2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 3 - Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-3-2. Duty of Owner of Premises to Licensee

1. A licensee is a person who:
   1. Is neither a customer, a servant, nor a trespasser;
   2. Does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises; and
   3. Is permitted, expressly or impliedly, to go on the premises merely for his own interests, convenience, or gratification.
2. The owner of the premises is liable to a licensee only for willful or wanton injury.

(Code 1933, § 105-402.)

- For article discussing origin and construction of Georgia provision concerning duty of landowner to licensees, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 239 (1980). For article, "Changes in Liability Standards for Owners and Occupiers," see 20 Ga. St. B. J. 41 (1983). For annual survey of tort law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (2005). For survey article on tort law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 375 (2008). For note discussing Georgia's approach to social guests injured on the land of another, and advocating elevation of the expressly invited social guest to the status of invitee, see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 130 (1969). For comment advocating revision of this section to distinguish between injuries caused by condition of the premises and those caused by landowner's affirmative acts, in light of Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963), see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 523 (1964). For comment discussing motel owner's duty of care to infants, in light of Waugh v. Duke Corp., 248 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1966), see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 480 (1967). For comment on Nesmith v. Starr, 115 Ga. App. 473, 155 S.E.2d 24 (1967), see 4 Ga. St. B. J. 518 (1968). For comment on Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rep. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496 (1968), applying a reasonable man test to the host in a personal injury suit brought by a social guest, rather than classifying plaintiff's status, see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 338 (1969). For comment on Ryckeley v. Georgia Power Co., 122 Ga. App. 107, 176 S.E.2d 493 (1970), see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 431 (1972). For comment, "A New Beginning for the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in Georgia," see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (1982).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Duty Owed to Children
• Applicability to Specific Cases

Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to hold this section unconstitutional in order to abolish common-law categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser and substitute the standard of reasonable care on the part of the occupier of premises in view of the probability of harm to entrants. Meyberg v. Dodson, 136 Ga. App. 324, 221 S.E.2d 200 (1975).

Manifest purpose and intent of this section is to deal with liability of an owner or occupier of land to licensees on account of willful and wanton neglect. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Wise, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63 (1940).

This section is plain and unambiguous. Anderson v. Cooper, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

"Knowledge" of risk involved in particular condition implies that chance of harm and gravity of threatened harm are appreciated. Haag v. Stone, 127 Ga. App. 235, 193 S.E.2d 62 (1972).

Licensee is person who is neither customer, nor servant, nor trespasser, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises, and who is permitted expressly or impliedly to go thereon merely for one's own interest, convenience, or gratification. Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939).

License is inferred when object is mere pleasure or benefit of person using. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

- After the presence of a licensee is known, exactly the same acts of caution may be required of the owner to satisfy the legal duty as would be necessary if the licensee were invited. Cooper v. Corporate Property Investors, 220 Ga. App. 889, 470 S.E.2d 689 (1996).

Whether person is invitee or licensee depends upon nature of relation or contact with owner of premises. If the relationship solely benefits the injured person, that person is at most a licensee. Frankel v. Antman, 157 Ga. App. 26, 276 S.E.2d 87 (1981).

General test as to whether person is invitee or licensee is whether the injured person at the time of the injury had present business relations with the owner of the premises which would render the person's presence of mutual aid to both, or whether the person's presence on the premises was for the person's own convenience, or on business with others than the owner of the premises. Cobb v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 Ga. App. 160, 198 S.E. 111 (1938); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Pries v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 66 Ga. App. 464, 17 S.E.2d 902 (1941); Brown v. Hall, 81 Ga. App. 874, 60 S.E.2d 414 (1950); Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983); Burkhead v. American Legion, Post Number 51, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 56, 332 S.E.2d 311 (1985).

The determining question as to whether a visitor is an invitee by implication or a licensee is whether or not the owner or occupant of the premises will receive some benefit, real or supposed, or has some interest in the purpose of the visit. Anderson v. Cooper, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958); Dawson v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 266, 173 S.E.2d 424 (1970).

In determining what is necessary to elevate a person above the status of a licensee, the statutory definition is plain and unambiguous, and must be applied as a whole; so that even if the person "is neither a customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises" the person must also come within the test which follows, and not be a person who is permitted expressly or impliedly to go on the premises merely for the person's own interest, convenience, or gratification. Dawson v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 266, 173 S.E.2d 424 (1970).

Whether a person is an invitee or a licensee depends upon the nature of the person's relation or contact with the owner (or tenant) of the premises. If the relation solely benefits the person injured, one is at most a licensee. If, on the other hand, the relation was of mutual interest to the parties, one is an invitee. Chatham v. Larkins, 134 Ga. App. 856, 216 S.E.2d 677 (1975).

Person is licensee when at time of injury the person's presence on the premises was for the person's own convenience, or on business with others than the owner of the premises. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

When an accident victim and the victim's companions returned to a restaurant's parking lot, the victim's entry thereon after closing hours was evidence from which the jury could find the victim was a mere licensee, and the owners and occupiers of the premises owed the victim only the duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure the victim. Savage v. Flagler Co., 258 Ga. 335, 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988).

Mere permission to enter premises creates the relation of licensee; invitation, express or implied, is necessary to create the more responsible relation and the consequent higher duty upon the owner or proprietor. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Hyde, 45 Ga. App. 548, 165 S.E. 466 (1932).

- Summary judgment is unavailable to a landowner against a person who sustains injury on real property when questions of fact exist as the injured person's status while on the property as to any duty of the landowner arising therefrom with particular reference to the law as to the liability of owners of recreational areas. North v. Toco Hills, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 116, 286 S.E.2d 346 (1981).

When the plaintiff was manager of a restaurant adjacent to and leased from a motel, and when the plaintiff was in the motel lobby at the request of the desk clerk and was shot during a robbery of the motel, the plaintiff's status as an invitee or licensee was an issue of disputed material fact making denial of summary judgment motions by both parties appropriate. Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enters., Inc., 194 Ga. App. 874, 392 S.E.2d 535 (1990).

Summary judgment was precluded for owner of auto tune-up shop, since the passenger of a customer slipped and fell while the customer obtained help for a mechanical problem, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to the passenger's legal status, whether the owner had constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard, and whether the risk presented was reasonable. Hartley v. Macon Bacon Tune, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 815, 507 S.E.2d 259 (1998).

In order for a visitor to occupy status of implied invitee, as distinguished from mere licensee, the visitor must come for a purpose connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, or which the occupant permits to be carried on there; there must at least be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the visitor's business relates, although the particular thing which is the subject of the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant. Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935); Morse v. Sinclair Auto. Serv. Corp., 86 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1936); Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 199 S.E. 582 (1938).

Principle on which courts distinguish case of implied license from one of implied invitation seems to be this: when the privilege of the user exists for the common interest or mutual advantage of both parties it will be a case of invitation; but if the privilege exists for the mere pleasure and benefit of the party exercising the privilege, it will be a case of license. Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936).

Test of "mutuality of interest" is generally used in reference to a business in which the occupant is engaged or which the occupant permits to be carried on there; it has no application in regard to a mere social guest. Laurens v. Rush, 116 Ga. App. 65, 156 S.E.2d 482 (1967).

- In the absence of some relation which inures to the benefit of the two, or to that of the owner, no invitation may be implied, and the injured person must be regarded as a licensee. Cobb v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 Ga. App. 160, 198 S.E. 111 (1938); Pries v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 66 Ga. App. 464, 17 S.E.2d 902 (1941).

- When a visit is made on express invitation, but the purpose of the visit is wholly disconnected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, such an invitee occupies the status of a mere licensee. Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935); Morse v. Sinclair Auto. Serv. Corp., 86 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1936).

An express invitation, like the one implied, does not give to the recipient the legal status of an invitee, unless the recipient's visit is in some way connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged; the basis of the rule appears to be that an occupant of real estate ordinarily has the right and privilege of using it as the occupant sees fit, without responsibility or liability, except from hidden pitfalls, to a visitor entering thereon merely for one's own interest, curiosity, or pleasure, but the visitor must take the premises subject to any ordinary accompanying risks, the same as the occupant personally. Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935).

Summary judgment should have been granted in favor of a store and its employees on a tortious misconduct claim in a parent's action arising out of the employees' claim that the parent's child stole from the store because the child did not meet the legal definition of an invitee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1; the child had to be regarded as a licensee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2(a)(3) because the child entered the store only to use its bathroom and had no intention of shopping there. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

Person is not licensee unless person has permission, express or implied, to go upon property of another, and the authorities are not agreed as to whether such permission may be implied by habitual use of property or general custom and reference thereto. The general rule is that a person who owns or controls property owes no duty to a trespasser upon it, except not to willfully or recklessly injure the person; and this rule applies alike to adults and to children of tender years. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934).

- An owner's invitation, and the protection due an invitee thereunder, extend to those portions of the premises necessary for ingress and egress and on parts necessary or incidental to the mutual business or purposes of the invitation; but an invitee who leaves such places for others on the premises not included in the invitation and disconnected with the objects of the invitation is, as to such parts of the premises, a mere licensee. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

If an invitee does not go beyond that part of the premises to which, as it reasonably appears to the invitee the invitation extends, the invitee does not become a licensee, but if the invitee does go beyond that part to which the invitee is invited, the invitee becomes a mere licensee. Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983).

