does not become an "invitee" of owner of the premises. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

- In a construction site delivery driver's claims against a general contractor and a subcontractor arising out of injuries that occurred when the driver was struck by a concrete-filled hose on the construction site, as to the subcontractor, the driver was a licensee because there was no evidence that the driver's presence was for their mutual benefit, but as to the general contractor, the question of whether the driver was a licensee or invitee was for the jury. Card v. Dublin Constr. Co., 337 Ga. App. 804, 788 S.E.2d 845 (2016), cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 140 (Ga. 2017).

- In action against property owner by independent contractor hired to do carpentry work for injuries sustained when beam upon which the contractor was standing fell to the ground, when the plaintiff was found to be a business invitee obviously hired for the plaintiff's expertise in carpentry and when the beam upon which the contractor was standing was ornamental and never intended for such use, the defendant property owner was not liable for injuries occasioned thereby unless the defendant had actual knowledge that such instrumentality was defective or unsuited for that purpose and knew or should have anticipated it would be diverted to such use. Amear v. Hall, 164 Ga. App. 163, 296 S.E.2d 611 (1982).

Determination that a widow's husband was an independent contractor on the owners' property while the husband was trimming the owners' tree limbs as part of a fundraising activity did not preclude a determination that the husband was also an invitee. Glenn v. Gibbs, 323 Ga. App. 18, 746 S.E.2d 658 (2013).

- The relationship between a college or university and one of its students is one of common interest and mutual advantage. It follows that a student is an invitee and not a mere licensee or social guest. Unless the college or university is immune from tort liability, it has a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for a student's safety. Walker v. Daniels, 200 Ga. App. 150, 407 S.E.2d 70 (1991).

- Board of Regents was not liable to a university campus visitor who was injured when the visitor tripped on a landscaping pipe in an unlit area off a walkway; the visitor was a licensee because there was no mutually beneficial interest in the visitor's being on campus in the middle of the night. Although the visitor was a guest of a university student, the visitor was in an area of campus that the visitor was not required to travel to reach the student's dorm. Scully v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 332 Ga. App. 873, 775 S.E.2d 230 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 741 (Ga. 2015).

This section has no application in regard to mere social guest. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

Mother and child were social guests; thus, not invitees, in the defendant's residence, even though they were planning a joint family social trip with the defendants for their mutual personal benefit. Riley v. Brasunas, 210 Ga. App. 865, 438 S.E.2d 113 (1993).

Social guest is not an invitee but is a licensee. Barry v. Cantrell, 150 Ga. App. 439, 258 S.E.2d 61 (1979).

- When there was no evidence that the homeowner derived any benefit from the homeowner's half-brother's presence in the home, the half-brother was a mere social guest or licensee and the voluntary act of cutting the lawn for the homeowner did not change this status, nor the homeowner's duty of care to the guest. Robinson v. Turner, 164 Ga. App. 515, 297 S.E.2d 522 (1982).

Country club member's invited social guests were invitees to whom the club owed a duty of ordinary care, where members were required to pay guest privileges of $2 per guest for use of the club's swimming pool. Haliburton v. Cole, 193 Ga. App. 795, 389 S.E.2d 13 (1989).

Security guard at shopping mall was invitee of owner of fast food restaurant in the mall and was not required to show that owner had been willfully or wantonly negligent. T & M Invs., Inc. v. Jackson, 206 Ga. App. 218, 425 S.E.2d 300 (1992).

- Neighbor who entered defendant's property by express invitation for the purpose of caring for their plants and shrubs was an invitee. Anderson v. Reynolds, 232 Ga. App. 868, 502 S.E.2d 782 (1998).

Court properly granted summary judgment to defendants after a neighbor slipped and fell on their lawn while bringing in their newspaper, since the defendants had no knowledge that the sprinkler system had caused the ground to become soggy. Hansen v. Cooper, 253 Ga. App. 533, 559 S.E.2d 740 (2002).

- Trial court erred in determining that a prison visitor was a licensee because the visitor's status was that of an invitee since both the visitor and the state and Department of Corrections received benefits from prison visitation; the prison at issue held itself open to visitors, maintaining regular visitation hours, and the state and Department supported inmate visitation. Freeman v. Eichholz, 308 Ga. App. 18, 705 S.E.2d 919 (2011).

Duty to keep premises safe for invitees extends to all portions of premises which are included within invitation and which it is necessary or convenient for the invitee to visit or use in the course of the business for which the invitation was extended, and at which his presence should therefor reasonably be anticipated, or to which he is allowed to go. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932); Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1942); Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

The duty to keep premises safe for invitees extends to any part thereof which one is specifically invited to enter, even though the place so entered is not designed for the use of, or ordinary use of, persons coming to the premises on business. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

- If the invitee does not go beyond that part of the premises to which, as the situation reasonably appears to the invitee, the invitation extends, the invitee cannot be held to have become a mere licensee because, as a matter of fact, the purposes of the invitation could have been fulfilled without going on such part of the premises. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932); Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1939).

- An owner's invitation, and the protection due an invitee thereunder, extend to those portions of the premises necessary for ingress and egress and on parts necessary or incidental to the mutual business or purposes of the invitation; but an invitee who leaves such places for others on the premises not included in the invitation and disconnected with the objects of the invitation is, as to such parts of the premises, a mere licensee. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

Invitee may rely upon discharge of duty resting upon occupier of land under this section by the person occupying the land and in control thereof, and is not necessarily, and as a matter of law, guilty of negligence in failing to discover the existence of a patent defect in the premises which renders the premises unsafe for persons coming upon the premises. Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Ga. App. 772, 166 S.E. 64 (1932); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Jones v. Hunter, 94 Ga. App. 316, 94 S.E.2d 384 (1956); Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958); Marshall v. Pig'n Whistle, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 526, 116 S.E.2d 671 (1960); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976).

When the owner or occupier of premises fails to exercise ordinary care in keeping reasonably safe such premises for the use of those who go upon the premises as invitees, and when such an invitee is injured by a patent defect in such premises of which the injured party has no actual knowledge, it cannot be held as a matter of law that such injured party was lacking in ordinary care in failing to observe the defect in time to avoid the injury. Parsons v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 69 Ga. App. 11, 24 S.E.2d 717 (1943).

If a defect, though patent, is not of such a nature and character as to be necessarily seen, in the exercise of ordinary care by a person coming upon the premises and who has a right to rely upon the duty of the owner or occupier of the premises to keep them safe, an invitee coming upon the premises is not, as a matter of law, guilty of negligence in not observing this defect. Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

Invitee, who is as fully aware of dangers and defects of premises as proprietor, assumes the risk and cannot recover from the defendant for dangers resulting in injuries by reason of such dangers and defects. Rogers v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 89 Ga. App. 903, 81 S.E.2d 721 (1954).

Invitee is not obligated to inspect premises to discover latent defects nor even to observe all patent defects. Herrington v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 119 Ga. App. 658, 168 S.E.2d 633, rev'd on other grounds, 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969).

Invitee need not choose safest way across owner's or proprietor's property but may travel any way customarily used and reasonably safe. Herrington v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 119 Ga. App. 658, 168 S.E.2d 633, rev'd on other grounds, 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969).

- The plain view doctrine puts a duty upon a person to look where the person is walking and to see large objects in plain view which are at a location where the objects are customarily placed and expected to be; not performing this duty may amount to a failure to exercise ordinary care for one's safety as would bar a recovery for resulting injuries. Stenhouse v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 473, 249 S.E.2d 276 (1978).

- Under the distraction doctrine, a plaintiff may be excused from the otherwise required degree of care because of circumstances creating an emergency situation of peril. This doctrine covers situations where the plaintiff's attention is distracted by a natural and usual cause, and this is particularly true when the distraction is placed there by the defendant or when the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care should have anticipated that the distraction would occur. Stenhouse v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 473, 249 S.E.2d 276 (1978).

One valid line of distinction existing under the distraction doctrine concerns the cause of the distraction. When the distraction is self-induced, the plaintiff can no more take the benefit of it to excuse the plaintiff's lack of care for the plaintiff's own safety than who creates an emergency can excuse oneself because of its existence. When the distraction comes from without, and is of such nature as naturally to divert the plaintiff, and also of such nature that the defendant might naturally have anticipated it, the result is different. Stenhouse v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 473, 249 S.E.2d 276 (1978).

Invitation, express or implied, is necessary to create more responsible relation and consequent higher duty upon owner or proprietor. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Hyde, 45 Ga. App. 548, 165 S.E. 466 (1932), later appeal, 47 Ga. App. 139, 169 S.E. 854 (1933).

- Victim was invitee; victim was invited by paving company's subcontractor to project site to observe saw blades and both had an interest in the effectiveness of the saw blades being used. Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 499 S.E.2d 722 (1998).

- An implied invitation is one which is held to be extended by reason of the owner doing something or permitting something to be done which fairly indicates to the person entering that one's entry and use of the property is consistent with the intents and purposes of the owner. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932); Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1939).

Invitation is implied when entry on premises is for purpose which is, or is supposed to be, beneficial to owner. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

An invitation of the owner or occupant of premises is implied by law when the person goes on the premises for the benefit, real or supposed, of the owner or occupant, or in a matter of mutual interest, or in the usual course of business, or for the performance of some duty. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933); Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944).

An invitation is inferred when there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while a license is inferred when the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it. Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935); Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

Federal food inspector was an invitee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, not a licensee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2, because the inspector was not present at an owner's chicken processing plant merely for the inspector's own pleasure or convenience but rather pursuant to United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) responsibilities; the owner could not have legally conducted business without the presence of USDA inspectors, which indicated that the owner received an advantage from the inspector's presence on the property and, thus, was easy to infer that the owner invited the inspector onto the premises in order to ensure compliance with federal regulations so that the owner could operate the plant. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Atkins, 310 Ga. App. 423, 713 S.E.2d 483 (2011).

In order for visitor to occupy status of implied invitee, as distinguished from mere licensee, one must come for purpose connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, or which the occupant permits to be carried on there; there must at least be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the visitor's business relates, although the particular thing which is the subject of the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant. Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935); Morse v. Sinclair Auto. Serv. Corp., 86 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1936); Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938).

Principle on which courts distinguish case of implied license from one of implied invitation, in the technical sense, seems to be this: speaking generally, when the privilege of the user exists for the common interest or mutual advantage of both parties it will be held to be a case of invitation; but if it exists for the mere pleasure and benefit of the party exercising the privilege, it will be held to be a case of license. Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936).

In case of implied invitation, gist of liability consists in fact that person injured did not act merely for the person's own convenience and pleasure, and from motives to which no act or sign of the owner or occupant contributed, but that the person entered the premises because the person was led to believe that they were intended to be used by visitors or passengers, and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the owner or person in possession and control of the premises, but that it was in accordance with the intention and design with which the way or place was adapted and prepared or allowed to be so used. Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938).

Invitation may be implied by dedication or may arise from known and customary use of portions of certain premises and it may be inferred from conduct, if notorious or actually known to the owner or the owner's authorized agent, or from any state of facts in which such invitation naturally and necessarily arises. Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952).

Invitation to use premises exists when person enters public place to trade. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

- When a visit is made on express invitation, but the purpose of the visit is wholly disconnected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, such an invitee occupies the status of a mere licensee. Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935); Morse v. Sinclair Auto. Serv. Corp., 86 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1936).

Express permission constitutes invitation only if circumstances imply assurance that premises have been prepared and made safe for particular visit. London Iron & Metal Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

Owner of place of business is not insurer of safety of customers. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956); Hammonds v. Jackson, 132 Ga. App. 528, 208 S.E.2d 366 (1974).

While owner or person in charge of property is not insurer of safety of the invitee thereon, one owes to invitee duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for one's safety and is liable for injury resulting from a breach of such duty. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

- Summary judgment is unavailable to a landowner against a person who sustains injury on real property when questions of fact exist as the injured person's status while on the property as to any duty of the landowner arising therefrom with particular reference to the law as to the liability of owners of recreational areas. North v. Toco Hills, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 116, 286 S.E.2d 346 (1981).

When the plaintiff was manager of a restaurant adjacent to, and leased from, a motel, and when the plaintiff was in the motel lobby at the request of the desk clerk and was shot during a robbery of the motel, the plaintiff's status as an invitee or licensee was an issue of disputed material fact making denial of summary judgment motions by both parties appropriate. Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enters., Inc., 194 Ga. App. 874, 392 S.E.2d 535 (1990).

For one person to be an invitee of another there must be some mutuality of interest. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Hyde, 45 Ga. App. 548, 165 S.E. 466 (1932), later appeal, 47 Ga. App. 139, 169 S.E. 854 (1933).

In order for injured party to have occupied the position of an invitee on the defendant's premises at the time the injured party received the alleged injuries, there must have been some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the injured party's business related, although the particular thing which was the subject of the visit may not have been for the benefit of the defendant. American Legion v. Simonton, 94 Ga. App. 184, 94 S.E.2d 66 (1956).

A privity of interest is necessary in order to raise an express invitee above the legal status of a licensee. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

Whether a person is an invitee or a licensee depends upon the nature of one's relation or contact with the owner of the premises. If the relationship is one of mutual interest to the parties, the injured party is an invitee of the owner. Frankel v. Antman, 157 Ga. App. 26, 276 S.E.2d 87 (1981).

When an accident victim and the victim's companions returned to a restaurant's parking lot, the victim's entry thereon after closing hours was evidence from which the jury could find the victim was a mere licensee, and the owners and occupiers of the premises owed the victim only the duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure the victim. Savage v. Flagler Co., 258 Ga. 335, 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988).

Liability of owner of property is dependent on whether the owner had any duty which might arise from control of the property or title thereto or a superior right to possession of property which is in possession or control of another. Williams v. Nico Indus., Inc., 157 Ga. App. 814, 278 S.E.2d 677 (1981), overruled on other grounds, 250 Ga. 568, 300 S.E.2d 145 (1983), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Mitchell County Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 279 Ga. 759, 582 S.E.2d 107 (2003). But see Preston v. Georgia Power Co., 227 Ga. App. 449, 489 S.E.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 869, 119 S. Ct. 163, 142 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1998); Santana v. Georgia Power Co., 269 Ga. 127, 498 S.E.2d 521 (1998).

Landowner is not insurer of invitee's safety. Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981).

Major tenant of an office building was the "owner or occupier" for purposes of liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 since, although it was not the title owner of the building, it occupied most of the space in the building. Georgia Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. Perry, 193 Ga. App. 288, 387 S.E.2d 898 (1989).

Owners or operators of nonresidential swimming facilities owe an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the safety and protection of invitees swimming in the pool. Walker v. Daniels, 200 Ga. App. 150, 407 S.E.2d 70 (1991).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, a hotel proprietor owes only a duty of "ordinary care" to guests of the hotel; however, ordinary care may vary according to location, exposure, and other factors specific to the hotel, and is ultimately a question to be answered by a jury. McNeal v. Days Inn of Am., 230 Ga. App. 786, 498 S.E.2d 294 (1998).

Plaintiff's claim for negligent failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe manner under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 failed because the plaintiff did not present competent evidence that the criminal act committed against the plaintiff on the defendant hotel's property by the unidentified third parties was reasonably foreseeable, the hotel did not have superior knowledge of the harm, and the plaintiff assumed the risk of harm. Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011).

In a slip and fall in a bathtub at a hotel, summary judgment was properly granted to the hotel defendants because the hotel defendants did not violate their statutory duty to the hotel's invitees as the plaintiff offered no expert testimony that the bathtub itself was somehow unreasonably hazardous, nor did the plaintiff show that the bathtub was in violation of any applicable safety code; and the only evidence of a transient substance that created the slippery or slick condition of the bathtub floor was the combination of water and soap, which the plaintiff admittedly was using to lather the plaintiff's body. Leavins v. Nayan Corp., 344 Ga. App. 417, 810 S.E.2d 324 (2018).

- Summary judgment for a gas station on a customer's claim for injuries arising from an incident when the customer tripped over sign legs and fell was proper; the sign posed no inherent danger, testimony indicated that the sign had always been there since the gas station opened, and there was no basis for liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Rowland v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 530, 634 S.E.2d 477 (2006).

- Corporation's unique requirement that tanker drivers delivering gasoline manually stick the gas tanks and the placement of the tank access in the gas station's active parking area were conditions created by the corporation and were not conditions inherent in the work of delivering gasoline; thus, the exception regarding whether the work changed the character for safety of the workplace did not apply. Rather, it was simply another way of asserting that the tanker driver's claims should be barred because the tanker driver assumed the risk of any alleged danger arising from the conditions the corporation imposed by continuing to work under such conditions, but factual issues remained on that issue barring summary judgment. Travis v. Quiktrip Corporation, 339 Ga. App. 551, 794 S.E.2d 195 (2016).

Summary judgment was improperly granted to the corporation that owned the gas station and the gas station manager because the tanker driver, the corporation, and the manager all knew that the placement of the tanks at the gas station presented a potential hazard because, while sticking the tanks, it put tanker drivers into the flow of traffic pulling in and out of the parking area where the tanks were located; the tanker driver had voiced displeasure that the corporation's policy of sticking the tanks subjected the tanker driver to risk; and the tanker driver did not voluntarily assume the risk of the traffic flow as the tanker driver was presented with the untenable choice of risking the traffic flow or risk losing the tanker driver's job. Travis v. Quiktrip Corporation, 339 Ga. App. 551, 794 S.E.2d 195 (2016).

Proprietor is not an insurer of customer's safety. Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 358 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905, 358 S.E.2d 869 (1987).

The proprietor is not the insurer of the invitee's safety, but is bound to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of which he or she has superior knowledge. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

Ownership alone, in absence of negligence, imposes no liability for injury sustained on premises. Jones v. Interstate N. Assocs., 145 Ga. App. 366, 243 S.E.2d 737 (1978).

Liability to invitees is not imposed merely because of ownership, but because of the invitation. If the invitation includes a representation of ownership or control, justice and reason require that the invitor may be taken at the invitor's word in that aspect of the case as well as in others. Davis v. City of Atlanta, 84 Ga. App. 572, 66 S.E.2d 188 (1951).

There is no liability from ownership alone; it must appear that injury resulted from breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the injured party. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 122 Ga. App. 374, 177 S.E.2d 119 (1970); Daniel v. Georgia Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 247 S.E.2d 139 (1978).

This section imposes duty on owner of reasonable inspection of premises for protection of invited persons. Brown v. Rome Mach. & Foundry Co., 5 Ga. App. 142, 62 S.E. 720 (1908); Fulton Ice & Coal Co. v. Pece, 29 Ga. App. 507, 116 S.E. 57 (1923).

The owner has a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe, this includes a duty to inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which the owner does not know and to take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement and use of the premises. Barksdale v. Nuwar, 203 Ga. App. 184, 416 S.E.2d 546 (1992).

When danger is not apparent, possessor of land has duty to exercise ordinary care to make condition reasonably safe or to give a warning adequate to enable the invitee upon the premises to avoid harm. Knowles v. La Rue, 102 Ga. App. 350, 116 S.E.2d 248 (1960).

Owner or occupier of land is under duty to invitees to discover and either keep premises safe from or warn of hidden dangers or defects not observable to such invitees in the exercise of ordinary care. Georgia Farmers' Mkt. Auth. v. Dabbs, 150 Ga. App. 15, 256 S.E.2d 613 (1979).

Owner of land owes duty to invitee to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee against injury, and the invitee must exercise ordinary care to keep the premises free from pitfalls and mantraps. Harvill v. Swift & Co., 102 Ga. App. 543, 117 S.E.2d 202 (1960).

Duty of owner or occupier of premises to invitee is to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. Pilgreen v. Hanson, 89 Ga. App. 703, 81 S.E.2d 18 (1954); Tatum v. Clemones, 105 Ga. App. 221, 124 S.E.2d 425 (1962); Simpson v. Dotson, 133 Ga. App. 120, 210 S.E.2d 240 (1974).

As to invitees on the premises of another, it is the duty of the owner to keep the premises, not in a reasonably safe condition, but in a safe condition. Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981).

A storekeeper is not liable as an insurer of the safety of persons whom the storekeeper has invited to enter the storekeeper's premises. The storekeeper owes a duty of ordinary care, to have the storekeeper's premises in a reasonably safe condition, not to lead them into a dangerous trap or to expose them to unreasonable risk, but to give them adequate and timely notice and warning of latent or concealed perils. Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 199, 433 S.E.2d 121 (1993).

An owner or occupier of land is liable in damages to invitees who come upon the land for injuries occasioned by the failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. Lake v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 195, 570 S.E.2d 638 (2002).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a food service corporation in a bench user's personal injury action, which arose when the user sat on a bench at a university and the bench collapsed, causing the user to fall and suffer injuries, as it was unclear from the contractual language between the corporation and the university whether the corporation had assumed control over the bench where the incident occurred; pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, the owner or occupier of the land had a duty to exercise ordinary care for invitees, but it was unclear whether the corporation was an occupier of the premises, which were owned by the university. Nair v. Aramark Food Serv. Corp., 276 Ga. App. 793, 625 S.E.2d 78 (2005).

A business entity and the entity's owners did not breach their duty of care under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to an invitee because the alleged defect in a transition area between dark, rubberized mat flooring around a playground and a green, astroturf-type surface was static and the invitee had successfully negotiated the transition area once to get into the playground; no other customers fell in the transition area in the three years that the business had been open. Sherrod v. Triple Play Cafe, LLC, 285 Ga. App. 689, 647 S.E.2d 376 (2007).

Summary judgment was properly granted to owners and managers of a shopping center in a store employee's trip and fall action, which occurred as the employee stepped on a grassy median between a sidewalk and the center's parking lot, as the owners and managers exercised ordinary care by conducting inspections of the premises which were reasonable under the circumstances pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Berni v. Cousins Props. Inc., 316 Ga. App. 502, 729 S.E.2d 617 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to create a genuine question of material fact as to whether the shop owner remained responsible for exercising ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for invitees because, regardless of the owner's presence at the precise time of the accident, some evidence showed that the owner both retained control of the premises and authorized or encouraged invitees to visit or remain on the shop floor. Sherwood v. Williams, 347 Ga. App. 400, 820 S.E.2d 141 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0303, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 366 (Ga. 2019).

- In order for there to be a duty arising from control of land at a time when one is not physically on the premises, there must be the grant of authority, dominion, or a continuing exclusive right to control the premises in question. In short, one must have the status of an occupier, such as a contractor who comes upon another's land for the purpose of constructing a house or building. Housing Auth. v. Famble, 170 Ga. App. 509, 317 S.E.2d 853 (1984).

Duty to keep premises safe (not reasonably safe) exists as to all persons who for any lawful purpose come upon premises at express or implied invitation of owner. Mitchell v. Gay, 111 Ga. App. 867, 143 S.E.2d 568 (1965).

Duty to keep premises safe for invitees applies to defects or conditions which are in nature of hidden dangers, traps, and the like, in that they are not known to the invitee and would not be observed by the invitee in the exercise of ordinary care. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

The duty to keep the premises safe applies to hidden dangers and defects and the owner or occupier must use ordinary care to guard, cover or protect the dangerous or defective portion of the premises for the safety of persons rightfully thereon which might include timely warning of such dangerous or defective condition. Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952).

- Owner or occupier of the land is liable in damages to those expressly or impliedly invited upon the premises for such damage as is occasioned by the owner's or occupier's failure to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe. Goldsmith v. Hazelwood, 93 Ga. App. 466, 92 S.E.2d 48 (1956); Knowles v. La Rue, 102 Ga. App. 350, 116 S.E.2d 248 (1960); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976).

The duty is imposed by law upon an owner as to an invitee to keep the premises and approaches safe and if the owner fails to exercise the care required of a reasonably prudent man in keeping such premises safe, the owner is liable to the invitee for an injury sustained thereon as a result of the unsafe condition of the premises. The owner must exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe, not to keep the premises reasonably safe. Massey v. Georgia Power Co., 85 Ga. App. 593, 69 S.E.2d 824 (1952).

The owner of premises is liable for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions existing on the premises as the result of the owner's failure to exercise ordinary care. Harvill v. Swift & Co., 102 Ga. App. 543, 117 S.E.2d 202 (1960).

- The owner or person in charge of the premises owes to invitees thereon the duty of keeping the premises in a reasonably safe and suitable condition, so that those invited to enter thereon shall not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger, and is therefore liable for injuries received by invitees as a result of a dangerous condition of the premises. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

- In a slip and fall action between a daughter and the daughter's mother, because the evidence showed that the daughter was a mere social guest or licensee in the mother's home at the time of the daughter's injury, and not an invitee, present only in the home for the daughter's convenience, and the mother did not act with any intent to harm the daughter, the mother was properly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability for the daughter's personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall. Behforouz v. Vakil, 281 Ga. App. 603, 636 S.E.2d 674 (2006).

- Even though there was no duty to warn those entering the store on a rainy day that there may be accumulations of water on the floor, when the proprietor voluntarily sought to mop every five minutes, to put out a safety mat, and to warn of the wet floor, there was a duty to perform the assumed measures with ordinary care. Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 424, 504 S.E.2d 245 (1998).

True ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted. Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977); Jones v. Interstate N. Assocs., 145 Ga. App. 366, 243 S.E.2d 737 (1978).

True ground of liability of owner or occupant of property to invitee is superior knowledge of proprietor of a condition that may subject the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm. Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978); Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981); Hackett v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 191 Ga. App. 442, 382 S.E.2d 180 (1989).

In a patron's slip and fall action filed against a home seller, the trial court properly found that the seller was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the patron could not show that the seller's knowledge of the condition which allegedly caused the patron's fall, specifically, loose gravel on the ground immediately adjacent to unbuffered metal trailer tongues, was superior to the patrons. Whitley v. H & S Homes, LLC, 279 Ga. App. 877, 632 S.E.2d 728 (2006).

Premises owner was properly granted summary judgment in an occupant's personal injury action filed against it as the uneven and unstable brick-paved walkway where the occupant fell was an open and obvious static condition which the occupant was presumed to have knowledge of, given that the occupant had successfully traversed the area before; moreover, while the occupant might have disagreed with the trial court's application of the law to the facts presented, that disagreement did not warrant reversal. Nemeth v. RREEF Am., LLC, 283 Ga. App. 795, 643 S.E.2d 283 (2007).

In a premises liability suit, the trial court properly granted the store summary judgment because, although the candle holder's globe picked up by the customer was made of glass, the customer knew of the dangers in handling a glass object and that people can be cut by glass; thus, the store did not possess superior knowledge of that danger. Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 323 Ga. App. 672, 747 S.E.2d 684 (2013).

- Trial court did not err in denying the owner of a chicken processing plant summary judgment in a federal food inspector's action to recover damages for injuries the inspector sustained when the inspector slipped and fell on a piece of viscera at the plant because the owner failed to carry the owner's burden on summary judgment to establish that the owner did not have constructive knowledge of the substance on the floor; the owner established that the owner had a customary inspection and cleaning procedure, but the owner failed to introduce any evidence to show adherence to the owner's inspection and cleaning procedure on the day of the inspector's fall. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Atkins, 310 Ga. App. 423, 713 S.E.2d 483 (2011).

Owner or occupier of land has duty to exercise ordinary care for safety of invitees in discovering defects or dangers in premises or instrumentalities thereon, and imposes a liability for injuries resulting from such defects as a reasonable inspection would disclose. Fuller v. Louis Steyerman & Sons, 46 Ga. App. 830, 169 S.E. 508 (1933); Camp v. Curry-Arrington Co., 49 Ga. App. 594, 176 S.E. 49 (1934); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1939); McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern, 65 Ga. App. 334, 15 S.E.2d 797 (1941); Indian Springs Swimming Pool Corp. v. Maddox, 70 Ga. App. 842, 29 S.E.2d 724 (1944); Johnson v. John Deere Plow Co., 214 Ga. 645, 106 S.E.2d 901 (1959).

- Given conflict between the experts' testimony concerning the obviously hazardous condition of a ramp and the inferences to be drawn from the absence of prior accidents, a question of fact existed whether the ramp was in a defective condition which the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care, knew or should have known would cause injury to an invitee. Haire v. City of Macon, 200 Ga. App. 744, 409 S.E.2d 670, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 896, 409 S.E.2d 670 (1991).

In an action arising from a plumber's fall through a fiberglass skylight, whether the building owner fulfilled the owner's duty to warn of the hidden danger of the roof's condition was a jury question. General Manufactured Housing, Inc. v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 382, 504 S.E.2d 220 (1998).

Condominium association did not owe a duty of care to a condominium owner's husband, who was killed by the criminal acts of third parties in the condominium's common area parking lot, because the condominium owners had specifically contracted that the association did not have a duty to provide security. Bradford Square Condo. Ass'n v. Miller, 258 Ga. App. 240, 573 S.E.2d 405 (2002).

- Customer failed to produce evidence that the condition which caused the customer's injury, a beer case placed on the floor by a customer, was a foreseeable danger or hazardous condition on the premises creating an unreasonable risk of harm, and the property owner's failure to protect the customer from the harm did not breach a duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. McDonald v. West Point Food Mart, Inc., 332 Ga. App. 753, 774 S.E.2d 774 (2015).

- Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the landowner after a customer was shot on the landowner's property, by a bullet originating across the street from the property, because the customer failed to show that the customer's injuries were the result of foreseeable conduct. While police reports indicated that there had been three prior instances involving guns in the area, the landowner was not aware of those reports or required to seek them out. Hill v. MM Gas & Food Mart, Inc., 351 Ga. App. 708, 832 S.E.2d 862 (2019).

Owner or occupier of land is liable for failure to warn invitees of dangers or defects in such premises or instrumentalities, of which the owner or occupier knew or of which it was the owner's or occupier's duty to know in the exercise of ordinary care. Fuller v. Louis Steyerman & Sons, 46 Ga. App. 830, 169 S.E. 508 (1933); Camp v. Curry-Arrington Co., 49 Ga. App. 594, 176 S.E. 49 (1934); Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum, 51 Ga. App. 1, 179 S.E. 415 (1935); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1939); Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943); Indian Springs Swimming Pool Corp. v. Maddox, 70 Ga. App. 842, 29 S.E.2d 724 (1944); Brown v. Hall, 81 Ga. App. 874, 60 S.E.2d 414 (1950); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Goldsmith v. Hazelwood, 93 Ga. App. 466, 92 S.E.2d 48 (1956); Jones v. West End Theatre Co., 94 Ga. App. 299, 94 S.E.2d 135 (1956); Ward v. VFW, Post 2588, 109 Ga. App. 563, 136 S.E.2d 481 (1964); Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978); Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983).

- The duty of the owner or occupier of premises to warn an invitee of dangers or defects of which the owner or occupier knew or in the exercise of ordinary care it was the owner's or occupier's duty to know applies to a latent peril as well as to a patent one. However, the actual result of an act or omission is not controlling in determining whether or not it was negligent, nor is the duty of the person doing or omitting to do an act to be estimated by what, after an injury has occurred, then first appears to be a proper precaution, but the question of negligence must be determined according to what should reasonably have been anticipated, in the exercise of ordinary care, as likely to happen. Swanson v. Choate, 108 Ga. App. 152, 132 S.E.2d 246 (1963).

