2020 Georgia Code
Title 46 - Public Utilities and Public Transportation
Chapter 9 - Transportation of Freight and Passengers Generally
Article 4 - Transportation of Passengers
Part 1 - Transportation by Carriers Generally
§ 46-9-132. Duty of Carriers of Passengers to Exercise Extraordinary Diligence

A carrier of passengers must exercise extraordinary diligence to protect the lives and persons of his passengers but is not liable for injuries to them after having used such diligence.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2040; Code 1868, § 2041; Code 1873, § 2067; Code 1882, § 2067; Civil Code 1895, § 2266; Civil Code 1910, § 2714; Code 1933, § 18-204.)

- Duty of drivers of motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire to stop at railroad crossings, § 40-6-142.

- For article, "The Uber Million Dollar Question: Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 461 (2017). For note, "Tort Liability in Georgia for the Criminal Acts of Another," see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 361 (1984).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Discharge of Passengers
• Jury Issues and Instructions
• Application

General Consideration

Driver testing for employment not "passenger."

- Driver of a bus, who was injured when the brakes failed while the driver was performing a test for employment as a bus driver, was not a "passenger" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132. Kirby v. Spate, 214 Ga. App. 433, 448 S.E.2d 7 (1994).

- The "extraordinary diligence" due by railroad companies to passengers is that extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful persons exercise under like circumstances. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Ry. v. Miller, 95 Ga. 738, 22 S.E. 660 (1895).

- What extraordinary care requires depends upon circumstances. One circumstance for consideration in dealing with a passenger is the condition of such passenger, known to the carrier or its agents, or so apparent as to charge them with knowledge. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Madden, 135 Ga. 205, 69 S.E. 165, 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 813, 21 Ann. Cas. 1077 (1910).

Where the standard is the diligence of very thoughtful persons, and where utmost diligence is greater than the standard, the diligence of every prudent and thoughtful person is, if anything, less than the standard, for it includes the degree of diligence of all prudent and thoughtful persons, whether or not they reach the comparative form of very prudent and thoughtful persons or the superlative of the most prudent and thoughtful persons. Andrews Taxi & U-Drive It Co. v. McEver, 101 Ga. App. 383, 114 S.E.2d 145 (1960).

- Carrier of passengers is bound to exercise extraordinary care and diligence for the safety of the carrier's passengers, and it matters not the kind of conveyance used or the nature of the motive power employed. Sheffield v. Lovering, 51 Ga. App. 353, 180 S.E. 523 (1935).

Carrier's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence is coextensive with relationship of passenger and carrier. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

Rule of extraordinary diligence applies only to receiving, keeping, carrying and discharging of passengers. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461 (1877); Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

A common carrier of passengers is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence to prevent insult, injury, or harm to a passenger transported by it. Hames v. Old S. Lines, 52 Ga. App. 420, 183 S.E. 503 (1935).

A common carrier has the duty to exercise extraordinary care to protect passengers on its vehicle. Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Allen, 96 Ga. App. 622, 101 S.E.2d 134 (1957).

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, a common carrier, in exercising extraordinary care, did not have to utilize the most approved pattern of an escalator in use up to the time of an injured party's accident. MARTA v. Rouse, 279 Ga. 311, 612 S.E.2d 308 (2005).

- Under former Code 1873, § 2067 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132), company would be liable to passengers for injuries unless extraordinary care and diligence was used, and slight neglect on the part of the agents and servants of the company will be sufficient evidence to fix its liability. Crawford v. Georgia R.R., 62 Ga. 566 (1879).

Under former Code 1882, § 2067 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132) there certainly can be no doubt that if a railroad company failed to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, it would be liable for injuries occasioned because of such failure to a passenger who personally exercised the proper care for the passenger's own protection. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Ry. v. Miller, 95 Ga. 738, 22 S.E. 660 (1895).

- After a person becomes a passenger by boarding a train and paying cash fare, the carrier was bound to extraordinary diligence by former Civil Code 1895, § 2266 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132). Williamson v. Central of Ga. Ry., 127 Ga. 125, 56 S.E. 119 (1906).

- Extraordinary degree of care is imposed upon servants of railway company to prevent and protect passengers from all injuries, and the railway company is responsible for any injury that the servant could have avoided by the exercise of such diligence. Bennett v. Central of Ga. Ry., 6 Ga. App. 185, 64 S.E. 700 (1909).