Plaintiff who entered defendant's premises for purpose of securing employment with defendant was mere licensee. Leach v. Inman, 63 Ga. App. 790, 12 S.E.2d 103 (1940).

- One who uses the premises of a merchant at a time beyond that to which an implied invitation extends is a mere licensee. Armstrong v. Sundance Entertainment, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 635, 347 S.E.2d 292 (1986).

Social guest in defendant's private home is mere licensee. Bryant v. Rucker, 121 Ga. App. 395, 173 S.E.2d 875 (1970); Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977); Barry v. Cantrell, 150 Ga. App. 439, 258 S.E.2d 61 (1979); Frankel v. Antman, 157 Ga. App. 26, 276 S.E.2d 87 (1981).

If plaintiff is a social guest in the defendant's home, the plaintiff is classified as a bare licensee, even though the plaintiff was expressly invited. Wren v. Harrison, 165 Ga. App. 847, 303 S.E.2d 67 (1983).

Social guests who were invited by the defendants to stay at the defendants' house after a wedding were licensees at the time one of them fell down an unguarded and unlighted stairwell leading to the basement. Knisely v. Gasser, 198 Ga. App. 795, 403 S.E.2d 85 (1991).

In a slip and fall action between a daughter and the daughter's mother, because the evidence showed that the daughter was a mere social guest or licensee in the mother's home at the time of the daughter's injury, and not an invitee, present only in the home for the daughter's convenience, and the mother did not act with any intent to harm the daughter, the mother was properly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability for the daughter's personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall. Behforouz v. Vakil, 281 Ga. App. 603, 636 S.E.2d 674 (2006).

Possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by condition on land if, but only if: (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger; and (b) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved; and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved. Patterson v. Thomas, 118 Ga. App. 326, 163 S.E.2d 331 (1968); Haag v. Stone, 127 Ga. App. 235, 193 S.E.2d 62 (1972); London Iron & Metal Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

Degree of care owed to social guest is less than that owed to invitee and the owner of such premises is liable only for willful or wanton injury. Ramsey v. Mercer, 142 Ga. App. 827, 237 S.E.2d 450 (1977).

Licensee must take premises as the licensee finds them. Rawlings v. Pickren, 45 Ga. App. 261, 164 S.E. 223 (1932); Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939).

As a general rule, owner of private grounds is under no obligation to keep them in safe condition for benefit of trespassers, bare licensees, or others who come upon the grounds, not by any invitation, express or implied, but for their own purposes, their pleasure, or to gratify their curiosity, however innocent or laudable their purpose may be. Rawlins v. Pickren, 45 Ga. App. 261, 164 S.E. 223 (1932).

Owner owes no duty to licensee to inspect premises or to prepare safe place for the licensee's reception. Kahn v. Graper, 114 Ga. App. 572, 152 S.E.2d 10 (1966).

Under this section, owner is under duty not to willfully or wantonly injure licensee. Herring v. Hauck, 118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198 (1968).

- The owner or person in charge of private grounds owes to a licensee thereon a duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee, or wantonly and recklessly exposing the licensee to hidden perils, and a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring the licensee after the licensee's presence on the premises is, or should be, discovered. Rawlins v. Pickren, 45 Ga. App. 261, 164 S.E. 223 (1932).

An owner owes to a licensee no duty as to the condition of the premises, unless imposed by statute, save that the owner should not knowingly let the licensee run upon a hidden peril, or willfully cause the licensee harm. Mortgage Comm'n Servicing Corp. v. Brock, 60 Ga. App. 695, 4 S.E.2d 669 (1939); Freeman v. Levy, 60 Ga. App. 861, 5 S.E.2d 61 (1939); Pries v. Atlanta Enters., Inc., 66 Ga. App. 464, 17 S.E.2d 902 (1941); Young v. Towles, 113 Ga. App. 471, 148 S.E.2d 455 (1966); Patterson v. Young, 118 Ga. App. 326, 163 S.E.2d 331 (1968); Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

The owner or occupier of premises owes to a mere licensee only the duty not to injure the licensee willfully or wantonly once the licensee's presence is discovered nor to maintain a pitfall or mantrap on the premises. Clark v. Rich's, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 242, 150 S.E.2d 716 (1966).

- To the licensee, as to the trespasser, no duty arises of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any given standard of safety, except that they must not contain pitfalls, man traps, and things of that character; the duty of the owner or occupier of the premises being merely not to willfully or wantonly injure the licensee by deliberate act, or by negligence in permitting some extraordinary concealed danger to exist and failing to warn the licensee thereof. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Ledbetter, 46 Ga. App. 500, 168 S.E. 81 (1933); Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150, 182 S.E. 625 (1935); Morse v. Sinclair Auto. Serv. Corp., 86 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1936).

The owner of premises owes to a licensee no duty of keeping the condition of the premises up to any given standard of safety, except that the premises must not contain pitfalls, mantraps, or things of that character. Flynn v. Inman, 49 Ga. App. 186, 174 S.E. 551 (1934); Ricks v. Boatwright, 95 Ga. App. 267, 97 S.E.2d 635 (1957); Abney v. London Iron & Metal Co., 152 Ga. App. 238, 262 S.E.2d 505 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

The duty generally owed a licensee by the owner or proprietor of premises is not to willfully and wantonly injure the licensee, which includes the obligation not to lay for the licensee or permit to exist pitfalls or man traps in which it may be reasonably anticipated the licensee will become ensnared; that is, concealed perils to which it may be reasonably anticipated the licensee may become a victim. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

While the landowner cannot intentionally injure or lay a trap for a trespasser or a licensee upon land, the landowner owes no other duty to the licensee. Kahn v. Graper, 114 Ga. App. 572, 152 S.E.2d 10 (1966).

An owner owes a licensee an obligation not to lay for the licensee or permit to exist pitfalls or man traps in which it may be reasonably anticipated the licensee will become ensnared. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975).

- Owners of property containing a tree were not liable to an individual after the individual's eardrum was punctured by a branch from the tree overhanging a sidewalk as there was no evidence of willfulness; it was clear that the tree and its overhanging branches were visible to the individual and were in no way a pitfall, mantrap, or hidden peril. Perkins v. Kranz, 316 Ga. App. 171, 728 S.E.2d 804 (2012).

The doctrine of mantrap applies to the duties owed by owners or occupiers of property. Queen v. City of Douglasville, 232 Ga. App. 68, 500 S.E.2d 918 (1998).

The standard "willful or wanton" imports deliberate acts or omissions, or that which discloses inference of conscious indifference to consequences. Washington v. Trend Mills, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 659, 175 S.E.2d 111 (1970).

- It is usually willful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuring a person who is actually known to be, or reasonably is expected to be, within the range of a dangerous act being done. Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Heath, 57 Ga. App. 763, 196 S.E. 125 (1938); Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975); Barry v. Cantrell, 150 Ga. App. 439, 258 S.E.2d 61 (1979).

- Homeowner's statements that the homeowner felt like the homeowner was at fault for an injured party's fall off of a deck were merely expressions of benevolence and were legally immaterial; the statements did not create questions of fact that precluded summary judgment as without willful or wanton conduct, the homeowner was not liable for the injured party's injuries. Trulove v. Jones, 271 Ga. App. 681, 610 S.E.2d 649 (2005).

If servants of the defendant were guilty of willful and wanton negligence which resulted in the plaintiff's injury, then the plaintiff's negligence, however gross, will not defeat recovery. Fox v. Pollard, 52 Ga. App. 545, 183 S.E. 854 (1936).

Exact point where ordinary negligence or lack of ordinary care passes into and becomes willful and wanton negligence is question for jury, under definite instruction from the trial judge that the facts must show that the failure to exercise ordinary care was not only negligence but that it amounted to willful and wanton negligence. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935).

In order for owner of premises to be liable for injuries to licensee from hidden danger, it is necessary that the owner know of the danger, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known thereof. Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).

Allegation that defendant knew or ought to have known of alleged defective condition is at best allegation of implied notice. Flynn v. Inman, 49 Ga. App. 186, 174 S.E. 551 (1934).

- In a licensee's personal injury action, the trial court properly found that a homeowner was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, as the homeowner owed no duty to the licensee to warn of the obviousness of a broom handle, tools on the floor, or the couch corner, which the licensee alleged caused a fall, as such were plainly visible and not hidden perils. Ellis v. Hadnott, 282 Ga. App. 584, 639 S.E.2d 559 (2006).

- Owner or proprietor of the premises must not wantonly and willfully injure the licensee; and since the licensee's presence as a result of the license is at all times probable, some care must be taken to anticipate the licensee's presence, and ordinary care and diligence must be used to prevent injuring the licensee after the licensee's presence is known or reasonably should be anticipated. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Ledbetter, 46 Ga. App. 500, 168 S.E. 81 (1933); Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936); Barry v. Cantrell, 150 Ga. App. 439, 258 S.E.2d 61 (1979).

After a proprietor or owner of property becomes aware, or should anticipate the presence of the licensee, the duty rests upon the owner or proprietor to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring the licensee. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958); Abney v. London Iron & Metal Co., 152 Ga. App. 238, 262 S.E.2d 505 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 759, 267 S.E.2d 214 (1980).