- When the owner or occupier of premises fails to exercise ordinary care in keeping reasonably safe such premises for the use of those who go upon the premises as invitees, and when such an invitee is injured by a patent defect in such premises of which the injured party has no actual knowledge, it cannot be held as a matter of law that such injured party was lacking in ordinary care in failing to observe the defect in time to avoid the injury. Bray v. Barrett, 84 Ga. App. 114, 65 S.E.2d 612 (1951); Willis v. Byrd, 116 Ga. App. 555, 158 S.E.2d 458 (1967).

- The basis of a proprietor's liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge and if the proprietor's invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn the invitee and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has so much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting, in view of the invitee's knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition. Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949); Rogers v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 89 Ga. App. 903, 81 S.E.2d 721 (1954); Tatum v. Clemones, 105 Ga. App. 221, 124 S.E.2d 425 (1962); Lincoln v. Wilcox, 111 Ga. App. 365, 141 S.E.2d 765 (1965); Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970); Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977); Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981); Gyles, Inc. v. Turner, 184 Ga. App. 376, 361 S.E.2d 538 (1987); Chisholm v. Fulton Supply Co., 184 Ga. App. 378, 361 S.E.2d 540 (1987).

Babysitter, who was an invitee in premises liability action based upon the babysitter's slipping and falling on a coin on the floor, could not recover because the babysitter's knowledge of the dangerous condition of the coins being on the floor of the property was at least that of the property owner. Ballard v. Burnham, 256 Ga. App. 531, 568 S.E.2d 743 (2002).

Because a customer seeking damages from a fall caused by tripping over a gas hose at a gas station admitted to having actual knowledge of the hazard at issue, the hose, the gas station did not have superior knowledge of the hazard, and the customer was unable to establish this element of the claim; thus, summary judgment in favor of the gas station was required. Right Stuff Food Stores, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 279 Ga. App. 784, 632 S.E.2d 405 (2006).

Victim's estate, as a matter of law, did not show that the owner violated the owner's duty of care under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 at the time the victim, who lived with the owner and the owner's son, who was the boyfriend, was shot by the boyfriend; the owner did not know more about the owner's son's violent designs on the victim than the victim knew, as the victim was with the boyfriend at the time the boyfriend was apprehended as armed and dangerous, friends of the couple noted the boyfriend's abusive treatment of the victim, and there was no evidence that the boyfriend had previously committed an assault or another such crime on or near the owner's property or against any member of the household. Hembree v. Spivey, 281 Ga. App. 693, 637 S.E.2d 94 (2006).

Because a party injured in a fall admitted to having actual knowledge not only of the alleged hazard which caused the fall, but of the specific danger the hazard presented, and as a result, appreciated the danger involved, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the premises owner as to the issue of liability, given that based on the foregoing, the party should have avoided any injury in the exercise of ordinary care. Callaway Gardens Resort, Inc. v. Bierman, 290 Ga. App. 111, 658 S.E.2d 895 (2008).

Summary judgment to property owners in a widow's action seeking damages for her husband's death as a result of a fall on the owners' property was warranted because the owners did not breach the owners' duty of care to the husband, who was an independent contractor as well as an invitee; the husband's fall from a ladder while cutting tree limbs was an ordinary danger associated with that task, of which the husband assumed the risk. Glenn v. Gibbs, 323 Ga. App. 18, 746 S.E.2d 658 (2013).

There is no duty to warn against obvious or patent dangers which may be observed and avoided by exercise of ordinary care. Georgia Farmers' Mkt. Auth. v. Dabbs, 150 Ga. App. 15, 256 S.E.2d 613 (1979).

Person is not expected to foresee and warn against dangers which are not reasonably expected, and which would not occur except under exceptional circumstances or from unexpected acts of the person injured. Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22, 243 S.E.2d 310 (1978).

When an instrumentality is put to a use not intended, the owner or person in control is not liable for the resulting injuries unless such person knew or should have known that it would be diverted to such use. Savannah E. Side Corp. v. Robinson, 102 Ga. App. 426, 116 S.E.2d 613 (1960).

Owner is liable for injury if owner had either actual or constructive knowledge of defect prior to the time injury occurred. Farahmand v. Local Properties, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 80 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Since the homeowner had no actual knowledge of the construction defect, and the homeowner established a lack of actionable constructive knowledge by demonstrating that the homeowner was incapable of discovering the defect by means of reasonable inspection, the homeowner has established as a matter of law that the homeowner discharged the duty of ordinary care owed to the invitee and summary adjudication in the homeowner's favor was authorized. Barksdale v. Nuwar, 203 Ga. App. 184, 416 S.E.2d 546 (1992).

- In a premises liability action filed by a guest of a property owner, because the guest failed to show that the owner had any actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard that allegedly caused the guest's injuries, specifically, a hole in an otherwise flat, grassy area of the owner's yard, the court properly granted the owner summary judgment. Thomas v. Deason, 289 Ga. App. 753, 658 S.E.2d 165 (2008).

Premises owner and a company that provided maintenance services for the premises were not liable for personal injuries sustained when an invitee fell in a hidden hole on a grassy median separating two parking lots in a shopping center because there was no evidence that the owner and maintenance company, which conducted regular inspections of the property, had actual or constructive knowledge of the hole. Witt v. Ben Carter Props., LLC, 303 Ga. App. 107, 692 S.E.2d 749 (2010).

Premises owner was not liable for personal injuries sustained when a pull-down staircase used to access the premises' attic detached while a contractor was using it; the owner had no knowledge of any defect in the premises causing the accident, and any such defect was not discoverable by a reasonable inspection in the exercise of ordinary care. Ferguson v. Premier Homes, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 614, 695 S.E.2d 56 (2010).

Assuming that the plaintiff prison visitor was an invitee, the great weight of the evidence demanded a conclusion that defendant United States conformed to the standard of care required when visitors entered the premises. The plaintiff introduced no evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge of any problem with water on the floor or the brightness of the lights in the bathroom where the plaintiff fell, and the plaintiff failed to show constructive knowledge because the alleged yellowish substance was not on the floor near the toilet long enough for the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to have discovered the substance, the defendant's reasonable inspection procedure would have negated any constructive knowledge imputed to the defendant, and the substantial weight of credible evidence required a conclusion that the lighting was more than bright enough to meet the standard of care. Tobar v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2009).

Trial court erred in denying an employer's motion for summary judgment in a guest's action to recover damages for injuries the guest sustained when an employee and an unidentified person assaulted the guest at a private party because the guest failed to come forward with evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer had knowledge of circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to anticipate a criminal assault at the party and that the employer had more knowledge of the possibility of such an assault than the guest had; there was no evidence that the employer had any knowledge that would have indicated the employee or any other partygoer had a propensity for violence, and there was no evidence that the employer had knowledge that violence had broken out at any similar party or gathering in the area. B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga. App. 649, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011).

Two restaurant owners were properly granted summary judgment in a suit based on O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 after an invitee was physically attacked by two sons of one of the owners as the owners could not have reasonably foreseen or prevented the attack since there had been no previous attacks and neither had knowledge of the attack to have reasonably foreseen or prevented the attack. Carter v. Riggins, 323 Ga. App. 747, 748 S.E.2d 117 (2013).

In a negligence action against the hospital based on the plaintiff's fall in the hospital's visitor parking deck, the hospital's motion for summary judgment was improperly denied because the knowledge of the generally prevailing hazardous snow and ice conditions was not sufficient to establish actual or constructive knowledge by the hospital or the plaintiff of the specific invisible ice hazard on the upper deck which caused the slip and fall; there was no evidence that the hospital had actual knowledge of the invisible ice hazard on the upper deck; and constructive knowledge of the hazard could not be inferred based on the lack of a reasonable inspection procedure as the hospital had round the clock patrols to look for snow and ice. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Hall, 344 Ga. App. 1, 806 S.E.2d 669 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0577, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 426 (Ga. 2018).

In a slip-and-fall case, the company's motion for summary judgment was improperly denied because there was no evidence that the company had actual knowledge of the gas spill; and the plaintiff did not show that the company had constructive knowledge of the spill as the owner's view of the spill was blocked by various vehicles; the substance was on the ground for 20 seconds at most, and only 5 or 10 seconds by the plaintiff's own estimation, when the plaintiff fell; the plaintiff conceded that there was nothing the owner could have done to prevent the plaintiff's fall; there was no evidence that the gas pump or nozzle was defective; and the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the spill. Keisha, LLC v. Dundon, 344 Ga. App. 278, 809 S.E.2d 835 (2018).

Summary judgment for a restaurant in a slip and fall case was proper and was affirmed since there was no showing that the restaurant had actual or constructive knowledge of the grease which allegedly caused the slip and fall that was superior to that of the injured person; an inspection by the restaurant manager only 5 to 10 minutes before the incident was sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the restaurant exercised ordinary care under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to inspect the premises and keep safe. Markham v. Schuster's Enters., Inc., 268 Ga. App. 313, 601 S.E.2d 712 (2004).

In a case brought by an injured person against a restaurant, seeking damages arising from the injured person's slip and fall in a restroom in the restaurant, summary judgment for the restaurant was reversed; the restaurant failed to show that the restaurant lacked superior knowledge of the water condition in the restroom since the restaurant knew that a toilet in an adjacent restroom had overflown onto the floor, a restaurant employee had pushed water from the adjoining restroom into the restroom at issue, the restaurant was notified by the injured person's sister that there was water everywhere, the sister's warning to the injured person stopped short of expressly extending to the inside of the restroom, and there was no warning cone placed at either the door of or inside the restroom in question. Belcher v. Ky. Fried Chicken Corp., 266 Ga. App. 556, 597 S.E.2d 604 (2004).

Rules governing land proprietor's duty to an invitee presuppose that possessor knows of condition and has no reason to believe that the proprietor's invitees will discover the condition or realize the risk involved therein. Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949); Rogers v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 89 Ga. App. 903, 81 S.E.2d 721 (1954); Jones v. West End Theatre Co., 94 Ga. App. 299, 94 S.E.2d 135 (1956); Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970); Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977); Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981).

The liability of a proprietor which results from failure to keep the premises safe always depends on notice of the danger except when notice is presumed, as in cases of defective construction. Veterans Org. of Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., Inc. v. Potter, 111 Ga. App. 201, 141 S.E.2d 230 (1965).

Notice may be actual or constructive, but, if the latter, it must be shown to have existed for a length of time, or under such circumstances as to put the owner of the building on notice before the owner will be liable for resulting injuries. Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S.E.2d 651 (1963).

When the defendant owes to the plaintiff a duty to exercise care to avoid injuring the plaintiff, the defendant will be charged with constructive knowledge of the existence of a defect or of a defective condition existing on the premises within the defendant's control which proximately causes the plaintiff's injuries. Rockmart Bank v. Hall, 114 Ga. App. 284, 151 S.E.2d 232 (1966).

Constructive knowledge may be based on a showing that a proprietor failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and keeping the proprietor's premises safe over a reasonable period of time, during which a dangerous condition was allowed to exist. Dillon v. Grand Union Co., 167 Ga. App. 381, 306 S.E.2d 670 (1983).

- Constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition may be based either on evidence that the dangerous condition lasted so long that the defendant should have discovered the condition, or on evidence that an employee of the defendant was in the immediate vicinity and could have easily seen the problem. Herrin v. Peeches Neighborhood Grill & Bar, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 528, 509 S.E.2d 103 (1998).

Summary judgment was properly granted because the victim failed to show that the restaurant had constructive knowledge of any allegedly inadequate lighting. The victim deposed that the victim could not recall the lighting conditions in the parking lot, whereas the restaurant managers testified that the lights were working on the night in question as indicated in daily maintenance logs. Bonner v. Southern Rest. Group, Inc., 271 Ga. App. 497, 610 S.E.2d 129 (2005).

In a slip and fall case filed by a retailer's patron alleging a breach of the retailer's duty to keep the retailer's premises reasonably safe, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the retailer on the issue of whether the retailer's nearby employees were in a position to discover the hazard on which the patron slipped, specifically a grape on the floor; however, in the absence of clear evidence of how long the grape was present on the floor, and in the absence of evidence that the retailer actually carried out the retailer's inspection procedures, the retailer could not show as a matter of law that the retailer lacked constructive knowledge of the hazard which caused the patron's fall. Blocker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 588, 651 S.E.2d 845 (2007).

There are two different classes of cases which may be based on constructive knowledge. The first is that type where liability of the owner is based on the fact that an employee of the owner was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition and could have easily seen the substance and removed the hazard. The second type of case is that based on the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and keeping the premises in safe condition, which requires that the defendant had been afforded a reasonable time within which to inspect and remove the hazard. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976).

In case of defective construction, notice to landlord or occupier is conclusively presumed. Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum, 51 Ga. App. 1, 179 S.E. 415 (1935).

- When evidence of a prior similar accident tends to show the condition and knowledge of that condition, the evidence is admissible; all that is required is that the prior accident be sufficient to attract the owner's attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated accident. Pembrook Mgt., Inc. v. Cossaboon, 157 Ga. App. 675, 278 S.E.2d 100 (1981).

- An owner or occupier of land has a duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 with regard to the approach to the owner's or occupier's premises circumscribed by the owner's or occupier's right in the approach. Todd v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 258 Ga. 194, 366 S.E.2d 674 (1988).

If the owner's right in the approach is the fee, the owner's duty is the exercise of due care by one who has the rights of an owner of a fee. The owner has the widest latitude in the use of the approach and must exercise due care within that framework to keep the approach safe. Todd v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 258 Ga. 194, 366 S.E.2d 674 (1988).

If the owner's right in the approach is an easement, the owner's duty is to use due care towards the invitees in the exercise of the owner's rights under the easement. The owner has a more limited framework than the owner of a fee. The owner's duty does not require the owner to do things not permitted under the easement. Todd v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 258 Ga. 194, 366 S.E.2d 674 (1988).

If the approach is a public way, the owner's duty is to exercise due care within the confines of the owner's right in the public way. The owner's rights in the public way may be quite limited but nonetheless exist. Todd v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 258 Ga. 194, 366 S.E.2d 674 (1988).

The word "approaches" is construed to mean that property directly contiguous, adjacent to, and touching those entryways to premises under the control of an owner or occupier of land, through which the owner or occupier, by express or implied invitation, has induced or led others to come upon the owner's or occupier's premises for any lawful purpose, and through which such owner or occupier could foresee a reasonable invitee would find it necessary or convenient to traverse while entering or exiting in the course of the business for which the invitation was extended. By "contiguous, adjacent to, and touching," the legislature meant property within the last few steps taken by invitees, as opposed to "mere pedestrians," as they enter or exit the premises. Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484, 436 S.E.2d 196 (1993).

Under certain circumstances, noncontiguous property can be deemed an "approach" because the landowner extended the approach to the landowner's premises by some positive action on the landowner's part, such as constructing a sidewalk, ramp, or other direct approach; such an exception is based on the fact that the owner or occupier of land, for the owner's or occupier's own particular benefit, has affirmatively exerted control over a public way or another's property. Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484, 436 S.E.2d 196 (1993).

Invitee, who was injured in a fall on rocks placed along the shoreline approximately 196 feet away from premises controlled by a motel, was not injured on an "approach" to the motel's premises so as to impose on the motel any duty to exercise ordinary care on the invitee's behalf. Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484, 436 S.E.2d 196 (1993).

When the portion of a grass strip where the plaintiff fell was not contiguous and was more than a few steps from the hotel, the property did not meet the definition of "approach". Rischack v. City of Perry, 223 Ga. App. 856, 479 S.E.2d 163 (1996).

A resort was not liable to two injured guests in a premises liability action, and therefore was granted summary judgment since the stairs from which the guests fell leading to a beach area were not owned by the resort, and the guests failed to show that the steps were part of the approach to the resort or in any manner maintained by the resort. Harris v. Inn of Lake City, 285 Ga. App. 521, 647 S.E.2d 277 (2007).

Because the trial court correctly determined that the parking lot in which a customer fell was owned and maintained by the grocery store's landlord, not by the grocery store, and was not an "approach" to the premises for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, the grocery store was properly granted summary judgment as to the issue of liability in a customer's personal injury suit filed against the store. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 284 Ga. App. 488, 644 S.E.2d 316 (2007).

Bus stop where the amusement park customer was attacked was located on an approach to the amusement park's premises because the park took positive steps to exert control over that area, invited the park's customers to use the bus stop, and appropriated the bus stop solely for the park's benefit. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P. v. Martin, 335 Ga. App. 350, 780 S.E.2d 796 (2015).

- In a personal injury action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the occupier of the property because the alleged hazard the walkway presented was obvious and, thus, avoidable by the customer in the exercise of reasonable care. The customer's deposition testimony showed that the customer observed the transition between the parking lot and the walkway and it appeared to the customer to be flat and nothing obstructed the customer's view of the area. D'Elia v. Phillips Edison & Co., 354 Ga. App. 696, 839 S.E.2d 721 (2020).

- Because the record was devoid of any evidence to show that a handicap ramp was improperly designed or constructed, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, a company had no duty to an invitee; consequently, the company was entitled to summary judgment in the invitee's action for slip and fall damages. Gibson v. Symbion, Inc., 277 Ga. App. 721, 627 S.E.2d 84 (2006).

- In a slip and fall case, summary judgment was properly granted to the defendant as there was no evidence that the rainwater hazard on the defendant's premises created an unreasonable risk of harm because the plaintiff slipped and fell in rainwater on the floor of the parking deck in a location where the plaintiff should have reasonably expected to find rainwater present; the plaintiff produced no evidence that the accumulation of rainwater in that area was unusual, abnormal, or unexpected given the location of the walkway and the weather conditions; and the defendant produced evidence that no unusual puddling or accumulation of water occurred in the parking deck, which was constructed with a slope to promote drainage and prevent puddling. Diaz v. MARTA, 341 Ga. App. 1, 798 S.E.2d 731 (2017).

- In a slip and fall case, the evidence was plain, palpable, and undisputed that the plaintiff had knowledge of the hazard, and thus the defendant was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff testified that the plaintiff saw the employee cleaning another section of the floor and saw a "wet floor" sign as the plaintiff exited the escalator; contemporaneous photos of the area showed a wet floor sign in the vicinity of the plaintiff's fall; and the plaintiff testified that the plaintiff was looking straight ahead as the plaintiff walked down the hall, the lighting was fine, and nothing obscured the plaintiff's vision. Allen v. ABM Aviation, Inc., Ga. App. , S.E.2d (July 31, 2020).

Evidence of a prior substantially similar incident is admissible to show the existence of a dangerous condition and knowledge of that condition so long as the prior incident was sufficient to attract the owner's attention to the alleged dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident. McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590, 302 S.E.2d 130 (1983).

- Ordinarily, even when the proprietor's negligence is shown, the properietor would be insulated from liability by the intervention of an illegal act which is the proximate cause of the injury. However, the above rule has been held inapplicable if the defendant property owner had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such criminal act would be committed. Confetti Atlanta, Ltd. v. Gray, 202 Ga. App. 241, 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 905, 414 S.E.2d 265 (1992).

- Proof of two prior crimes at a location on the defendant's premises other than the asserted "dangerous" parking lot in which the plaintiff was assaulted had no relevancy or probative value with regard to the defendant's knowledge of that "dangerous condition." McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590, 302 S.E.2d 130 (1983); Nalle v. Quality Inn, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 119, 358 S.E.2d 281 (1987).

While a proprietor would ordinarily be insulated from liability arising from the proprietor's own negligence by the intervention of an illegal act which is the proximate cause of another's injury, this exception is inapplicable if the defendant-proprietor had reasonable grounds for apprehending that a criminal act would be committed. Arnold v. Athens Newspapers, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 735, 327 S.E.2d 845 (1985); Donaldson v. Olympic Health Spa, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 258, 333 S.E.2d 98 (1985).

If the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, the proprietor then has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous characters. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

- Evidence was sufficient to give rise to a triable issue as to whether a restaurant proprietor had a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard the proprietor's patrons against the risk posed by criminal activity since the proprietor knew about a purse snatching in the proprietor's parking lot and may have known that the proprietor's business was located in a "high crime" area. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

There was no proof of lack of ordinary care in failing to take proper steps to prevent criminal acts since grocery store was maintained in a manner no different or less than that used by other stores, particularly in regard to the lack of security personnel and reliance on local police authorities to handle criminal matters that did arise. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 205 Ga. App. 308, 422 S.E.2d 209 (1992).

Since there had been no prior incidents of theft of customers' belongings in grocery store, as a matter of law, the store owed no duty to plaintiff to protect the plaintiff from this risk. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 205 Ga. App. 308, 422 S.E.2d 209 (1992).

In an action against a landlord by a tenant who was attacked and raped in the garage of her apartment building, even assuming the landlord had knowledge of several prior thefts, there was no evidence that prior crimes against individuals occurred prior to the attack and the attack was not reasonably foreseeable by the landlord. Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, 222 Ga. App. 169, 474 S.E.2d 31 (1996), aff'd, 268 Ga. 604, 492 S.E.2d 865 (1997).

So long as the occurrence of prior crimes should "attract the landlord's attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident," the prior crimes were relevant to the issue of foreseeability. Woodall v. Rivermont Apts. Ltd. Partnership, 239 Ga. App. 36, 520 S.E.2d 741 (1999).

Evidence that an apartment was located in a high crime area was relevant to the question of whether the increase in property crimes at the apartment should have placed the landlord on notice of the risk of violent crime. Woodall v. Rivermont Apts. Ltd. Partnership, 239 Ga. App. 36, 520 S.E.2d 741 (1999).

When the plaintiffs were victims of burglary, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping in their apartment, prior similar occurrences did not require that, in the past, someone else was kidnapped for the purpose of forcing the opening of a safe or store; all that was required was that prior incidents be sufficient to attract the landlord's attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the incident. FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton, 240 Ga. App. 880, 524 S.E.2d 524 (1999).

- In an action for injuries resulting from a fight in the parking lot of a nightclub, since the plaintiffs were unable to show superior knowledge on behalf of the owner of the leasehold and operator of the nightclub, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Habersham Venture, Ltd. v. Breedlove, 244 Ga. App. 407, 535 S.E.2d 788 (2000).

In a customer's personal injury action, a property owner was properly granted summary judgment, as the owner had no duty to foresee any danger from its criminally damaged pay phone falling on the customer's head, the way the injury occurred was not reasonably expected, and due to the fact that such could not occur except from the customer's unexpected acts. McAfee v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 756, 642 S.E.2d 422 (2007).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, a bar owner was not liable for a customer's shooting of the bar's patrons unless this crime was foreseeable and the owner did not exercise ordinary care to prevent the crime. As crimes occurring outside the bar, and the theft of a customer's wallet inside the bar, did not give the owner notice sufficient to call the owner's attention to the danger of violence in the bar, evidence of those crimes was not admissible. Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 311, 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a restaurant with regard to a stabbed patron's premises liability claim because there was no evidence that similar criminal activities occurred at the restaurant or in the parking lot and there was no evidence that the restaurant or the employees had any previous encounters with the drunk customer such that they should have been on notice of violent tendencies. Whitfield v. Tequila Mexican Rest. No. 1, Inc., 323 Ga. App. 801, 748 S.E.2d 281 (2013).

Right to control must be established when landowner is sought to be held liable for activities of a third person on the property with permission. Title ownership alone is not sufficient. Liability depends upon control, rather than ownership, of the premises. Daniel v. Georgia Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 247 S.E.2d 139 (1978).

No liability attached even though the defendant owned the property, when exclusive, actual control and operation of the premises was exercised by another party, and the plaintiff failed to establish a breach of any duty owed by the defendant attributable to the defendant's occupation, actual control of, or operations on the property. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Newton, 157 Ga. App. 436, 278 S.E.2d 85 (1981).

Question of whether or not party is owner or occupier of land depends on whether or not party has control of property, whether or not the owner or occupier has title thereto and whether or not the owner or occupier has a superior right to possession of property which is in the possession or control of another. Scheer v. Cliatt, 133 Ga. App. 702, 212 S.E.2d 29 (1975).

One who is in complete control over either land or chattels is under same duty to protect others as is possessor of land or chattels; the custodian in complete charge is not excused from liability by the fact that the custodian is acting for the benefit of another, but is subject to the same liability and has the same immunities as the possessor. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).

Whether particular appurtenance or instrumentality of property is under control of owner or occupant is usually a question of fact. Scheer v. Cliatt, 133 Ga. App. 702, 212 S.E.2d 29 (1975); Food Giant, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 183 Ga. App. 465, 359 S.E.2d 223 (1987).

- In a co-ownership situation where an owner does not actually control the activities of the co-owner/occupier, the right to control evidenced by bare record title ownership is sufficient to establish liability for the occupier's conduct. Daniel v. Georgia Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 247 S.E.2d 139 (1978).

- In a premises liability action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a participant in a contest held by a licensee, without considering the question of whether the participant assumed the risk of falling by participating in a jump-rope in a suit and dress shoes, as that participant failed to show that the licensee had control over the condition of the premises where the contest was held, and had superior knowledge of the hazard or defect which allegedly caused the participant's injuries. Dixon v. Infinity Broad. East, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 71, 656 S.E.2d 211 (2007).

Owner and occupier of premises is guilty of negligence in knowingly maintaining premises in patently defective condition. Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Ga. App. 772, 166 S.E. 64 (1932).

The proprietor must refrain from creating, maintaining, or employing in the conduct of the proprietor's business a device or instrumentality which is apt in the ordinary course of human events to injure persons lawfully coming into the proprietor's establishment. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

Ordinarily, defendant owner or proprietor would be allowed reasonable time to exercise care in inspecting and keeping premises in safe condition. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976); Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).

- It is the duty of a proprietor to protect an invitee from injury caused by the misconduct of employees, customers, and third persons if there is any reasonable apprehension of danger from the conduct of those persons or if injury could be prevented by the proprietor through the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. Confetti Atlanta, Ltd. v. Gray, 202 Ga. App. 241, 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 905, 414 S.E.2d 265 (1992).

- It is the duty of one who invites members of the general public to come to one's place of business to protect such customers or invitees from injury caused by the misconduct of one's own employees, in the conduct and scope of one's business, and from the misconduct of other persons who come upon the premises. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cox, 51 Ga. App. 880, 181 S.E. 788 (1935).

Occupier of land is not liable for injuries sustained by invitee upon premises unless dangerous condition was created by occupier or occupier's employee, or by third person, and in the latter case there is liability only after the occupier has knowledge of, or by exercise of ordinary care could have discovered, the hazardous condition, and then fails to use reasonable care to eliminate the condition. Veterans Org. of Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., Inc. v. Potter, 111 Ga. App. 201, 141 S.E.2d 230 (1965).

- An owner of premises is liable in damages to a guest when the owner has reason to anticipate the misconduct of another guest inflicting the injury but not otherwise since the owner is not the insurer of the safety of guests. Veterans Org. of Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., Inc. v. Potter, 111 Ga. App. 201, 141 S.E.2d 230 (1965).

In a premise liability action, because questions of fact remained as to whether a student was a university's invitee at the time the student was shot, on what was alleged to be the university's property at the time of the assault and, thus, whether the university owed the student a duty of ordinary care, and no evidence was presented that the student lost an "invitee" status, summary judgment in the university's favor was reversed. Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc. v. Williams, 288 Ga. App. 180, 654 S.E.2d 402 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 227 (Ga. 2008).

An occupier of land is liable for injuries sustained by an invitee upon the occupier's premises through a dangerous condition created by a third person only after the occupier has knowledge of, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have discovered, the hazardous condition, and then fails to use reasonable care to eliminate it. Bowling v. Janmar, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 53, 234 S.E.2d 849 (1977).

Knowledge by the owner or "occupier" or one's employee of the dangerous condition created by a third person is a prerequisite to recovery under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Newton, 157 Ga. App. 436, 278 S.E.2d 85 (1981).

- If the conduct of employees outside of the scope of their employment, or of third persons or customers, is such as to cause any reasonable apprehension of danger to other customers or invitees because of such conduct, it is the duty of the proprietor to interfere to prevent probable injury; and a failure so to interfere, and consequent damage, will subject such proprietor to an action for damages for such negligent failure to prevent the injury; but this duty of interference on the proprietor's part does not begin until the danger is apparent, or the circumstances are such as would put an ordinarily prudent man on notice of the probability of danger. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cox, 51 Ga. App. 880, 181 S.E. 788 (1935); Willis v. Byrd, 116 Ga. App. 555, 158 S.E.2d 458 (1967).

When a customer is on the premises by the invitation of the proprietor, and while therein lawfully engaged, it is the duty of the proprietor to protect the customer from injury caused by the misconduct, not only of the proprietor's own employees, but of other customers and third persons. Adamson v. Hand, 93 Ga. App. 5, 90 S.E.2d 669 (1955).

It is the duty of a proprietor to protect an invitee from injury caused by the misconduct of employees, customers and third persons if there is any reasonable apprehension of danger from the conduct of said persons or if injury could be prevented by the proprietor through the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. Georgia Bowling Enters., Inc. v. Robbins, 103 Ga. App. 286, 119 S.E.2d 52 (1961); Hewett v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 773, 272 S.E.2d 744 (1980).

A proprietor is bound to use reasonable care to protect invitees from injury not only from defects in the premises but also from other dangers arising from the use of the premises by the proprietor or the proprietor's licensees. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

Two patrons sued a bar owner after the patrons were shot by another customer, alleging the owner negligently failed to provide adequate security inside the bar. Defense counsel argued that as the patrons knew their assailant, their knowledge of the danger the assailant posed was greater than the owner's, but the patrons failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid the danger, and since these facts were a defense to the negligence charge, counsel's comments were proper. Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 311, 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008).

- It would impose too great a duty upon a proprietor and would make the proprietor the insurer of the safety of all patrons, which the proprietor is not, to require the proprietor at all times to have immediate knowledge of and to remove every article on which a patron might stumble and fall when the article is placed there, not by the proprietor or the proprietor's employees, but by other patrons. Hammonds v. Jackson, 132 Ga. App. 528, 208 S.E.2d 366 (1974).

- In a wrongful death case arising out of a forklift accident on a chicken farm, the farm owner was not entitled to summary judgment because, although the forklift was owned and operated by another, the owner was aware of the dangers of operating forklifts and there was no designated forklift path on the farm. Further, it was not clear that the owner had surrendered possession of the premises to the chicken company's subcontractors who had come to catch and transport the chickens. Mullinax v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 354 Ga. App. 186, 840 S.E.2d 666 (2020).

- A general contractor had a non-delegable duty to keep the premises and approaches to houses under construction safe and was liable for the acts or omissions of its independent contractors in this regard. Kaplan v. Pulte Home Corp., 245 Ga. App. 286, 537 S.E.2d 727 (2000).