Under former Civil Code 1910, § 2714 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132) carrier was bound for extraordinary diligence on part of the carrier's agents, for the protection of the carrier's passengers. Mason v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 135 Ga. 741, 70 S.E. 225, 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 280 (1911).

A carrier of passengers is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence on behalf of the carrier and the carrier's agents to protect the lives and persons of his passengers, and if, after entering into the relation of carrier for hire and passenger, the servant of the carrier be guilty of any negligence resulting in a breach of duty owing to the passenger, the carrier will be liable for nominal damages at least. Tennessee Coach Co. v. Snelling, 51 Ga. App. 432, 180 S.E. 741 (1935).

A common carrier is liable whenever a passenger being transported by it suffers insult, mortification, or embarrassment resulting directly from the failure of its servants to perform their legal duty to such passenger or from their negligent and wrongful acts. Hames v. Old S. Lines, 52 Ga. App. 420, 183 S.E. 503 (1935).

If plaintiff suffered insult and was embarrassed and mortified by reason of any negligent acts of the defendant common carrier or its servants or their failure to perform their legal duty towards the person as a passenger, then the passenger would be entitled to recover. Hames v. Old S. Lines, 52 Ga. App. 420, 183 S.E. 503 (1935).

If plaintiff was a passenger in defendant's taxicab at the time plaintiff was raped by the driver of the cab, plaintiff would be entitled to recover, for plaintiff was entitled, by virtue of plaintiff's contract of passenger carriage, not only to be protected against the negligent acts of the company's agent resulting from the omission to perform its duties to its passengers, but plaintiff was likewise entitled to be protected against the wanton and willful acts of violence wrongfully committed on plaintiff's person by the servant of the company during the continuance of the relation instituted by plaintiff's contract with the company. Co-op Cab Co. v. Singleton, 66 Ga. App. 874, 19 S.E.2d 541 (1942).

- Liability of a common carrier for an assault by one of its employees on a passenger is not dependent on the question as to whether the employee was acting within the scope of employment or in the line of the employee's duty, but is based upon its broad duty as a common carrier to protect its passengers from assault. Southeastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S.E.2d 371 (1943).

- If a passenger on a railway train becomes ill in transit, and this is known to the servants of the carrier in charge of such train, or is so apparent that they are charged with knowledge of it, it is their duty to give the passenger such care and protection beyond that demanded under ordinary circumstances as is reasonably practicable with the facilities at hand, and consistent with the safe and proper conduct of the business and the safety and comfort of the other passengers. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Madden, 135 Ga. 205, 69 S.E. 165, 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 813, 21 Ann. Cas. 1077 (1910).

- Duty imposed by former Civil Code 1895, § 2266 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132) cannot be waived or released even by an express contract. Being one in which the public has an interest, public policy forbids such a waiver or release. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665, 36 S.E. 202, 50 L.R.A. 673 (1900); Hearn v. Central of Ga. Ry., 22 Ga. App. 1, 95 S.E. 368 (1918).

- An express contract entered into by the carrier and the passenger, under the terms of which the carrier is released from all liability to the passenger for personal injuries received while a passenger on such freight-train, is in effect a contract by which the carrier undertakes to relieve itself from the consequences of the negligence of itself and servants, and cannot be enforced. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665, 36 S.E. 202, 50 L.R.A. 673 (1900).

- Upon proof of injury to a passenger of a railroad company by the running of its locomotive, cars, or other machinery, or by any person in its employment and service, the law raises a presumption that the injury was caused by the negligence of the company. Douthitt v. Louisville & N.R.R., 136 Ga. 351, 71 S.E. 470 (1911). See also Central R.R. v. Freeman, 75 Ga. 331 (1885).

When a passenger is injured, a legal presumption that the carrier failed to exercise extraordinary care arises in the passenger's favor. The carrier can, of course, rebut this presumption by making it appear that extraordinary care and diligence was exercised. This is a jury question. Eason v. Crews, 88 Ga. App. 602, 77 S.E.2d 245 (1953); Piller v. Hanger Cab. Co., 115 Ga. App. 260, 154 S.E.2d 420 (1967).