After the presence of the licensee is known, exactly the same acts of caution may be required of the proprietor, to satisfy the legal duty, as would be necessary if the licensee were invited. Barry v. Cantrell, 150 Ga. App. 439, 258 S.E.2d 61 (1979).

- This section does not apply when a trespasser is injured but an owner must not harm the trespasser by the use of active negligence. Rome Furnace Co. v. Patterson, 120 Ga. 521, 48 S.E. 166 (1904).

Fact that plaintiff might be trespasser does not alone necessarily negate any right of recovery for the plaintiff's injuries. Holcomb v. Ideal Concrete Prods., 140 Ga. App. 857, 232 S.E.2d 272 (1976).

In the case of trespasser, liability arises only when injury has been occasioned by willful and wanton negligence of proprietor or owner; no duty of anticipating the trespasser's presence is imposed, and the duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring the trespasser after the trespasser's presence and danger is actually known is, in point of fact, merely the duty not to injure the trespasser wantonly or willfully. Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936).

Failure to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to trespasser after the trespasser's presence has become actually known may amount to wantonness. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935).

- While every person should so use one's property that such use will not in the usual and ordinary course of human activities result in injury to others, yet as a general rule, one is not bound to anticipate the presence of trespassers on private property, but is, on the other hand, entitled to assume that other persons will obey the law, and not trespass. Norris v. Macon Term. Co., 58 Ga. App. 313, 198 S.E. 272 (1938).

- It is usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuring a licensee who is actually known to be, or reasonably is expected to be, within range of a dangerous act being done; however, if a licensee has equal knowledge of the dangerous condition or the risks involved, such as the presence of ice on driveway, there is no wilful or wanton action on the part of the owner and there is no liability to the licensee. Evans v. Parker, 172 Ga. App. 416, 323 S.E.2d 276 (1984).

Defendant landowner was not liable for injuries allegedly sustained when the plaintiff slipped and fell on a frost-covered bridge on the defendant's land since the plaintiff was aware of the presence of frost on the bridge and had equal knowledge of the incline of the bridge, having recently crossed it. Nixon v. Edmonson, 177 Ga. App. 662, 340 S.E.2d 278 (1986).

- The Georgia Department of Natural Resources' liability to people who use state land is similar to that which a possessor of land owes a licensee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2. Lee v. Dep't of Natural Res. of Ga., 263 Ga. App. 491, 588 S.E.2d 260 (2003).

- Trial court committed reversible error in a premises liability suit by providing an inapt, incorrect, and not reasonably raised or authorized by the evidence jury charge on assumption of risk because the charge, in essence, supported the defendants argument that anyone who chose to remain on the property consented to assume the risk of being shot and killed, which was flawed reasoning. Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp., 353 Ga. App. 162, 836 S.E.2d 555 (2019).

Cited in Jackson v. Sheppard, 62 Ga. App. 142, 8 S.E.2d 410 (1940); Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (1944); Nabors v. Atlanta Biltmore Corp., 77 Ga. App. 730, 49 S.E.2d 688 (1948); American Legion v. Simonton, 94 Ga. App. 184, 94 S.E.2d 66 (1956); Nechtman v. Wellington Plaza, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 40, 102 S.E.2d 57 (1958); Martin v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 101 Ga. App. 819, 115 S.E.2d 248 (1960); Hicks v. M.H.A., Inc., 107 Ga. App. 290, 129 S.E.2d 817 (1963); Stanton v. Grubb, 114 Ga. App. 350, 151 S.E.2d 237 (1966); Chambers v. Peacock Constr. Co., 115 Ga. App. 670, 155 S.E.2d 704 (1967); Hospital Auth. v. Morelli, 116 Ga. App. 26, 156 S.E.2d 667 (1967); Murray Biscuit Co. v. Hutto, 119 Ga. App. 377, 167 S.E.2d 182 (1969); Mion Constr. Co. v. Rutledge, 123 Ga. App. 777, 182 S.E.2d 500 (1971); Blair v. Manderson, 126 Ga. App. 235, 190 S.E.2d 584 (1972); Rutledge v. City of Atlanta, 130 Ga. App. 99, 202 S.E.2d 571 (1973); Rodriguez v. Newby, 131 Ga. App. 651, 206 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Strickland v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 317, 291 S.E.2d 396 (1982); Strickland v. Strickland, 198 Ga. App. 440, 402 S.E.2d 66 (1991); Lipham v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 385, 430 S.E.2d 590 (1993); Stanfield v. Kime Plus, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 316, 436 S.E.2d 54 (1993); Riley v. Brasunas, 210 Ga. App. 865, 438 S.E.2d 113 (1993); Ballenger Paving Co. v. Gaines, 231 Ga. App. 565, 499 S.E.2d 722 (1998); Hannah v. Hampton Auto Parts, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 392, 506 S.E.2d 910 (1998); Barnes v. St. Stephen's Missionary Baptist Church, 260 Ga. App. 765, 580 S.E.2d 587 (2003); McCullough v. Reyes, 287 Ga. App. 483, 651 S.E.2d 810 (2007).

Duty Owed to Children

1. In General

Greater quantum of care, though not greater degree of care, may be necessary when child of tender years is involved and a dangerous thing exists on the premises. Higginbotham v. Winborn, 135 Ga. App. 753, 218 S.E.2d 917 (1975); Wren v. Harrison, 165 Ga. App. 847, 303 S.E.2d 67 (1983).

The owner of lands on which a dangerous thing exists may be in legal duty bound to use a greater quantum of precaution in behalf of an infant licensee thereon than the owner would in behalf of an adult invited guest. The sum of the whole matter is included in the expression frequently enunciated that "duties arise out of circumstances." Barry v. Cantrell, 150 Ga. App. 439, 258 S.E.2d 61 (1979).

A well-defined distinction runs through the cases, between injuries caused by a dangerous statical condition and premises when dangerous active operations are being carried on, a much higher degree of care is necessary in protecting children in the latter case than in the former. Atlantic Steel Co. v. Cleaton, 52 Ga. App. 502, 183 S.E. 827 (1936).

- A child who accompanies the parent customer into a store, or similar establishment does not come within the definition of a licensee contained in this section, for the child does not enter such establishment "merely for his own interest, convenience or gratification," but the child's presence is essential and vital to the business conducted on the premises by the owner or proprietor; the child has the status of an invitee to whom the law requires ordinary care to be accorded. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

- A four-year-old child, though permitted "almost daily" for a period of more than two years to call upon and play with the four-year-old son of the owner or occupant of real property, does not, in so doing, enter onto the premises for any purpose connected with the business of the owner or occupant or for any purpose beneficial to the owner or occupant and, therefore, the owner does not by virtue of such permissive play, even though known to the owner or occupant, enter onto such premises as an invitee of the owner or occupant of the premises, but is, as to such owner or occupant, merely a licensee. Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 151 S.E.2d 905 (1966).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the property owners in a negligence claim because genuine issues of material fact remained as to the whether the property owners violated applicable building codes in the construction of their deck, whether they exercised ordinary care in preventing injury to their guests from a defect in the deck or showed such indifference to consequences as to justify a finding of wantonness, and whether their injured grandchild, a licensee, had equal knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for the grandchild's personal safety. Hicks v. Walker, 262 Ga. App. 216, 585 S.E.2d 83 (2003).

- In a parent's suit as a next friend to the parent's daughter, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to a retailer and its employees on the parent's claim of tortious misconduct, as no evidence was presented that the child victim was the retailer's business invitee, but was merely a licensee under both O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-1 and51-3-2, as the child merely entered the business with the sole intent to use the restroom; however, summary judgment was properly denied as to the invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, false arrest and damages claims filed by the parent against the defendants. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

- Defendant homeowners were properly granted summary judgment in a premise liability action arising from an injury sustained by a child while the child and the homeowners' children were playing in a shed, and a pulley fell from an I-beam and broke the child's leg since the child was a licensee, and the homeowners did not know that the child was in the shed or that the child would play with a pulley and chain in the shed. Bartlett v. Maffett, 247 Ga. App. 749, 545 S.E.2d 329 (2001).

- When a child and the child's parents were social guests of defendant and the child was on the defendant's dock under the supervision of the child's parents at the time the child drowned, and they were familiar with its construction and their son's limitations, since the duty of providing a safe playground for a child rests upon the child's parents, any breach of that duty must be imputed to the parents, rather than the defendant, although the dock had no handrails and from some positions a cabinet in the center of the dock partially obstructed the view. Wren v. Harrison, 165 Ga. App. 847, 303 S.E.2d 67 (1983).

- When question of whether child was licensee was not raised by evidence, a charge on that issue was unauthorized. Williams v. Worsley, 235 Ga. App. 806, 510 S.E.2d 46 (1998), recons. denied; overruled on other grounds by Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 834 S.E.2d 77 (2019).

Attractive nuisance is maintained when owner keeps premises in such state or condition as to lure and attract children to play upon or around some dangerous instrumentality; and of course, when such a state of facts exists, the owner or creator of such "attractive nuisance" owes a higher measure of duty to the public generally than it does when this principle is not applicable. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934).

When a railroad company leaves a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, unfastened in a city, on a lot which is not securely inclosed, and when people and children are wont to visit it and pass through it, this is negligence on the part of such company; and when an infant of ten or 12 years of age resorted to the turntable, and in riding upon the turntable was dangerously and seriously injured, the railroad company is liable for damages for such injuries to the infant. Carter v. La Mance, 40 Ga. App. 695, 151 S.E. 406 (1930).