- Although there was evidence that the subsidiary companies owned the project premises or had employees or agents on the premises, the trial court did not err by directing a verdict in their favor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50(a) because when a property owner or occupier surrendered temporary possession and control of the property to an independent contractor to perform work on the property, the owner/occupier was generally not liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 for injuries sustained on the property by the contractor's invitees due to unsafe working conditions on the premises which the owner/occupier had no right to control. The record showed that the subsidiary companies surrendered possession and control of the project premises to the independent contractor to perform the work as an independent contractor, that none of the defendants interfered with the independent contractor's status as an independent contractor, and that the independent contractor had the duty to keep the project premises safe for its invitees; therefore, there was no evidence that the subsidiary companies had a duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to keep the project premises safe. Ramcke v. Ga. Power Co., 306 Ga. App. 736, 703 S.E.2d 13 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0482, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 583 (Ga. 2011).

- Employer not liable for assault to employee by her boyfriend occurring in the employer's parking lot since the attack had no connection with employment and the place chosen just happened to be the employer's parking lot. Griffin v. AAA Auto Club S., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 1, 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996).

Since the attack on the plaintiff employee was not a random stranger attack but grew out of a private relationship which had no connection with the premises or employment whatsoever, the employer did not create or allow to exist an environment which placed the plaintiff at risk any more than if the employee had been at home or on the street. Johnson v. Holiday Food Stores, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 822, 520 S.E.2d 502 (1999).

- The fact that a person for whom a proprietor is not legally responsible (i.e., a visiting salesperson) might have accidentally discarded a foreign substance onto the floor of the premises removes the element of "exclusive physical control" and, therefore, renders the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable. Dillon v. Grand Union Co., 167 Ga. App. 381, 306 S.E.2d 670 (1983).

- If the resulting injury happened suddenly and without warning and the proprietor of premises could not, by the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered or prevented it, there could be no recovery. The duty of the proprietor to interfere to prevent probable injury does not begin until the danger is apparent, or the circumstances are such as would put an ordinarily prudent man on notice of the probability of danger. Lincoln v. Wilcox, 111 Ga. App. 365, 141 S.E.2d 765 (1965).

Owner or occupier breaches no duty to invitee if by exercising ordinary care the owner or occupier could not have discovered and prevented the condition or circumstances that proximately caused the injury. Rhodes v. B.C. Moore & Sons, 153 Ga. App. 106, 264 S.E.2d 500 (1980).

The general rule in such cases is not whether injuries result or the consequences were possible, but whether the injuries were probable, that is, likely to occur according to the usual experience of persons. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

Proprietor is under no duty to continuously patrol premises in absence of facts showing that premises are unusually dangerous. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).

- Cases holding that the standard of care owed an invitee injured in the use of an elevator is one of extraordinary diligence rather than ordinary care involve mechanical failure or improper use of the elevator and have no application when the elevator was merely the situs of a slip and fall. Hughes v. Hospital Auth., 165 Ga. App. 530, 301 S.E.2d 695 (1983).

- Disputed facts regarding whether the storage facility owner fulfilled the owner's duty of exercising ordinary care in keeping the owner's approaches safe by providing a walk board with no means of securing the board to a loading dock or moving van precluded summary judgment. McGinnis v. Admiral Moving & Storage Co., 223 Ga. App. 410, 477 S.E.2d 841 (1996).

- Trial court erred in granting an electric company's motion for summary judgment in a visitor's personal injury action alleging that the company negligently maintained and inspected electrical wire the company had installed on private property because the jury had to decide whether the visitor was a licensee or an invitee and then consider the company's liability as occupier of the premises under the appropriate premises liability standard; a jury could find that the visitor was an invitee rather than a licensee because there was evidence that the visitor was looking at real property that was being offered for sale, that the property owner received the benefit of a potential sale from the visit to the property, but there was also evidence that the visitor was a licensee. McGarity v. Hart Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 307 Ga. App. 739, 706 S.E.2d 676 (2011).

- Questions of whether or not an owner breached the owner's duty of care to invitees, and whether an invitee exercised reasonable care for the invitee's own safety are normally for a jury, except in plain, palpable, and undisputed cases when reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusion to be reached. Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981).

- A charge to the jury to the effect that such a landowner is under the duty to see that the premises are "in such condition that the person invited may approach and remain thereon in safety," was error, in that the court, instead of charging, according to the true rule, that the duty of the landowner is to keep the landowner's premises safe, placed upon the landowner the heavier burden of seeing that the person on the premises remained there in safety. Southern Ry. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134 S.E. 824 (1926).

There is a clear distinction between duty owing to invitee and duty owing to a mere licensee; an owner owes to a licensee no duty as to the condition of the premises, unless imposed by statute, save that the owner should not knowingly let the licensee run upon a hidden peril, or willfully cause the licensee harm; while to one invited the owner is under obligation for reasonable security for the purposes of the invitation. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934); Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1939).

Duty of ordinary care that patron owes to invitees is same duty of ordinary care in keeping the premises safe which master owes to the servant; in either case, two elements must exist in order to merit recovery, fault on the part of the owner, and ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee. Rogers v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 89 Ga. App. 903, 81 S.E.2d 721 (1954); Braun v. Wright, 100 Ga. App. 295, 111 S.E.2d 100 (1959).

Person is required to exercise ordinary care to keep premises safe and free from hidden dangers with respect to invitee. Young v. Towles, 113 Ga. App. 471, 148 S.E.2d 455 (1966).

Duty to invitee is to exercise ordinary care to keep premises safe, not reasonably safe. Western & A.R.R. v. Hetzel, 38 Ga. App. 556, 144 S.E. 506 (1928); Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 169 Ga. 246, 149 S.E. 876 (1929).

- There is a wide difference between exercising ordinary care to keep the premises safe and exercising such care to keep the premises reasonably safe. Massey v. Georgia Power Co., 85 Ga. App. 593, 69 S.E.2d 824 (1952).

The precise legal intent of term "ordinary care" must depend upon circumstances of each individual case. It is a relative and not an absolute term. Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972).

What ordinary care is must be determined in part by the standards of care generally regarded as adequate in similar situations. Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 507, 148 S.E.2d 451 (1966).

The actual result of an act or omission is not controlling in determining whether or not it was negligent, nor is the duty of the person doing or omitting to do an act to be estimated by what, after an injury has occurred, then first appears to be a proper precaution, but the question of negligence must be determined according to what should reasonably have been anticipated, in the exercise of ordinary care, as likely to happen. Roberts v. Wicker, 213 Ga. 352, 99 S.E.2d 84 (1957); Savannah E. Side Corp. v. Robinson, 102 Ga. App. 426, 116 S.E.2d 613 (1960).

An ordinary care standard is whether a reasonably prudent person at the time and in the circumstances would have foreseen danger and what the person reasonably would have done to prevent injury; negligence is defective foresight judged by this standard rather than by hindsight of what actually happened and the effectiveness of the action taken. Smith v. Poteet, 127 Ga. App. 735, 195 S.E.2d 213 (1972); Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

The standard of care imposed by this section upon the owner or occupier of premises is measured by what the prudent man would do under the circumstances, and that whether in terms of "reasonable care," or "ordinary care," in keeping the premises "safe" or "reasonably safe" it is the same. Hammonds v. Jackson, 132 Ga. App. 528, 208 S.E.2d 366 (1974).

- Ordinary care and diligence, as applied to the keeping of premises in safe condition, is a very elastic term, varying the quantum of actual caution to be exercised according to the nature of the use to which the property is devoted. Townley v. Rich's, Inc., 84 Ga. App. 772, 67 S.E.2d 403 (1951); Jones v. Hunter, 94 Ga. App. 316, 94 S.E.2d 384 (1956); Smith v. Poteet, 127 Ga. App. 735, 195 S.E.2d 213 (1972).

Mere omission to act when there is a duty to act will amount to actionable negligence as to one to whom duty is due. However, no duty to act arises until one has notice, actual or constructive, that failure to so act will probably result in injury to another. Norris v. Macon Term. Co., 58 Ga. App. 313, 198 S.E. 272 (1938).

Landowner is not an insurer of an invitee's safety, because the law only requires such diligence toward making the premises safe as the ordinarily prudent person in such matters is accustomed to use. Barksdale v. Nuwar, 203 Ga. App. 184, 416 S.E.2d 546 (1992).

Exercise of ordinary care by owner to keep premises safe for invitees includes duty to anticipate negligence of others which is usual or likely to happen. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976); Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

- When there is nothing in the evidence to indicate the propriety or the necessity of making an inspection to ascertain the possible or probable existence of any defects, ordinary diligence does not require an inspection when there is no reason to think an inspection is necessary. Roberts v. Wicker, 213 Ga. 352, 99 S.E.2d 84 (1957); McLaury v. McGregor, 110 Ga. App. 679, 139 S.E.2d 444 (1964); Hood v. McCall Clinic, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 314, 243 S.E.2d 571 (1978).

One is not chargeable with negligence in failing to discover and remedy danger which one would not have discovered by exercise of ordinary care, or which has not existed for a sufficient time to charge one with the duty of discovering it. Neither is a person bound to foresee and guard against casualties which are not reasonably to be expected, which would not occur save under exceptional circumstances, or which result from an unexpected act of the person injured. McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern, 65 Ga. App. 334, 15 S.E.2d 797 (1941); Savannah E. Side Corp. v. Robinson, 102 Ga. App. 426, 116 S.E.2d 613 (1960).

It is usually willful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to person who is actually known to be, or reasonably expected to be, within the range of a dangerous act being done. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934); Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936).

- The law demands of the owner of premises that the owner neither create upon the property nor permit after reasonable opportunity to learn of its existence a structural condition of static danger which with foreseeable probability may be activated by the negligence of another and imperil persons lawfully upon the property. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

Because an injured person provided no evidence, in responding to a summary judgment motion, that an ordinarily prudent operator of an outdoor establishment would have applied a urethane coating to wood handrails installed outside and would not have pressure washed them, summary judgment in favor of a park, an authority, and a city was proper in the injured person's claim seeking damages for getting a splinter from a bridge handrail. Hamblin v. City of Albany, 272 Ga. App. 246, 612 S.E.2d 69 (2005).

- When a dangerous or hazardous condition is created by the owner or occupier of the premises, allegations showing that the owner or occupier knew or could have known or have discovered such dangerous or hazardous condition are not required. Kroger Co. v. Anderson, 110 Ga. App. 696, 140 S.E.2d 108 (1964).

In order to state a cause of action in a case when the plaintiff alleges that due to an act of negligence by the defendant as the plaintiff slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the defendant's floor, the plaintiff must show: (1) that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance; and (2) that the plaintiff was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).

- It is a question of fact for the jury, whether an owner exercised ordinary care in constructing the premises, and in keeping in a safe condition. Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S.E. 388 (1925).

It is ordinarily a question of fact for a jury whether an owner or occupier of premises has exercised the proper care and diligence in keeping the premises safe for those invited thereon. Lake v. Cameron, 64 Ga. App. 501, 13 S.E.2d 856 (1941); DeKalb County Hosp. Auth. v. Theofanidis, 157 Ga. App. 811, 278 S.E.2d 712 (1981).

The plaintiff, being an invitee, because of mutuality of interest, was due ordinary care and it is for the jury to determine the issues of negligence. Martin v. Henson, 95 Ga. App. 715, 99 S.E.2d 251 (1957).

Ordinarily, whether the owner or occupant of land exercises ordinary care in keeping premises in a safe condition, upon which an invitee goes and is injured, whether the invitee could have avoided injury in the exercise of ordinary care, or whether both were negligent in some degree, as the proximate cause of an injury, or the absence of any negligence, are questions for jury determination, which the court will not decide as a matter of law on demurrer except as to acts declared by law to be negligence, or palpable and indisputable cases when reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusion to be reached. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Donovan, 115 Ga. App. 330, 154 S.E.2d 659 (1967).

An owner of premises must, as to invitees, exercise ordinary care to keep premises safe, not reasonably safe. When an invitee is injured on the premises, the question of negligence, whose negligence and what negligence is for the jury to determine under all the facts and circumstances of the case. Simpson v. Dotson, 133 Ga. App. 120, 210 S.E.2d 240 (1974).

It is well-settled law that questions of negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and the exercise of ordinary care for one's protection ordinarily are to be decided by a jury, and a court should not decide them except in plain and indisputable cases. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

Question of reasonable foreseeability and statutory duty imposed by this section to exercise ordinary care to protect invitees, is for a jury's determination rather than summary adjudication by the courts when an intervening criminal act if the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such criminal act would be committed. Lay v. Munford, Inc., 235 Ga. 340, 219 S.E.2d 416 (1975).

When the defective condition is one of such character that reasonable and prudent men may reasonably differ as to whether an accident could or should have been reasonably anticipated from its existence or not, then the case is generally one for the jury; but when the defect, if any, was so slight that no careful or prudent man would reasonably anticipate any danger from its existence, but still an accident happened which could have been guarded against by the exercise of extraordinary care and foresight, the question of the defendant's responsibility is one of the law. McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern, 65 Ga. App. 334, 15 S.E.2d 797 (1941); Roberts v. Wicker, 213 Ga. 352, 99 S.E.2d 84 (1957); Griffith v. Morgan, 117 Ga. App. 216, 160 S.E.2d 420 (1968).

A number of factors chargeable to defendant, none of which of itself reaches negligence threshold, may in their totality make jury question on whether a defect results which should have been foreseen by the owner or occupier of the premises as posing a hazard to an invitee thereon. Lumbus v. D.L. Claborn Buick-Opel, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 807, 266 S.E.2d 526 (1980).

- When an owner of land fails to comply with this section, and an invitee is injured by a patent defect, contributory negligence of the injured person cannot be implied as a matter of law. Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S.E. 388 (1925).

There is a greater duty owed to small children lawfully upon premises than to older persons. Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944).

- A well-defined distinction runs through the cases, between injuries caused by a dangerous statical condition and premises where dangerous active operations are being carried on, a much higher degree of care is necessary in protecting children in the latter case than in the former. Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936).

"Due care" or "ordinary care" to avoid injury to another may involve a greater duty owed to small children lawfully upon premises than to older persons, and accordingly the degree of care may vary with the capacity of the invitee. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

The degree of care owed to a child by a landlord with regard to common areas over which the landlord has retained control may be greater than that which would be owed to an adult under the same circumstances. Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga. App. 392, 336 S.E.2d 287 (1985), cert. vacated sub nom. Pine Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. Lidster, 255 Ga. 405, 341 S.E.2d 8 (1986).

With regard to minor invitees, the degree of care owed is proportioned to their ability to foresee and avoid perils which may be encountered; therefore, the degree of care owned a minor in a particular set of circumstances may be greater than that which would be owed an adult. Massey v. Hilton Heights Park, 121 Ga. App. 214, 173 S.E.2d 396 (1970).

One using or handling any instrumentality of an unusual and dangerous character is bound to take exceptional precautions to prevent injury thereby, and children of tender years and youthful persons generally are entitled to a degree of care proportioned to their ability to foresee and void the perils that may be thus encountered; therefore, the fact that the defendant's servants might or might not have intended to return to the place of construction when dynamite caps were left unguarded and exposed at some short or indefinite time thereafter would not relieve the defendant from taking the necessary and proper precautions during the interval, however short, during which the operatives were in fact absent. Lee v. Georgia Forest Prods. Co., 44 Ga. App. 850, 163 S.E. 267 (1932).

There is duty to keep turntable fastened so that child attracted thereto will not be injured. Ferguson v. Columbus & Rome Ry., 75 Ga. 637 (1885).

Doctrine of turntable cases does not apply to moving car upon track of railroad company. Underwood v. Western & A.R.R., 105 Ga. 48, 31 S.E. 123 (1898).

- When there is no negligence involved in the keeping and maintaining of the premises, and no actual notice of the peril of the child, there is no absolute duty to guard against every possible way in which a child might escape from the normal use of the premises and, by climbing upon portions thereof not intended for such use places oneself in danger of injury by falling. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

While the owner of premises may owe more duty to a child than to an adult coming upon the owner's premises by implied invitation, yet the owner is not bound to guard every stairway, cellarway, retaining wall, shed, tree, and open window on the owner's premises, so that such child cannot climb to a precipitous place and fall off. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

Owner is not insurer of safety of child, and accordingly is not liable for injuries resulting solely from the conduct of the child in misusing otherwise safe premises, which misuse by the child was unknown to the owner. McLaury v. McGregor, 110 Ga. App. 679, 139 S.E.2d 444 (1964); Lincoln v. Wilcox, 111 Ga. App. 365, 141 S.E.2d 765 (1965).

Turntable doctrine does not permit recovery from owner of vacant house when a child was injured entering therein. O'Connor v. Bruckner, 117 Ga. 451, 43 S.E. 731 (1903).

- A child who accompanies a parent customer into a store, or similar establishment does not come within the definition of a licensee contained in former Code 1933, § 105-402 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2), for the child does not enter such establishment "merely for his own interest, convenience or gratification," but the child's presence is essential and vital to the business conducted on the premises by the owner or proprietor; the child has the status of an invitee to whom the law requires ordinary care to be accorded. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

- When the defendant mill maintained on its premises houses for its employees, in vicinity of which a reservoir was located, and incident to draining such reservoir for sanitary purposes invited employees and their children to catch and remove fish and turtles found therein, providing a ladder for the purpose, the child of an employee who was killed by falling into an open well three feet from the ladder was an invitee upon the premises. Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944).

- In a parent's suit as a next friend to the parent's daughter, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to a retailer and its employees on the parent's claim of tortious misconduct, as no evidence was presented that the child victim was the retailer's business invitee, but was merely a licensee under both O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-1 and51-3-2, as the child merely entered the business with the sole intent to use the restroom; however, summary judgment was properly denied as to the invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, false arrest, and damages claims filed by the parent against the defendants. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the property owners in a negligence claim because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the property owners violated applicable building codes in the construction of their deck, whether they exercised ordinary care in preventing injury to their guests from a defect in the deck or showed such indifference to the consequences as to justify a finding of wantonness, and whether an injured child had equal knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for the child's own safety. Hicks v. Walker, 262 Ga. App. 216, 585 S.E.2d 83 (2003).

Carrier owes duty of ordinary care with respect to member of public entering upon premises for purpose of doing business with the carrier, including persons coming to meet arriving passengers. Hightower v. City Council, 124 Ga. App. 537, 184 S.E.2d 678 (1971).

Carrier's duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish safe station facilities is not to be confused with carrier's duty to use extraordinary care in receiving, transporting and discharging its passengers. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

Relationship of carrier and passenger terminates when passenger has been safely discharged and when the carrier is no longer bound to exercise extraordinary care for the passenger's safety, but is bound to use only the same degree of care for the passenger's safety as it would for the safety of any other member of the public upon its premises by invitation, express or implied. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

Being no longer restricted to a designated route from the airplane on which one had been traveling, the individual was no longer a passenger when the individual stumbled over a low wall between the parking lot and the waiting area of the landing field and sustained the individual's injuries. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

Duty of carrier by air in respect to maintenance of its premises for use of arriving or departing passengers is same as that of any owner or occupier of land to those whom one induces, by express or implied invitation, to enter one's premises for lawful purposes, and that duty is to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

Duty of carrier to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises safe exists not only with respect to those persons being received or who have been discharged as passengers, but also with respect to any member of the public entering such premises for the purposes of doing business with the carrier, including even persons coming to meet arriving passengers. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

- The liability under this section of a railroad company as the owner or occupier of land, engaged in business, is the same as that of any person. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Hunter, 128 Ga. 600, 58 S.E. 154 (1907).

Railroad must exercise reasonable care to make right of way safe. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lawley, 33 Ga. App. 375, 126 S.E. 273, cert. denied, 33 Ga. App. 828 (1925).

Person who goes to railroad station to meet and look after incoming passenger occupies status of invitee. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Hyde, 45 Ga. App. 548, 165 S.E. 466 (1932).

- A servant of a patron of a railroad who is on the premises of the railroad in connection with the servant's employment by the patron, waiting to be transported to a place where the servant would actually engage in the duties of the servant's employment, the servant's presence on the premises being incidental to the servant's employment and having been brought about by the servant's employer, is an invitee on the premises, and under the admissions in the pleadings and the evidence in this case, the plaintiff was an invitee on the premises of the defendant. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Dupriest, 81 Ga. App. 773, 59 S.E.2d 767 (1950).

- When a person enters upon the premises of a railroad company to meet a train in order to see "a party" for the purpose of trying to procure through that person employment in which the railroad company was in no wise interested or concerned, the presence of the person so entering upon the premises is purely for the person's own benefit and interest, and the person is a mere licensee, and not an invitee. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Hyde, 45 Ga. App. 548, 165 S.E. 466 (1932).

- When a stranger passing along the street on a rainy night might, while in the exercise of ordinary care, have believed that a privately owned roadway or driveway was but a continuation of the public street, and thus have been reasonably misled into driving thereupon in an effort to cross a railroad, there was what amounted to an implied invitation on the part of the defendant roadway owner to enter upon its premises. Williamson v. Southern Ry., 42 Ga. App. 9, 155 S.E. 113 (1930).

Ordinarily, only duty owing by a railway company to a trespasser upon or about the company's property is not wantonly or willfully to injure the trespasser after the trespasser's presence has been discovered. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Stamps, 48 Ga. App. 309, 172 S.E. 806 (1934).

After presence of trespasser upon track of defendant in front of its approaching train is discovered, it becomes the duty the trespasser of the agents in charge the trespasser's of the train to give him some warning of the trespasser's dangerous position. Fox v. Pollard, 52 Ga. App. 545, 183 S.E. 854 (1936).

Operator of retail mercantile establishment owes duty to those who come to operator's store to trade of using care and caution necessary to keep the store premises and approaches in a safe condition. Parsons v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 69 Ga. App. 11, 24 S.E.2d 717 (1943).

When a person maintains a place of business at which the person sells goods or dispenses services to those who comply with the person's requirements as to compensation therefor, such person owes a duty, to those coming to the premises to trade with the person, of using the care and caution necessary to keep the premises and approaches thereto in a safe condition. Lake v. Cameron, 64 Ga. App. 501, 13 S.E.2d 856 (1941).

When a person maintains a place of business at which the person sells goods or dispenses services, such person owes a duty to those coming to the premises to trade with the person of using ordinary care and caution to keep the premises in a safe condition, and in the exercise of this duty, the merchandise and fixtures with which such person conducts the person's business, must not be so placed as to threaten injury to those visiting the store who are in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety. Parsons, Inc. v. Youngblood, 105 Ga. App. 583, 125 S.E.2d 518 (1962); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Donovan, 115 Ga. App. 330, 154 S.E.2d 659 (1967); Cox v. K-Mart Enters. of Ga., Inc., 136 Ga. App. 453, 221 S.E.2d 661 (1975), later appeal, 143 Ga. App. 30, 237 S.E.2d 432 (1977).

A storekeeper who balances merchandise on display in a precarious manner (or allows another to so arrange a display) should anticipate that slight force, not sufficient ordinarily to suggest to the actor who does not know of the peril that injury will result, may be sufficient to cause injury, and the storekeeper is not relieved of the consequences of this negligence by an intervening act which one should have anticipated. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Donovan, 115 Ga. App. 330, 154 S.E.2d 659 (1967).

The owner of any business establishment owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the approaches and passages which the owner expects and invites the customers to traverse free of objects and conditions of which the owner has knowledge and which might foreseeably cause injury. Brown v. Iocovozzi, 117 Ga. App. 693, 161 S.E.2d 385 (1968).

- Certainly, the defendants had "some interest" in the customer's visit since the defendants were owners of a shopping center and success of the defendants' shopping center venture depended on whether their tenants do a satisfactory volume of business. A customer is an invitee, and owners owe the customer the duty of using ordinary care not to injure the customer in the place where invited. Hicks v. M.H.A., Inc., 107 Ga. App. 290, 129 S.E.2d 817 (1963).

Merchant does not become insurer of customer's safety; merchant is required only to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring the customer. King Hdwe. Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 84 S.E.2d 686 (1954).

Merchant is not insurer of safety of merchant's customers, but the law requires such diligence toward making the premises safe as the ordinarily prudent businessman in such matters is accustomed to use. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976).

Store proprietor to which prospective customers are invited is not insurer of their safety while in store, but owes to the customers merely the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the store in a safe condition for their proper use. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Greer, 68 Ga. App. 583, 23 S.E.2d 484 (1942).

Storekeeper is not insurer of safety of its customers, the duty imposed upon it under the law being to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. McMullan v. Kroger Co., 84 Ga. App. 195, 65 S.E.2d 420 (1951).

Proprietor of premises is not insurer of safety of persons thereon against all acts of coinvitees; and when the proprietor has used ordinary care to keep the premises safe, the proprietor not guilty of negligence. Watson v. McCrory Stores, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 516, 103 S.E.2d 648 (1958); Lincoln v. Wilcox, 111 Ga. App. 365, 141 S.E.2d 765 (1965); Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979).

True ground of liability is store proprietor's superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the property. Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 507, 148 S.E.2d 451 (1966); Mewborn v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 284, 346 S.E.2d 95 (1986).

- In an action by a customer against a drugstore for burns suffered when bleach spilled from a bottle as the customer removed it from a shelf, the jury was authorized to find that by placing a caustic substance contained in package without some sort of leakage protection, such as a protective wrap, at above the eye level of the average adult, the store should have anticipated that in the event of leakage, injury would result; reversing A.B.C. Drug Co. v. Monroe, 214 Ga. App. 136, 447 S.E.2d 315 (1994). Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 266 Ga. 385, 467 S.E.2d 558 (1996).

Knowledge of a puddle of water surrounded by ice, coupled with knowledge of the generally prevailing weather conditions, is knowledge of a probable danger of encountering additional ice under the surface of the water and a danger of slipping when walking thereon. Bloch v. Herman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 280, 430 S.E.2d 86 (1993).

Because no evidence was presented that a hardware store had actual knowledge that a hazard existed, summary judgment for the hardware store was proper in a claim for damages arising from an incident when a box fell on a customer at the hardware store. Green v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 277 Ga. App. 779, 627 S.E.2d 836 (2006).

- Store patron who was badly injured when the patron slipped in pooled water in the garden section of a hardware store failed to establish that a store employee who told the patron to follow the employee had necessarily diverted the patron's attention under the distraction doctrine so that the patron was excused from discovering the open and obvious water and caution signs on the floor of the garden shop. Weickert v. Home Depot U.S. A., Inc., 347 Ga. App. 889, 821 S.E.2d 110 (2018), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2019).

- Store was entitled to summary judgment on a claim by a store patron who slipped and fell on a slippery substance in the store's shopping center's common area parking lot because the parking lot was not an approach to the store premises within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and was maintained by the shopping center owner. Boyd v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 347 Ga. App. 140, 817 S.E.2d 698 (2018).

If the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, the proprietor then has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous characters. The proprietor is not the insurer of the invitee's safety, but is bound to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of which the proprietor has superior knowledge. Woods v. Kim, 262 Ga. App. 910, 429 S.E.2d 262 (1993).

- A judgment in favor of a customer in a premises liability action was upheld on appeal as the customer established that the retailer breached the duty of care owed to the customer when the customer was robbed of the customer's car and shot in the retailer's parking lot and that the retailer had foreseeable knowledge of such criminal activity. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 290 Ga. App. 541, 659 S.E.2d 905 (2008).

- In a premises liability action brought by a customer against a retailer involving an occurrence wherein the customer was carjacked and shot in the retailer's parking lot, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing into evidence prior incidents of criminal activity at the retailer's premises as, considering the location, nature, and extent of those prior criminal occurrences and their likeness to the incident involving the customer, the other occurrences were sufficiently similar. While there was no evidence of a prior incident in which the victim was shot and the victim's car was taken at gunpoint, such as what had occurred to the customer, the prior criminal occurrences did not need to be identical to the one involving the customer and there were several robberies and assaults with a deadly weapon upon the premises, as well as thefts of and from vehicles in the retailer's parking lot, which showed that it was reasonable to anticipate that an unauthorized entry into a vehicle might occur when the driver was nearby and that personal harm to the driver would result. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 290 Ga. App. 541, 659 S.E.2d 905 (2008).

- In an action for negligence against a store owner for a mugging that occurred in a vacant lot adjacent to the strip mall in which the store was located, summary judgment for the owner was erroneous, since the owner had specific knowledge of prior criminal attacks on the premises, attackers loitered on the owner's premises waiting for victims, and the attackers followed the victim from the owner's premises to the lot and assaulted the victim. Wilks v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 207 Ga. App. 842, 429 S.E.2d 322 (1993).

Premises mentioned in this section must constitute actual store building and lot of land on which it rests, which is under the actual dominion and control of the owner or occupier. Elmore of Embry Hills, Inc. v. Porcher, 124 Ga. App. 418, 183 S.E.2d 923 (1971).

- Occupant of premises, notwithstanding fact that the occupant may have turned them over to independent contractor for repair, is not necessarily thereby relieved of duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe for a person lawfully coming upon the premises. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Cain, 50 Ga. App. 629, 179 S.E. 128 (1935).

When the occupant of premises which are used by the occupant in conducting a retail store in which business is done with the public and to which customers lawfully come to trade has merely permitted the landlord to come thereon for the purpose of making repairs in the floor, and has not relinquished control of the premises, and, while the repairs are being made, permits a customer to come into the store for the purpose of trading, the occupant nevertheless owes a duty to the customer to use ordinary care to have the premises safe. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Cain, 50 Ga. App. 629, 179 S.E. 128 (1935).

Failure of shopping mall owner to seal walls of transformer room did not render the owner liable for damage to property of clothing store caused by smoke and soot from transformer room fire which escaped into storeroom. Sugrue v. Flint Elec. Membership Corp., 155 Ga. App. 481, 270 S.E.2d 921 (1980).

- Owner of premises is not under duty as reasonably prudent man to make walls airtight so that gaseous matter cannot disseminate from one room to the other. Sugrue v. Flint Elec. Membership Corp., 155 Ga. App. 481, 270 S.E.2d 921 (1980).

- Each owner or occupier is responsible for keeping sidewalk immediately in front of and adjacent to the owner's or occupier's store in safe condition, and that the responsibility for the parking area, and those stretches of pavement that are not in front of the premises of any owner or occupier, must be borne by the owner and operator of the shopping center, provided the owner or operator has retained control of the shopping center. Elmore of Embry Hills, Inc. v. Porcher, 124 Ga. App. 418, 183 S.E.2d 923 (1971).

- Because the catch basin was open and obvious, the property owners were under no duty to warn. Freyer v. Silver, 227 Ga. App. 253, 488 S.E.2d 728 (1997), aff'd, 234 Ga. App. 243, 507 S.E.2d 7 (1998).

- It is duty of occupier to use ordinary care to maintain steps in the building used by its customers in a condition reasonably safe against accidents from slipping. Scott v. Rich's, Inc., 47 Ga. App. 548, 171 S.E. 201 (1933).