- In an action by a passenger against a street-railway company on account of a personal injury, after a presumption of negligence arises from the evidence, in order to rebut it the defendant must make it appear from the evidence that its agents or servants exercised extraordinary care and diligence in connection with those things in which it was charged that its negligence consisted. Brunswick & A.R.R. v. Gale, 56 Ga. 322 (1876); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Gilleland, 133 Ga. 621, 66 S.E. 944 (1909).

Where an injury to a passenger is proved to have been caused by a company's negligence, the presumption against the company will not be rebutted by the company showing that it exercised only ordinary care and diligence; as railroad companies are bound to use extraordinary care and diligence for the safety of passengers by reason of former Code 1882, § 2067 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132). East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Ry. v. Miller, 95 Ga. 738, 22 S.E. 660 (1895); Douthitt v. Louisville & N.R.R., 136 Ga. 351, 71 S.E. 470 (1911).

- Intermediate court erred in overruling Darlington Corp. v. Finch, 113 Ga. App. 825, 149 S.E.2d 861 (1966), as a common carrier, in exercising extraordinary care, has to stay informed of safety advances in product design, but is not held to a per se rule that requires it to buy and incorporate those safety advances into previously-purchased, non-defective products; Darlington is reinstated. MARTA v. Rouse, 279 Ga. 311, 612 S.E.2d 308 (2005).

Cited in Stiles v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 65 Ga. 370 (1880); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Johnston, 106 Ga. 130, 32 S.E. 78 (1898); Savannah Elec. Co. v. Bennett, 130 Ga. 597, 61 S.E. 529 (1909); Bennett v. Central of Ga. Ry., 6 Ga. App. 185, 64 S.E. 700 (1909); Turner v. City Elec. Ry., 134 Ga. 869, 68 S.E. 735 (1910); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Deas, 22 Ga. App. 425, 96 S.E. 267 (1918); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gilbert, 39 Ga. App. 56, 146 S.E. 33 (1928); Southern Ry. v. Bartlett, 44 Ga. App. 710, 162 S.E. 831 (1932); Tennessee Coach Co. v. Snelling, 51 Ga. App. 432, 180 S.E. 741 (1935); Roberts v. Baker, 57 Ga. App. 733, 196 S.E. 104 (1938); Southern Ry. v. Skinner, 74 Ga. App. 57, 38 S.E.2d 756 (1946); Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Allen, 96 Ga. App. 622, 101 S.E.2d 134 (1957); Savannah Transit Co. v. Williams, 107 Ga. App. 212, 129 S.E.2d 417 (1963); Darlington Corp. v. Finch, 113 Ga. App. 825, 149 S.E.2d 861 (1966); Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Hines, 138 Ga. App. 746, 227 S.E.2d 489 (1976); Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Simpson, 139 Ga. App. 34, 228 S.E.2d 20 (1976); Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 699 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc., 177 Ga. App. 62, 338 S.E.2d 438 (1985); Tinnel v. Trailways Lines, 185 Ga. App. 534, 364 S.E.2d 904 (1988); Effort Enters., Inc. v. Crosta, 194 Ga. App. 666, 391 S.E.2d 477 (1990); Mattox v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 200 Ga. App. 697, 409 S.E.2d 267 (1991).

Discharge of Passengers

Helping passenger alight.

- As a general rule, it is not the duty of the employees of a railway company in charge of a passenger train to physically assist passengers in alighting therefrom, but to furnish reasonable opportunity and facilities for leaving the train; but the duty of rendering assistance may arise from special circumstances. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Madden, 135 Ga. 205, 69 S.E. 165, 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 813, 21 Ann. Cas. 1077 (1910).

- Where relation of carrier and passenger is once established, it continues until passenger is safely deposited at passenger's point of destination, and until the passenger has left or has had a reasonable time within which to leave the cab of the carrier; and if, during the continuance of this relation, the passenger suffers an injury in consequence of the negligent, wrongful or wanton tort of the carrier's driver, the carrier is liable. Co-op Cab Co. v. Singleton, 66 Ga. App. 874, 19 S.E.2d 541 (1942); Southeastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S.E.2d 371 (1943).