All persons are presumed to anticipate the natural and reasonable consequences of their own conduct, and the theory of the so-called "turntable cases" in that one who sets before young children a temptation, which one has reason to believe may lead them into danger, must use ordinary care to protect them from harm; thus a child, who would otherwise occupy the status of a trespasser, will be taken to have received an implied invitation to enter upon the premises of another, when it is shown that one does so on account of having been allured thereto by reason of the maintenance of an instrumentality such as would naturally and reasonably attract young children. Clary Maytag Co. v. Rhyne, 41 Ga. App. 72, 151 S.E. 686 (1930).

One who maintains dangerous instrumentalities or appliances on one's premises of a character likely to attract children in play, or permits dangerous conditions to remain thereon with the knowledge that children are in the habit of resorting thereto for amusement, is liable to a child who is injured therefrom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 48 Ga. App. 706, 172 S.E. 740, rev'd on other grounds, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934).

The attractive nuisance doctrine, sometimes called the "turntable doctrine," is that, when a person, who has an instrumentality, agency, or condition upon the person's own premises, or who creates such condition on the premises of another, or in a public place, which may reasonably be apprehended to be a source of danger to children, is under a duty to take such precautions as one reasonably prudent would take to prevent injury to children of tender years whom one knows to be accustomed to resort there, or who may, by reason of something there which may be expected to attract them, come there to play. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 48 Ga. App. 706, 172 S.E. 740, rev'd on other grounds, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934).

When the defendants were aware of the custom of children to play in and around the defendant's premises, the defendants are bound to anticipate the presence of such children and are under a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring the children after their presence is known or reasonably should be anticipated. Holcomb v. Ideal Concrete Prods., 140 Ga. App. 857, 232 S.E.2d 272 (1976).

Attractive nuisance doctrine has been held not to apply to ponds when there is no unusual danger. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933).

- Court will not extend turntable doctrine to an ordinary case of a landowner merely allowing a pool of water or pond to stand on a vacant lot. Carter v. La Mance, 40 Ga. App. 695, 151 S.E. 406 (1930).

A person who creates or maintains a pond of water upon private premises is under no duty to maintain it in a condition of safety, as against drowning, for children who, with the mere acquiescence and knowledge of the owner but without express or implied invitation, come upon the premises and go in the pond. St. Clair v. City of Macon, 43 Ga. App. 598, 159 S.E. 758 (1931).

When children and others had been bathing in the defendant's lake for a long time, and the defendant knew this and did not forbid the children to do so, but permitted free swimming, bathing, and fishing in the lake, this did not render those of the public who so used the lake, invitees of the defendants, expressly or impliedly from known customary permissive use. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933).

When the plaintiff's infant son, nine years old, in company with another, went upon the premises of the defendants to bathe in an artificial pond thereon, which use was permitted and acquiesced in by the defendants, and stepped into a deep hole in the pond and was drowned, the defendants were not liable to the plaintiff for the death of the plaintiff's son in that they maintained an attractive nuisance and failed to provide signs or other warning that the deep hole was in the pond, or in that the children failed to have ropes or cables around the hole so as to keep small children from stepping into the same. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933).

The danger of drowning in a swimming pool or other pond or lake is an apparent, open danger, the knowledge of which is common to all, including a boy nine years of age; and there is no just view, consistent with recognized rights of property owners, which would compel one owning such water to fill it up or surround it with an impenetrable wall. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933).

Although an owner of land may know of the habit of children to visit a pond on the owner's premises and bathe, the owner is as a rule under no obligation to erect barriers or take other precautions to prevent the children from being injured thereby. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933).

The owner of unfenced land on which, within 100 to 120 feet of a passing highway, is a pool of water, apparently clear and pure, but in fact poisonous, is not liable for the deaths of trespassing children, who went into the water and died of the poison, when it is at least doubtful whether the water could be seen from any place where the children lawfully were, and there is nothing to show that the pool was what led them to enter the land, and it does not appear that children were in the habit of going to the place. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. O'Neal, 48 Ga. App. 706, 172 S.E. 740, rev'd on other grounds, 180 Ga. 153, 178 S.E. 451 (1934).

The attractive nuisance theory of recovery does not apply to natural ponds or water hazards. Wren v. Harrison, 165 Ga. App. 847, 303 S.E.2d 67 (1983).

Principles of this section were not applicable when a small child playing in defendant's back yard, with the defendant's knowledge, was injured while tinkering with the fastening apparatus of the tail gate of defendant's truck. Conkle v. Conkle, 90 Ga. App. 802, 84 S.E.2d 599 (1954).

No cause of action against the defendant is shown by the petition from which it appeared that the plaintiff, a child, was injured by the soil pan of a bulldozer falling on the child when playing with other children, in accordance with a custom known to the defendant, on an unenclosed, vacant lot on which the defendant was constructing a house and on which the defendant had parked or stored the bulldozer in a statical condition, with the soil pan suspended in the air instead of resting upon the ground, even though the defendant had actual knowledge of the presence of the children on the lot, as this useful machinery, so parked in its statical condition, did not constitute such a hidden peril as to make the defendant guilty of willful and wanton negligence in failing to warn the children away from the bulldozer. Brown v. Bone, 85 Ga. App. 22, 68 S.E.2d 190 (1951).

No cause of action is stated in a petition in which nine year old plaintiff seeks to recover the injuries alleged to have been received when the plaintiff visited a guest of the defendant's motel, with the implied knowledge of the defendant, and stuck the plaintiff's hand into the wringer attachment of an electrical washing machine provided by the defendant for the use of the defendant's motel guests even though it was alleged that the wringer was a dangerous, unguarded, attractive nuisance to small children. Ricks v. Boatwright, 95 Ga. App. 267, 97 S.E.2d 635 (1957).

- While it is true that it is actionable negligence for one to leave unguarded on a part of one's own premises, which one knows is frequented by children of tender years for the purpose of play, a dangerous thing or condition which may injure such children, one is not required to provide against remote or improbable injuries to children playing upon one's land, and as to a natural condition or common dangers existing in the order of nature, the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply, and it is the duty of parents to warn their children of such dangers. McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933).

Applicability to Specific Cases

Entry into property restricted to employee use.

- Defendant was not liable when the plaintiff, whose status was that of a trespasser or at best a licensee, went into a part of the defendant's property restricted to employees, used a piece of furniture to gain access to an ordinarily inaccessible area and then walked to the rear of that area where the plaintiff fell. Frank Mayes & Assocs. v. Massood, 238 Ga. App. 416, 518 S.E.2d 903 (1999).

- Trial court did not err in granting co-owners' motions for summary judgment in a wrongful death action filed by a decedent's mother and sister because the co-owners did not have superior knowledge of the danger posed by the retaining wall from which the decedent fell and the decedent had actual knowledge of the hazard; the fact that an owner was negligent per se in failing to comply with a building code does not impose liability if the owner lacks superior knowledge of the hazard. Barnes v. Morganton Baptist Ass'n, 306 Ga. App. 755, 703 S.E.2d 359 (2010).

- When it is alleged that the defendant was negligent in permitting board to be placed in dangerous position and in failing to warn the plaintiff thereof, this allegation is tantamount to an averment that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defective condition of the premises and the petition thus set forth a cause of action even if the plaintiff had been a licensee rather than an invitee. Lenkeit v. Chandler, 97 Ga. App. 769, 104 S.E.2d 476 (1958).

As a matter of law as to a licensee the mere construction and maintenance of a residence in such manner that adjoining door-ways of identical appearance open into a bedroom or bathroom and an unlighted flight of basement stairs from a common hallway is not actionable negligence. LaBranche v. Johnson, 127 Ga. App. 244, 193 S.E.2d 228 (1972).

Because the plaintiff, a licensee, had successfully traversed frayed carpet at the defendant homeowners' porch door at least 20 times and stated that on one of those visits, the plaintiff stumbled while exiting through the same doorway and that the plaintiff believed that the carpet had also caused that stumble, the plaintiff's testimony made it clear that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the risks associated with the carpet at the threshold and the grant of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of the defendants was, therefore, proper. Odum v. Gibson, 245 Ga. App. 394, 537 S.E.2d 801 (2000).

- The duty to the licensee is slightly higher than the duty to the trespasser because the trespasser's presence, as a result of the license, is at all times probable and some care must be taken to anticipate the trespasser's presence and when the alleged injury is caused by the alleged dangerous statical condition of the stairway, no duty arises with reference to the trespasser or the licensee of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any given standard of safety, except that they must not contain pitfalls, mantraps, and things of that character. Leach v. Inman, 63 Ga. App. 790, 12 S.E.2d 103 (1940).

When a trespasser is seeking to recover for an injury caused by a dangerous statical condition of the premises, as in the case of a stairway negligently constructed and maintained, liability of the owner of the premises arises only where the injury has been occasioned by willful and wanton negligence of the owner or proprietor thereof, there is no duty of anticipating the trespasser's presence and when the trespasser's presence and danger is not in fact known, no duty arises on the part of the owner of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any given standard except that it must not contain pitfalls, mantraps, and things of that character. Leach v. Inman, 63 Ga. App. 790, 12 S.E.2d 103 (1940).