If, by reason of the negligence of the owner or occupier of a building to which the public is invited, the steps are maintained in a condition unsafe to the persons using the steps, and if by reason of such defect a person lawfully in the building using the steps is injured without fault on the person's part, the occupier or owner of the building is responsible in damages therefor. Scott v. Rich's, Inc., 47 Ga. App. 548, 171 S.E. 201 (1933).

- One maintaining a defective footway, walkway, or excavation on the premises through which another falls may be held guilty of actionable negligence unless it appears for other reasons that the plaintiff cannot recover. Narjoe Timber & Supply Co. v. Hanson, 133 Ga. App. 506, 211 S.E.2d 380 (1974).

- When the pleadings and evidence before the court show that the defendant grocery store invited the plaintiff to use the ramp which had been constructed at the store's request as a facility to its business, the defendant owed the plaintiff as its business invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the ramp safe for the invitee's use. Scoggins v. Campbellton Plaza Corp., 114 Ga. App. 23, 150 S.E.2d 179 (1966).

- Store owner's negligence was question for the jury since evidence showed that the store had actual knowledge for a ten-to-fifteen minute period that an escalator on its premises was malfunctioning and failed either to correct that potentially dangerous condition by stopping the malfunctioning escalator or otherwise, in the alternative, to warn its patrons of the existence of the potentially dangerous condition. Ellis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 193 Ga. App. 797, 388 S.E.2d 920 (1989).

- A retail market may be negligent in failing to provide footmats at the door leading from a private meat-cutting area of the store to the public area. Dillon v. Grand Union Co., 167 Ga. App. 381, 306 S.E.2d 670 (1983).

- In a case in which a customer sued a store after the customer tripped on a rubber mat outside the store's entrance, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the store since genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the store lacked superior knowledge of the hazard posed by the mat that caused the customer to trip and fall. Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605, 708 S.E.2d 563 (2011).

- A customer who tripped and fell when the customer's pants cuff caught the outer corner of a store shelf was not entitled to recover against the store based on premises liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; the customer made the turn at issue many times before and did so while observing the hazard of which the customer complained, and given that the customer was able to observe the shelf corner for ten seconds before falling, the shelf corner was an open and obvious condition of which the customer had at least equal knowledge and could have avoided in the exercise of ordinary care. Wright v. K-Mart Corp., 286 Ga. App. 765, 650 S.E.2d 300 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 124 (Ga. 2008).

- A store owner is not liable to a customer who slips and falls due to an openly visible "static condition", such as a hole or uneven place on the sidewalk at the edge of the store, and the owner has reason to believe the customer will discover the condition or realize the risk involved. Jeter v. Edwards, 180 Ga. App. 283, 349 S.E.2d 28 (1986).

A claim involving a static defect differs from other slip and fall cases in that when a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom. Herrin v. Peeches Neighborhood Grill & Bar, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 528, 509 S.E.2d 103 (1998).

Trial court properly found that a shopping center curb where an injured person fell was an open and obvious static condition and that the injured person failed to exercise reasonable care for their own safety; pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants in the injured person's claim because the injured person failed to show that the curb was negligently designed, constructed, maintained, or difficult to see, and contended only that the injured person failed to appreciate the height of the curb. Pirkle v. Robson Crossing, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 259, 612 S.E.2d 83 (2005).

Trial court did not err in granting a store owner summary judgment in a customer's action to recover damages for injuries the customer sustained when the customer fell from a curb in the store's parking lot because the customer had equal knowledge of any hazard presented by the height of the curb; even if the curbed sidewalk was hazardous, the condition was open and obvious and, thus, in the exercise of ordinary care, the customer could have avoided the hazard. McLemore v. Genuine Parts Co., 313 Ga. App. 641, 722 S.E.2d 366 (2012).

Because a customer did not testify that the purported distraction of people attending a tool show in any way obstructed the customer's view of a curb, the proof offered clearly put the case within the line of cases involving the plain view doctrine and effectively eliminated any distraction theory. McLemore v. Genuine Parts Co., 313 Ga. App. 641, 722 S.E.2d 366 (2012).

- Trial court erred in granting defendant orchard owners' motion for summary judgment after the plaintiff fell into a hole while picking fruit and, from the plaintiff's testimony concerning the size of the hole, a jury would have been authorized to infer both that it had been in existence for a substantial period of time and that it was large enough to have been observable during routine mowing and maintenance. Lawless v. Sasnett, 200 Ga. App. 398, 408 S.E.2d 432, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 896, 408 S.E.2d 432 (1991).

- The fact that the defendant shopping mall owners did not anticipate that the actual encroachment of dangerous construction activity onto their unpatrolled and unbarriered sidewalk would take the form of an intentional rather than an inadvertent act of the workers was immaterial; the defendants could still be found liable if the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the defendants were on notice that the failure to take any precautions to protect their invitees on the adjacent sidewalk would result in some form of potential physical encroachment of the dangerous construction activity with an injurious result. Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga. App. 194, 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986).

- Evidence raised a question of fact concerning whether restaurant employees could have foreseen the potential danger stemming from loud and unruly bar patron who eventually attacked plaintiff with a pool cue, such that factual question existed for the jury to resolve on the issue of negligence and diligence, and the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Good Ol' Days Downtown, Inc. v. Yancey, 209 Ga. App. 696, 434 S.E.2d 740 (1993).

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that a fight resulting in a bar patron's injuries was foreseeable and could have been avoided if the bar and the bar's owner had banished the patrons involved in the fight based on their duty to the patron, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. The patrons involved in the fight were chronically combative, had been banished on previous occasions, and were hostile and combative for hours before the subject fight. Mulligan's Bar & Grill v. Stanfield, 294 Ga. App. 250, 668 S.E.2d 874 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0351, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 192 (Ga. 2009).

- When a corporation, engaged in the retail mercantile business, impliedly extends an invitation to the public to trade in its store, it is required to exercise the same degree of diligence to protect its customers from the tortious misconduct of its employees as an individual must exercise to protect an invitee from the misconduct of such individual's agents and employees acting about their master's business and within the scope of their employment, though such misconduct of the corporation's agents and employees may involve elements of slander. Simpson v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 76 Ga. App. 232, 45 S.E.2d 678 (1947).

In suit against corporation engaged in the retail business for failure to exercise due care to protect its customers from the tortious misconduct of its servants and employees acting within the scope of and about their master's business, the fact that such misconduct may involve elements of slander does not prevent the plaintiff from having a cause of action against the corporation for breach of its duty towards the plaintiff as an invitee on its premises. Simpson v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 76 Ga. App. 232, 45 S.E.2d 678 (1947).

Customer must exercise ordinary care for customer's own safety, and must avoid effect of merchant's negligence after it becomes apparent to the customer or in the exercise of ordinary care the customer should have learned of it. King Hdwe. Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 84 S.E.2d 686 (1954).

When the plaintiff in descending the defendant's steps may have been looking at the steps and picking the plaintiff's way down as alleged in the petition, yet, when the plaintiff did not know the actual condition of the steps as the plaintiff alleges, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was under the circumstances guilty of negligence in using the steps, and that this negligence barred recovery. Scott v. Rich's, Inc., 47 Ga. App. 548, 171 S.E. 201 (1933).

It could not be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff's negligence, if any, would bar a recovery, the plaintiff having ascended the step in question in going into the passageway, in view of the plaintiff's poor eyesight and of allegations that the situation presented an appearance, to one going from the passageway to the lobby, different from what it was to one going from the lobby to the passageway. Boyd v. Gardner, 62 Ga. App. 662, 9 S.E.2d 202 (1940).

Grocery storekeeper's maintenance of a concrete bar from three and one-half inches to six inches high and five feet long, in the storekeeper's parking lot which could easily be seen by anyone with normal vision while walking there and exercising ordinary care for the storekeeper's own safety is not actionable. McMullan v. Kroger Co., 84 Ga. App. 195, 65 S.E.2d 420 (1951).

A grocery storekeeper is not bound to anticipate that customers would so disregard their own safety as to obstruct their vision with packages or sacks so as to be unable to see where they were walking. McMullan v. Kroger Co., 84 Ga. App. 195, 65 S.E.2d 420 (1951).

A customer is not bound to avoid tripping or stumbling over articles which are not usually or are unusually, obstructing the aisles of a store, and which in the exercise of ordinary care the customer did not observe. King Hdwe. Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 84 S.E.2d 686 (1954).

Trial court did not err in granting a lessee's motion for summary judgment in a customer's premises liability action under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to recover damages for injuries the customer sustained when the customer fell down stairs in a shop because the customer failed to exercise ordinary care for the customer's own safety pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7; despite the customer's inability to see beyond the merchandise, the customer continued to move in that direction, and the customer's attempt to walk between or over the thick clutter of merchandise, when there was not an aisle or clear area of floor visible, constituted a voluntary departure from the route designated and maintained by the lessee for the customers' safety and convenience and imposed a heightened duty of care for the customer's own safety. Bartlett v. McDonough Bedding Co., 313 Ga. App. 657, 722 S.E.2d 380 (2012).

- Mall patron's claim against the mall for injuries the patron suffered when the patron ran into the stationary pane of a revolving glass door was barred by Georgia's prior traversal doctrine because the patron had successfully negotiated the same revolving door twice earlier that same day and had equal knowledge of the door and the door's stationary parts. Gervin v. The Retail Property Trust, 354 Ga. App. 11, 840 S.E.2d 101 (2020).

- When the alleged dangerous condition consists of the presence of a foreign substance on the floor, the proprietor's superior opportunity to discover the substance may be established by evidence that an employee was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition who could have easily seen the substance and removed the hazard. In order to make out a prima facie case under this theory, however, it must additionally be shown that the substance had been on the floor for a length of time sufficient to have enabled the employee to discover and remove the substance. Flowers v. Kroger Co., 191 Ga. App. 464, 382 S.E.2d 184 (1989).

Summary judgment for an employer was affirmed on an employee's premises liability negligence claim as no one, including the employee, saw any foreign substance or other matter on the floor and no one, including the employee, had any idea what caused the slip and fall; without evidence of the existence of a foreign substance that somehow caused a fall, there could be no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of the alleged danger. Chapman v. C.C. Dickson Co., 273 Ga. App. 640, 616 S.E.2d 478 (2005).

In a premises liability action against a retailer, because the patron failed to show proof that a single employee of the retailer was in the immediate area of the spill that allegedly caused the patron's fall, and could have easily seen and removed the spill prior to the slip and fall, or proof that the liquid had been there for a sufficient length of time that the retailer should have discovered and removed the spill during a reasonable inspection and: (1) inasmuch as the purported hazard was not readily visible to the patron; and (2) the patron failed to establish that the retailer's employees, who were at least 20 to 30 feet away, could have easily seen and removed the spill, or that the liquid had been on the retailer's floor long enough that the retailer should have discovered and removed the spill during a reasonable inspection, the trial court erred in denying the retailer's motion for summary judgment as to the retailer's liability to the patron. Kmart Corp. v. McCollum, 290 Ga. App. 551, 659 S.E.2d 913 (2008).

Store's motion for summary judgment in a patron's personal injury suit was denied because there existed genuine issues of disputed fact as to whether the store exercised reasonable care as required under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; there was conflicting evidence on the issue of the store's constructive knowledge of an alleged puddle of cooking oil on the floor since the store's evidence showed that the store's assistant manager inspected the floor about 10 minutes before the patron fell, and the patron testified that the patron was in the aisle for five to 10 minutes before falling, the patron did not see the assistant manager, and the assistant manager had to be called down from an upstairs office at the back of the building when the patron reported the incident. Williams v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 28, 2008).

- Whether the proprietor followed reasonable inspection procedures, which would have revealed water on the floor near the entrance on a rainy day, was a question of fact. Smith v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 504 S.E.2d 31 (1998).

Owner of mall was not negligent as a matter of law since the owner had less than 90 seconds to clean up water spilled on the floor prior to the plaintiff's fall. Pickering Corp. v. Goodwin, 243 Ga. App. 831, 534 S.E.2d 518 (2000).

District court did not err in categorizing the plaintiff's case as a rainy-day slip and fall case because it had rained earlier in the day but was not raining at the time of the incident and did not err in concluding as a matter of law that the water accumulation was not unusual since the plaintiff conceded that the wet spot was difficult to discern and that the plaintiff could have tracked in the water on the plaintiff's shoes and when the store employees inspected the floor a few minutes before and a few minutes after the fall, and all the employees stated that the floor was clean and dry. Womack-Sang v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. May 19, 2014)(Unpublished).

- Because genuine material fact issues remained as to whether a supermarket's inspection procedures in the area in which a customer fell were reasonable and whether a reasonable inspection procedure would have detected a mixture of chicken blood and water on the floor, summary judgment in favor of the supermarket was reversed; moreover, the appeals court rejected the supermarket's claim that the customer had equal knowledge of the hazard since the customer had previously walked down the aisle before the customer fell there. Food Lion, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. App. 574, 660 S.E.2d 426 (2008).

- Fact questions, precluding summary judgment in a slip and fall case, existed as to whether store employees had constructive knowledge of egg spillage on the pavement outside the store. Boss v. Food Giant, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 434, 388 S.E.2d 37 (1989).

- In a slip and fall action, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the store as the aisle where the fall occurred had been inspected about 20 minutes before the fall, a cashier informed of the hazard told a bagger about the spill and the bagger went to get clean-up items and clean the spill, and there was no evidence that the patron fell after the cashier was notified of the spill or that there was any delay in the attempt to clean up the spill. Youngblood v. All American Quality Foods, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 817, 792 S.E.2d 417 (2016).

Knowledge on part of the proprietor that there is foreign substance on floor that could cause patrons to slip and fall may be either actual or constructive. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).

- When a customer slips on a substance placed on the floor by others than the owner it is necessary to allege and prove either that the defendant had knowledge or that under the circumstances the owner was chargeable with constructive knowledge of the substance's existence. This is particularly applicable to spilled foods and liquids. Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 507, 148 S.E.2d 451 (1966); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976); Garrison v. Rich's, 154 Ga. App. 663, 269 S.E.2d 513 (1980).

While owner or occupier of land is liable to invitees for the owner's or occupier's failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping premises safe, before owner can be held liable for slippery conditions of floors, produced by presence of a foreign substance thereon, proof should show that the owner or occupier was aware of the substance or would have known of the substance's presence had the owner or occupier exercised reasonable care and that the person injured was unaware of the substance. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980); Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 164, 460 S.E.2d 849 (1995).

Pawn shop was entitled to summary judgment in the plaintiff's personal injury action arising out of an injury caused by a saw, as the pawn shop did not breach its duty to inspect under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; the pawn shop's inspection of the saw, which included determining whether it operated properly, did not reveal the defect that caused it to turn immediately upon being plugged in. Walker v. Bruhn, 281 Ga. App. 149, 635 S.E.2d 322 (2006).

Patron's claims for damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when the patron removed a bread maker from a merchant's shelf and several crock pots fell from another shelf failed because the patron failed to show, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, that the merchant was actually or constructively aware of the allegedly perilous display of cookware; the patron presented no evidence that an employee of the merchant was in the immediate vicinity at the time of the incident and in a position to see and remove the danger, the patron did not offer evidence that the alleged hazard had existed for any significant amount of time prior to the incident, there was no evidence of prior incidents that might have put the merchant on notice of the hazard, and the merchant submitted evidence that all of the merchant's employees were trained to patrol the aisles and check for unsafe conditions and that one of the merchant's employees had walked through the aisle where the incident occurred shortly before and did not observe anything out of the ordinary. Gootee v. Target Corp., 256 Fed. Appx. 253 (11th Cir. 2007)(Unpublished).

Parent's suit to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the parent's minor child when a metal pamphlet rack fell on the child's foot in a retail store was properly dismissed on summary judgment; the parent failed to show that the retailer breached the retailer's duty of care under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, as there was no evidence that the retailer had actual knowledge of any defect in the rack, no constructive knowledge could be imputed to the retailer even if the rack was defectively constructed or installed, the retailer could not have easily seen and eliminated the hazardous condition, the parent did not offer any evidence that the defect existed a sufficient length of time that the retailer should have discovered it during a reasonable inspection, and because there was no record evidence indicating that the retailer constructed the rack, no presumption existed that the retailer knew of the defect. Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 Fed. Appx. 292 (11th Cir. 2007)(Unpublished).

Trial court erred in denying a motion for j.n.o.v. filed by the owners and operators of a thrift store because there was no evidence that the owners possessed superior knowledge of the hazard posed by the allegedly defective chair, such as whether the defect was one which would have been visible during an inspection or how long the defect had existed. Family Thrift, Inc. v. Birthrong, 336 Ga. App. 601, 785 S.E.2d 547 (2016).

- It would impose too great a duty upon the proprietor and would make the proprietor the insurer of the safety of all patrons, which the proprietor is not, to require the proprietor at all times to have immediate knowledge of and to remove every article on which a patron might stumble and fall when the article is placed there, not by the defendant or the defendant's employees, but by other patrons. Watson v. McCrory Stores, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 516, 103 S.E.2d 648 (1958).

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to a retailer, in a customer's negligence action filed against it for injuries sustained when a tomato tower punctured an eye, as the customer's injury arose out of a third party's actions which the retailer did not and could not have foreseen, and hence no evidence was presented that the retailer breached a duty owed to the customer. Thomas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 699, 644 S.E.2d 538 (2007).

- Since there was no actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous and unsafe condition, and there is nothing in the petition to show or indicate the propriety or necessity of making an inspection to ascertain the possible or probable existence of any defect, such as that other people had tripped or fallen on the steps, ordinary diligence did not as a matter of law require an inspection when the defendant had no reason to think an inspection was necessary. McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern, 65 Ga. App. 334, 15 S.E.2d 797 (1941).

The positive testimony that no snakes had been seen on the premises in the six years of an owner's tenure shows that an injury caused by running from a snake was unexpected; in the absence of knowledge of such a danger there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to keep the grass mowed short in order to guard against it. Nor does a plaintiff's testimony that there were snakes along a river a mile or so away raise such a duty when in fact there had been none in the area around the building. Williams v. Gibbs, 123 Ga. App. 677, 182 S.E.2d 164 (1971).

This section does not require a proprietor to patrol the floor constantly when there are no conditions making the premises unusually dangerous. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 142 (1976).

- Store's motion for summary judgment in a patron's personal injury suit was denied because there existed genuine issues of disputed fact as to whether the store exercised reasonable care as required under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; the adequacy of the store's inspection procedure, which required inspection every two hours, could not be decided as a matter of law since there was evidence that the procedure was not followed, and there was further conflicting evidence on the issue of the store's constructive knowledge of an alleged puddle of cooking oil on the floor. Williams v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 28, 2008).

- Jury issue was presented as to whether an electric company exercised ordinary care to keep premises safe because it could not be concluded as a matter of law that the company's inspection procedure was reasonable when there was evidence that an electrical wire presented a safety hazard, that the wire should have been covered with a junction box and placed on a concrete pad, and that at the time of a visitor's injury the wire was not, and there was no evidence that any inspection was performed for at least five years between the initial post-installation inspection and the incident; a jury could find without expert testimony that the company had a duty to conduct more frequent inspections to ensure that the company's live electrical wires were not left uncovered from the evidence presented, and a jury could conclude that the company was negligent in failing to discover the exposed live wire through more frequent inspection of the company's equipment. McGarity v. Hart Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 307 Ga. App. 739, 706 S.E.2d 676 (2011).

- An action by a customer who was injured using an exercise machine on display in a store could not survive summary judgment when evidence showed that the store used reasonable care in inspecting the machine, and that a loose nut on the machine was a hidden defect that could not have been foreseen. Anderson v. Service Merchandise Co., 230 Ga. App. 551, 496 S.E.2d 743 (1998).

Since the plaintiff's evidence failed to show actual or constructive notice of danger, there was no breach of duty to use ordinary care imposed upon the retailer. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976).

Plaintiff could not recover for fall on supermarket's wet floor absent defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of the floor's dangerous condition. The existence of such knowledge is a matter for the jury when there is evidence from which it may be inferred. See Gold & White, Inc. v. Long, 159 Ga. App. 259, 283 S.E.2d 45 (1981).

- In a slip-and-fall premises liability case, the trial court properly granted a store and two of the store's employees summary judgment because the uncontroverted evidence showed that the customer walked over the boxes once without incident and then walked over the boxes again when the fall occurred, thus, the customer had equal knowledge of the danger. Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 324 Ga. App. 105, 749 S.E.2d 400 (2013).

- When condensation leaked from the ceiling for a long enough period of time to cause a couple of ceiling tiles to become wet-looking, while water dripped over a two- to three-foot area, it could be concluded that the leak occurred over an extended period, sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the previously known condensation hazard was recurring, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant. Lee v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 237 Ga. App. 228, 513 S.E.2d 737 (1999).

- In a slip-and-fall case based on an owner's alleged constructive knowledge of the hazard, action was not supported by a mere showing that owner's employees were in the immediate area of the hazard absent a showing that the employees had the means and opportunity to discover and remove the hazard. Mitchell v. Food Giant, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 705, 337 S.E.2d 353 (1985).

- In an action for damages for injuries received by an invitee of a store as a result of falling upon a stairway, under this section imposing upon the owner or occupier of land the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the premises in safe condition as to invitees, the plaintiff must allege negligence on the part of the defendant without at the same time barring the plaintiff from recovery by showing, through other facts, that the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for the plaintiff's own safety. Watson v. McCrory Stores, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 516, 103 S.E.2d 648 (1958).

- A petition which alleged that the plaintiff, while present in the defendant's store as a customer, desiring to make a purchase from the defendant, was in a loud and angry tone, which could be heard by other customers present, falsely and unjustly accused by one of the defendant's clerks of having in a handbag a certain article belonging to the defendant, which charge humiliated and embarrassed the plaintiff, set out a cause of action for a willful and intentional tort, that is, the failure to protect the plaintiff as a customer, lawfully upon the defendant's premises, from injury caused by the misconduct of the defendant's employees. Sims v. Miller's, Inc., 50 Ga. App. 640, 179 S.E. 423 (1935).

Petition set forth a cause of action against a photographic studio for maintaining premises in such a way that a dangerous and treacherous situation (a step-down) existed as to a person going from a studio room down the passageway to the lobby. Boyd v. Gardner, 62 Ga. App. 662, 9 S.E.2d 202 (1940).

In an action for damages against the defendant corporation engaged in the retail pharmaceutical business, caused by false accusations of the clerk and manager of one of the defendant's retail stores, that the plaintiff, who was a customer in that store, was attempting to cheat and swindle the store out of a sum of money by falsely representing that the clerk had given the clerk a $10.00 bill from which to obtain the sum of 39 cents this being the purchase price of an article bought by the plaintiff in that store, and when the petition also alleged that the plaintiff was assaulted by one of the defendant's employees and was otherwise humiliated and embarrassed by such employees in the presence of other customers in that store, the allegations of the petition were sufficient, as against the general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) thereto, to set out a cause of action against the defendant corporation. Simpson v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 76 Ga. App. 232, 45 S.E.2d 678 (1947).

Petitions stated a cause of action against a hardware company for negligence in permitting a roll of chicken wire to be left in the aisle of the store where the plaintiff (plaintiff's wife) tripped over the wire, sustaining the injuries sued for. King Hdwe. Co. v. Teplis, 91 Ga. App. 13, 84 S.E.2d 686 (1954).

- The petition alleged a good cause of action against the owner of a public place for resort and recreation for failure to use ordinary care in the protection of the plaintiff guest against the misconduct of other guests. Adamson v. Hand, 93 Ga. App. 5, 90 S.E.2d 669 (1955).

- When the plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff fell because of slippery wax, oil, or other finish that the defendant placed on the floor, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show that defendant was negligent either in the materials the defendant used in treating the floor or in the application of those materials. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).

Evidence or allegations that after the accident, defendant, owner of premises, made changes or repairs are not permissible. Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944).

- In action against store proprietor by plaintiff who slipped and fell, when there was no evidence that the defendant or the defendant's agents were guilty of any negligence, but simply showed that the plaintiff fell while shopping in the defendant's store, it could not be inferred from the record that the defendant negligently maintained the defendant's floor and summary judgment for the defendant was proper. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).

- When, in a department store to which the public is invited to do business, the top and edge of a stairway landing, which is used by the customers of the store, is covered with a metal strip, which through long use has become worn down, smooth, slick, slippery, dangerous and unsafe for use by the customers of the store, it is a question for the determination of the jury whether such department store in the exercise of ordinary care for the safety of its customers in the store should have discovered and remedied such defective and dangerous condition. Townley v. Rich's, Inc., 84 Ga. App. 772, 67 S.E.2d 403 (1951).

Whether alleged defects caused the plaintiff's fall and resulting injuries, and whether or not the defendant storekeeper actually knew of the alleged defects, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered and repaired the defects or warned the plaintiff of the defects' presence, or whether the plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care for the plaintiff's own safety should have discovered the defects in the floor and avoided the defects, were questions for determination by the jury. Jones v. Hunter, 94 Ga. App. 316, 94 S.E.2d 384 (1956).

- Under the allegations of the petition the plaintiff, at the time of the plaintiff's injury, was an invitee of the defendant cotton mill, and it was a question for the jury whether or not the act of the defendant's store manager, in striking and injuring the plaintiff, was so closely connected with the employer's business as to render the defendant liable for the willful assault of its servant. Crawford v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 63 Ga. App. 458, 11 S.E.2d 234 (1940).

- In a personal injury action filed against an invitee against a commercial premises owner, the invitee's request that the trial court instruct the jury that an owner would be considered to have constructive knowledge of a foreign substance if it was shown that the owner did not have in place, or did not follow, a reasonable inspection procedure at the time of the incident, was properly denied, as the quoted portion of the requested charge was incorrect. Taylor v. AmericasMart Real Estate, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 555, 651 S.E.2d 754 (2007).

Home, Apartment, and Landowners

Ordinary care standard applicable to homeowners.

- Before a recovery is authorized for the plaintiff in an action against a homeowner for injuries suffered by the plaintiff while in the home it must be shown that the conditions allegedly causing the injuries were less safe than those provided by ordinarily prudent homeowners for their invitees. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 122 Ga. App. 374, 177 S.E.2d 119 (1970).

In this personal injury action, the granting of summary judgment to the defendants was affirmed because the plaintiff's knowledge of icy conditions in the defendants' driveway at the time of the incident was at least equal, if not superior, to that of the defendants; as the plaintiff walked across the driveway four times. Kouche v. Farr, 317 Ga. App. 277, 730 S.E.2d 45 (2012).

Ordinary care does not require homeowner to mop continuously as guests (invitees) track water from the swimming pool into the basement or to give warning of such condition to them. Stanton v. Grubb, 114 Ga. App. 350, 151 S.E.2d 237 (1966).

- When it is alleged that the defendant homeowner was negligent in permitting a board to be placed in its dangerous position and in failing to warn the plaintiff thereof, this allegation is tantamount to an averment that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defective condition of the premises and the petition thus set forth a cause of action even if the plaintiff had been a licensee rather than an invitee. Lenkeit v. Chandler, 97 Ga. App. 769, 104 S.E.2d 476 (1958).

No evidence was adduced to show that the homeowner had any knowledge or reasonable anticipation of a dangerous condition superior to that of the homebuilder or the defendant, the homebuilder's employee, rendering the homeowner not liable for the defendant's injuries sustained from a false scaffolding board. Wimpey v. Otts, 207 Ga. App. 40, 427 S.E.2d 34 (1993).

- The true ground of liability is the landowner's superior knowledge of the perilous condition and the danger to persons coming upon the property. It is when the perilous condition is known to the owner and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted. Horney v. Panter, 204 Ga. App. 474, 420 S.E.2d 8 (1992).

- Summary judgment was properly denied to a trailer park owner in a premises liability action based upon the murder of a tenant in the park since the owner had a duty to provide security to the park as a result of a contract it entered with all residents and failed to inform the residents that security was discontinued. Brookview Holdings, LLC v. Suarez, 285 Ga. App. 90, 645 S.E.2d 559, cert. denied, 285 Ga. App. 90, 645 S.E.2d 559 (2007).

- When no problem was readily discernible in the stairs outside an apartment either through inspection or regular walks through the property, and the plaintiff noticed no problems with the stairs even though the plaintiff went up and down them several times a day, and since no complaints had been made to the housing authority, there was no evidence that a reasonable inspection would have discovered the defect in the metal edging of the stairs, and thus no evidence of constructive knowledge. Padilla v. Hinesville Hous. Auth., 235 Ga. App. 409, 509 S.E.2d 698 (1998).

- Homeowners' summary judgment motion should have been granted as the homeowners had no actual or constructive notice of a problem with a deck that collapsed, injuring the injured party; the home had been inspected one year earlier, and no problem with the deck was identified, although the inspection report indicated that the deck was not bolted to the house. Nailing a deck to a house was acceptable at the time of the inspection. Wingo v. Harrison, 268 Ga. App. 156, 601 S.E.2d 507 (2004).

- Homeowner was not liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to a contractor hired to clean pine straw on the homeowner's roof when the contractor rested the contractor's foot on an awning which gave way, leading to a fall and injuries, because there was no evidence that the owner had any knowledge, actual or constructive, of the defective attachment of the awning to the home. Sipple v. Newman, 313 Ga. App. 688, 722 S.E.2d 348 (2012).

Liability extends to excavations either on premises or immediately adjacent to sidewalk, highway, or private way habitually used by public. Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937).

When the owner of premises negligently maintains a pit or excavation upon the owner's land immediately adjacent to and abutting adjoining premises, and which, as a lot in a city upon which business is conducted, is in continuous use, and a person lawfully upon the adjoining premises in passing thereon immediately adjacent to the excavation, at night and without knowledge of the excavation, and without fault on the owner's part, makes a misstep and falls into the excavation and is injured, the owner of the premises containing the excavation is liable in damages for the injury. Cox v. Greenfield, 50 Ga. App. 699, 179 S.E. 178 (1935).

There is a duty on the part of a landowner not to maintain on the owner's premises a dangerous excavation so that persons passing along a street immediately adjoining may not be injured while in the exercise of ordinary care or when by necessity or accident they slightly deviate from such street or walkway. Wright v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 316, 7 S.E.2d 793 (1940).

When the defendant may have been negligent in failing to erect a barrier or guard for its culvert at a particular place, and would have been liable to the plaintiff if the plaintiff had casually or inadvertently walked or fallen into such culvert, the plaintiff was precipitated into such culvert by intervening negligent acts of the city and of the driver of the automobile, which acts were not such as would probably have occurred in the usual, natural and probable course of events, under the facts as pleaded the negligence of the defendant railway company, while contributing to the injury, did not constitute the proximate and efficient cause of the injury. Wright v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 316, 7 S.E.2d 793 (1940).