The relationship of carrier and passenger exists until the passenger's destination has been reached and the passenger has either alighted from the means of conveyance in safety or has been afforded reasonable time and opportunity to do so. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

The relationship of carrier and passenger terminates when the passenger has been safely discharged and when the carrier is no longer bound to exercise extraordinary care for the passenger's safety, but is bound to use only the same degree of care for the passenger's safety as it would for the safety of any other member of the public upon its premises by invitation, express or implied. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

Carrier's duty to exercise extraordinary care for the safety of its passengers continues until the passenger has been conducted to a place where the passenger has some freedom of locomotion and can in a measure look out for the passenger's own safety. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

If a passenger is discharged at an unsafe place and is injured, it is immaterial that the passenger has alighted. The duty of the carrier continues until the passenger is out of such danger. Columbus Transp. Co. v. Curry, 104 Ga. App. 700, 122 S.E.2d 584 (1961).

- Plaintiff, in a suit seeking damages for injuries which occurred when plaintiff was struck by a train at a station, failed to come forward with any evidence rebutting the affidavits of the train's operators showing that they did nothing to breach their duty of care, i.e., each operator averred that the operator had been trained "to be extremely alert and to maintain a constant visual check of conditions as far ahead as possible" when entering and leaving the station and "to visually scan the entire station area, including the platforms and the track itself," and that the operator had done so upon entering and leaving the station on the morning in question and had observed nothing unusual. Robertson v. Metropolitan Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 199 Ga. App. 681, 405 S.E.2d 745 (1991).

- The duty of the operator of a public carrier to exercise extraordinary care and diligence in selecting a safe place to discharge passengers is met when the operator does in fact discharge them at a reasonably safe place. Columbus Transp. Co. v. Curry, 104 Ga. App. 700, 122 S.E.2d 584 (1961).

Ordinarily a common carrier of passengers by street car or other conveyance on city streets discharges its legal duty to a passenger when it deposits the passenger at a usual and reasonably safe place for alighting and crossing the street. Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App. 322, 187 S.E. 715 (1936); Greeson v. Davis, 62 Ga. App. 667, 9 S.E.2d 690 (1940); Jordan v. Wiggins, 66 Ga. App. 534, 18 S.E.2d 512 (1942); Knight v. Atlanta Transit Sys., 137 Ga. App. 667, 224 S.E.2d 790 (1976).

- Carrier is not permitted to deposit passenger at place which it knows will reasonably expose the passenger to unusual peril, and it may be held liable for a proximately resulting injury. Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App. 322, 187 S.E. 715 (1936).

- A carrier is not under a duty to wait until approaching automobiles have stopped or to warn a passenger of the usual dangers of traffic which in the passenger's exercise of ordinary care would be avoidable. Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App. 322, 187 S.E. 715 (1936); Greeson v. Davis, 62 Ga. App. 667, 9 S.E.2d 690 (1940); Jordan v. Wiggins, 66 Ga. App. 534, 18 S.E.2d 512 (1942).

- The rule of liability against a carrier for negligence in discharging a passenger at an unsafe place is not that the carrier must show knowledge on the part of its operator that an unsafe condition exists, but only slight negligence in depositing the passenger at a place which will reasonably expose the passenger to peril. Columbus Transp. Co. v. Curry, 104 Ga. App. 700, 122 S.E.2d 584 (1961).

- In the case of a child of tender years diligence required of school bus driver to deposit passenger at a reasonably safe place must be exercised with a consideration of the limited abilities of the minor, and whether, with respect to the minor, a safe place has been selected is usually a question for the jury. Greeson v. Davis, 62 Ga. App. 667, 9 S.E.2d 690 (1940); Jordan v. Wiggins, 66 Ga. App. 534, 18 S.E.2d 512 (1942).

Where a child of the age of seven years is caused to alight in a place where danger to the child is apparent to the driver, or in the exercise of proper care should have been, a jury question, at least, if presented as to whether or not the driver was negligent. Dishinger v. Suburban Coach Co., 84 Ga. App. 498, 66 S.E.2d 242 (1951).

Jury Issues and Instructions

Jury instructions.

- Failure to instruct the jury that a cab driver could assume that the driver of the other car would obey the law of right of way was not error, as extraordinary diligence might, in the opinion of the jury, require that the driver should look out for law violators as one of the perils which might interfere with the driver's safe transit, and it was a question for the jury to determine what extraordinary diligence demanded. Black & White Cab Co. v. Clark, 67 Ga. App. 170, 19 S.E.2d 570 (1942).