When the injury for which a recovery is sought is caused by the dangerous statical condition of the premises (stairway), the injury to the licensee has to be occasioned by willful and wanton negligence and while the owner or proprietor of the premises must not willfully and wantonly injure the licensee, yet the owner is not free from a duty to the licensee. Leach v. Inman, 63 Ga. App. 790, 12 S.E.2d 103 (1940).

When the alleged injury is caused by the dangerous, statical condition of a stairway, and no dangerous active operations were being carried on and no active negligence is involved, no duty arises with reference to the licensee of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any standard of safety except that they must not contain a pitfall, a mantrap, or other things of that character. Kahn v. Graper, 114 Ga. App. 572, 152 S.E.2d 10 (1966).

- Denial of an owner's summary judgment motion was reversed as the owner's duty to a licensee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2(b) arose after the owner became aware of, or should have anticipated the presence of, the licensee near the peril and the owner had no knowledge that the licensee, who was invited into the owner's home by the owner's friends, was on the owner's property and should not have anticipated the licensee's presence near a defective brick wall; the licensee's claim that the defective wall was a mantrap or pitfall was rejected as that doctrine rested upon the theory that the owner was expecting a trespasser or licensee and had prepared the premises to do the trespasser injury. Buce v. Fudge, 281 Ga. App. 221, 635 S.E.2d 788 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 107 (Ga. 2007).

- When a defendant owner of a house, permits the purchaser of the incomplete house, to occupy it as the purchaser's home with the purchaser's family, an inference can be drawn that the defendant impliedly permits third persons to enter the premises to make welcoming visits, and thus that such visitors are licensees. MacKenna v. Jordan, 123 Ga. App. 801, 182 S.E.2d 550 (1971).

When the purpose of three men in going to the home of the defendant was to see the renovation that had been made and that while there they toured the home, talked about duck hunting and drank beer, this authorized a determination by the jury that the plaintiff was a licensee in the defendant's home at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Delk v. Sellers, 149 Ga. App. 439, 254 S.E.2d 446 (1979).

- Homeowner could not be held liable for a guest's drowning as the homeowner was neither required by law, with respect to any extraordinary duty, nor by the circumstances, regarding any personal conditions of adult-guest, to watch over the guest, and there is no rule of general "foreseeability" that all persons who swim may drown. Belcher v. James, 207 Ga. App. 796, 429 S.E.2d 165 (1993).

- An owner of property was not liable for the drowning of an 11-year old social guest in a swimming pool since the existence and condition of the pool was open and obvious and there was no evidence the drowning was caused by any defect in the pool. Hemphill v. Johnson, 230 Ga. App. 478, 497 S.E.2d 16 (1998).

- When a decedent entered a lake to rescue the decedent's minor son, the decedent became, at most, a licensee; since an owner or occupier of property owed no duty to trespassers or licensees other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring them, and since there was no evidence that a developer acted in a willful or wanton manner, summary judgment for the developer in a wrongful death case arising from the decedent's drowning was proper. Brazier v. Phoenix Group Mgmt., 280 Ga. App. 67, 633 S.E.2d 354 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 113 (2007).

- Homeowner was not liable for an injured party's injuries because the injured party was injured when the homeowner rolled into a pool at the prodding of a boy and the injured party jumped out of the way; the injured party had an equal knowledge of the obvious lack of railings on the deck. Trulove v. Jones, 271 Ga. App. 681, 610 S.E.2d 649 (2005).

An owner was not liable to a guest, who was a licensee, for a failure to warn the guest of the low railing on a balcony as the condition of the balcony constituted a static condition, not a hidden peril, pitfall, or mantrap; there was no evidence that the owner wilfully or wantonly injured the guest or that the owner knowingly exposed the guest to a dangerous activity, hidden peril, pitfall, or mantrap under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2(b). Jordan v. Bennett, 312 Ga. App. 838, 720 S.E.2d 301 (2011).

- Premises owner and its operator were properly granted summary judgment in an action filed against them by a decedent's administrator, as the decedent, who was granted permission to hunt on the property without a permit, was not shown to be anything other than a licensee, no breach of any duty owed to the decedent as a licensee was presented, and an intervening illegal act by a third party was the proximate cause of the decedent's death; moreover, because the evidence showed that there had never been an accidental shooting of one hunter by another on the premises, no basis existed for holding that the owners or operator should have foreseen that a third party would come onto the property and illegally shoot at a target which the third party could not identify. Hadden v. ARE Props., LLC, 280 Ga. App. 314, 633 S.E.2d 667 (2006).

- Trial court clearly erred in denying the appellant's motion for summary judgment because the appellant, the property owner of the home the appellant allowed the appellant's daughter's estranged husband to enter and who thereafter killed the daughter, could not have foreseen the violent criminal actions of the estranged husband, a third party, in the negligence suit brought by the deceased daughter's estate. Van v. Kong, 344 Ga. App. 754, 811 S.E.2d 474 (2018).

- Evidence supported the jury's verdict and there was no error in denying the property owner's motion for new trial because the trial court correctly determined that a jury should decide whether the property owner was wanton or wilful in failing to take ordinary care to warn invitees and their guests, such as the plaintiff, of the hazardous conditions on the owner's premises, including frequent criminal activity and gunfire, of which the owner arguably had knowledge. Khalia, Inc. v. Rosebud, 353 Ga. App. 350, 836 S.E.2d 840 (2019).

- Board of Regents was not liable to a university campus visitor who, while intoxicated, tripped on a landscape pipe in a pine-straw landscaped area off a walkway and tumbled into an eight-foot-deep window well because the visitor was a licensee and the only duty was to avoid wilful or wanton injury; the window well was not a mantrap. Scully v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 332 Ga. App. 873, 775 S.E.2d 230 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 741 (Ga. 2015).

- A visitor's decision to stop by a condominium residence, without first calling to make a definite appointment with the resident, served only the visitor's convenience, and the visitor's status at best was that of a licensee. Planned Community Servs., Inc. v. Spielman, 187 Ga. App. 703, 371 S.E.2d 193, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 371 S.E.2d 193 (1988).

Injured party was a licensee after the injured party entered into the lobby of a radio station just to be with the injured party's child, who was being interviewed, and had no other business at the station; the station did not obtain a benefit by virtue of the injured party's visit and did not impliedly invite the public at large into its lobby. Howard v. Gram Corp., 268 Ga. App. 466, 602 S.E.2d 241 (2004).

- In a suit seeking damages sustained when the plaintiff stepped in a hole in the defendant's backyard and injured herself, even assuming the plaintiff was originally an invitee when the plaintiff went to the defendant's front door, and regardless of however innocent the plaintiff's subsequent decision to enter the defendant's backyard, in order to visit a friend in a nearby house, may have been, at the time of the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not on a portion of the premises to which as the situation might reasonably appear to the plaintiff's an implied invitation extended. The plaintiff was, therefore, at the time of injury, a licensee, to whom the owner or proprietor of the premises is liable only for wilful or wanton injury. Swanson v. Smith, 199 Ga. App. 471, 405 S.E.2d 301 (1991).

There is a duty on the part of the landowner not to maintain on the landowner's premises dangerous excavation so that persons passing along a street immediately adjoining may not be injured while in the exercise of ordinary care or when by necessity or accident they slightly deviate from such street or walkway. Wright v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 316, 7 S.E.2d 793 (1940).

When an owner of premises allows an excavation to be placed in dangerous proximity to a thoroughfare so that persons in the exercise of ordinary care might casually fall therein it is the duty of such owner so to inclose the excavation as to afford reasonable immunity against danger, but when the adjacent land is level or approximately so and that which caused the injury is so far removed that a traveller in the exercise of ordinary care would not have been injured thereby, no duty to such traveller arises. Wright v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 316, 7 S.E.2d 793 (1940).

When the defendant may have been negligent in failing to erect a barrier or guard for its culvert at a particular place, and would have been liable to the plaintiff if the plaintiff had casually or inadvertently walked or fallen into such culvert, the plaintiff was precipitated into such culvert by intervening negligent acts of the city and of the driver of the automobile, which acts were not such as would probably have occurred in the usual, natural and probable course of events, under the facts as pleaded the negligence of the defendant railway company, while contributing to the injury, did not constitute the proximate and efficient cause of the injury. Wright v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 316, 7 S.E.2d 793 (1940).

Lease contract provision relieving landlord of obligation to keep premises in repair is not effective as against third persons lawfully on the premises, even if the tenant knew of the defective condition. Flagler Co. v. Savage, 258 Ga. 335, 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988).

- When a person enters upon the premises of a railroad company to meet a train in order to see "a party" for the purpose of trying to procure employment in which the railroad company was not interested or concerned, the presence of the person so entering upon the premises is purely for the person's own benefit and interest, and the person is a mere licensee, and not an invitee. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Hyde, 45 Ga. App. 548, 165 S.E. 466 (1932), later appeal, 47 Ga. App. 139, 169 S.E. 854 (1933).

- After the decedent was electrocuted when a pipe the decedent was removing from the ground came into contact with an uninsulated high voltage wire 25 feet above the ground, the defendant railroad is not liable since the decedent was a licensee, and the defendant's maintenance of uninsulated wire 25 feet above ground level did not constitute "willful or wanton injury," for recovery for damages. Leisner v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 420 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969).