- If a landowner constructs a private way over the owner's property and for a long period of time acquiesces in its use by members of the general public or so constructs the private way in connection with a public road as to make it impossible, under all conditions, to distinguish between them, this would amount to an implied invitation, at least to the extent that the owner should anticipate the presence of members of the general public thereon. Norris v. Macon Term. Co., 58 Ga. App. 313, 198 S.E. 272 (1938).

- When an owner of premises allows an excavation to be placed in dangerous proximity to a thoroughfare so that persons in the exercise of ordinary care might casually fall therein it is the duty of such owner to enclose the same as to afford reasonable immunity against danger, but when the adjacent land is level or approximately so and that which caused the injury is so far removed that a traveller in the exercise of ordinary care would not have been injured thereby, no duty to such traveller arises. Wright v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 316, 7 S.E.2d 793 (1940).

- The owner of land traversed by a public highway is under no duty to a traveler along the highway to maintain in a safe condition for travel the abutting premises at a point such a distance from the highway that it cannot be reached by the ordinary deviations from the highway incident to careful traveling thereon, but can only be reached by a traveler who has, negligently and in a manner oblivious of his own safety, completely abandoned the highway and gone over onto the abutting premises. Williamson v. Southern Ry., 42 Ga. App. 9, 155 S.E. 113 (1930).

- The construction of a covered cable gate to divide a Wildlife Management Area from a Wildlife Refuge Area was a static condition on the premises in question. As such, the landowners owed a trespasser who was injured in a motorcycle accident involving the gate a duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure the trespasser. Trammell v. Baird, 262 Ga. 124, 413 S.E.2d 445 (1992).

- While the landowners were told about an abandoned well on their property, they did not know where the well was, and nothing indicated where the well was; further, nothing indicated that the well was defectively covered rather than filled, and thus the landowners had no duty to inspect the property to locate the well or to inform an invitee of its existence. Sisson v. Elliott, 278 Ga. App. 156, 628 S.E.2d 232 (2006).

- While the duties of the owner of an apartment house who reserved a qualified right of possession of the halls, steps, porches, or other parts of the building of which common use was made by the tenants were as set out in former Code 1933, § 105-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1), and render the owner liable for injuries occasioned by the owner's failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe, as to an owner and landlord who fully parts with possession of the premises, the liability was as provided in former Code 1933, § 61-112 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14) and related only to injuries occasioned by defective construction or failure to keep the premises in repair when there was a duty to repair and notice had been given of the defect. Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga. App. 207, 124 S.E.2d 441 (1962).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a condominium association with regard to a visitor's negligence suit following an injury in a revolving door because the visitor failed to show that the door malfunctioned in any manner and, absent evidence of a defect in addition to a fall, the association had no liability to support a finding that the association had superior knowledge that the revolving doors were a hazard to the visitor. Siegel v. Park Ave. Condo. Ass'n, 322 Ga. App. 337, 744 S.E.2d 876 (2013).

- Trial court properly granted a condominium association summary judgment in a premises liability action because interpreting the condominium association documents established that the association did not have a duty to remove snow and ice from the common walkway where the resident fell. Scrocca v. Ashwood Condominium Ass'n, 326 Ga. App. 226, 756 S.E.2d 308 (2014).

- The question of whether a particular area of an apartment building - i.e., a patio deck behind an apartment, from which a tenant fell after the railing gave way - was a common area over which the landlord retained a qualified right of possession, rendering the landlord liable for failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe, or was an area which was in the exclusive possession of the tenant, rendering the landlord liable for failure to repair in the face of a notice of defect, was a matter for determination by the trier of fact, and the court properly instructed the jury as to both legal theories. Andres v. Roswell-Windsor Village Apts., 777 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1985).

- Trial court committed reversible error in a premises liability suit by providing an inapt, incorrect, and not reasonably raised or authorized by the evidence jury charge on assumption of risk because the charge, in essence, supported the defendants argument that anyone who chose to remain on the property consented to assume the risk of being shot and killed, which was flawed reasoning. Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp., 353 Ga. App. 162, 836 S.E.2d 555 (2019).

- Facts of the case established that the United States, through its agency of Housing and Urban Development, had relinquished possession and control of the house where the plaintiff's son was injured, to an independent contractor, and that the United States, therefore, was not liable for any negligent failure to maintain the property in a safe condition. Tisdale v. United States, 838 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 62 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1995).

A property owner can delegate the responsibility of maintaining a safe workplace by relinquishing possession and control of the property to an independent contractor. Torrington Co. v. Hill, 219 Ga. App. 453, 465 S.E.2d 447 (1995).

Nothing prohibited a landlord from assigning by contract the landlord's duty to repair and maintain the premises. Rainey v. 1600 Peachtree, L.L.C., 255 Ga. App. 299, 565 S.E.2d 517 (2002).

In a premises liability action filed by a repairman arising from injuries suffered while repairing a roof, because the trial court properly found that an out-of-possession landlord and its tenants who surrendered control of the owned premises did not ratify the repairman's employer's actions in not providing safety equipment, and did not have superior knowledge of the dangers involved, the out-of-possession landlord and its tenants were properly granted summary judgment in the repairman's premises liability action. Saunders v. Indus. Metals & Surplus, Inc., 285 Ga. App. 415, 646 S.E.2d 294 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 624 (Ga. 2007).

The owner of an apartment building where an invitee was injured when a breezeway railing broke was not entitled to summary judgment on the theory that the owner was not liable for the negligent acts of the independent contractors who installed or inspected the railing during a renovation project; the owner had a nondelegable duty to keep its premises safe for the invitee and a material fact question existed as to whether the owner had given full and complete control to the independent contractors such that the owner was relieved of its duty to the invitee. Carpenter v. Sun Valley Props., LLC, 285 Ga. App. 1, 645 S.E.2d 35, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 563 (Ga. 2007).

- Party guest, who was injured when the guest dove into a swimming pool adjacent to a condominium clubhouse, was an invitee, not a mere licensee, of the condominium association's premises, since the clubhouse had been reserved by a condominium homeowner on behalf of the party host. Plantation at Lenox Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Lee, 196 Ga. App. 420, 395 S.E.2d 817 (1990).

- Trial court erred in denying the lessees' motion for summary judgment on the tree trimmer's premises liability claim as well as the spouse's derivative claim for loss of consortium because the tree trimmer nor the spouse offered any evidence that the lessees disturbed the ladder before the ladder collapsed and the lessees unequivocally denied touching the ladder, thus, to say the lessees caused the ladder to fall would be mere conjecture. Barclay v. Stephenson, 337 Ga. App. 365, 787 S.E.2d 322 (2016).

- Petition alleging that the plaintiff was maliciously shot and injured by the janitor of an apartment house while the plaintiff was present in the house as the guest of a tenant, the janitor, within the knowledge of the defendants (security deed holder and managing agents), being a man of vicious and dangerous character, having a propensity to assault and injure others without cause, and that the defendants were negligent in retaining the janitor as such employee after knowledge of this trait, is sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendants. Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937).

- After the plaintiff tenant was beaten, robbed, and raped in her apartment by an intruder, fact issues precluded summary judgment for the defendant apartment owner in her action alleging that the defendant failed to keep its premises reasonably safe by providing adequate security. Doe v. Briargate Apts., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 408, 489 S.E.2d 170 (1997).

In an action by an apartment tenant who was the victim of robbery, assault, and threatened rape in her apartment, evidence of prior criminal acts of robbery and assault on the premises gave rise to a triable issue of fact as to whether the apartment owner and manager failed in their duty to exercise ordinary care to safeguard tenants against foreseeable risks. Walker v. St. Paul Apts., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 298, 489 S.E.2d 317 (1997).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an apartment complex owner, and against the decedent's personal representative, in the latter's premises liability action against the former, as: (1) evidence was lacking that the vacant apartment where the decedent was murdered was negligently left unlocked; and (2) despite the criminal history of the area where the apartment was located, the owner had no reasonable belief to anticipate that a murder would have occurred on its premises; moreover, guesses or speculation which raised merely a conjecture or possibility were insufficient to create even an inference of fact for consideration on summary judgment. Wojcik v. Windmill Lake Apts., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 766, 645 S.E.2d 1 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 637 (Ga. 2007).

- In a wrongful death action filed by a decedent-lessee's administrator in which the decedent was killed when crossing a public highway that the lessor did not control, the lessor was properly granted summary judgment, as the administrator failed to show that the lessor was negligent per se or that the lessor breached either a common law or private duty owed to the lessee. Walton v. UCC X, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 847, 640 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

- An apartment complex and its property manager were erroneously denied summary judgment in a wrongful death action filed against them by the decedent's estate, as neither defendant had superior knowledge that a criminal act would be committed on the premises, and because the decedent's own actions led to the dangerous situation regarding apprehension by bail bondsmen as the decedent failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. Gateway Atlanta Apts., Inc. v. Harris, 290 Ga. App. 772, 660 S.E.2d 750 (2008).

- Advertisement in a Sunday newspaper, headed "Apartments - Unfurnished," followed by a list of certain apartments at given addresses, together with brief description and prices, under which appeared the words, "Draper-Owens Co., Realtors," "521 Grant Bldg.," and "Wa 9511," was free from ambiguity, and, properly construed, did not constitute an invitation, express or implied, to the public to inspect any of the premises, but was merely a notice that the listed apartments were available for leasing at named rentals, inviting any interested person to communicate with the advertiser. Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, a landowner can be liable for third-party criminal attacks if the landowner has reasonable grounds to apprehend that such a criminal act would be committed but fails to take steps to guard against injury. Constructive knowledge of danger is sufficient to establish liability; a series of unforced entries and burglaries since a certain employee was hired by an apartment complex, the complex's knowledge that residents suspected an employee, and the fact that the employee was discovered in an apartment without authorization was sufficient to defeat a directed verdict motion on a claim against the complex after an individual was attacked and killed by an employee of the complex. TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003).

- Because a minor child was bitten by another tenant's dog, an action by the parent of the child against the owner of the apartment complex and its leasing agent resulted in summary judgment against the parent, as the out-of-possession landlord's only liability to third persons was that of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, which was inapplicable; there was no showing that either the owner or agent had any type of knowledge of the dog's propensities or viciousness, and the agent was therefore not shown to be liable on any claim arising under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Griffiths v. Rowe Props., 271 Ga. App. 344, 609 S.E.2d 690 (2005).

- In a slip and fall action, there was an issue as to whether the management company was in control of the handicap ramp on the apartment property to the degree necessary to impose on the company the duty to keep the premises safe, including the duty to warn, as an occupier of the premises and, thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the management company. Stelly v. WSE Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 350 Ga. App. 627, 829 S.E.2d 871 (2019).

- True ground of premises liability is the landowner's or occupier's superior knowledge of the perilous condition and the danger therefrom to persons coming upon the property, and it is when the perilous condition is known to the owner/occupier and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted; a trial court's summary judgment dismissing claims against real estate agents and brokers for injuries arising from a dog bite while the injured person was viewing listed property for sale was affirmed since there was no showing that the real estate agents and brokers had any knowledge that the dogs were dangerous. Gibson v. Rezvanpour, 268 Ga. App. 377, 601 S.E.2d 848 (2004).

- Summary judgment in favor of an apartment owner was inappropriate in light of the duty imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 upon the party controlling the premises during a renovation project to guard against hazards associated with work activities near high-voltage power cables. Santana v. First Guaranty Mgt. Corp., 223 Ga. App. 472, 477 S.E.2d 857 (1996).

- In a wrongful death action, a trial court did not err by denying a corporate officer's motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the corporate officer was the owner/operator of the convenience store where the decedent was shot and killed. Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012).

Summary judgment was precluded for owner of auto tune-up shop after the passenger of a customer slipped and fell while the customer obtained help for a mechanical problem, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to the passenger's legal status, whether the owner had constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard, and whether the risk presented was reasonable. Hartley v. Macon Bacon Tune, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 815, 507 S.E.2d 259 (1998).

- Trial court erred in denying tenant's motion for summary judgment in the invitee's slip and fall case against the tenant, as no dispute existed but that the invitee fell in the landlord-owned and maintained parking lot, and not in an area where the tenant owed a duty to exercise ordinary care for the invitee's safety, such as an "approach" to its store, which included the area up to and including the sidewalk in front of the tenant's store. Food Lion, Inc. v. Isaac, 261 Ga. App. 311, 582 S.E.2d 476 (2003).

In a personal injury action arising out of a slip and fall, because jury questions existed as to whether a premises owner's inspection procedure was reasonable, the appeals court refused to say that the owner lacked constructive knowledge of a hazard that allegedly caused a slip and fall as a matter of law. Thus, summary judgment entered in favor of the owner was reversed. Gibson v. Halpern Enters., 288 Ga. App. 790, 655 S.E.2d 624 (2007).

When premises owner was deemed to have superior knowledge of the hazard that was alleged to have caused the slip and fall, based on the testimony of the injured patron's daughter that the owner had actual knowledge of the hazard, summary judgment in the owner's favor was unauthorized, and the appeals court erred in finding otherwise. Dickerson v. Guest Servs. Co., 282 Ga. 771, 653 S.E.2d 699 (2007).

- Court of appeals erred in affirming an order denying the owners of a planned residential development summary judgment in an estate's premises liability action because a guest had equal knowledge of the threat of alligators within the community; although the guest knew that the wild alligators were dangerous, the guest chose to go for a walk at night near a lagoon in a community in which the guest knew wild alligators were present. Landings Ass'n v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397, 728 S.E.2d 577 (2012).

- In a premises liability action for injuries the plaintiff received after stepping on an anti-theft sensor pin while shopping, summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendant as there was not plain, palpable, and undisputable proof that the defendant's inspection procedures or cleaning practices were adequate to guard against known or foreseeable dangers because the defendant was aware of the specific risk associated with stray pins on the floor; the defendant suffered from daily shoplifting activity; the defendant knew that the shoplifters tended to randomly discard the sensor pins without regard to where the pins landed; and there was no evidence of any policy or procedure requiring that the storeroom floor be inspected for hazards during working hours. Donastorg v. Rainbow USA, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 215, 802 S.E.2d 425 (2017).

- In a suit in which an injured party alleged liability based on static hazards, including design defects, and the failure to warn of those defects, whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the injured party would plummet over nine feet into the bottom of an unguarded hole while attempting to use a dumpster was a jury question; it could not be inferred from the evidence that the injured party often "used" a landfill and a particular dumpster and, thus, that the injured party knew or should have known about the particular hazard. Barton v. City of Rome, 271 Ga. App. 858, 610 S.E.2d 566 (2005).

Trial court erred in denying an employer's summary judgment motion on premises liability claims filed by a group of female employees claiming that a manager's act of installing a video surveillance system in a women's restroom was an intentional act and premises liability sounded in negligence; further, the women's prayers for mental anguish amounted to claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and the women suffered no physical impact. Johnson v. Allen, 272 Ga. App. 861, 613 S.E.2d 657 (2005).

Summary judgment for an owner of a gas station was reversed as jury issues were created as to: (1) whether the customer had actual knowledge that an uncoiled hose in the parking lot ran to the passenger's side of the customer's car; (2) whether the customer should have also known that the hose ran to the passenger's side; (3) whether the hose was a large object that was in plain view at a location where it was customarily found and expected to be so that the customer should have seen or at least anticipated the hose in the exercise of ordinary care; and (4) whether the customer failed to exercise ordinary care by stepping off the curb without looking. Ward v. Autry Petroleum Co., 281 Ga. App. 877, 637 S.E.2d 483 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 158 (Ga. 2007).

When a worker was injured by falling through an opening on the second story of a house, it was error to grant summary judgment to the house's buyers and sellers in a suit under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; the worker's admission that the worker would have seen the opening had the worker looked up while ascending stairs did not establish as a matter of law a failure to exercise ordinary care, as the worker testified that the worker was looking at the worker's feet because the stairs were narrow and that when the worker had been in the house previously, the opening was not there. Britton v. Farmer, 283 Ga. App. 733, 642 S.E.2d 415 (2007).

- In a premises liability action arising from a slip and fall on ice by an injured lessee, because jury issues existed as to whether the party exercised the requisite care, and as to the premises owner's knowledge of the hazard, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the owner and an insurer and in reasoning that the lessee failed to exercise due care. Little v. Alliance Fire Prot., Inc., 291 Ga. App. 116, 661 S.E.2d 173 (2008).

- Theater patron tripped and fell on an A-frame "Wet Floor" sign that had been knocked to the floor. As the theater knew that the sign was present, and in view of evidence presented by the patron that these types of signs tended to collapse on contact with moving crowds, were a tripping hazard when knocked over, and should not be used in high-traffic areas, the theater was not entitled to summary judgment on the patron's premises liability claim. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009).

- Summary judgment was denied to the defendant premises owner because: (1) the plaintiff customer presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had knowledge of a hazardous condition - water on the floor - because the floor was mopped 15 minutes prior to the plaintiff's fall and a wet-floor cone had been located near the fall; (2) the evidence was not conclusive that the plaintiff had equal or superior knowledge of the hazard or that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care for the plaintiff's own safety; (3) there was a question of fact concerning whether rainy conditions caused or contributed to the hazard such that the defendant would prevail on the defendant's "rainy day" defense; and (4) it was unclear whether the plaintiff was on notice of the wet floor hazard prior to the plaintiff's fall. Ahuja v. Cumberland Mall, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2011).

- In a customer's premises liability action, because factual issues existed as to whether a retailer knew or should have known of a hazardous condition when it left a rolled-up carpet mat leaning on its end in the produce department, and whether the retailer could foresee that it would be knocked over and become a tripping hazard, summary judgment in favor of the retailer, and against the customer, was reversed. Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 281 Ga. App. 132, 635 S.E.2d 399 (2006).

A trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the owners of a restaurant in which a suing customer slipped and fell because there was evidence that three employees were within a few feet of the area where the customer fell and could have easily seen and removed the hazard; thus, a genuine issue of fact arose as to whether the owners had constructive knowledge of the sticky substance on the floor that the customer slipped on. Somers v. M.A.U., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 731, 658 S.E.2d 242 (2008).

Because the evidence and the inferences permitted the conclusion that the defendants controlled the premises and should have foreseen a victim's rape at a party in a recording studio, summary judgment on a theory of premises liability was not warranted. There was evidence that while the rape was occurring, an affiliate of the recording label that paid for the use of the studio knocked on the door and was asked to guard the door; a jury could infer that the affiliate, a representative of the label, had prior knowledge that the rapist was going to attack the victim or had previously attacked other women in a similar fashion. Westmoreland v. Williams, 292 Ga. App. 359, 665 S.E.2d 30 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 890 (Ga. 2008).

Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a restaurant owner in a slip and fall case because the customer who fell in the parking lot introduced evidence to show that the owner failed to follow the owner's established inspection schedule, thereby raising an inference that the owner had constructive knowledge of the wooden object the customer fell from; thus, summary judgment was inappropriate. Samuels v. CBOCS, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 421, 742 S.E.2d 141 (2012).

Grant of summary judgment was reversed because although there was no allegation that the company had actual knowledge of the stick in the parking lot, the customer introduced evidence to show that the company failed to follow the company's established inspection schedule, thereby raising an inference that the company had constructive knowledge of the object. Samuels v. CBOCS, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 421, 742 S.E.2d 141 (2012).

- Trial court erred in granting a grocery store summary judgment in a customer's premises liability action seeking to recover damages for injuries the customer sustained when the customer fell in the store's restroom because the case presented the typical slip and fall case issues that had to be determined by a jury since the customer testified to slipping on water on the floor that the customer could only detect after the customer fell, and the testimony was supported by that of the person who was with the customer and also to some extent by the store's assistant manager; whether the water on the floor was open and obvious was a jury question given the conflicting testimony on whether the water could be seen, and whether the customer failed to exercise ordinary care for the customer's own safety because the customer had previously walked through the water on the floor was also an issue the jury had to decide. Mairs v. Whole Foods Mkt. Group, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 638, 694 S.E.2d 129 (2010).

Trial court erred by granting summary judgment for the defendant bus station in a premises liability suit under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 brought by the plaintiff customer who was attacked after a verbal altercation. Because the evidence was not plain, palpable, and undisputed, issues concerning the bus station's negligence and the customer's lack of ordinary care for personal safety were not susceptible to summary adjudication. Bennett v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 316 Ga. App. 565, 730 S.E.2d 52 (2012).

Independent Contractors

Independent contractor expected to determine safety.

- An independent contractor is expected to determine for oneself whether the contractor's place of employment is safe or unsafe, and ordinarily may not recover against the owner for injuries sustained in the performance of the contract. Herrin v. Peeches Neighborhood Grill & Bar, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 528, 509 S.E.2d 103 (1998).

Burden of proving the surrender of possession and control of the property to an independent contractor is on the property owner. Hess v. Textron Auto. Exteriors, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 264, 536 S.E.2d 291 (2000).

- A building contractor in possession and control of a building's premises is bound to take reasonable measures to protect persons on the premises by his invitation from injuries which might arise from hidden defects or places of unusual danger. Williams v. Nico Indus., Inc., 157 Ga. App. 814, 278 S.E.2d 677 (1981), overruled on other grounds, 250 Ga. 568, 300 S.E.2d 145 (1983), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Mitchell County Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 279 Ga. 759, 582 S.E.2d 107 (2003). But see Preston v. Georgia Power Co., 227 Ga. App. 449, 489 S.E.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 869, 119 S. Ct. 163, 142 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1998); Santana v. Georgia Power Co., 269 Ga. 127, 498 S.E.2d 521 (1998).

When a general contractor has received full and complete possession of an area for construction, reasonable care may require that one constantly monitor the site for risk of danger to others or erect barriers to prevent others from traveling into areas where they may be exposed to danger. Such responsibility may extend even to portions of the site being worked upon by subcontractors. Bartlett v. Holder Constr. Co., 244 Ga. App. 397, 535 S.E.2d 537 (2000).

- When the defendant is neither the owner nor the occupier of the premises, but rather, an independent contractor, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 imposes no independent duty to inspect the premises of the occupier for the safety of the occupier's invitees. Greene v. Piedmont Janitorial Servs., Inc., 220 Ga. App. 743, 470 S.E.2d 270 (1996).

- The defendant was not entitled to immunity in a slip and fall case, notwithstanding its assertion that the fall was caused by the actions of an independent contractor, as the duty imposed on owner/occupiers to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe is statutory and, therefore, the defendant was liable for the acts and omissions of its independent contractor. Kroger Co. v. Strickland, 248 Ga. App. 613, 548 S.E.2d 375 (2001).

In a slip and fall case, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a premises owner on grounds that: (1) no material issue of fact remained as to whether a roof repair contractor's injuries were caused by the owner's failure to keep the subject premises safe; (2) the contractor failed to present any evidence that a foreign substance or any unusual hazard on the roof surface caused the fall; (3) it was not raining on the day of the fall; and (4) prior to the fall, the contractor inspected the roof by walking the length of it and looking at it from below, satisfied that the area was safe. Hardnett v. Silvey, 285 Ga. App. 424, 646 S.E.2d 514 (2007).

In a slip and fall action filed by a mall patron against the mall's owner and its cleaning contractor, summary judgment was properly granted to the latter, as no evidence was presented that it wrongfully failed to clean the spot on which the patron slipped; however, summary judgment in the owner's favor was reversed, as it failed to present evidence of any reasonable inspection procedures, giving the patron the benefit of an inference of the owner's constructive knowledge of a hazard. Prescott v. Colonial Props. Trust, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 753, 642 S.E.2d 425 (2007).

The court of appeals upheld an order granting summary judgment to a janitorial services company on claims filed against it by a premises owner's invitee for damages sustained by the invitee resulting from a slip and fall on the owner's premises, as the janitorial services company was an independent contractor and not an owner occupier of the premises where the invitee fell, and hence it owed no contractual duty to the invitee. Taylor v. AmericasMart Real Estate, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 555, 651 S.E.2d 754 (2007).

Provider of janitorial services to a hospital was not negligent, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 under a theory of premises liability, for a hospital employee's slip and fall because the provider was an independent contractor. The hospital's reservation of rights to ensure that provider carried out its obligations did not demonstrate that hospital directed or controlled the provider's work. Perkins v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2007).

In an employee's slip and fall action against the employer's cleaning service for negligent application of furniture polish, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the service did not have an independent duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 like an owner/occupier to inspect the premises for the safety of the employee's invitees. Williams v. Capitol Corporate Cleaning, Inc., 313 Ga. App. 61, 720 S.E.2d 228 (2011).

Contractor can be in possession and control of a portion of landowner's premises. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970).

- Evidence of nonconformity with Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., standards is admissible as proof of a landowner's superior knowledge of a defect in the premises under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; thus, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the landowner's OSHA violations, even though the plaintiff welder worked for a contractor and not directly for the landowner when the plaintiff was injured on the landowner's property. The personal injury verdict for the welder was reversed, however, based on an improper instruction that failed to clarify for the jury that the landowner could have discharged the landowner's duty to warn of latent defects on the premises by informing the contractor without also telling the contractor's employee, the injured welder. Long Leaf Indus., Inc. v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. App. 343, 556 S.E.2d 242 (2001).

Landowner or one in possession of land is relieved of duties of a landowner to those who come onto premises when possession and control is surrendered to independent contractor. The contractor then becomes the occupier of the land within the meaning of this section. If such possession and control were still in the landowner, it would be no defense to the landowner that the defective condition causing the injury was created by independent contractor if the landowner, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have discovered the defect. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970).

Theory that the plaintiff was an invitee of the elevator company, employed to make alterations on elevator because the plaintiff was an employee and invitee of the lessee would not be sustainable since if the elevator company had exclusive control of the elevators, the plaintiff as an employee of the lessee would not have occupied the status of invitee as to the elevator either as to the elevator company or the lessee, in the absence of allegations showing an authorized invitation otherwise. Callaham v. Carlson, 85 Ga. App. 4, 67 S.E.2d 726 (1951).

- Since an independent contractor/invitee had constructive knowledge of a potential hazard, the employer/landowner was not liable for the injuries resulting from the existence of such hazard. Apostol-Athanasiou v. White, 176 Ga. App. 178, 335 S.E.2d 442 (1985).

Summary judgment for an owner was affirmed as an injured party's knowledge that the outside steps were slippery when wet was at least equal to that of the owner as the injured party had advised the owner's supervisory personnel that the steps were slippery when wet; as the injured party was not carrying equipment when the fall occurred, the need to carry equipment could not have precluded the injured party from taking a dry, inside stairway. Gillis v. Foodonics Int'l, Inc., 273 Ga. App. 759, 615 S.E.2d 854 (2005).

- Since the defendant had by contract assumed the duty of maintaining and repairing building, which duty in the first instance devolved upon the owner, and actually entered upon such duty by repairing a part of the building, then its failure to repair another part of the building, resulting in injury to the plaintiff, rendered it liable, not because it had breached its contract with principal, but because, by assuming the total duty of repair and maintenance, it had caused the owner to rely upon it and prevented the job from being done by others, and had therefore breached a duty owing to the public generally and the plaintiff in particular of maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Bostick, 90 Ga. App. 46, 81 S.E.2d 853 (1954).

A general contractor engaged by the owner of property to perform construction or repair work thereon and who takes possession of the premises assumes the status of "occupier," and this sets in the duty to use ordinary care to see that the premises are in a reasonably safe condition for the workers on the project. Tyler v. Peel Corp., 371 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1967).

- The provisions of this section prescribe the duty which the proprietor of premises owes to a contractor's servant who comes lawfully upon the premises to repair machinery or instrumentalities thereon. Fulton Ice & Coal Co. v. Pece, 29 Ga. App. 507, 116 S.E. 57 (1923).

- The decisions seem to predicate the nonliability of owners of property, or contractees, to the employees of independent contractors, under circumstances when the work is free from the direction and control of the owner, or contractee, and possession of the premises is not retained by the contractee, either in whole or in part, on the fact that the servants of the contractor, or others coming upon the premises at the invitation of the independent contractor, are invitees of the independent contractor and not of the contractee. McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949).

Worker's claim against a tire manufacturing plant, alleging a violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 due to a forklift having an emergency brake that did not work, thereby allowing the forklift to jump back while holding up a transformer, resulting in the worker's arm being crushed by the fallen transformer, failed; the independent contractor was doing work for the worker's own employer, the worker showed no evidence that the tire plant had actual or constructive knowledge of a defect in the forklift, and the forklift was not a part of the premises. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Merritt, 271 Ga. App. 16, 608 S.E.2d 714 (2004).

Employees of a subcontractor who were electrocuted while working on a construction project had not shown that the owner of the project had the necessary control to be liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. It was not enough that the owner had the right to visit the site, to ensure that the work conformed to the contract drawings and specifications, and to stop work on the project; there had to be such a retention of a right of supervision so that a contractor was not entirely free to do the work in the contractor's own way. Dalton v. 933 Peachtree, L.P., 291 Ga. App. 123, 661 S.E.2d 156 (2008).

- When the owner of premises employs a general contractor to construct a dwelling house upon the premises, and places the general contractor in possession and control of the premises, a subcontractor whom the general contractor employs to do certain work connected with the construction of the building is an invitee of the general contractor to whom the latter owes the duty of ordinary care. Braun v. Wright, 100 Ga. App. 295, 111 S.E.2d 100 (1959).

- United States relinquished possession and control of property to a realty company through an area management broker contract, under which the realty company agreed to arrange for and supervise the management, rehabilitation, and maintenance of the property and to inspect the property on a regular basis and to eliminate any safety hazards that the inspection revealed; thus the realty company became the occupier of the property and thereby assumed the nondelegable duty under Georgia law to exercise ordinary care to keep the property safe. Tisdale v. United States, 62 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1995).

In a slip and fall case, circumstantial evidence of a connection between an independent cleaning service and the liquid in which the plaintiff fell precluded summary judgment for the service. Kelley v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 230 Ga. 508, 496 S.E.2d 732 (1998).

- In a wrongful death action premised on both negligence and negligence per se filed on behalf of a mother's deceased minor son, a premises owner was properly granted summary judgment as the independent contractor that hired the decedent, and not the premises owner, had sole control over its personnel, and the son's hazardous occupation on the owner's premises for a third party did not in and of itself demonstrate that the owner was in violation of Georgia's child labor laws; thus, the appeals court declined to reach the issue of whether an owner who knew or had reason to know that its independent contractor was employing a minor under the age of 16 to perform a dangerous occupation on the owner's premises was in violation of O.C.G.A. § 39-2-2. Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 579, 651 S.E.2d 839 (2007).

- When the record showed that the lessee of a warehouse had at least five of its employees working in the warehouse each day and that, under the express terms of its contract with the defendant, who provided staff to operate the warehouse, it retained responsibility for maintaining certain aspects of the premises, no premises liability attached to the defendant independent contractor. Maddox v. Cumberland Distrib. Servs. of Ga., Inc., 236 Ga. App. 170, 511 S.E.2d 270 (1999).