In an action against a carrier for wrongful death of a passenger due to negligent operation of a bus, the judge should instruct the jury that the duty of the driver to exercise extraordinary care continued in all events, whether or not the jury believed that the driver was confronted with a sudden emergency, but that if they should conclude that a sudden emergency did arise, in deciding whether the driver continued to exercise extraordinary care they should take into consideration the fact that when one is confronted with a sudden emergency the driver is not to be held to the same accuracy of judgment as would be required of the driver if the driver had time for deliberation. Scott v. Torrance, 69 Ga. App. 309, 25 S.E.2d 120 (1943).

Failure to define the term "extraordinary diligence" in an instruction on the law pertaining to the duty a carrier owes to its passengers was not harmful error because the term is comprised of words of ordinary understanding and is self-explanatory. Adams v. MARTA, 246 Ga. App. 698, 542 S.E.2d 130 (2000).

- What facts suffice to show exercise of extraordinary diligence is ordinarily question for jury. Modern Coach Corp. v. Faver, 87 Ga. App. 221, 73 S.E.2d 497 (1952).

It was ordinarily for the jury to determine whether the performance or nonperformance of a specific act was in compliance with the duty imposed on a carrier by the provisions of former Code 1933, § 18-204 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132) as to the exercise by it of extraordinary care and diligence. Modern Coach Corp. v. Faver, 87 Ga. App. 221, 73 S.E.2d 497 (1952).

It is for the jury to say, under all the facts, whether the company was negligent in not providing a suitable conductor to preserve order, or whether the person in charge of the car as driver was negligent in the preservation of order thereof, and the safe carriage of the passengers to the place of destination. Holly v. Atlanta S.R.R., 61 Ga. 215, 34 Am. R. 97 (1878).

Where decedent was run over by a bus after the driver let decedent off on the roadway approximately four feet from the curb and about 25 feet from the bus stop, the issues of decedent's negligence and the duty of care owed to decedent were questions for the jury. Cuthbert v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 190 Ga. App. 550, 379 S.E.2d 413, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 897, 379 S.E.2d 443 (1989).

- Whether there was a lack of due care on the part of the plaintiff who was injured when alighting from a bus which had stopped 35 feet from the regular stopping point was a question of fact for the jury. Columbus Transp. Co. v. Curry, 104 Ga. App. 700, 122 S.E.2d 584 (1961).

Application

Duty to exercise ordinary care in providing station facilities distinguished.

- The carrier's duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish safe station facilities for those to be received or for those who have been discharged as passengers is not to be confused with the carrier's duty to use extraordinary care in receiving, transporting and discharging its passengers. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

- One who has a railroad ticket and is present to take the train at the ordinary point of departure, is a passenger, though the passenger has not entered the cars. In duties toward the passenger, directly involving the passenger's safety, the company is bound to extraordinary diligence, and in those touching the passenger's convenience or accommodation, to ordinary diligence. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461 (1877).

- After a person paid their fare and went through the turnstile to await a train, the person became a "passenger" under O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132. Walker v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 226 Ga. App. 793, 487 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

- No person shall recover from a railroad company for an injury to oneself or the passenger's property, where the same is done by the passenger's consent, or is caused by the passenger's own negligence. If the plaintiff and the agents of the company are both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to plaintiff. Central R.R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207 (1883).

- The duty to exercise extraordinary care which was imposed upon common carriers as defendants did not abrogate the requirement which a tort plaintiff had under § 51-11-7 to exercise ordinary care for one's own safety to avoid the consequences caused by the defendant's negligence. Knight v. Atlanta Transit Sys., 137 Ga. App. 667, 224 S.E.2d 790 (1976).

- Passenger's comments to bus company's ticket agent that police would probably be looking for the passenger and that the agent should not tell them where the passenger was were insufficient to put company on notice that the passenger would be a danger to other passengers. Southeastern Stages, Inc. v. Stringer, 263 Ga. 641, 437 S.E.2d 315 (1993).

When the event causing harm to a passenger is a criminal act by a third party, the duty of the carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence to prevent that act arises only if the carrier has reason to anticipate it. Walker v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 226 Ga. App. 793, 487 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

- A railroad company is bound to use extraordinary care and diligence to protect its passengers, while in transit, from violence, injury, or outrage and humiliation by third persons. This protection must be afforded by the conductor to the extent of all the power with which the conductor is clothed by the company or by the law, and the conductor's failure to afford it, when the conductor had knowledge that there was occasion for the conductor's interference, will subject the company to liability in damages. Hillman v. Georgia R.R. & Banking, 126 Ga. 814, 56 S.E. 68, 8 Ann. Cas. 222 (1906).