- The alleged failure of the defendant railroad company to keep its right-of-way at a private crossing clear of weeds and bushes does not violate any duty owed to the plaintiff's decedent. The owner of the premises owes no such duty to a licensee or trespasser. Wise v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 61 Ga. App. 372, 6 S.E.2d 135 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63 (1940).

Fact that pedestrians frequently used part of right of way to walk without objection would not make one walking thereon licensee. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935).

Only duty owing by railway company to trespasser is not to wantonly or willfully injure the trespasser after the trespasser's presence has been discovered. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935); Collett v. Atlanta, B. & C.R.R., 51 Ga. App. 637, 181 S.E. 207 (1935); Fox v. Pollard, 52 Ga. App. 545, 183 S.E. 854 (1936); Groves v. Southern Ry., 61 Ga. App. 651, 7 S.E.2d 208 (1940).

After the presence of a trespasser upon the track of the defendant in front of its approaching train is discovered, it becomes the duty of the agents in charge of the train to give the trespasser some warning of the trespasser's dangerous position. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935); Fox v. Pollard, 52 Ga. App. 545, 183 S.E. 854 (1936).

Lack of ordinary care on part of railway company in failing to anticipate trespasser's presence would not render the company liable when the trespasser was personally guilty of lack of ordinary care in exposing oneself to peril, but might render the company liable if the presence of the trespasser on the track at such a time and place was free from a lack of ordinary care on the trespasser's part. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

- It cannot be said as a matter of law that the failure of a person approaching and entering upon a railroad crossing, and unaware of the approach of a train, to stop, look, and listen, renders such person guilty of such lack of ordinary care as would prevent recovery except in cases of willful and wanton conduct on the part of the defendant company. Wise v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 61 Ga. App. 372, 6 S.E.2d 135 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63 (1940).

- The mere failure of the employees of a railway company to discover the presence of a trespasser at a place where, and a time when, it was their duty to anticipate the presence of trespassers, and thereafter to take such needful and proper measures for the trespasser's protection as ordinary care might require, might amount to a lack of ordinary care on the part of the railroad company, but would not, in and of itself, amount to willful and wanton misconduct. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935); Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

- When, however, from the locality, circumstances, and known habits of the public generally, there is reason to apprehend that the track in front of the locomotive may not be clear of human beings, then the duty of anticipating the presence of and danger to such trespassers devolves on the employees of the company operating the train. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

If the presence of a trespasser on the track at the time and place of the injury is brought about by peculiar facts and circumstances which relieve the trespasser from the guilt of a lack of ordinary care in thus exposing oneself, the company might be liable for a mere lack of ordinary care on the company's part in failing to anticipate the trespasser's presence at a time when and a place where the company was charged with such duty, and in thereafter failing to take such proper precautions for the trespasser safety as might seem reasonably necessary. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

Whether the locality, the time, and the circumstances of an injury to one using the right of way, and the known habits and frequency of the public in using it, create such a condition as will charge the servants of the company operating the locomotive with the special duty of looking out for the presence of a trespasser at the time and place of the injury, is generally a question for the jury, in the light of all the evidence introduced. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

When a number of persons habitually, with the knowledge and without the disapproval of a railroad company, use a private passageway for the purpose of crossing the tracks of the company at a given point, the employees of the company in charge of a train, who are aware of the custom, are bound, on a given occasion, to anticipate that persons may be upon the tracks at this point; and they are under a duty to take such precautions to prevent injury to such persons as would meet the requirements of ordinary care and diligence. The imposition of such a duty on the part of the servants of the railroad company would not relieve a person going upon the tracks at the crossing from the duty of exercising ordinary care for his own safety. Wise v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 61 Ga. App. 372, 6 S.E.2d 135 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63 (1940).

- Even though a trespasser may not be deficient in any of the trespasser's faculties of sight or hearing, or there be no surrounding physical conditions to interfere with or hinder the exercise of such faculties, and while the agents in charge of the train have the right to conclude and act on the conclusion that such person will leave the track in time to save oneself from injury, in that they are then under no duty to check the speed of the train, yet as a matter of ordinary prudence and care, it is their duty to sound the whistle and ring the bell, as a warning of the approaching danger, and the jury would be authorized to find that such negligence, under the circumstances, amounted to wantonness. Humphries v. Southern Ry., 51 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E. 135 (1935); Fox v. Pollard, 52 Ga. App. 545, 183 S.E. 854 (1936).

It is for jury to find whether failure to use ordinary care in operation of train amounts to wanton or willful conduct. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Heath, 57 Ga. App. 763, 196 S.E. 125 (1938).

- When the car in which an employee's children were traveling was struck by a train after the driver dropped off the employee at the employer's facility, the fact that the children were licensees did not prevent the employee from bringing a premises liability claim against the employer for its failure to comply with a zoning ordinance requiring the employer to pay for the installation of traffic signals at the railroad crossing where the accident occurred. Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 650 S.E.2d 709 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1876, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 156 (Ga. 2008).

- When there were no allegations of willful and wanton negligence, nor is there any proof of the negligence, proof by plaintiff that injuries were caused by running of train would not make out a prima facie case against defendant railroad, as he was at a place where defendant owed him no duty until after he was discovered, and there was no evidence showing this fact. Collett v. Atlanta, B. & C.R.R., 51 Ga. App. 637, 181 S.E. 207 (1935).

This section cannot be taken as having reference to independent tort by railroad company in the operation of its trains, but, according to its own language and by reason of its context and indicated source, must be construed as only having reference to the liability of an owner or occupier of premises to one injured on account of a failure to keep the premises and approaches in a proper state of repair. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Wise, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63 (1940); Southern Ry. v. Liley, 75 Ga. App. 489, 43 S.E.2d 576 (1947); Martin v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 103 Ga. App. 281, 119 S.E.2d 56 (1961).

- When the uncontradicted evidence shows that there was no mutuality of interest, monetary or otherwise, between a patron of a pony ride and the operator of a gas station who was also the unknowing occupier of the vacant lot where the ride was set up, the plaintiff was, as to the defendant, at most only a licensee. Walker v. Reed, 180 Ga. App. 165, 348 S.E.2d 707 (1986).

- Homeowners did not breach any duty owed to an eight-year-old child who was killed while riding as a passenger on a go-cart driven by their grandson. Bunn v. Landers, 230 Ga. App. 744, 498 S.E.2d 109 (1998).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to homeowners on parent and next friend's negligence suit against them after the parent and next friend's 11-year-old child sat at the top of a rollerblading ramp, slid down it, and fractured the child's wrist in the process as the child was a social invitee, which made the child a licensee on their property and, thus, the homeowners only owed the child a duty not to willfully or wantonly injure the child; since the record did not show any evidence that the homeowners willfully or wantonly injured the child, inasmuch as the homeowners were not home at the time and did not even know the child was on their property, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the homeowners on the parent and next friend's claim that the dangerous condition on their property caused the child's injury. Rice v. Elliott, 256 Ga. App. 87, 567 S.E.2d 721 (2002).

- Georgia has adopted the position that a firefighter's status as to the landowner whose property the firefighter comes upon in order to fight a fire is that of a licensee but in view of the statutory language defining a "licensee," it would perhaps be more appropriate to state, as does the Restatement of the Law of Torts (2nd ed.) § 345, p. 228, that firefighters are sui generis but treated "on the same footing as licensees." Ingram v. Peachtree S., Ltd., 182 Ga. App. 367, 355 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

While a firefirefighter may recover for negligence independent of the fire, a landowner is not liable for negligence in causing the fire. Hence, the status of invitee or licensee, if pertinent at all, only comes into play in determining what duty is owed the firefighter with regard to events extrinsic to the fire's inception. Ingram v. Peachtree S., Ltd., 182 Ga. App. 367, 355 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

- Given the emergency circumstances with which a property owner was faced, it was unreasonable to expect the owner to have exercised the same degree of care in preparing the owner's home and property for the arrival of the emergency personnel as the owner would have been required to exercise before welcoming an invitee in a non-emergency situation. Accordingly, under the circumstances presented in the case, the emergency medical technician who responded to the scene and was injured on the owner's property was a licensee as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2(a). Sands v. Lindsey, 314 Ga. App. 160, 723 S.E.2d 471 (2012).

Emergency medical technician (EMT) failed to demonstrate that a jury issue existed as to whether a property owner breached the owner's duty to the EMT as a licensee. The EMT failed to cite to any authority supporting a conclusion that the owner's oversights, occurring when the owner left open the owner's front door but left closed the owner's glass storm door in anticipation of the arrival of the EMT in response to an emergency situation, evidenced a wanton disregard for the EMT's safety, as opposed to mere negligence. Sands v. Lindsey, 314 Ga. App. 160, 723 S.E.2d 471 (2012).

- If the defendants should have known of the hazards created by the defects in wiring at their boat dock and the injured social guest did not, the wiring may have constituted the sort of "hidden peril," "pitfall," or "mantrap" which the premises owner was obligated, even to a bare licensee, to correct. If there was such a "mantrap," the defendants' conduct may have been willful or wanton. Bragg v. Missroon, 186 Ga. App. 803, 368 S.E.2d 564 (1988).

A pond, either natural or man-made, cannot be deemed a man-trap, and when the plaintiff fails to show the defendant's actual knowledge of hidden stumps and roots within the lake, summary judgment for the defendant is proper. Nye v. Union Camp Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1988).