- Because there was no evidence to challenge the defendant maintenance contractor's status as an independent contractor, the maintenance contractor was not subject to premises liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 since the duties imposed on the defendant premises owner by § 51-3-1 were not delegable. Ahuja v. Cumberland Mall, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2011).

In a couple's slip and fall case, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of an independent contractor that had applied a de-icing mixture to the area on the night before the fall when there was no evidence the injured plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the shopping center and the independent contractor and since there was no evidence that the independent contractor had been negligent. Davidson v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 640, 765 S.E.2d 783 (2014).

- Widow's husband who offered to cut tree limbs on owners' property as part of a church fundraising activity was an independent contractor since there was no evidence that the owner retained the right to control various factors, such as when the limbs would be trimmed or the manner, method, and means of trimming the limbs. Glenn v. Gibbs, 323 Ga. App. 18, 746 S.E.2d 658 (2013).

Landlord Liability

General liability not controlled by this Code section.

- The liabilities of an owner who had been transformed into a landlord was no longer fixed by former Code 1933, § 105-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1), but limited and determined by former Code 1933, § 61-112 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14). Goettee v. Carlyle, 68 Ga. App. 288, 22 S.E.2d 854 (1942); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965); Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga. App. 847, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967).

A landlord was not liable for injuries to a tenant suffered as the result of the independent criminal conduct of a third party which occurred within the premises over which the tenant had complete control; the owner's duty to the tenant was limited to that imposed under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, i.e., a duty to ensure that the leased premises were properly constructed and maintained. Plott v. Cloer, 219 Ga. App. 130, 464 S.E.2d 39 (1995).

An out-of-possession landlord's tort liability to third persons was determined under the premises set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and it was error to assess liability based upon principles of common law negligence. Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 516 S.E.2d 66 (1999), reversing Lemon v. Martin, 232 Ga. App. 579, 502 S.E.2d 273 (1998).

Landlord was not liable for injuries a patron sustained in a restaurant owner's parking lot because although the landlord was responsible by verbal lease for the main structure, while the owner was responsible for maintaining the area where the injury occurred, and the landlord retained limited entry or inspection rights that were unrelated to the cause of the injuries, such limited rights did not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate the landlord's limited liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and replace it with the liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Lake v. APH Enters., LLC, 306 Ga. App. 317, 702 S.E.2d 654 (2010).

Out-of-possession landlord's duty to guests provided in O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14. - Because a landlord was an out-of-possession landlord, guests of the tenant were required to show pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 that their damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or faulty construction of the premises. The guests could not prevail by meeting the less stringent negligence standard applicable to premises owners and occupiers generally, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Aldredge v. Byrd, 341 Ga. App. 300, 799 S.E.2d 263 (2017).

Word "owner" as used in former Code 1933, § 105-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1) was not synonymous with "landlord," as the latter word is used in former Code 1933, § 61-112 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14); and since the owner of land has fully parted with both possession and right of possession by any lawful contract of rental, the owner's liabilities are those prescribed by former Code 1933, §§ 61-112 and 105-401 was without application, though it is otherwise when the possession or the right of possession was not fully parted with. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. Corp. v. Hafer, 21 Ga. App. 246, 94 S.E. 252 (1917); Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Edwards v. Lassiter, 67 Ga. App. 368, 20 S.E.2d 451 (1942); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965); Cooperwood v. Auld, 175 Ga. App. 694, 334 S.E.2d 22 (1985).

- Generally, an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor or its employee because the employer does not control the manner in which the independent contractor's work is done; but when the duty owed to an invitee by a landlord is statutory and nondelegable, the landlord may not escape liability by claiming the negligent act was done by a property manager or other "filter." Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 458 S.E.2d 883 (1995).

In an action against a landlord and apartment manager arising from the death of a tenant who was killed in a fight with another tenant, even assuming the defendants had a duty to intervene in the fight, there was no evidence the defendants breached this duty because the manager attempted to send the two men home and called police when the manager believed a fight was imminent. Traicoff v. Withers, 247 Ga. App. 428, 544 S.E.2d 177 (2000).

Tenant established a material fact issue as to whether a landlord should have reasonably foreseen the tenant's rape, based on evidence regarding a stranger's intrusion into another resident's apartment and the later rape of that resident by an attacker, who was the same man who raped the tenant; these incidents were similar, if not identical, to the tenant's rape, and summary judgment for the landlord in the tenant's premises liability claim was error. Mason v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 106, 633 S.E.2d 426 (2006).

In an O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 premises liability case in which a resident of a mobile home park was shot during a robbery of a mobile home where the resident was staying, the park manager and owner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the resident was precluded from recovery as a matter of law because the resident had equal or superior knowledge of the risk posed by criminal activity at the mobile home park and failed to exercise ordinary care for the resident's own safety. The owner and the manager conceded for purposes of their motion that they were aware of similar crimes that occurred at the park prior to the robbery at issue; irrespective of whether the resident had equal or superior knowledge of the risk of third-party criminal attacks at the park, a question of material fact existed as to whether the resident failed to exercise ordinary care for the resident's own safety. Vilchez v. ARC Cmtys. 17, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2010).

This section may have application in landlord-tenant situation when landlord does not fully part with right of possession. Kreiss v. Allatoona Landing, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 427, 133 S.E.2d 602 (1963).

When a landlord retains a qualified possession and general supervision of the premises the landlord may be liable for injuries arising from the landlord's failure to maintain the premises in proper repair even without actual knowledge, if in the exercise of ordinary care the landlord should have known thereof, and in such circumstances, the use of the words "owner or occupier" is synonymous with "landlord," that is, of a landlord who retains qualified possession and general supervision of the rented premises, as in the case of an apartment house owner. Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952).

A landlord, such as an apartment house owner, who retains qualified possession and general supervision of portions of the demised premises of which common use is made by the tenants, is liable in damages to the tenants and the other invitees for injuries occasioned by the landlord's failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. Nesmith v. Starr, 115 Ga. App. 472, 155 S.E.2d 24 (1967).

- When the landlord retains a qualified possession and general supervision of the landlord's building, the landlord may be held liable for injuries arising from failure to maintain the building in proper repair, even without actual notice of the defect, if, in the exercise of ordinary care, the landlord should have known of it. Paul v. Sharpe, 181 Ga. App. 443, 352 S.E.2d 626 (1987).

Landowner can relinquish control over portion of premises and is thereafter relieved of duties of this section. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970).

Retention of the right to approve tenant insurance policies and the right to enter the leased premises in emergencies and during business hours for landlord related purposes does not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate appellee's limited liability under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and replace it with the liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Godwin v. Olshan, 161 Ga. App. 35, 288 S.E.2d 850 (1982).

Shopping center owner's duty to keep safe premises did not extend to leased areas in which tenant had exclusive possession and control. Stephens v. Clairmont Ctr., Inc., 230 Ga. App. 793, 498 S.E.2d 307 (1998).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to warehouse owner on invitee's claim for damages after the invitee fell, during a party hosted by the tenant, from a skateboard ramp that the tenant installed and was injured as the warehouse owner's retention of the right to inspect the leased premises did not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate the warehouse owner's limited liability under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and replace it with liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, which imposed liability for those having a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping premises safe. Ray v. Smith, 259 Ga. App. 749, 577 S.E.2d 807 (2003).

A landlord owed no duty to provide security at an office complex which was in the exclusive control of the tenant. Gale v. North Meadow Assocs. Joint Venture, 219 Ga. App. 801, 466 S.E.2d 648 (1995).

Lessor of offices in building who retains control of entrance and hallways owes duty of care to all invitees of the tenants. Lebby v. Atlanta Realty Corp., 25 Ga. App. 369, 103 S.E. 433 (1920).

Landlord who neither retains some control, or right of control, or assumes control over premises is ordinarily under no duty to inspect the premises and ascertain whether or not they are in a safe condition. Davis v. City of Atlanta, 84 Ga. App. 572, 66 S.E.2d 188 (1951).

Lessor owes no duty to strangers who enter premises for their own purposes. Jones v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 22 Ga. App. 717, 97 S.E. 112 (1918).

- In order for the landlord to be liable it must appear that notice of the defective and unsafe condition of the premises had been given to the landlord, and a reasonable opportunity afforded the landlord to repair the defective condition; or it must appear that the landlord otherwise had knowledge of the defect in the premises that caused the tenant to receive personal injuries. Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S.E.2d 651 (1963).

- When a portion of leased premises is dangerously out of repair and that condition is known to the tenant who continues to use that area, the tenant cannot recover from the landlord for damages resulting from the condition; but the severity of the doctrine of assumption of risk has been ameliorated in cases when its application would make the tenant "a captive" in the tenant's own home. Carey v. Bradford, 218 Ga. App. 325, 461 S.E.2d 290 (1995).

When a dangerous area is tenant's only access or only safe or reasonable access to the home, tenant's equal knowledge of the danger does not excuse the landlord of damages caused by the landlord's failure to keep the premises in repair. Carey v. Bradford, 218 Ga. App. 325, 461 S.E.2d 290 (1995).

When a person appearing to park in a space at an apartment complex suddenly jumped the curb, crossed a sidewalk, and fatally struck a child, the complex's landlord was not liable to the child's parents for not installing "bumper stops" in the complex's parking lot because such devices were not required by any state, federal or local law or ordinance, and a highway traffic safety manual the parents' expert relied on in opining that such devices were required had limited application to parking lots and indicated they had a limited ability to shield pedestrians from vehicles. Sotomayor v. TAMA I, LLC, 274 Ga. App. 323, 617 S.E.2d 606 (2005).

When a person appearing to park in a space at an apartment complex suddenly jumped the curb, crossed a sidewalk, and fatally struck a child, the complex's landlord was not liable to the child's parents for not installing "bumper stops" in the complex's parking lot, even though it had installed them around its leasing office, because it was not shown they were installed to protect pedestrians, and there was no evidence that anyone had driven a car into the wall of one of the buildings at the complex, as occurred here, providing the landlord with notice of the possibility of such an event. Sotomayor v. TAMA I, LLC, 274 Ga. App. 323, 617 S.E.2d 606 (2005).

When a person appearing to park in a space at an apartment complex suddenly jumped the curb, crossed a sidewalk, and fatally struck a child, the complex's landlord was not liable to the child's parents because it was not reasonably foreseeable that such an event would occur. Sotomayor v. TAMA I, LLC, 274 Ga. App. 323, 617 S.E.2d 606 (2005).

Liability results only from landlord's failure to exercise ordinary care to make repairs after notice to the landlord of defective condition coupled with a failure to repair within a reasonable time. Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S.E.2d 651 (1963).

Notice of separate and independent patent defect, in no way connected with latent defect which occasioned the injury, cannot be taken as constructive notice of latter, or as devolving upon the landlord any duty of inspection. Hendrick v. Muse, 48 Ga. App. 295, 172 S.E. 661 (1934).

- Even though the landlord had purchased the premises only 12 days prior to the plaintiff's fall, it was not self-evident that such period of time was insufficient to discover the claimed hazard; thus, the issue of the landlord's constructive knowledge was for the jury. Yeh v. Arnold, 232 Ga. App. 725, 503 S.E.2d 645 (1998).

In the invitee's premises liability action against the landlord, a factual issue existed as to the landlord's knowledge of the backyard hazard because the invitee offered proof that the landlord did not act responsibly in taking care of the outside of the house; the landlord admittedly did not inspect the yard for hazards or perform work in the back yard; the tenant testified that the landlord was very poor at maintaining the back yard; and the invitee's testimony regarding the size of the hole and the overgrowth covering the hole would permit a reasonable jury to infer both that the hole had been in existence for a substantial period of time and that the hole was large enough to have been observable during routine mowing and maintenance. Watson v. Dana, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 10, 2020).

- In certain circumstances, evidence of a similar prior occurrence is admissible to show knowledge on the owner's or landlord's part of a dangerous condition. Sparks v. Pine Forest Enters., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 598, 331 S.E.2d 34 (1985).

Incidents which occurred more than two months apart and involved different persons and conditions of surface and lighting and which occurred at a different address apparently some considerable distance apart were not sufficiently closely related or similar to the circumstances of each other as to be relevant evidence as to landlord's knowledge of a dangerous condition. Sparks v. Pine Forest Enters., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 598, 331 S.E.2d 34 (1985).

In action alleging apartment owner/managers' negligence in failing to provide a door sufficiently secured to deter criminal entry, evidence of other criminal incidents involving forced entry through a similar door that had occurred in the apartment complex during the three years prior to the attack on the plaintiff was admissible as evidence of the owner/managers' knowledge of the specific dangerous condition alleged. Bayshore Co. v. Pruitt, 175 Ga. App. 679, 334 S.E.2d 213 (1985).

Because a landlord knew that a v-notch in a curb was dangerous when covered with straw and knew that the tenants and their invitees regularly and improperly crossed the yard near the curb, the landlord was liable for an invitee's injuries under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 when the invitee fell in the v-notch. Brad Bradford Realty, Inc. v. Callaway, 276 Ga. App. 648, 624 S.E.2d 179 (2005).

Guest of tenant is invitee upon premises of landlord when the guest is invited by the tenant and visits the tenant in such premises. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

- Plaintiff while present in an apartment house as the guest of a tenant is an invitee within the purview of this principle. Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937).

As regards the liability of the owner of an apartment house, a guest of a tenant therein may be an invitee. Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952).

Landlord is liable to one lawfully brought on rented premises, by invitation of tenant, for injuries arising from failure to keep premises in repair, when the defect is known to the landlord or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been known, providing, of course, the person killed or injured was also in the exercise of due care. Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952).

Since the defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of the previous existence of alleged defects at the time the property was leased to the plaintiff's son the defendant's failure to remedy the defects or warn of their existence constituted a breach of duty owed by the defendant to invitees on the premises. Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954).

The guests of invitee tenants, those coming on the leased premises for business purposes beneficial to the tenant, and those doing business with the tenant are there by the tenant's invitation and stand in the tenant's shoes insofar as the guests suffer injury due to the negligence of the owner or occupier of the premises. Davis v. Garden Servs., Inc., 155 Ga. App. 34, 270 S.E.2d 228 (1980).

It is not essential that a direct contractual relation between the plaintiff and the owner be shown if the presence of the plaintiff is such that it should have been anticipated by the owner for the mutual benefit of the plaintiff and the owner's tenant. Davis v. Garden Servs., Inc., 155 Ga. App. 34, 270 S.E.2d 228 (1980).

- The common-law duty of the defendant "to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe" for invitees exist independently of any particular terms of a lease agreement between the defendant and a third party. Mitchell v. Gay, 111 Ga. App. 867, 143 S.E.2d 568 (1965).

Although landlord might be held liable for injuries so sustained, it does not preclude liability on part of lessee. Fuller v. Louis Steyerman & Sons, 46 Ga. App. 830, 169 S.E. 508 (1933).

- When an eight-year-old child, paying the child's first visit to the apartment complex where the child's aunt and cousin lived, was injured when a bridge railing in a common area gave way as the child leaned on it, as to invitees on bridge, such as the child, liability of the owner and manager of the complex was not predicated upon wanton and willful negligence. The applicable standard of care is that prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Paul v. Sharpe, 181 Ga. App. 443, 352 S.E.2d 626 (1987).

Where owner of property leases it to be used in conduct of business, those coming upon premises in connection with business are invitees of owner and proprietor. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958); Atlanta Braves, Inc. v. Leslie, 190 Ga. App. 49, 378 S.E.2d 133 (1989).

Tenant owes no duty of protection to customers of cotenants. Smith v. Inman, 32 Ga. App. 24, 122 S.E. 632 (1924).

- Trial court erred in denying an apartment building owner's motion for summary judgment on an invitee's premises liability claim arising out of the invitee's slipping and falling in a puddle of water in the building's laundry room; the invitee offered no evidence that the owner had actual knowledge of the hazard, and could not show constructive knowledge given that the owner inspected the laundry room every two hours and there was no evidence of any prior slip and fall. Patrick v. Macon Hous. Auth., 250 Ga. App. 806, 552 S.E.2d 455 (2001).

Summary judgment was properly entered for a landlord and a property manager (appellees) in a negligence suit filed by an injured party as appellees complied with state law as to the installation of smoke detectors contained in O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40(a)(2), and as evidence of any failure to maintain the detectors was inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40(g); as O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40(a)(2) was more specific, it governed over any conflicting statutory or common law duty of care, such as those contained in O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-13 and51-3-1, and as O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40(g) was enacted more recently than the older statutes, it controlled. Hill v. Tschannen, 264 Ga. App. 288, 590 S.E.2d 133 (2003).

In a wrongful death suit, because the record was devoid of any evidence that the landlords knew that a tenant, a nephew, had left a gun accessible and loaded on the day a visiting youth was shot, or any other occasion, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment for the landlords; since the landlords knew or should have known that the nephew would have friends occasionally come to visit at the leased premises, the landlords, as possessors of the land, would have been subject to liability for the youth's fatal injury by the loaded shotgun if, but only if, the landlords knew or had reason to know of the hazard in the nephew's loft room and then failed to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn visitors, which such superior knowledge of the hazard on the part of the landlords was not shown. McCullough v. Reyes, 287 Ga. App. 483, 651 S.E.2d 810 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 178 (Ga. 2008).

In a social guest's suit for personal injuries brought against the tenants of certain real property as well as the property owner and the owner's property management company, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the property owner as there was no evidence that the property owner had actual or constructive knowledge of any problem with the condition of or construction of the deck that fell while the guest was standing upon the deck. Silman v. Assocs. Bellemeade, 294 Ga. App. 764, 669 S.E.2d 663 (2008), aff'd, 286 Ga. 27, 685 S.E.2d 277 (2009).

Trial court erred by denying a building owner's motion for summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 in an employee's action to recover damages for injuries the employee sustained when the door to a handicap bathroom stall the employee used at work fell off of the door's hinges because the owner had no actual knowledge of any problem with bathroom stall door hinges; the owner conducted reasonable inspections of the property as a matter of law and had never received a report of any problems with any bathroom door hinges before the employee's injury, and there was no evidence that an inspection of the hinge would have revealed any defect. Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ga. App. 1, 720 S.E.2d 329 (2011).

- Even assuming that a landlord retained possession and control of premises the landlord owned, the landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when a tenant's dog bit the plaintiff since there was no evidence that the plaintiff had superior knowledge of any dangerous condition. Webb v. Danforth, 234 Ga. App. 211, 505 S.E.2d 860 (1998).

Trial court did not err in granting a dog owner summary judgment in a roommate's action under the vicious animal statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, and the premises liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, to recover damages for injuries the roommate sustained when the owner's dog attacked the roommate inside the owner's townhouse because the roommate had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity equal to that of the owner's; the roommate's own testimony was that the roommate was aware of the dog's previous unprovoked attack and was nervous when around the dog, presumably because the roommate was afraid that the dog could attack again. Stolte v. Hammack, 311 Ga. App. 710, 716 S.E.2d 796 (2011).

In an action by a woman seriously injured in a pit bull attack, the landlord of the dogs' owners was entitled to summary judgment despite the landlord's failure to fix a broken gate latch, O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, because there was no evidence that the landlord was aware of the dogs' vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals erred in applying O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 to the landlord and to presume such awareness because the statute applied only to owners and keepers of dangerous animals. Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480, 826 S.E.2d 100 (2019).

- In a typical dog bite case, regardless of whether the cause of action is based on the premises liability statute of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, or the dangerous animal liability statute of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, a plaintiff must produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in order to show that the owner of the premises had superior knowledge of the danger. Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316, 667 S.E.2d 135 (2008).

- In a parent's personal injury action seeking to hold the dog owner's liable for injury to the parent's child, the dog owners were entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence that the dog ever displayed vicious behavior or evinced a propensity to bite anyone prior to biting the child as required for such an action. Swanson v. Tackling, 335 Ga. App. 810, 783 S.E.2d 167 (2016).

- In the invitee's premises liability action against the landlord, the tenant's testimony raised a question of fact as to whether the landlord retained control over the backyard and thus owed a duty of ordinary care to keep the yard reasonably safe for the invitee. Watson v. Dana, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 10, 2020).

- The trial court correctly concluded that apartment complex owner had no responsibility for installing or maintaining traffic signal device, as that duty is officially vested in municipalities by virtue of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50. Zumbado v. Lincoln Property Co., 209 Ga. App. 163, 433 S.E.2d 301 (1993).

- Whether a landlord provided an adequate fire detection and alarm system in a rented house was an issue of fact for the jury. Denise v. Cannon, 219 Ga. App. 765, 466 S.E.2d 885 (1995).

- In a premises liability action involving the drowning death of a child following a car being driven into an apartment complex lake, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the apartment complex because it could not be negligent as a matter of law for failing to foresee the events at issue, notwithstanding the complex's failure to install a guardrail along the lake. Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P., 333 Ga. App. 222, 775 S.E.2d 763 (2015).

- In a premises liability action involving a rape of a minor at an apartment building, the trial court abused the court's discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery without either reaching the merits or determining whether the desired discovery procedures had been promptly commenced, diligently pursued, and completed without unnecessary delay and the court's reasoning that trial was only a few weeks away with no time to address the matter fairly and thoughtfully was not compelling. Pres. Mgmt., Inc. v. Herrera, 352 Ga. App. 710, 835 S.E.2d 777 (2019).

- When, in an action by the tenant's business invitee to recover damages from the landlord, the judge charged O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, and then immediately charged O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, the court charged what might be termed the qualifying section first, and then immediately charged the section which it was intended to qualify. The court thus went from the particular to the general rather than from the general to the particular, and this assembling in the charge of the language of the two sections if error, was not harmful to the plaintiff. Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 35 S.E.2d 364 (1945).

This section applies to a master-servant relationship, and it is not error to give a charge verbatim from this section in a negligence action by a servant against the master. Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972).

Duty of the master to use ordinary care to keep the master's premises safe so that the master's servants may perform their duties in safety is but a phrase of the ancient organized doctrine of the common law codified in this section which provides that when the owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads the others to come upon the master's premises for any lawful purpose, the master is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by the master's failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and the approaches safe. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hilderbrand, 48 Ga. App. 140, 172 S.E. 87 (1933); Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 376, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948).

General rule of law declaring duty of master in regard to furnishing servant safe place to work is usually applied to permanent place, or one which is quasi permanent. It does not apply to such places as are constantly shifting and being transformed as a direct result of the servant's labor, and when the work in its progress necessarily changes the character for safety of the place in which it is performed as it progresses. Powell v. Shurling, 51 Ga. App. 67, 179 S.E. 653 (1935).

- When in an action by an injured invitee (servant) for damages the petition failed to allege that the owner (master) had knowledge of the decayed condition of the underside of the outside stairway, but did allege this defect and rotten condition did not exist and was not apparent at the time of previous repairs to those steps and at the time of the invitee's fall the condition "could not be seen by ordinary observation," and in effect based the invitee's petition on the theory that it was the absolute duty of the owner (master) to make an inspection of the premises, for the purpose of keeping them in repair, irrespective of any apparent fact or circumstance which might, to a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary diligence, indicate the necessity of any such inspection, the judge did not err in sustaining the demurrer (now motion to dismiss) and in dismissing the petition. Williamson v. Kidd, 65 Ga. App. 285, 15 S.E.2d 801 (1941).

Neither in master and servant cases nor in invitee cases has a master or owner been held liable when one did not know of the danger and when one was not lacking in the exercise of ordinary diligence in discovering the danger; however, the master or owner need not have either actual knowledge or implied notice of the result of the danger. Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 376, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948).

- It was not necessary in order for the petition seeking damages for the death of the plaintiff's husband, an employee of the defendant, to state a cause of action that it allege that the master or owner had either actual knowledge or implied notice that butane gas was in the well in which the servant or invitee was working; since the petition alleged that the master or owner knew that butane gas was installed on the master or owner's premises, knew that the tank and the pipeline were of secondhand material, knew that the gas line was buried at a point on the master or owner's property within four feet of the well where the servant or invitee would be at work, and knew that the men whom the master or owner procured to install the tank and pipe were unskilled in this type of work, the master or owner was chargeable with the knowledge that the pipeline was defective in that through rust and decay it had become weakened and was unfit for the transmission of butane gas and dangerous. Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 376, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948).

- Petition alleging that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was bitten by a dog on entering the premises, and that a defendant did not furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work, in that keeping the dog endangered the plaintiff's life and safety while the plaintiff was in the performance of duties incident to the plaintiff's employment since no facts were alleged to show that the defendant had knowledge that the dog was vicious, or that it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to work in the house with the dog present, failed to set out a cause of action because of the failure to allege facts showing the defendant knew, or should have known of the danger. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944).

- When the peanut market plant contracted with the employee's employer to remove and replace a motor from the top of a grain elevator at the plant, where the employee's injury was received from a danger that would ordinarily and naturally exist in doing the work which the employee was employed to perform, and since the employee could not have engaged in the work without knowing and seeing the identical condition which, as grounds of negligence, it was alleged that the master allowed to exist, the general rule of a master providing a safe work place to a servant or employee pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 did not apply. Howell v. Farmers Peanut Mkt. of Sowega, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 610, 442 S.E.2d 904 (1994).

- Construction or demolition sites by their inherent nature are naturally temporary and in a state of continuous alteration. Since removal of asphalt shingles to reveal wooden shingles below perforce would have altered a roof's condition and affected the footing of persons working on the roof, an injury while doing this work was an exception to the general rule of a master providing a safe work place to a servant or employee pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Elsberry v. Ivery, 209 Ga. App. 620, 434 S.E.2d 158 (1993).

Under facts alleged, petition did not show duty on defendants' part to warn servant of independent contractor as to the condition of the smokestack, which the servant climbed for the purpose of painting the smokestack. McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949).

- When the defendant's servant had no authority to employ the plaintiff-customer to assist the servant in the manner alleged, the plaintiff became the servant of the defendant's servant when the plaintiff assisted the servant of the master and since in this capacity the plaintiff was not the servant or invitee of the defendant, the plaintiff could not recover for injuries received. Barber v. Rich's, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 880, 90 S.E.2d 666 (1955).

- A company was not liable to a decedent's estate or the decedent's aunt for injuries inflicted on them by the decedent's estranged husband after the women fled their home seeking safety at the company's premises; the attack was not reasonably foreseeable by the company, and the decedent and the decedent's aunt had knowledge equal to or superior to that of the company that the husband had threatened to kill the decedent on the day of the attack and that the husband had a violent history and knew where the decedent worked. Cook v. Micro Craft, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 434, 585 S.E.2d 628 (2003).

- It is a misdirection to charge the jury in language the effect of which is to subject the master to more extensive obligations than those indicated by the phrase "ordinary care" or its equivalents. Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972).

- Whether plaintiff's spouse, employee-invitee of the defendant, was in the exercise of ordinary care in failing to discover the presence of gas in the well prior to the explosion, was a jury question. Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 396, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948).

- Whether the conditions leading to the death of the deceased, the owner or employer's knowledge of their existence, and the owner's or employer's failure to warn the servant or invitee of them, amounted to the lack of the exercise of ordinary care, was a jury question. Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 396, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948).

It is the duty of innkeeper not only to furnish his guest or patron with shelter and comforts but also to exercise ordinary care to protect the guest from danger. Newton v. Candace, 94 Ga. App. 385, 94 S.E.2d 739 (1956).

Innkeeper is not insurer of guests' safety but has only a duty to see that the premises are reasonably safe. Truett v. Morgan, 153 Ga. App. 778, 266 S.E.2d 557 (1980).

- In a slip and fall case dealing with a hotel tub, the guest and the guest's wife presented a fact question as to whether the tub had any nonslip surface because the guest stated that the tub had no traction, only dark striping where possibly traction strips used to be, but the other witnesses stated that the dark stripes were traction strips built into the tub which did not wear out and could not be removed; and the guest's wife stated that the hotel's general manager told the wife that the hotel's bathrooms were being renovated, that there were no traction strips in that shower, and that the room should not have been occupied, but the manager stated that the manager did not remember discussing traction strips or tub surfaces with the wife. Hall v. Noble-Interstate Management Group, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 661, 824 S.E.2d 705 (2019).

For purposes of a negligence per se claim based on a slip and fall in a hotel bathtub, the guest and the guest's wife raised a jury question as to whether the defendants violated hotel/motel safety codes requiring anti-slip tubs, slip strips, appliques, or slip-proof mats because a jury could find that the guest's fall resulted from an unreasonable risk of harm because the hotel's tub did not have proper or regulation-compliant traction. Hall v. Noble-Interstate Management Group, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 661, 824 S.E.2d 705 (2019).

- In a premises liability action, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the hotel owner because a jury question existed as to the hotel's exercise of reasonable care since there was testimony that another grab bar had been repaired previously and a jury could find that the hotel lacked reasonable inspection procedures and, thus, had at least constructive knowledge of the defect. Bright v. Sandstone Hospitality, LLC, 327 Ga. App. 157, 755 S.E.2d 899 (2014).

Duty of restaurant proprietor is to exercise ordinary care to keep premises safe. Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 507, 148 S.E.2d 451 (1966).

Evidence that a restaurant parking lot had been in disrepair for many years authorized the finding that the defendant failed in the defendant's duty to carry out periodic inspections and to take reasonable steps to protect the invitees from those dangers foreseeable from the uneven parking lot. Jackson v. Waffle House, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 371, 537 S.E.2d 188 (2000).

- Merchant's selection and use of devices, such as "Wet Floor" signs, designed to warn patrons of one hazard that have the inherent potential to expose the patron to a different one does not relieve the merchant of the duty to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition and not to expose the invitees to unreasonable risk. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009).

Restaurant acted reasonably in fulfilling the restaurant's duty toward a customer by calling the police after the customer followed another patron outside into the parking lot and the patron produced a gun. Modesitt v. Waffle House, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 381, 444 S.E.2d 412 (1994).

- Whether the proprietor of a public restaurant was negligent in failing to exercise ordinary care in protecting the plaintiff as a customer from an unlawful assault made upon the plaintiff by another customer who was drunk, quarrelsome, and arrogant, and whose condition was known to the proprietor, and when the offending customer had caused some commotion and argument before injuring the plaintiff, was a question for the jury, and the trial court erred in deciding it on demurrer (now motion to dismiss) and in dismissing the case. Hall v. Davis, 75 Ga. App. 819, 44 S.E.2d 685 (1947).

- While it may be true that the mere fact that there is a slight difference between floor levels in different parts of a restaurant which the public is invited to enter does not of itself constitute negligence, and that the mere fact that the floor of a restaurant which the public is invited to enter is highly polished, so as to be slippery, does not constitute negligence of itself, and that a restaurant which the public is invited to enter may be so dimly lighted as to be in a state of semidarkness does not constitute negligence of itself, it cannot be said as a matter of law that, in a restaurant where to the restauranteur's knowledge the three elements exist together, their combined effect is not to create a dangerous condition, nor that the restauranteur is not negligent in failing to give invitees notice or warning of such condition. Pilgreen v. Hanson, 89 Ga. App. 703, 81 S.E.2d 18 (1954), later appeal, 94 Ga. App. 423, 94 S.E.2d 752 (1956).