Bus company was not liable for injuries sustained by passenger while attempting to exit a bus which had broken down and the driver and passengers were awaiting the arrival of a replacement bus when an unidentified individual falsely exclaimed that the bus was on fire. Paschal v. Ferguson Transp., Inc., 189 Ga. App. 447, 375 S.E.2d 901 (1988).

- The governing principles of law concerning the termination of the relation of carrier and passenger have been laid down in cases involving carriers by rail, and these principles are also controlling in an action against a carrier by air, since both types of carrier operate upon fixed schedules and over fixed routes, and ordinarily discharge their passengers at a station or terminal facility located at the passenger's destination. Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952).

- Bus company owed to plaintiff passenger duty to exercise extraordinary diligence to protect plaintiff from injury in the operation of such bus. Modern Coach Corp. v. Faver, 87 Ga. App. 221, 73 S.E.2d 497 (1952).

- Extraordinary diligence was measure of care which conductors must exercise toward passengers under former Code 1882, § 2067 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132). Georgia R.R. v. Homer, 73 Ga. 251 (1884).

- The owner of an office building, equipped with an elevator which is operated for conveying the owner's tenants and their employees and patrons to and from the various floors, was not a common carrier in the sense that the owner was bound to serve all the public; yet the owner's duty as to protecting passengers in the elevator was the same under former Civil Code 1910, § 2714 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132) as that chargeable to carriers of passengers by other means. Grant v. Allen, 141 Ga. 106, 80 S.E. 279 (1913).

Owner of elevator in an office building owes duty of extraordinary diligence to elevator passengers and cannot delegate this duty to an independent contractor engaged in elevator repair; thus, the owner is liable for slight negligence. Gaffney v. EQK Realty Investors, 213 Ga. App. 653, 445 S.E.2d 771 (1994); Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga. App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 249 (1997).

One who carries passengers on an elevator from floor to floor of a large office building, or of a hotel, constantly and continuously, is a carrier of passengers. No rational distinction in principle can be based on the fact that the passengers are carried vertically rather than horizontally; and the distance the passengers are carried is not material. Helmly v. Savannah Office Bldg. Co., 13 Ga. App. 498, 79 S.E. 364 (1913).

- The duty of extraordinary care was imposed on owner of the building because the escalator was operated and the servicer was employed by the owner. Millar Elevator Serv. Co. v. O'Shields, 222 Ga. App. 456, 475 S.E.2d 188 (1996).

An airport shuttle train or people mover providing free transportation inside the secured area of the airport has the same status of public transportation as escalators and elevators and requires the exercise of extraordinary diligence in the transportation of passengers. Saltis v. Benz, 243 Ga. App. 603, 533 S.E.2d 772 (2000).

- Where one employed generally by a railroad is issued trip passes on trains to go to and from work, and is also permitted to ride without the payment of fare without using one's pass, and is not engaged in or within the scope of one's employment while so riding on a train, the employee occupies the status of a passenger for hire, and the railroad is liable to the employee for injuries inflicted by its negligence, while the employee is so riding, and if the injury occurs at a time when the employee is using a pass a limitation therein relieving the railroad from liability on account of its negligence is void. Fowler v. Western & A.R.R., 75 Ga. App. 156, 42 S.E.2d 499 (1947).

- A carrier who receives a passenger on one of its freight trains is bound by the same standard of diligence as if the passenger were being transported on a regular passenger-train. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665, 36 S.E. 202, 50 L.R.A. 673 (1900).

A passenger who voluntarily seeks to be transported on a freight-train takes the risk of the usual and necessary jolts and jars which occur in the operation of such train, but the carrier is not relieved from the use of extraordinary diligence to the passenger to prevent unusual and unnecessary jolts and jars. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665, 36 S.E. 202, 50 L.R.A. 673 (1900).

- Operator of school motorbus is carrier of passengers and is required to exercise extraordinary care and diligence for the safety of any one of such school children riding in the operator's bus. Sheffield v. Lovering, 51 Ga. App. 353, 180 S.E. 523 (1935); Eason v. Crews, 88 Ga. App. 602, 77 S.E.2d 245 (1953).