- A small depression in the defendant's residential yard, two or three steps from the concrete sidewalk (that the plaintiff did not use), which hole was covered by a corner of indoor/outdoor carpeting, did not constitute a mantrap or pitfall. Hawkins v. Brown, 228 Ga. App. 311, 491 S.E.2d 423 (1997).

- It cannot be said that the placement of gravel on a private roadway which is under construction constitutes a pitfall or mantrap. Nor can it be said to be a dangerous or hazardous condition from which a deliberate attempt to inflict injury can be inferred. Francis v. Haygood Contracting, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 74, 404 S.E.2d 136, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 404 S.E.2d 136 (1991).

- Defendant's actions do not evidence the level of intent for willfulness or wantonness required to show the violation of a duty to a licensee. Aldredge v. Symbas, 248 Ga. App. 578, 547 S.E.2d 295 (2001).

- A landlord is liable to a person injured while visiting a tenant for the visitor's own personal advantage only for willful or wanton injury to the visitor, a licensee. Brown v. Clay, 166 Ga. App. 694, 305 S.E.2d 367 (1983).

- Since there was no evidence that the homeowner derived any benefit from the half-brother's presence in the home, the half-brother was a mere social guest or licensee and the half-brother's voluntary act of cutting the lawn for the homeowner did not change this status, nor the homeowner's duty of care to the half-brother. Robinson v. Turner, 164 Ga. App. 515, 297 S.E.2d 522 (1982).

- Homeowner could be held liable for burns suffered by a guest taking a shower based on the owner's intentional conduct in increasing the water temperature combined with the homeowner's negligent omission in failing to mention this fact when the guest announced the intention to bathe. Waldo v. Moore, 241 Ga. App. 797, 527 S.E.2d 887 (2000).

- Guest of the homeowner was a licensee while visiting the homeowner at the homeowner's mobile home and thus the homeowner owed the guest a duty to not willfully or wantonly injure the guest; accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the homeowner as a trier of fact had to consider whether the homeowner had superior knowledge that carpet scrap was a hazard to the guest. Williams v. Truett, 251 Ga. App. 46, 553 S.E.2d 350 (2001).

- Trial court erred in denying summary judgment to both a city and the Department of Transportation, in a slip and fall case filed against them by a pedestrian, as: (1) the pedestrian conceded that the pedestrian was a licensee with equal constructive knowledge of any hazard posed by potholes; (2) the pothole in which the pedestrian fell was not a concealed or camouflaged danger; and (3) no evidence was presented that the pothole was maintained wilfully or wantonly. Ga. DOT v. Strickland, 279 Ga. App. 753, 632 S.E.2d 416 (2006).

- Former employee who returned to the place of employment after business hours at the employee's own behest, in order to retrieve the employee's personal effects after the employee was terminated, was a licensee, not an invitee. Rucker v. Troll Book Fairs, 232 Ga. App. 189, 501 S.E.2d 301 (1998).

- Property owner was not liable in wrongful death action since the decedent was, at most, a social guest or licensee since the parent failed to show that the property owner had any knowledge about the actual danger of firearms being discharged on New Year's Eve at or near the owner's property and there was no evidence of substantially similar crimes occurring on the owner's property. Spear v. Calhoun, 261 Ga. App. 835, 584 S.E.2d 71 (2003).

- In a social guest's suit for personal injuries brought against the tenants of certain real property as well as the property owner and the owner's property management company, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the property owner as there was no evidence that the property owner had actual or constructive knowledge of any problem with the condition of or construction of the deck that fell while the guest was standing upon the deck. Silman v. Assocs. Bellemeade, 294 Ga. App. 764, 669 S.E.2d 663 (2008), aff'd, 286 Ga. 27, 685 S.E.2d 277 (2009).

- Federal food inspector was an invitee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, not a licensee under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2, because the inspector was not present at an owner's chicken processing plant merely for the inspector's own pleasure or convenience but rather pursuant to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) responsibilities; the owner could not have legally conducted business without the presence of USDA inspectors, which indicated that the owner received an advantage from the inspector's presence on the property and, thus, was easy to infer that the owner invited the inspector onto the premises in order to ensure compliance with federal regulations so that the owner could operate the plant. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Atkins, 310 Ga. App. 423, 713 S.E.2d 483 (2011).

- In a construction site delivery driver's claims against a general contractor and a subcontractor arising out of injuries that occurred when the driver was struck by a concrete-filled hose on the construction site, as to the subcontractor, the driver was a licensee because there was no evidence that the driver's presence was for their mutual benefit, but as to the general contractor, the question of whether the driver was a licensee or invitee was for the jury. Card v. Dublin Constr. Co., 337 Ga. App. 804, 788 S.E.2d 845 (2016), cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2017); cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 140 (Ga. 2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability, § 111 et seq.

Negligent Excavation - Cave-In on Worker, 21 POF3d 217.

- 65A C.J.S., Negligence, § 490 et seq.

- Proximate cause as determining landlord's liability, where injury results to a third person from a nuisance that becomes such only upon tenant's using the premises, 4 A.L.R. 740.

Duty of abutting owner to continue safeguard against injury which he has voluntarily furnished, 5 A.L.R. 936.

Right of third person to enter premises against objection of the landlord, 6 A.L.R. 465; 43 A.L.R. 206.

Liability of owner to licensee or invitee for conditions on premises recently vacated by tenant, 10 A.L.R. 244.

Effect of verbal abuse to change one's status from licensee or invitee to trespasser, 12 A.L.R. 254.

Liability of adjoining property owner for injury to one deviating from highway or frequented path, 14 A.L.R. 1397; 159 A.L.R. 136.

Duty to guard against danger to children by electric wires, 17 A.L.R. 833; 41 A.L.R. 1337; 49 A.L.R. 1053; 100 A.L.R. 621.

Status of passenger in ordinary coach who enters Pullman coach for temporary purpose, 18 A.L.R. 71.

Sublessee or assignee of lease as trespasser, 18 A.L.R. 503.

Liability for injury by articles temporarily placed in space between sidewalk and curb, 22 A.L.R. 1495.

Liability for injury to one in street by object falling from window, 29 A.L.R. 77; 53 A.L.R. 462.

Attractive nuisances, 36 A.L.R. 34; 39 A.L.R. 486; 45 A.L.R. 982; 53 A.L.R. 1344; 60 A.L.R. 1444.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises, 41 A.L.R. 842.

Liability to trespasser or bare licensee as affected by distinction between active and passive negligence, 49 A.L.R. 778; 156 A.L.R. 1226.

Liability for conditions in space between lot lines and sidewalk actually within limits of street, but apparently part of the abutting property, 56 A.L.R. 220.

Liability for injury to elevator passenger as affected by the fact that sides of car are open and unprotected, 57 A.L.R. 259.

Duty and liability respecting condition of store or shop, 58 A.L.R. 136; 100 A.L.R. 710; 162 A.L.R. 949.

Use of space within lot lines, as part of public sidewalk as affecting owner's responsibility for its condition, 58 A.L.R. 1042.

Liability for injury to child guest on one's premises, 60 A.L.R. 108.

Liability for injury by stepping or falling into opening in sidewalk while doors were open or cover off, 70 A.L.R. 1358.

Landlord's liability for injuries to strangers outside premises as affected by covenant to repair or reservation of right to enter to make repairs, 89 A.L.R. 480.

Right of one other than owner or lessee of premises to benefit of rule that restricts duty toward trespasser or licensee to abstention from willful or wanton injury, 90 A.L.R. 886.

Duty and liability of carrier toward one accompanying departing passenger or present to meet incoming one, with respect to conditions at or about station, 92 A.L.R. 614.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to person thereon by dog not owned or harbored by former, 92 A.L.R. 732.

Liability of one exercising the rights of an owner of realty for injuries due to its condition, as affected by want of legal title, 96 A.L.R. 1068; 130 A.L.R. 1525.

Rule of property owner's immunity from liability for injury to or death of trespasser, absent wanton or willful conduct, as affected by fact that danger zone extends beyond the property, 102 A.L.R. 218.

Duty of federal courts to follow decision of state courts as to doctrine of attractive nuisance, 103 A.L.R. 703.

Liability of railroad company for injury to trespassers or licensees other than employees or passengers struck by object projecting, or thrown, from passing train, 112 A.L.R. 850.

"Safe place" statutes as applicable to municipalities or other public bodies when engaged in performing a governmental function, 114 A.L.R. 428.

Duty to guard against operation of elevator by unauthorized person, 117 A.L.R. 989.

Liability of owner or occupier of premises other than store or shop for personal injury to another due to slippery condition of floor, 118 A.L.R. 425.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury to one who falls over obstructions placed to protect lawn, 129 A.L.R. 740.

Liability for injury or death on or near golf course, 138 A.L.R. 541; 82 A.L.R.2d 1183.

Liability, under attractive nuisance doctrine or related principle, for injury to children jumping or falling from nondefective and statutory object or structure reached by climbing, 145 A.L.R. 322.

Duty of owner or occupier of premises to persons thereon upon invitation of, or otherwise in connection with, licensee, 147 A.L.R. 651.

Entering dark place on unfamiliar premises as contributory negligence, 163 A.L.R. 587.