Restaurant owner was not liable to a guest who was injured in a drive-by shooting committed by the spouse of a waitress at the restaurant. Hillcrest Foods, Inc. v. Kiritsy, 227 Ga. App. 554, 489 S.E.2d 547 (1997).

Restaurant and employee thereof were not liable for injuries received by a patron during an altercation with another person since neither the restaurant nor the employee could have reasonably foreseen the consequences of failing to remove the assailant from the premises. Ableman v. Taco Bell Corp., 231 Ga. App. 761, 501 S.E.2d 26 (1998).

Even if a restaurant owner violated a duty to an invitee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to keep the premises safe, handcuffing the invitee too tightly when the invitee was arrested following an altercation at the restaurant was an intervening act by a police officer which was not foreseeable to the owner, was not triggered by the original negligence, and was sufficient by itself to cause the injury. Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516 (2009).

- In an action by a patron against a hair salon for injuries allegedly caused by the collapse of a defectively designed and manufactured facial table, since there were issues of fact as to whether ordinary diligence required an inspection of the table by the salon sufficient to reveal the defect, summary judgment for the salon was not authorized. Brown v. Who's Three, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 131, 457 S.E.2d 186 (1995).

- Genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a handicapped-accessible ramp was unsafe and whether the plaintiff's use of the ramp was unreasonable. Davis v. GBR Properties, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 550, 504 S.E.2d 204 (1998).

- A motel owner is required to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. The owner has a duty to guests to afford premises that are reasonably safe for use, and a duty to inspect which would render the owner liable for injuries caused by defects which would be disclosed by a reasonable inspection. Coates v. Mulji Motor Inn, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 208, 342 S.E.2d 488 (1986).

An earlier burglary of one of the defendant's motel rooms where the lighting immediately outside was dim was admissible in the plaintiffs' suit alleging that as a result of poor lighting, the area immediately outside the motel room where the plaintiffs were attacked and robbed was a "defective condition" subjecting the plaintiffs to unreasonable risk of harm from criminal activity. Burdine v. Linquist, 177 Ga. App. 545, 340 S.E.2d 198 (1986).

Innkeeper had no duty to inform guests of prior criminal incidents cited by the plaintiffs since the incidents were sufficiently dissimilar to their assault/robbery to have placed the innkeeper on notice that reasonable grounds existed to believe that the subject criminal act was likely to occur. Burnett v. Stagner Hotel Courts, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1994).

Summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted to a motel company, dismissing a guest's suit seeking to recover for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on the shower floor in the company's motel, because the guest failed to demonstrate that the shower floor presented a hazard, and even assuming that the guest had shown the existence of a hazard, the guest failed to show that the company possessed superior knowledge of the potential harm under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Bryant v. DIVYA, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 101, 628 S.E.2d 163 (2006).

Summary judgment for a motel's owner was affirmed as although a guest allegedly bitten by a poisonous spider submitted an expert's affidavit that a pest control company breached the company's standard of care and affidavits that there were spider incidents at the owner's other properties, it was undisputed that the owner had no knowledge that there were venomous spiders in the rooms at the motel. Dew v. Motel Props., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 368, 638 S.E.2d 753 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 205 (Ga. 2007).

Court of appeals did not err in affirming an order granting a motel summary judgment in a spouse's wrongful death action, alleging that the failure of the motel's personnel to heed the spouse's concern about the guest amounted to a breach of duty to render aid to a guest because the motel had no duty to comply with the spouse's requests to attempt a rescue of the guest from the guest's medical peril; the alleged negligence in the spouse's suit could not be credibly cast as a condition of the premises or akin to a premises hazard like a smoke-filled building because any risk or problem stemming from a medical condition unrelated to and not caused by the guest's stay at the facility was not internal to the premises but rather internal to the guest. Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc., 289 Ga. 565, 713 S.E.2d 835 (2011).

- Whether a motel owner and the patron had equal knowledge of the dangers in using the motel's swimming pool at night without an underwater light being turned on was a question for the jury, when the motel owner knew that the underwater light was there and that was in part a safety device, knew that there was a steep slope, was experienced in caring for the pool, had observed its use by guests under various conditions, used it personally, and was familiar with its characteristics. Coates v. Mulji Motor Inn, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 208, 342 S.E.2d 488 (1986).

- Hotel was not liable to a person injured in a fight in the hotel because the party had equal or superior knowledge of the threat of harm posed by a co-worker based on an earlier altercation outside of the front entrance of the hotel, the fact that the party saw the co-worker return to the hotel after hotel security broke up their fight, the fact that the party was aware that the co-worker wanted to continue fighting, and the fact that the party made a conscious decision to return to the hotel without attempting to contact hotel security. Snellgrove v. Hyatt Corp., 277 Ga. App. 119, 625 S.E.2d 517 (2006).

- Trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of a hotel in a guest's suit against the hotel on the guest's premises liability claim after a massage therapist allegedly sexually assaulted the guest because that claim required that the guest show a causal connection between the massage therapist's background and the injuries sustained, and the guest failed to show that the hotel knew or reasonably should have known that the massage therapist had a tendency to engage in behavior relevant to the guest's injuries. Tomsic v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 374, 739 S.E.2d 521 (2013).

- In an action for damages caused when a guest was shot on hotel premises, summary judgment for the hotel was precluded when a record of criminal activity in parking lots of nearby hotels, including serious crimes against persons, coupled with a record of criminal activity in the hotel's own parking lot (a crime about once every two weeks) was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether the hotel was put on notice that criminal conduct against the hotel's guests was foreseeable, creating a duty to protect the hotel's guests against violent crimes. Matt v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 212 Ga. App. 792, 443 S.E.2d 290 (1994), aff'd, 265 Ga. 235, 454 S.E.2d 507 (1995).

- Mere knowledge by the owner or operator of a service station that one means of access to its premises has been blocked, the obstacle being placed on the property of a shopping center at the entrance of a common way connecting the two places of business, which way belongs to the shopping center and over which the owner and operator of the service station has a mere easement of passage, together with failure of the owner and operator of the service station to remove the obstacle so placed an undetermined period of time prior to the plaintiff's injuries caused by the latter's collision with the obstacle, or failure of such owner or operator to give warning does not constitute actionable negligence on the part of such owner and operator. Spindel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 100 Ga. App. 323, 111 S.E.2d 160 (1959).

- In a premises liability suit brought by an amusement park customer who claimed that mildew underneath a mat caused the customer to slip, it could not be said that the park lacked constructive knowledge of the hazard; there were issues of fact as to whether the park had inspected the mat on the date of the incident and as to whether an alleged inspection had been adequate. Valentin v. Six Flags Over Ga., L.P., 286 Ga. App. 508, 649 S.E.2d 809 (2007).

Six Flags, an amusement park, cannot evade liability for the foreseeable consequence of the park's failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the park's premises safe, simply because the park's patron had moved off those premises in an attempt to distance oneself from the patron's attackers. Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 801 S.E.2d 24 (2017).

While the off-duty police officers hired by Six Flags may have sometimes assisted Cobb County with security issues outside the park's gates, the evidence does not show the level of dominion and control required to render the company responsible for the safety of its patrons at and around the bus stop in the same way it is responsible within the confines of the park's premises and approaches. Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 801 S.E.2d 24 (2017).

Spectator Events and Facilities

Theater.

- The owner of a motion-picture theatre is liable to its customers or patrons, who are invitees, when they purchase tickets and enter the theatre for the purpose of witnessing the show, when such owner is negligent in causing or allowing the slippery substance to be placed and remain on the floor in the theatre. United Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Carpenter, 68 Ga. App. 438, 23 S.E.2d 189 (1942).

After the plaintiff, as a member of the public entered the first floor of the theatre, which was poorly lighted, and walked in search of a seat, and, when the plaintiff reached a point near the right-hand side of the seat, fell into an open stairway, of which the plaintiff had no notice or knowledge, and which the plaintiff could not see, and was injured and was not warned by the ushers or other employees of the existence of such open stairway, the defendants were negligent. Smith v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 46 Ga. App. 760, 169 S.E. 243 (1933).

Injured party failed to show that the theater had knowledge of a dangerous condition and that the injured party did not; the injured party was aware of the amount of light in the theater as the injured party had already walked upstairs to get to the seat, walked down several more stairs before falling, and if the injured party thought it was too dark to walk down the stairs, it was incumbent upon the injured party to inquire about alternatives. Lake v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 195, 570 S.E.2d 638 (2002).

- There being nothing in the petition to show that the assault complained of, or anything of such character, could or should have been anticipated by the defendant, or that the defendant failed to do anything that the defendant should have done for the safety or protection of the plaintiff as the defendant's invitee, the petition fails to show negligence, and the general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) thereto should have been sustained. Atlanta Baseball Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ga. App. 497, 144 S.E. 351 (1928).

Since the defendant sponsored meetings on the defendant's premises, it could not be said that the plaintiff did not occupy position of invitee on the defendant's premises when the plaintiff allegedly received the injuries complained of. American Legion v. Simonton, 94 Ga. App. 184, 94 S.E.2d 66 (1956).

When sponsor of a soap box derby invited public to attend contest held on a public street, a person attending became an invitee by express invitation to the public generally. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Graden, 79 Ga. App. 230, 53 S.E.2d 371 (1949).

When a petition alleges that a certain street of a municipality was set aside to the sponsor of a soap box derby for the purpose of conducting the derby for the entertainment of the public, and the races are conducted by such sponsor who received the benefit of valuable advertising by reason thereof, and the contest was attended by the public at the invitation of such sponsor, the sponsor became an occupier of the premises within the meaning of this section. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Graden, 79 Ga. App. 230, 53 S.E.2d 371 (1949).

Defendant lodge was under duty to exercise ordinary care to keep clubroom and means of access thereto in reasonably safe condition for use by defendant's invitees. Hanson v. Atlanta Lodge No. 78 B.P.O. Elks, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 116, 76 S.E.2d 77 (1953).

- Since the invitee's injury was caused by vomit on the owner's floor, before the owner would be liable therefor it must appear that the owner knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that this substance was on the floor. United Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Carpenter, 68 Ga. App. 438, 23 S.E.2d 189 (1942).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the facility operator because an attendee, after attending a concert at the facility, slipped and fell on gum balls that had fallen from sweet gum trees; the operator was not liable under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, as the accumulation of gum balls from sweet gum trees was natural, and there was no evidence that it had become an obvious hazard. Leibel v. Sandy Springs Historic Cmty. Found., Inc., 281 Ga. App. 390, 636 S.E.2d 27 (2006).

- It would impose too great a duty upon the proprietor of a place of amusement and would make the proprietor the insurer of the safety of all patrons, which the proprietor is not, to require the proprietor at all times to have immediate knowledge of and to remove every article on which a patron might stumble and fall when the article is placed there, not by the defendant or the defendant's employees, but by other patrons. Jones v. West End Theatre Co., 94 Ga. App. 299, 94 S.E.2d 135 (1956).

Stadium owner was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries from a fall on a cup or liquid from the cup as the plaintiff was walking down the stairs after a game because it would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, for the owner to implement inspection procedures to address this particular situation. Daniels v. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 751, 524 S.E.2d 801 (1999).

- When a person wishing to witness a professional baseball game purchases a ticket and chooses or accepts a seat in a portion of the grandstand which is unprotected, he voluntarily assumes the risk inherent in such a position, the person being presumed to know there is a likelihood of wild balls being thrown or batted into the grandstand thus unprotected; when during the warm-up preliminary to playing such a professional baseball game a wild ball is thrown into that portion of the grandstand occupied by such spectator and the spectator is injured, the spectator cannot recover. Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S.E.2d 828 (1949).

By entering the theater, the patron voluntarily assumed the risk that other patrons might negligently throw popcorn cartons to the floor, and that patrons often did so, and, knowing that the management would not and did not attempt to clean the cartons up during the progress of the entertainment, the patron assumed the risk of finding one of the cartons in the patron's path. Rogers v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 89 Ga. App. 903, 81 S.E.2d 721 (1954).

Plaintiffs' claim that a church induced them to walk on boards on an infield was rejected as the plaintiffs' photographs showed that although the track was fenced off from the bleachers, with the boards covering the only opening in the fencing, people attending the event had the options of either stepping off the boards as soon as they cleared the fencing or stepping over them altogether; the plaintiffs were under no compulsion to remain on the boards as the plaintiffs moved towards the infield, nor was the church responsible for the injured party's distraction as the party walked across the boards since the party knew of their dangerous condition before becoming distracted. Haggerty v. Hebron Baptist Church, Inc., 273 Ga. App. 371, 615 S.E.2d 148 (2005).

- Summary judgment for a church was affirmed as the injured party knew before a fall that the boards "were not anchored down," "were not flush with each other," and "moved" when a vehicle drove over the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs could not show that they lacked knowledge of the boards' dangerous condition and, therefore, could not prove that the church's negligence caused the fall. Haggerty v. Hebron Baptist Church, Inc., 273 Ga. App. 371, 615 S.E.2d 148 (2005).

- Sponsor of performance at a public civic center that it had leased did not have a duty to inspect the leased premises and approaches to discover and to warn of the existence of the dangers of plate glass doors since the sponsor had no actual knowledge prior to the incident at issue that any glass door in the center had been broken and had no reason to think that an inspection was necessary. Zellers v. Theater of Stars, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 406, 319 S.E.2d 553 (1984).

- Trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of an arts center in a widow's wrongful death action because the center had no duty as a matter of law to provide an on-site ambulance or an automatic external defibrillator device at the concert the widow and her husband attended; the widow did not adduce any evidence that the traffic on the night her husband suffered a cardiac arrest was hazardous or that the ambulance that answered the 911 call was delayed by the concert crowd or traffic. Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., Inc., 311 Ga. App. 693, 716 S.E.2d 713 (2011).

Miscellaneous

Agent may be liable when possessing sole authority to manage property.

- When a landowner gives an agent sole authority to manage property, including renting and repairing, and when it is specifically alleged that the agent agreed to and did in fact assume such authority for the landowner, the agent may be held individually liable for a violation of this duty, not as an agent, but as an independent tort-feasor whose breach of duty owed to a third person is the actionable negligence. Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954).

An agent who undertakes the sole and complete control and management of the principal's premises is liable to third persons, to whom a duty is owing on the part of the owner, for injuries resulting from the owner's negligence in failing to make or keep the premises in a safe condition. Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954).

- Because of the special relationship existing between a nursing home and its residents, the residents must generally be considered invitees of the home. Accordingly, as to such residents, the nursing home has a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises safe. Pye v. Taylor & Bird, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 814, 456 S.E.2d 63 (1995).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred in imposing liability on a condominium association for the security company's share of fault as the general verdict did not distinguish the award and the jury may have imposed fault on the condominium association based strictly on a theory of nuisance, and the imposition of fault on the security company under common law, which negligence could be completely independent of, and not imputable to the condominium association. Camelot Club Condo. Assoc. v. Afari-Opoku, 340 Ga. App. 618, 798 S.E.2d 241 (2017).

- In a patient's suit against a hospital arising out of her rape by a male nurse, summary judgment was proper on the patient's negligent hiring claim, but her negligent retention and premises liability claims were supported by evidence of past sexual assaults at the hospital, including one incident of inappropriate touching by the male nurse. Little-Thomas v. Select Specialty Hospital-Augusta, Inc., 333 Ga. App. 362, 773 S.E.2d 480 (2015).

- Since the plaintiff tenant was an invitee on facilities provided by the defendant landlord as a means of egress and ingress between the shore and the tenant's rented dock slip, and since it appeared that the plaintiff was injured because in the course of repairs and renovations of the docks the defendant lined up a main floating dock with an auxiliary catwalk, leaving a space between the two, at a point where there had previously been an apron rounding out the angle of two intersecting dock areas, and had also disconnected the lights from this portion of the dock so that persons walking on the area at night would not be on notice of any difference between the structures, the facts set out presented a jury question as to negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to close or warn patrons against the hole between the dock section and catwalk at the point where the apron or flare between the intersecting dock sections had previously been located. Kreiss v. Allatoona Landing, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 427, 133 S.E.2d 602 (1963).

- An employee of an express company who entered the premises for the purpose of removing certain goods for the defendant is an invited person within the terms of this section. Southern Paramount Pictures Co. v. Gaulding, 24 Ga. App. 478, 101 S.E. 311 (1919).

After a fast-food restaurant cashier struck a customer, then got into a fight with the customer, the customer's premises liability claim against the restaurant failed; the restaurant did not have knowledge that the cashier would engage in such conduct because the cashier had indicated in a job application that the cashier had not been convicted of a felony, and during the three months that the cashier worked at the restaurant prior to the altercation, there was no evidence that the cashier ever argued with, much less struck, customers. Dowdell v. Krystal Co., 291 Ga. App. 469, 662 S.E.2d 150 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2008).

- The evidence failed to eliminate a factual issue as to whether grocery store exercised reasonable care in inspecting the property to make the property safe for the store's invitees; before the victim fell in spilled oil, the store manager became aware of the inadequacy of the manager's previous efforts to clean up all of the substance spilled by some children earlier in the evening, thereby creating a duty to reinspect the premises, and grocery store was unable to show that such a re-inspection occurred, further, the store manager's response to the discovery of the first spill reported by victim's family provided some assurance that the floor was clean when the family resumed their shopping; under these circumstances, victim cannot be said to have had equal or superior knowledge of the hazard as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for store. Burke v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 115, 441 S.E.2d 429 (1994).

Owner of a grocery store was erroneously granted summary judgment in a negligence suit by a store patron who slipped on a grape and fell, as the testimony regarding the manager's unobstructed view of the area where the fall occurred, the manager's admission that the manager could have seen the grape, and the evidence that the manager and two other employees were in the immediate vicinity and could easily have removed the hazard had they seen it, all revealed that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the store owner had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Dix v. Kroger Co., 257 Ga. App. 19, 570 S.E.2d 89 (2002).

Trial court erred in denying the grocery store's motion for summary judgment in a customer's slip and fall action as the customer could not establish that the store had superior knowledge of the oily hazard on which the customer fell given that the store's customer service manager had made an inspection of the area where the fall occurred about five minutes before the fall and found that the area was free of hazards. Ingles Markets, Inc. v. Rhodes, 340 Ga. App. 769, 798 S.E.2d 340 (2017).

After the plaintiff slipped on ice tea that had spilled in one of the aisles of the grocery store, the store's motion for directed verdict was improperly denied because the manager placed a caution cone in front of the spill to warn customers of the condition; the plaintiff did not notice the cones or the spill even after the plaintiff successfully walked past the first cone; according to surveillance camera footage from inside the store, the time between the manager receiving notice of the spill and learning that the plaintiff had fallen was about 75 seconds; and the store did not have a reasonable amount of time after notice of the hazardous condition to exercise care in correcting the condition prior to the plaintiff's fall. Bi-Lo, LLC v. Green, 346 Ga. App. 770, 816 S.E.2d 298 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1581, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 173 (Ga. 2019).

- At the very least, the last 10 to 15 yards of a road leading to a company's property, which included a railroad crossing where a car was struck by a train, constituted a final approach to that property; the evidence indicated that the company treated the road as an extension of its own property or as the functional equivalent of a private driveway. Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 650 S.E.2d 709 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1876, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 156 (Ga. 2008).

- One who, by contract or otherwise, controls the operation of a fair and of the premises, invites the public to attend, and receives a percentage of the profits cannot avoid liability for a patron's injury resulting from defective amusement apparatus or devices on the grounds that the concessionaire in control of those devices is an independent contractor. Hayes v. Century 21 Shows, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 490, 157 S.E.2d 779 (1967).

- Since a sheet-draped gurney cannot be considered either a "defect" or an "unusual" obstruction in a hospital facility, the mere fact that the gurney upon which the plaintiff's spouse lay happened to be sheet-draped would not serve to relieve the plaintiff of the plaintiff's duty to maintain a lookout ahead so as to discover and avoid a possibly injurious contact with the wheels of the gurney. Meriwether Mem. Hosp. Auth. v. Gresham, 202 Ga. App. 535, 414 S.E.2d 694, cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 906, 414 S.E.2d 694 (1992).

Right of firefighter to go upon premises to extinguish fire is based on permission not invitation even if the owner or occupier turns in the alarm. London Iron & Metal Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

- The single circumstance of a plaintiff's being a police officer acting in the course of the officer's official duty has been held traditionally not to imply an assurance that the premises have been prepared and made safe for the particular visit and thus not to sustain a finding of implied invitation. London Iron & Metal Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

- After the plaintiff fell and broke the plaintiff's hip, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 did not impose a statutory duty upon the security company or the company's employee to inspect the premises to keep the premises safe for invitees, such as the plaintiff, because there was no evidence that either the company or the company's employee owned or occupied the store where the plaintiff fell, or that the plaintiff was an invitee of either the company or the employee, as the plaintiff and the plaintiff's husband were the invitees of the corporation that managed the store. Simmons v. Universal Prot. Servs., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 374, 825 S.E.2d 858 (2019).

- It is immaterial, in a tort action who removed a manhole cover from premises under the defendant's control, if the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have discovered that it had been removed and should have either replaced it or placed barricades or warning lights around. Harvill v. Swift & Co., 102 Ga. App. 543, 117 S.E.2d 202 (1960).

- In a wrongful death action against a church as a premises owner, because the decedent's spouse, as administrator of the estate, failed to raise a material fact question of the church's liability for allowing its parishioners to park on the side of the roadway, and thus, obstruct the decedent's view of the adjacent intersection, causing the decedent to collide with an oncoming northbound vehicle, the church was properly granted summary judgment. Gay v. Redland Baptist Church, 288 Ga. App. 28, 653 S.E.2d 779 (2007).

Private property owners could forbid the possession of a weapon on the owners' premises as property law, tort law, and criminal law, such as that later codified in O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b)(3),51-3-1,51-3-2,51-9-1, provided the canvas on which the Second Amendment was drafted and illustrated that the basis of the Second Amendment did not include protection for a right to carry a firearm in a place of worship against the church owner's wishes. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).

- When a minor plaintiff, an invitee at a public parking lot, whose parent had paid consideration for parking, and had parked where directed by the person in charge of the parking lot, was injured by falling into a ten-foot pit behind the parking place, the defendant owner, who had filled up the lot level with the top of the pit, thus creating the dangerous instrumentality, and maintained it without guardrails or lights to prevent the patrons of the lot from falling into the pit or ditch, was liable under this section. Gray v. Watson, 54 Ga. App. 885, 189 S.E. 616 (1936).

When the facts pled show that the plaintiff, an invitee, did not see the "gully" on the parking lot of the defendant into which the plaintiff stepped and was injured, not because the plaintiff was not looking where the plaintiff was going, but because the formation of the "gully" was such that the shades and shadows of the vari-colored areas of that lot, at and about the gully, presented an optical illusion, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the ocular illusion while approaching the plaintiff's car for the purpose of entering therein on that part of the parking lot in question, was not or could not have been so presented to the plaintiff, and such question is for the jury. Smith v. Swann, 73 Ga. App. 144, 35 S.E.2d 787 (1945).

Owners of premises whereon the public is invited to come are not required to keep their parking lots and other such areas free from irregularities and trifling defects. Associated Distribs., Inc. v. Canup, 115 Ga. App. 152, 154 S.E.2d 32 (1967).

In order for the invitee to recover for injuries sustained when the invitee slipped and fell in the owner's parking lot, two elements must exist: (1) fault on the part of the owner; and (2) ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee. Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981).

Absent evidence that the owner reasonably inspected the parking lot for defects and that the ice formation was a new defect of which the owner had no notice or sufficient time to correct, it could not be said as a matter of law that complied with duty to business invitees to keep the premises safe. Kauffman v. Eastern Food & Gas, Inc., 246 Ga. App. 103, 539 S.E.2d 599 (2000).

Appellants' motions for summary judgment in a premises liability action filed by the appellee were improperly denied because, to the extent that the lack of a crosswalk or traffic warnings in the parking lot constituted a defect on the property, that defect was open and obvious and the appellee had equal knowledge of any such defect as the appellee had been to the shopping center numerous times; and the appellee actually saw the car that ultimately hit the appellee heading in the appellee's direction before the appellee stepped into the parking lot and, thus, the appellee had superior knowledge of the immediate risk posed by that car, which could have been avoided by waiting for the car to either stop or to pass before proceeding. Cherokee Main St., LLC v. Ragan, 345 Ga. App. 405, 813 S.E.2d 397 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1105, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 716 (Ga. 2018).

City had actual notice of design defect in landfill for summary judgment purposes when an injured party's expert averred: (1) that there was an elevation difference of between eight and 10 feet between the working surface and the grade elevation near the bottom of a dumpster; (2) that cover plates installed over the opening did not continue along the full length of the dumpster and left a corner unprotected; and (3) that there were no visual markings to warn of the fall hazard. Barton v. City of Rome, 271 Ga. App. 858, 610 S.E.2d 566 (2005).

- The accumulation of naturally occurring ice does not negate an owner's duty to exercise ordinary care in inspecting the premises in every circumstance. Dumas v. Tripps of N.C., Inc., 229 Ga. App. 814, 495 S.E.2d 129 (1998).

When the plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff had slipped on ice in a parking lot, the trial court properly refused to give the plaintiff's proposed jury instruction as to an accumulation of naturally occurring ice; both the charge requested and the charge given covered a proprietor's duty to exercise ordinary care, including the duty to inspect the premises for dangerous conditions. Fowler Props. v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76, 646 S.E.2d 197 (2007).

- Defendant was held to a standard of reasonable care in inspecting trees on its property to ensure safety. Wesleyan College v. Weber, 238 Ga. App. 90, 517 S.E.2d 813 (1999).

The jury was authorized to find that a four foot rotten cavity in a tree trunk had existed for such a period of time that the defendant property owner, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have discovered and removed this hazard to users of the street. Wesleyan College v. Weber, 238 Ga. App. 90, 517 S.E.2d 813 (1999).

Evidence of a prior substantially similar incident is admissible to show the existence of a dangerous condition and knowledge of that condition so long as the prior incident was sufficient to attract the owner's attention to the alleged dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident. McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590, 302 S.E.2d 130 (1983).

- Proof of two prior crimes at a location on the defendant's premises other than the asserted "dangerous" parking lot in which the plaintiff was assaulted had no relevancy or probative value with regard to the defendant's knowledge of that "dangerous condition." McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590, 302 S.E.2d 130 (1983); Nalle v. Quality Inn, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 119, 358 S.E.2d 281 (1987).

Receiver may be liable in official capacity for damage or injury resulting from lack of ordinary care in the maintenance of property, placed in the receiver by order of the court, to invitees injured thereby. Becknell v. McConnell, 142 Ga. App. 567, 236 S.E.2d 546 (1977).

- Petition alleging that the defendant rest stop owed to the decedent bus passenger the duty of maintaining its premises and the approaches thereto in a reasonably safe condition, that this was a regular bus rest stop and the buses that necessarily stopped there had to be parked on a steep incline and in order for buses to remain safely parked at this place, it was necessary that "scotch" blocks be placed under the wheels of the bus, it having been furnished with and accepted such blocks for that express purpose, and that the defendant, with knowledge that the bus had stopped in front of the rest station, had failed in the performance of its duty in the above regard, resulting in the death of the decedent, set out facts tending to show that the defendant was liable to the plaintiffs. Scoggins v. Peggy Ann of Ga., Inc., 87 Ga. App. 19, 73 S.E.2d 79 (1952).

- In a slip and fall case based on an injured party's fall in a truck stop's shower, the truck stop owner was not entitled to summary judgment because its admitted lack of a regular inspection procedure created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it had constructive knowledge of the condition which caused the injured party to fall, and it was not shown that the injured party failed to exercise care for the party's own safety, as the party removed two used bars of soap from the shower floor. Pylant v. Samuels Inc., 262 Ga. App. 358, 585 S.E.2d 696 (2003).

- Being lifted by a forklift holding a makeshift platform not fixed to the forks entailed an open and obvious risk that the platform could move up, down, or sideways, causing the people on the platform to lose their balance without having a means to recover; because after two nights using the forklift and platform in this condition, an injured person was aware of and appreciated both actually and subjectively the risk of injury by falling, and freely and voluntarily chose to be lifted this way to work on a billboard, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the injured person's suit based on the theories of O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-2 and51-3-1. Sones v. Real Estate Dev. Group, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 507, 606 S.E.2d 687 (2004).

As a student in defendant's riding school, the plaintiff was an invitee on the defendant's premises and thus within the class of persons to whom the duty established by this section was owed by the defendant. Mitchell v. Gay, 111 Ga. App. 867, 143 S.E.2d 568 (1965).

- A person having the right to use the land upon which an electric company has an easement, over which high-tension lines are built, is not a trespasser as to such company merely because the person sits upon the concrete base of the steel tower and touches the tower with the person's hand, such conduct not being inconsistent with the electric company's use of the easement and not being in itself unreasonable or unusual. Leonard v. Georgia Power Co., 58 Ga. App. 130, 197 S.E. 869 (1938), aff'd, 187 Ga. 608, 1 S.E.2d 579 (1939).

An electric company is bound to know that persons are likely to sit down on concrete bases supporting steel towers carrying high-tension wires, and to touch the steel towers, and it is liable for injuries due to its negligence in failing to exercise the degree of care commensurate with the danger attendant upon its failure to erect and maintain the lines so as not to cause injury to persons coming in contact with them. Leonard v. Georgia Power Co., 58 Ga. App. 130, 197 S.E. 869 (1938), aff'd, 187 Ga. 608, 1 S.E.2d 579 (1939).

- When wiring or other electrical appliances on private premises are owned and controlled by owner or occupant of premises, company which merely furnishes electricity is not liable for injuries caused by their defective condition, to the owner or occupant, or to third persons on the premises, except that the rule thus stated seems to be properly qualified to the extent that, whenever current is supplied with actual knowledge on the part of one supplying it of the defective and dangerous condition of one's customer's appliances, one will be charged with liability for injuries occasioned by supplying current for use on such defective wires or appliances. Hatcher v. Georgia Power Co., 40 Ga. App. 830, 151 S.E. 696 (1930).

- Landlord was not liable for injuries to a tenant who was shot while sitting on a bench outside the apartment building because the tenant was aware that it was dangerous to sit on the bench at night and that prior shootings had occurred on the block and, thus, the tenant's knowledge of the danger was at least equal to that of the landlord. Johnson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 243 Ga. App. 157, 532 S.E.2d 701 (2000).

Theater, as a premises owner, did not breach its duty to the injured party, as an invitee, to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises and approaches safe, since the injured party's injuries were not caused by any nonfeasance or malfeasance on the theater's part, but upon the injured party's voluntary act of confronting a loud patron, appreciating the danger in doing so. Fernandez v. Ga. Theatre Co. II, 261 Ga. App. 892, 583 S.E.2d 926 (2003).

