2020 Georgia Code
Title 48 - Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 4 - Tax Sales
Article 3 - Redemption of Property Sold for Taxes
§ 48-4-48. Ripening of Tax Deed Title by Prescription

1. A title under a tax deed properly executed at a valid and legal sale prior to July 1, 1989, shall ripen by prescription after a period of seven years from the date of execution of that deed.
2. A title under a tax deed executed on or after July 1, 1989, but before July 1, 1996, shall ripen by prescription after a period of four years from the execution of that deed. A title under a tax deed properly executed on or after July 1, 1996, at a valid and legal sale shall ripen by prescription after a period of four years from the recordation of that deed in the land records in the county in which said land is located.
3. A tax deed which has ripened by prescription pursuant to any provision of this Code section shall convey, when the defendant in fi. fa. is not laboring under any legal disability, a fee simple title to the property described in that deed, and that title shall vest absolutely in the grantee in the deed or in the grantee's heirs or assigns. In the event the defendant in fi. fa. is laboring under any legal disability, the prescriptive term specified in this Code section shall begin from the time the disabilities are removed or abated.
4. Notice of foreclosure of the right to redeem property sold at a tax sale shall not be required to have been provided in order for the title to such property to have ripened under subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section.

(Ga. L. 1949, p. 1132, § 1; Code 1933, § 91A-438, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1391, § 3; Ga. L. 1996, p. 783, § 1.)

- For annual survey article discussing real property law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 441 (1999). For annual survey article on real property law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (2000). For annual survey of real property law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 367 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1949, p. 1132, § 2-A, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Decision to award a limited liability company fee simple title in real property did not violate the contract impairment clauses in U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X as a corporation's rights to the property pursuant to a 1984 tax deed had not vested prior to the effective date of a 1989 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48, which operated retrospectively. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205 (2009).

If levy of tax execution is excessive, sale held under levy is void. Craig v. Arnold, 227 Ga. 333, 180 S.E.2d 733 (1971) (decided under Ga. L. 1949, p. 1132, § 2-A).

- Tax grantee's title did not ripen since the grantee never occupied the property nor committed any acts or exhibited any conduct which would amount to adverse possession of the property for the requisite period. Blizzard v. Moniz, 271 Ga. 50, 518 S.E.2d 407 (1999).

Since a tax deed holder never occupied the property or engaged in any act evidencing ownership other than payment of taxes, the trial court erred in finding that the tax deed holder had prescriptive title and in refusing to allow a successor in title to redeem the property. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 was not a statute of repose operating to foreclose the right of redemption upon the mere passage of time. Mark Turner Props., Inc. v. Evans, 274 Ga. 547, 554 S.E.2d 492 (2001).

Because a tax deed was executed after the effective date of the amendment to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48, the trial court erred in ruling that title vested in a county by the passage of time and in granting summary judgment to its purchaser; the case was remanded for further proceedings since there were questions, inter alia, on the purchaser's entitlement to a prescriptive title. Cmty. Renewal & Redemption, LLC v. Nix, 279 Ga. 840, 621 S.E.2d 722 (2005).

Limited liability company (LLC) was entitled to fee simple title to property conveyed by a warranty deed after the LLC redeemed the property under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 as to a 1984 tax deed held by a corporation because title had not ripened in the corporation under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 as the corporation had not established adverse possession. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205 (2009).

In a quiet title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60, although a corporation with a 1984 tax deed to the property in dispute claimed that ripening of title had occurred under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 as the corporation held the tax deed for the required seven-year period under a former version of the statute, a 1989 amendment that applied expressly to tax deeds executed prior to July 1, 1989, required adverse possession by the tax deed grantee in order for title to ripen. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205 (2009).

Successor in interest to the owner of property had successfully redeemed the property from the purchaser of a tax deed by tendering an adequate amount, O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(2), although it was refused by the purchaser; the court rejected the purchaser's claim that the purchaser acquired title by prescription under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 because the prescriptive period was not met and the purchaser's possession of the unfenced, uninhabited property was not sufficiently adverse. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).

- Trial court did not err when the court concluded that a buyer's tax deed did not ripen by prescription into a fee simple title because neither the buyer's payments of taxes nor occasional cleanup and mowing of areas were sufficiently notorious or exclusive as to constitute actual possession. Washington v. McKibbon Hotel Group, Inc., 284 Ga. 262, 664 S.E.2d 201 (2008).

- It was incumbent upon parties claiming a right to redemption actually to exercise the right during the four-year period; the filing of a civil action alleging the existence of that unexercised right was not sufficient. Machen v. Wolande Mgt. Group, Inc., 271 Ga. 163, 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an association, and the association's employee and a board member, on the claims by a property purchaser against them for extortion and removal of liens arising out of the purchaser's failure to pay association fees after the purchaser purchased seven properties in a subdivision through a tax sale resulting from unpaid property taxes; while it was true that the purchaser did not obtain a fee simple absolute title, and that title could be restored to specified predecessors through redemption or before the purchaser gave notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45, the purchaser did receive title sufficient to trigger automatic membership in the association and was thus required to pay the association's assessed fees. Croft v. Fairfield Plantation Prop. Owners Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 311, 623 S.E.2d 531 (2005).

Cited in Moultrie v. Wright, 266 Ga. 30, 464 S.E.2d 194 (1995).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions, § 462.

- Necessity of actual possession to give title by adverse possession under invalid tax title, 22 A.L.R. 550.

Necessity of recording tax deed to protect title as against interest derived from former owner, 65 A.L.R. 1015.

Statute limiting period for attack on tax title as affecting remaindermen in respect of a tax sale during life tenancy, 124 A.L.R. 1145.

Time limitation for attack on tax title as affected by defective description of property in the assessment or the tax deed, 133 A.L.R. 570.

Payment, tender, or deposit of tax as condition of injunction against issuance of tax deed upon ground that it had become barred by lapse of time or that the property had been redeemed, 134 A.L.R. 543.