Unintentional intrusion on land of another as affecting right of recovery for injuries, 174 A.L.R. 471.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to vehicles or their contents, 3 A.L.R.2d 758.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground of liability for damage or injury to third person, 6 A.L.R.2d 284.

Liability for injury in connection with automatic elevator, 6 A.L.R.2d 391.

Liability for injury of child on electric transmission tower or pole, 6 A.L.R.2d 754.

Liability of landowner for drowning of child, 8 A.L.R.2d 1254.

Liability for injury by explosive or the like found by, or left accessible to, a child, 10 A.L.R.2d 22.

Liability of carrier for injuries to person boarding vehicle or ship for social or other purposes in connection with a passenger, 11 A.L.R.2d 1075.

Liability of landlord to one using fire escape for other than intended purpose, 12 A.L.R.2d 217.

Liability for injury resulting from swinging door, 16 A.L.R.2d 1161.

Storekeeper's duty and liability to one passing through store to another destination, 23 A.L.R.2d 1135.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to fall of object or substance from ceiling of place of public resort, 24 A.L.R.2d 643.

Liability for injury to guest in home or similar premises, 25 A.L.R.2d 598.

Intoxication of person injured or killed as affecting applicability of last clear chance doctrine, 26 A.L.R.2d 308.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior stairs, passageways, areas, or structures used in common by tenants, 26 A.L.R.2d 468; 65 A.L.R.3d 14; 68 A.L.R.3d 382.

Liability of landowner for injury to or death of child caused by cave-in or landslide, 28 A.L.R.2d 195.

Liability of landowner for injury to or death of child resulting from piled or stacked lumber or other building materials, 28 A.L.R.2d 218.

Passenger on freight elevator as attractive nuisance, 28 A.L.R.2d 1222.

Liability of owner or occupant for condition of covering over opening or vault in sidewalk, 31 A.L.R.2d 1334.

Duty of landowner to erect fence or other device to deter trespassing children from entering third person's property on which dangerous condition exists, 39 A.L.R.2d 1452.

Liability of builder or owner of building under construction for injuries received on premises by infant, 44 A.L.R.2d 1253.

Child accompanying business visitor to store, shop, or the like as invitee or licensee, 44 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Liability of landowner for injury or death of adult falling down unhoused well, cistern, mine shaft, or the like, 46 A.L.R.2d 1069.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to injured person permitted to use power tools or appliances, 46 A.L.R.2d 1377.

Liability of landowner for injury or death of child caused by cut or puncture from broken glass or other sharp object, 47 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Duty of a possessor of land to warn adult licensees of danger, 55 A.L.R.2d 525.

Duty and liability of an innkeeper to visitor or caller of registered guest, 58 A.L.R.2d 1201.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of litter or debris on floor, 61 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of obstacle placed or dropped on floor, 61 A.L.R.2d 110.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of litter or debris on stairway, 61 A.L.R.2d 174.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to presence of obstacle placed or dropped on steps, 61 A.L.R.2d 205.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on floor made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on steps made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 131.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to machine or machinery in motion other than vehicles, railroad cars, or streetcars, 62 A.L.R.2d 898.

Independent contractor's or subcontractor's liability for injury or death of third person occurring during excavation work not in street or highway, 62 A.L.R.2d 1052.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to defect in floor or floor covering, 64 A.L.R.2d 335.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall due to defect in stairway, 64 A.L.R.2d 398.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for fall on steps slippery by nature or through wear, 64 A.L.R.2d 471.

Hospital's liability to visitor injured as result of condition of exterior walks, steps, or grounds, 71 A.L.R.2d 427.

Hospital's liability to visitor injured by slippery, obstructed, or defective interior floors or steps, 71 A.L.R.2d 436.

Place or manner of depositing snow moved by abutting owner or occupant as affecting his liability to pedestrian injured in street, 71 A.L.R.2d 793.

Duty owed to, and status of, social guest of employee on employer's business premises, 78 A.L.R.2d 107.

Liability for injury or death due to physical condition of church premises, 80 A.L.R.2d 806.

Liability for injury from overhead door, 83 A.L.R.2d 743.

Liability of strip or other surface mine or quarry operator to person, other than employee, injured or killed during mining operations, 84 A.L.R.2d 733.

Liability for injury or death of child in refrigerator, 86 A.L.R.2d 709.

Status of one who enters a store or other place of public resort solely for purpose of using facilities accessible to public, such as telephone, mailbox, lavatory, or the like, 93 A.L.R.2d 784.

Duty of proprietor toward visitor upon premises on private business with or errand or work for employee, 94 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of owner or occupant of building for personal injury or death of person in street resulting from objects falling or thrown from building interior, 97 A.L.R.2d 1431.

Liability of owner of vacant building for injury to child trespassing on premises, 99 A.L.R.2d 461.

Liability of hotel, motel, summer resort, or private membership club or association operating swimming pool, for injury or death of guest or member, or of member's guest, 1 A.L.R.3d 963.

Liability of owner or operator of interior parking facility for bodily injury to nonemployees on premises, 4 A.L.R.3d 938.

Liability for injury or death of child social guest, 20 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Liability of owner of private residential swimming pool for injury or death occasioned thereby, 20 A.L.R.3d 1395.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injuries sustained by mail carrier, 21 A.L.R.3d 1099.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark as contributory negligence, 22 A.L.R.3d 286.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark along outside path or walkway as contributory negligence, 22 A.L.R.3d 599.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark along inside hall or passageway as contributory negligence, 24 A.L.R.3d 388.

Liability of owner or operator of power lawnmower for injuries resulting to third person from its operation, 25 A.L.R.3d 1314.

Telephone company's liability for injuries sustained by user of public telephone or telegraph as a result of condition of premises on which instrument was installed, 25 A.L.R.3d 1432.

Duty of possessor of land to warn child licensees of danger, 26 A.L.R.3d 317.

Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk, 35 A.L.R.3d 230.

Tort liability of private schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents due to condition of buildings, equipment, or outside premises, 35 A.L.R.3d 975.

Liability of owner or operator of parking lot for personal injuries allegedly resulting from condition of premises, 38 A.L.R.3d 10.

Liability of owner or operator of parking lot for personal injuries caused by movement of vehicles, 38 A.L.R.3d 138.

Liability of owner or operator of automatic carwash facility for personal injury or property damage to nonemployees on premises, 41 A.L.R.3d 690.

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle, 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Liability in connection with injury allegedly caused by defective condition of private road or driveway, 44 A.L.R.3d 355.

Use of set gun, trap, or similar device on defendant's own property, 47 A.L.R.3d 646.

Liability for injuries from ice or snow on residential premises, 54 A.L.R.3d 559.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to trees, shrubs, and the like, 59 A.L.R.3d 848.

Liability in action based upon negligence, for injury to or death of, person going upon cemetery premises, 63 A.L.R.3d 1252.

Animals as attractive nuisance, 64 A.L.R.3d 1069.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in areas of building (other than stairways) used in common by tenants, 65 A.L.R.3d 14.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior steps or stairs used in common by tenants, 67 A.L.R.3d 490.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in interior steps or stairs used in common by tenants, 67 A.L.R.3d 587.

Liability of storekeeper for death of or injury to customer in course of robbery, 72 A.L.R.3d 1269.

Liability of operator of swimming facility for injury or death allegedly resulting from absence of or inadequacy of rescue equipment, 87 A.L.R.3d 380.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury or death allegedly caused by failure to adequately fence facility, 87 A.L.R.3d 886.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises, 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Liability of governmental unit or private owner or occupant of land abutting highway for injuries or damage sustained when motorist strikes tree or stump on abutting land, 100 A.L.R.3d 510.

Tenant's agreement to indemnify landlord against all claims as including losses resulting from landlord's negligence, 4 A.L.R.4th 798.

Liability of lessee to persons injured by defects in premises or property after surrender of possession by lessee, 11 A.L.R.4th 579.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to fireman coming thereon in discharge of his duty, 11 A.L.R.4th 597.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises for injury or death resulting from contact of crane, derrick, or other movable machine with electric line, 14 A.L.R.4th 913.

Res ipsa loquitur as to cause of or liability for real-property fires, 21 A.L.R.4th 929.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner's liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser, 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to police officer coming thereon in discharge of officer's duty, 30 A.L.R.4th 81.

Liability of dog owner for injuries sustained by person frightened by dog, 30 A.L.R.4th 986.

Liability to adult social guest injured otherwise than by condition of premises, 38 A.L.R.4th 200.

Liability to one struck by golf ball, 53 A.L.R.4th 282.

Ski resort's liability for skier's injuries resulting from condition of ski run or slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632.

Baseball player's right to recover for baseball-related personal injuries from nonplayer, 55 A.L.R.4th 664.

Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 A.L.R.4th 221.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack off leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 89 A.L.R.4th 374.

Liability for personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in church premises, 8 A.L.R.5th 1.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground for liability to third party, 13 A.L.R.5th 289.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injury to patron on premises from criminal attack by third party, 31 A.L.R.5th 550.

Liability of owner or operator of business premises for injuries from electrically operated door, 44 A.L.R.5th 525.

Liability of hotel, motel, resort, or private membership club or association operating swimming pool, for injury or death of member, 55 A.L.R.5th 463.

Liability of owner, operator, or other parties, for personal injuries allegedly resulting from snow or ice on premises of parking lot, 74 A.L.R.5th 49.