When a couple brought suit against a grocery store and the owner of a shopping center after one spouse was assaulted in the center's parking lot, summary judgment was properly granted for the store and the owner. The couple had failed to bring forward any evidence of a substantially similar crime that took place before the attack and thus had not shown that the attack was reasonably foreseeable. Drayton v. Kroger Co., 297 Ga. App. 484, 677 S.E.2d 316 (2009).

- A meter reader of the Georgia Power Company in performing the reader's duties and going on the premises of persons to whom the reader's employer furnishes electric current to read the meters is an invitee of the owner of the premises in so doing. Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943).

Floor mats can constitute hazards for which landowners may be liable. Whatley v. National Servs. Indus., Inc., 228 Ga. App. 602, 492 S.E.2d 343 (1997).

In a dog bite case, whether the cause of action is based on the premises liability statute or the dangerous animal liability statute, the plaintiffs were required to produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in order to show the dangerous condition of which the premises owner had superior knowledge. Wade v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000).

Trial court erred in denying an animal care clinic's motion for summary judgment in a guest's action to recover damages for injuries the guest sustained when a dog bit the guest because the guest failed to produce any evidence of the dog's vicious or dangerous propensity pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 51-2-7 and51-3-1; the dog had never bitten or harmed anyone before the incident with the guest. Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray, 316 Ga. App. 193, 728 S.E.2d 822 (2012).

Trial court did not err in granting a dog owner summary judgment in a nurse's action under the premises liability statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, to recover for injuries the nurse sustained when the dog bit the nurse while the nurse was at the owner's home because the nurse pointed to no evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact on the dog's vicious propensity and the owner's knowledge thereof. Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 729 S.E.2d 559 (2012).

- In a wrongful death action based on the death of an infant caused by a dog, the dog owner was entitled to summary judgment on the parents' claim for premises liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 since the parents failed to present evidence that the animal demonstrated dangerous propensities. Harper v. Robinson, 263 Ga. App. 727, 589 S.E.2d 295 (2003).

Condominium association's duty to its members only pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 with regard to the common elements of a condominium property may be circumscribed by the terms of the condominium instruments or contract, and a court must look to the terms of the contract, as well as O.C.G.A. § 44-3-70 et seq., in order to determine an association's duties, and in that regard, it is the paramount public policy of Georgia that courts will not lightly interfere with the freedom of parties to contract as a contracting party may waive or renounce that which the law has established in his or her favor, when it does not thereby injure others or affect the public interest. Bradford Square Condo. Ass'n v. Miller, 258 Ga. App. 240, 573 S.E.2d 405 (2002).

In a personal injury action against a community owners' association arising out of an injury to an owner in a common area of the community, a trial court did not err in construing a restrictive covenant to relieve the association of its duty to inspect the common area and maintain it in a safe condition under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; by providing that owners would use common areas at their own risk and peril, the covenant indicated an intention not merely to create a duty parallel to that ordinarily born by a landowner, but to shift the duty entirely to owners using the common area. Hayes v. Lakeside Vill. Owners Ass'n, 282 Ga. App. 866, 640 S.E.2d 373 (2006).

- Summary judgment was properly granted against an injured party, who testified to previously visiting a doctor's office and successfully crossing over protruding tree roots with little or no problem since the patient failed to prove that the doctor had more than an equal knowledge of the hazardous condition; thus, the doctor had no duty to warn. Pye v. Reagin, 262 Ga. App. 490, 586 S.E.2d 5 (2003).

- In a wrongful death suit based on the murder of a bank customer who was trying to use a night depository, summary judgment was properly entered for the bank. Although a previous late-night attempt to break into the bank's automated teller machine was at least marginally sufficient to put the bank on notice of the possibility of a criminal attack upon a bank customer at night in the same place, the decedent had knowledge that was equal to the bank's of the danger that was presented by the night depository's location in a secluded, poorly lit area. Norby v. Heritage Bank, 284 Ga. App. 360, 644 S.E.2d 185 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 553 (Ga. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability, §§ 6, 7, 13 et seq., 24.

Liability of an Owner or Operator of a Self-Service Filling Station for Injury or Death of a Business Invitee on the Premises, 46 POF3d 161.

- 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 63 et seq.

- Liability for injury to person in street by fall of part of structure of completed building, 7 A.L.R. 204; 138 A.L.R. 1078.

Right to eject customer from store, 9 A.L.R. 379; 33 A.L.R. 421.

Liability of owner to licensee or invitee for conditions on premises recently vacated by tenant, 10 A.L.R. 244.

Effect of verbal abuse to change one's status from licensee or invitee to trespasser, 12 A.L.R. 254.

Liability of owner of premises for injury to person or property from debris in street due to fire, 14 A.L.R. 224.

Duty of owner to licensee as to changing condition of premises, 20 A.L.R. 202.

Duty and liability of owner or keeper of place of amusement respecting injuries to patrons, 22 A.L.R. 610; 29 A.L.R. 29; 38 A.L.R. 357; 44 A.L.R. 203; 53 A.L.R. 855; 61 A.L.R. 1289; 98 A.L.R. 557.

Right of one injured while stopping or loitering in street, 24 A.L.R. 766.

Liability of municipal corporations for injuries due to conditions in parks, 29 A.L.R. 863; 42 A.L.R. 263; 99 A.L.R. 686; 142 A.L.R. 1340.

Liability of abutting owner for injury from electrically charged object near sidewalk or highway, 30 A.L.R. 1240.

Landlord's liability to one injured while using, for a purpose for which it was not intended, property remaining in the former's control, 30 A.L.R. 1390; 49 A.L.R. 564; 12 A.L.R.2d 217.

Duty and liability respecting condition of store or shop, 33 A.L.R. 181; 43 A.L.R. 866; 46 A.L.R. 1111; 58 A.L.R. 136; 100 A.L.R. 710; 162 A.L.R. 949.

Liability for personal injury by barbed wire, 36 A.L.R. 545.

Responsibility of owner or occupant of abutting property for injury due to ice or snow on sidewalk as affected by his practice of removing it, 41 A.L.R. 266.

Special injury to property interest as condition of right to enjoin diversion of dedicated property, 41 A.L.R. 1410.

Liability for injury to person on business premises, in consequence of passing through wrong doorway, 42 A.L.R. 1098.

Liability of owner of office building or tenement house for loss of or damage to property of tenant due to dishonesty or negligence of owner's employee, 42 A.L.R. 1335.

Liability of operator of logging road or other private railroad for injury to person on track, 46 A.L.R. 1076.

Landlord's responsibility for injury to stranger due to tenant's negligence as to doors, guards, etc., provided by former, but in tenant's possession and control, 47 A.L.R. 846.

Liability to trespasser or bare licensee as affected by distinction between active and passive negligence, 49 A.L.R. 778; 156 A.L.R. 1226.

Liability for conditions in space between lot lines and sidewalk actually within limits of street, but apparently part of the abutting property, 56 A.L.R. 220.

Liability for injury to elevator passenger as affected by the fact that sides of car are open and unprotected, 57 A.L.R. 259.

Use of space within lot lines, as part of public sidewalk as affecting owner's responsibility for its condition, 58 A.L.R. 1042.

Duty toward invitee as regards explosives, 60 A.L.R. 1069.

Liability for injury by stepping or falling into opening in sidewalk while doors were open or cover off, 70 A.L.R. 1358.

Landlord's liability for injuries to strangers outside premises as affected by covenant to repair or reservation of right to enter to make repairs, 89 A.L.R. 480.

Duty and liability of carrier toward one accompanying departing passenger or present to meet incoming one, with respect to conditions at or about station, 92 A.L.R. 614.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to person thereon by dog not owned or harbored by former, 92 A.L.R. 732.

Liability of one exercising the rights of an owner of realty for injuries due to its condition, as affected by want of legal title, 96 A.L.R. 1068; 130 A.L.R. 1525.

Effect of notice on ticket for amusement device to limit liability of proprietor for injury to patron, 97 A.L.R. 582.

Duty to guard against danger to children by electric wires, 100 A.L.R. 621.

"Safe place" statutes as applicable to municipalities or other public bodies when engaged in performing a governmental function, 114 A.L.R. 428.

Duty to guard against operation of elevator by unauthorized person, 117 A.L.R. 989.

Liability of owner or occupier of premises other than store or shop for personal injury to another due to slippery condition of floor, 118 A.L.R. 425.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to one who falls over obstructions placed to protect lawn, 129 A.L.R. 740.

Violation of statute or ordinance regarding safety of building or premises as creating or affecting liability for injuries or death, 132 A.L.R. 863.

Liability for death or injury on or near golf course, 138 A.L.R. 541; 82 A.L.R.2d 1183.

Duty and liability as regards lighting conditions in theater, 143 A.L.R. 61.

Responsibility of operator of place of amusement for negligence of concessionaire or the latter's employees, 145 A.L.R. 962.

Duty of owner or occupier of premises to persons thereon upon invitation of, or otherwise in connection with, licensee, 146 A.L.R. 651.

Standing railroad car or streetcar and appliances as attractive nuisance, 152 A.L.R. 1263.

Innkeeper's liability for injury to or death of child guest, or child who accompanies guest, 153 A.L.R. 577.

Breach of lessor's agreement to repair as ground of liability for personal injury to tenant or one in privity with latter, 163 A.L.R. 300; 78 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Liability for injury in connection with automatic elevator, 6 A.L.R.2d 391.

Liability of carrier for injuries to person boarding vehicle or ship for social or other purposes in connection with a passenger, 11 A.L.R.2d 1075.

Liability of landlord to one using fire escape for other than intended purpose, 12 A.L.R.2d 217.

Liability of barber, beauty shop or specialist, barber college, or school of beauty culture, for injury to patron, 14 A.L.R.2d 860; 93 A.L.R.3d 897.

Liability to patron of public amusement for accidental injury from cause other than assault, hazards of game or amusement, or condition of premises, 16 A.L.R.2d 912.

Liability for injury resulting from swinging door, 16 A.L.R.2d 1161.

Liability of owner or operator of park or other premises on which baseball or other game is played, for injuries by ball to person on nearby street, sidewalk, or premises, 16 A.L.R.2d 1458.

Liability of proprietor for injury to customer or patron caused by pushing, crowding, etc., of other patrons, 20 A.L.R.2d 8.

Liability for injury to customer or patron from defect in or fall of seat, 21 A.L.R.2d 420.

Storekeeper's duty and liability to one passing through store to another destination, 23 A.L.R.2d 1135.

Oil and gas tanks, pipes and pipelines, and apparatus and accessories thereof as constituting attractive nuisance, 23 A.L.R.2d 1157.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to fall of object or substance from ceiling of place of public resort, 24 A.L.R.2d 643.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior stairs, passageways, areas, or structures used in common by tenants, 26 A.L.R.2d 468; 65 A.L.R.3d 14; 68 A.L.R.3d 382.

Seller's or manufacturer's liability for injuries as affected by buyer's or user's allergy or unusual susceptibility to injury from article, 26 A.L.R.2d 963.

Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents or injuries at place where injury or damage occurred, 31 A.L.R.2d 190.

Liability of owner or occupant for condition of covering over opening or vault in sidewalk, 31 A.L.R.2d 1334.

Liability of motor carrier to passenger for injuries assertedly caused by failure to heat conveyance adequately, 33 A.L.R.2d 1358.

Liability of owner or operator of auto race track for injury to patron, 37 A.L.R.2d 391.

Liability for injury to or death of child from burns caused by hot ashes, cinders, or other hot waste material, 42 A.L.R.2d 930.

Liability of storekeeper for injury of customer by another customer's use or handling of stock or equipment, 42 A.L.R.2d 1103.

Liability of builder or owner of building under construction for injuries received on premises by infant, 44 A.L.R.2d 1253.

Child accompanying business visitor to store, shop, or the like as invitee or licensee, 44 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Liability of landowner for injury or death of child caused by cut or puncture from broken glass or other sharp object, 47 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Liability of private owner or operator of bathing resort or swimming pool for injury or death of patron, 48 A.L.R.2d 104.

Liability of owner or operator of theater or other place of amusement for injury to patron using stairway or steps, 55 A.L.R.2d 866.

Liability of innkeeper to guest injured while using ramp or similar inclined surface, 58 A.L.R.2d 1173.

Liability of innkeeper for injury to guest using steps or stairs, 58 A.L.R.2d 1178.

Duty and liability of an innkeeper to visitor or caller of registered guest, 58 A.L.R.2d 1201.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of litter or debris on floor, 61 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of obstacle placed or dropped on floor, 61 A.L.R.2d 110.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of litter or debris on stairway, 61 A.L.R.2d 174.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of obstacle placed or dropped on steps, 61 A.L.R.2d 205.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on floor made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on steps made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 131.

Independent contractor's or subcontractor's liability for injury or death of third person occurring during excavation work not in street or highway, 62 A.L.R.2d 1052.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for fall on floor made slippery by waxing or oiling, 63 A.L.R.2d 591.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for fall on floor made slippery by washing or cleaning, 63 A.L.R.2d 694.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to defect in floor or floor covering, 64 A.L.R.2d 335.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to defect in stairway, 64 A.L.R.2d 398.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for fall on steps slippery by nature or through wear, 64 A.L.R.2d 471.

Liability of contractor or owner of building being demolished for injuries to infant on premises, 64 A.L.R.2d 972.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on ramp or inclined floor, 65 A.L.R.2d 420.

Liability of proprietor of store, office or similar business premises for injury from fall on stepdown or other one-step change in floor level, 65 A.L.R.2d 471.

Liability of owner or operator to adult trespasser in or on motor vehicle or equipment, 65 A.L.R.2d 798.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall down open stairway, or into trap door or similar floor-level opening, 66 A.L.R.2d 331.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for fall due to improper lighting of steps or stairway, 66 A.L.R.2d 443.

Liability of municipality for torts in connection with airport, 66 A.L.R.2d 634.

Liability to patron of scenic railway, roller coaster, or miniature railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689.

Liability of private owner or operator of picnic ground for injury or death of patron, 67 A.L.R.2d 965.

Liability of owner, occupant, or operator of premises or machinery or equipment for injury or death resulting from contact of crane, derrick, or other movable machine with electric line, 69 A.L.R.2d 160, 14 A.L.R.4th 913.

Amusements: liability for injury from slide or chute, 69 A.L.R.2d 1067.

Innkeeper's liability for injury to guest using exterior passageways or walks, 69 A.L.R.2d 1107.

Liability of innkeeper, restauranteur, or tavern keeper or injury occurring on or about premises to guest or patron by person other than proprietor or his servant, 70 A.L.R.2d 628.

Hospital's liability to visitor injured as result of condition of exterior walks, steps, or grounds, 71 A.L.R.2d 427.

Hospital's liability to visitor injured by slippery, obstructed, or defective interior floors or steps, 71 A.L.R.2d 436.

Liability of innkeeper for injury by object thrown or falling because of conduct of guest, 74 A.L.R.2d 1241.

Liability for injury to one on or near merry-go-round, 75 A.L.R.2d 792.

Duty owed to, and status of, social guest of employee on employer's business premises, 78 A.L.R.2d 107.

Liability for injury or death due to physical condition of church premises, 80 A.L.R.2d 806.

Liability of proprietor of business premises for injury from fall on exterior walk, ramp, or passageway connected with the building in which the business is conducted, 81 A.L.R.2d 750.

Liability for injury to person in street by glass falling from window, door, or wall, 81 A.L.R.2d 897.

Liability of private promoter or operator of public fireworks exhibition or display for personal injury, death, or property damage, 81 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Liability for injury or death on or near golf course, 82 A.L.R.2d 1183.

Liability for injury from overhead door, 83 A.L.R.2d 743.

Liability of strip or other surface mine or quarry operator to person, other than employee, injured or killed during mining operations, 84 A.L.R.2d 733.

Liability of owner, lessee, or operator for injury or death on or near loop-o-plane, Ferris wheel, miniature car, or similar rides, 86 A.L.R.2d 350.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or his privies from heating system or equipment, 86 A.L.R.2d 791.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or privies from electrical system or equipment, 86 A.L.R.2d 838.

Liability of consignee for personal injury or death of one other than his employee in connection with carrier unloading operations, 86 A.L.R.2d 1399.

Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of sidewalk, 88 A.L.R.2d 331.

Liability of owner or operator of theater or other place of amusement to patron injured by condition of or defect in lavatory, restroom, or toilet facilities, 88 A.L.R.2d 1090.

Liability to spectator at basketball game injured as result of hazards of game, 89 A.L.R.2d 1163.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury sustained when customer or patron strikes head (or other portion of body) on overhead beam or similar overhead structure or projection, 90 A.L.R.2d 329.

Liability of proprietor of bowling alley for injury to patron, 92 A.L.R.2d 1074.

Duty of proprietor toward visitor upon premises on private business with or errand or work for employee, 94 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of operator of skiing, tobogganing, or bobsledding facilities for injury to patron or participant, 94 A.L.R.2d 1431; 95 A.L.R.3d 203.

"Economic benefit" or "public invitation" as test of licensee-invitee status, 95 A.L.R.2d 992.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center to patrons for injuries from defects or conditions in sidewalks, walks, or pedestrian passageways, 95 A.L.R.2d 1341.

Liability of owner or occupant of building for personal injury or death of person in street resulting from objects falling or thrown from building interior, 97 A.L.R.2d 1431.

Railroad's liability for injury or death of one other than employee because of alleged unsafe or defective condition of its own freight car which he was loading or unloading, 99 A.L.R.2d 176.

Liability of hotel, motel, summer resort, or private membership club or association operating swimming pool, for injury or death of guest or member, or of member's guest, 1 A.L.R.3d 963.

Liability to prospective tenant or purchaser for injury resulting from condition of premises, 3 A.L.R.3d 976.

Liability of owner or operator of interior parking facility for bodily injury to nonemployees on premises, 4 A.L.R.3d 938.

Liability of owner or operator of garage or gasoline filling station for bodily injury to nonemployees on premises, 8 A.L.R.3d 6.

Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 8 A.L.R.3d 1393.

Liability of owner or operator of trampoline center for injury to or death of spectator or patron, 8 A.L.R.3d 1427.

Private person's duty and liability for failure to protect another against criminal attack by third person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619.

Liability of owner or operator of funeral home for injury sustained by patron or invitee due to condition of premises, 14 A.L.R.3d 629.

Liability for injury to one attending wrestling or boxing match or exhibition, 14 A.L.R.3d 993.

Liability for injury to one attending hockey game or exhibition, 14 A.L.R.3d 1018.

Liability of social club for injury to or death of nonmember, 15 A.L.R.3d 1013.

Liability for injury to patron of billiard or poolroom, 15 A.L.R.3d 1420.

Hospital's liability to patient or prospective patient injured as result of physical condition of premises, 16 A.L.R.3d 1237.

Landlord's liability to tenant's business patron injured as a result of defective condition of premises, 17 A.L.R.3d 422.

What constitutes "public" use affecting landlord's liability to tenant's invitees for defects in leased premises, 17 A.L.R.3d 873.

Abutting owner's liability for injury from ice formed on sidewalk by discharge of precipitation due to artificial conditions on premises, 18 A.L.R.3d 428.

Liability, for injury to patron, of owner or operator of retail store failing to provide carryout service, 21 A.L.R.3d 931.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injuries sustained by mail carrier, 21 A.L.R.3d 1099.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark as contributory negligence, 22 A.L.R.3d 286.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark along outside path or walkway as contributory negligence, 22 A.L.R.3d 599.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark on outside steps or stairs as contributory negligence, 23 A.L.R.3d 365.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark across exterior premises as contributory negligence, 23 A.L.R.3d 441.

Premises liability insurance: coverage of injury sustained on or in connection with sidewalks or ways adjacent to certain named property, 23 A.L.R.3d 1230.

Liability of owner or operator of self-service laundry for personal injury or damages to patron or frequenter of premises from defect in premises or appliances, 23 A.L.R.3d 1246.

Liability of owner or operator for injury to patron of fair, carnival, or the like, from operation of sideshows, games, or similar concessions, 24 A.L.R.3d 945.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark on inside steps or stairs as contributory negligence, 25 A.L.R.3d 446.

Liability of owner or operator of power lawnmower for injuries resulting to third person from its operation, 25 A.L.R.3d 1314.

Telephone company's liability for injuries sustained by user of public telephone or telegraph as a result of condition of premises on which instrument was installed, 25 A.L.R.3d 1432.

Liability of owner or operator of drive-in movie theater for injury or death to patron or frequenter, 26 A.L.R.3d 1314.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark across interior premises as contributory negligence, 28 A.L.R.3d 605.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to building or construction inspector coming upon premises in discharge of duty, 28 A.L.R.3d 891.

Liability of owner or operator of premises for injury to meter reader or similar employee of public service corporation coming to premises in course of duties, 28 A.L.R.3d 1344.

Status of injured adult as trespasser on land not owned by electricity supplier, as affecting its liability for injuries inflicted upon him by electric wires it maintains thereon, 30 A.L.R.3d 777.

Liability of owner or operator of premises for injury to person coming to premises in course of delivery or pickup of merchandise or similar products, 32 A.L.R.3d 9.

Tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents due to condition of buildings or equipment, 34 A.L.R.3d 1166.

Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk, 35 A.L.R.3d 230.

Tort liability of private schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents due to condition of buildings, equipment, or outside premises, 35 A.L.R.3d 975.

Premises liability: liability of owner or occupant to garbage or trash man coming on premises in course of duty, 36 A.L.R.3d 610.

Hospital's liability to patient injured going to or using bathroom or toilet facilities, 36 A.L.R.3d 1235.

Liability of physician or dentist for injury to patient from physical condition of office premises, 36 A.L.R.3d 1341.

Liability of owner or operator of parking lot for personal injuries allegedly resulting from condition of premises, 38 A.L.R.3d 10.

Liability of owner or operator of parking lot for personal injuries caused by movement of vehicles, 38 A.L.R.3d 138.

Liability of dance hall proprietor or operator for injury to patron resulting from conditions of premises, 38 A.L.R.3d 419.

Tort liability of private schools and institutions of higher learning for negligence of, or lack of supervision by, teachers and other employees or agents, 38 A.L.R.3d 908.

Liability of operator of business premises to patron injured by condition of adjacent property, 39 A.L.R.3d 579.

Liability of landlord for injury or death occasioned by swimming pool maintained for tenants, 39 A.L.R.3d 824.

Liability of owner or operator of park for mobile homes or trailers for injuries caused by appliances or other instruments on premises, 41 A.L.R.3d 324.

Liability of owner or operator of trailer camp or park for injury or death from condition of premises, 41 A.L.R.3d 546.

Liability of owner or operator of automatic carwash facility for personal injury or property damage to nonemployees on premises, 41 A.L.R.3d 690.

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle, 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Liability in connection with injury allegedly caused by defective condition of private road or driveway, 44 A.L.R.3d 355.

Liability of owner or operator of drive-in restaurant for injury or death to patron, 45 A.L.R.3d 1428.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises, 48 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Liability of lessee of particular premises in shopping center for injury to patron from condition on portion of premises not included in his leasehold, 48 A.L.R.3d 1163.

Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injuries to patron caused by insect or small animal, 48 A.L.R.3d 1257.

Landlord's liability to tenant or tenant's invitees for injury or death due to ice or snow in areas or passageways used in common by tenants, 49 A.L.R.3d 382.

Liability of owner or operator of store or similar place of business for injury to child climbing or playing on furniture, fixtures, displays, or the like, 50 A.L.R.3d 1227.

Liability of bank for injuries sustained by customer in course of bank robbery, 51 A.L.R.3d 711.

Liability for injuries from ice or snow on residential premises, 54 A.L.R.3d 558.

Liability of abutting landowner for injury to municipal employee engaged in constructing or repairing sewers or drains, 58 A.L.R.3d 1085.

Liability of innkeeper to guest for injury due to fire, 60 A.L.R.3d 1217.

Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 63 A.L.R.3d 893.

Liability in action based upon negligence, for injury to or death of, person going upon cemetery premises, 63 A.L.R.3d 1252.

Liability of landlord for personal injury or death due to inadequacy or lack of lighting on portion of premises used in common by tenants, 66 A.L.R.3d 202.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death due to defects in appliances supplied for use of different tenants, 66 A.L.R.3d 374.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior steps or stairs used in common by tenants, 67 A.L.R.3d 490.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in interior steps or stairs used in common by tenants, 67 A.L.R.3d 587.

Liability of storekeeper for death of or injury to customer in course of robbery, 72 A.L.R.3d 1269.

Liability of owner or operator of theatre or other amusement to patron assaulted by another patron, 75 A.L.R.3d 441.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury to or death of diver allegedly resulting from hazardous condition in water, 85 A.L.R.3d 750.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury or death allegedly resulting from defects of diving board, slide, or other swimming pool equipment, 85 A.L.R.3d 849.

Store or business premises slip-and-fall: modern status of rules requiring showing of notice of proprietor of transitory interior condition allegedly causing plaintiff's fall, 85 A.L.R.3d 1000.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury or death allegedly resulting from condition of deck, bathhouse, or other area in vicinity of water, 86 A.L.R.3d 388.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury to or death of swimmer allegedly resulting from hazardous condition in water, 86 A.L.R.3d 1021.

Liability of operator of swimming facility for injury or death allegedly resulting from absence of or inadequacy of rescue equipment, 87 A.L.R.3d 380.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury or death allegedly caused by failure to adequately fence facility, 87 A.L.R.3d 886.

Liability of operator or nonresidential swimming facility for injury or death allegedly resulting from failure to provide or exercise proper supervision, 87 A.L.R.3d 1032.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury or death inflicted by third person, 90 A.L.R.3d 533.

Liability to spectator at baseball game who is hit by ball or injured as a result of other hazards of game, 91 A.L.R.3d 24.

Liability of hotel or motel operator for injury or death resulting to guest from defects in furniture in room or suite, 91 A.L.R.3d 483.

Liability for injuries in connection with revolving door on nonresidential premises, 93 A.L.R.3d 132.

Liability of hotel or motel operator for injury or death of guest or privy resulting from condition in plumbing or bathroom of room or suite, 93 A.L.R.3d 253.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine in action for injury to patron of beauty salon, 93 A.L.R.3d 897.

Liability for injuries in connection with allegedly dangerous or defective doormat on nonresidential premises, 94 A.L.R.3d 389.

Liability of storekeeper to customer injured by shopping cart, baby stroller, or similar vehicle handled or controlled by another customer, 94 A.L.R.3d 439.

Liability of owner or operator of boat livery for injury to patron, 94 A.L.R.3d 876.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises, 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Liability for injury on, or in connection with, escalator, 1 A.L.R.4th 144.

Liability of urban redevelopment authority or other state or municipal agency or entity for injuries occurring in vacant or abandoned property owned by governmental entity, 7 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to fireman coming thereon in discharge of his duty, 11 A.L.R.4th 597.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury or death resulting from contact of crane, derrick, or other movable machine with electric line, 14 A.L.R.4th 913.

Liability of theater owner or operator for injury to or death of patron resulting from lighting conditions on premises, 19 A.L.R.4th 1110.

Liability of owner of store, office, or similar place of business to invitee falling on tracked-in water or snow, 20 A.L.R.4th 438.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner's liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser, 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Liability of operator of grocery store to invitee slipping on spilled liquid or semiliquid substance, 24 A.L.R.4th 696.

Liability of hotel or motel operator for injury to guest resulting from assault by third party, 28 A.L.R.4th 80.

Liability of hotel or motel for guest's loss of money from room by theft or robbery committed by person other than defendant's servant, 28 A.L.R.4th 120.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to police officer coming thereon in discharge of officer's duty, 30 A.L.R.4th 81.

Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog, 30 A.L.R.4th 986.

Tavernkeeper's liability to patron for third person's assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 281.

Parking facility proprietor's liability for criminal attack on patron, 49 A.L.R.4th 1257.

Tennis club's liability for tennis player's injuries, 52 A.L.R.4th 1253.

Liability to one struck by golf ball, 53 A.L.R.4th 282.

Tree or limb falls onto adjoining private property: personal injury and property damage liability, 54 A.L.R.4th 530.

Ski resort's liability for skier's injuries resulting from condition of ski run or slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632.

Baseball player's right to recover for baseball-related personal injuries from nonplayer, 55 A.L.R.4th 664.

Duty and liability of subcontractor to employee of another contractor using equipment or apparatus of former, 55 A.L.R.4th 725.

Liability for injury to customer or other invitee of retail store by falling of displayed, stored, or piled objects, 61 A.L.R.4th 27.

Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 A.L.R.4th 221.

Liability of proprietor of private gymnasium, reducing salon, or similar health club for injury to patron, 79 A.L.R.4th 127.

Liability of cosmetology school for injury to patron, 81 A.L.R.4th 444.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 A.L.R.4th 374.

Duty of retail establishment, or its employees, to assist patron choking on food, 2 A.L.R.5th 966.

Liability for personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in church premises, 8 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability for injury or death from collision with guy wire, 8 A.L.R.5th 177.

Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents or injuries at place where injury or damage occurred, 10 A.L.R.5th 371.

Air carrier's liability for injury from condition of airport premises, 14 A.L.R.5th 662.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injury to patron on premises from criminal attack by third party, 31 A.L.R.5th 550.

Liability of owner or operator of skating rink for injury to patron, 38 A.L.R.5th 107.

Liability for injury to customer from object projecting into aisle or passageway in store, 40 A.L.R.5th 135.

Liability for injury to customer or patron from amusement device maintained by store or shopping center for use of customers, 40 A.L.R.5th 807.

Liability of proprietor of store, business, or place of amusement, for injury to one using baby stroller, shopping cart, or the like, furnished by defendant, 42 A.L.R.5th 159.

Landlord's liability for failure to protect tenant from criminal acts of third person, 43 A.L.R.5th 207.

Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injuries from electrically operated door, 44 A.L.R.5th 525.

Apportionment of liability between landowners and assailants for injuries to crime victims, 54 A.L.R.5th 379.

Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513.

Liability of hotel, motel, resort, or private membership club or association operating swimming pool, for injury or death of member, 55 A.L.R.5th 463.

Liability of owner or operator of self-service filling station for injury or death of patron, 60 A.L.R.5th 379.

Liability of owner of private residential swimming pool for injury or death occasioned thereby, 64 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability of owner, operator, or other parties, for personal injuries allegedly resulting from snow or ice on premises of parking lot, 74 A.L.R.5th 49.

Comparative negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk in action against owner of store, office, or similar place of business by invitee falling on tracked-in water or snow, 83 A.L.R.5th 589.

Liability of owner of store, office, or similar place of business to invitee falling on tracked-in water or snow, 123 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability of owner or operator of store or similar place of business for injury resulting from defective or dangerous shelves, displays, racks, counters, or the like, 1 A.L.R.6th 297.

Liability for injury on or in connection with escalator, 63 A.L.R. 6th 495.