A school bus operator who used the operator's bus on nonschool days for special trips was a "carrier of passengers" within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 18-204 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132). Scott v. Torrance, 69 Ga. App. 209, 25 S.E.2d 120 (1943).

- Rule of former Code 1873, § 2067 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132) applied to street railway carriers. Holly v. Atlanta S.R.R., 61 Ga. 215 (1878); City & Sub. Ry. v. Findley, 76 Ga. 311 (1886).

In the conduct of operating electric street cars as a common carrier it was bound to use extraordinary diligence under former Civil Code 1895, § 2266 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-132). Savannah Elec. Co. v. Wheeler, 128 Ga. 550, 58 S.E. 38, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1176 (1907).

- Operators of taxicab business transporting general public are carriers of passengers, and amenable to the legal duty of exercising extraordinary diligence for their protection. Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App. 322, 187 S.E. 715 (1936).

- Amusement ride known as "The Wheelie" was not a public conveyance; therefore, the standard of care owed by the proprietor, owner, and operator of "The Wheelie" was a duty of ordinary care to the passengers. Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 250 Ga. 352, 297 S.E.2d 468 (1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, § 832, 836.

- Liability of carrier for injury to passenger by articles belonging to carrier on the floor or in the aisles, 3 A.L.R. 640; 12 A.L.R. 1346.

Liability of street railway company to passenger on account of crowded condition of cars, 5 A.L.R. 1257; 42 A.L.R. 1329.

Carrier's duty to passenger while train is going through tunnel, 9 A.L.R. 96.

Stipulation releasing carrier from liability for injury to free passenger as affecting liability for gross negligence or willful or wanton injury, 9 A.L.R. 501.

Liability of carrier for injury due to casual or temporary condition of station or its approaches, 10 A.L.R. 259.

Duty of carrier to other passengers respecting transportation of insane passenger, 12 A.L.R. 242.

Liability of carrier for injury to passenger due to obstruction of aisle or platform by property of another passenger, 19 A.L.R. 1372.

Duty and liability of carrier as to "step box" or other device to facilitate entering and leaving car, 20 A.L.R. 914.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable to injury to passenger in a collision where one of the vehicles is not within carrier's control, 25 A.L.R. 690; 83 A.L.R. 1163; 161 A.L.R. 1113.

Loss of contract or business opportunity as element of damages for wrongful ejection from train or being carried past station, 25 A.L.R. 916; 82 A.L.R. 665; 97 A.L.R. 588.

Liability of employer for acts or omissions of independent contractor in respect of positive duties or former arising from or incidental to contractual relationships, 29 A.L.R. 736.

Liability of carrier for injury to passenger by car window, 29 A.L.R. 1262; 45 A.L.R. 1541.

Carrier's liability for injury to passenger due to rushing or crowding of passengers, 32 A.L.R. 1315; 155 A.L.R. 634.

Responsibility of carrier to its passengers for conditions on roadway or at stations of another carrier over whose line it detours, 33 A.L.R. 820.

Liability of carrier for injury to passenger by car door, 41 A.L.R. 1089.

Liability of street railway company to passenger on account of crowded condition of car, 42 A.L.R. 1329.

Liability of street railway company to passenger struck by vehicle not subject to its control, 44 A.L.R. 162.

Liability of carrier for injury to passenger due to construction of floor of car or vessel on different levels, 48 A.L.R. 1424.

Carrier's liability to passenger for failure to keep trains to schedule time, 52 A.L.R. 1332.

Duty and liability of carrier as to assisting passenger to board or alight from car or train, 55 A.L.R. 389; 59 A.L.R. 940.

Liability of street railway company for injury to passenger or pedestrian as result of overhang of car in rounding curve, 55 A.L.R. 479.

Duty and liability of carrier to passenger attempting to leave moving street car, 56 A.L.R. 981.

Liability of proprietor or operator of private railroad for injury to one other than employee riding thereon, 57 A.L.R. 818.

Liability of carrier by water for injury to passenger while embarking or disembarking, 59 A.L.R. 1355.

Duty and liability to passenger temporarily leaving train, 61 A.L.R. 403.

Status of, and liability of street railway company to, person approaching to board street car, 75 A.L.R. 285.

Duty of Pullman Company to protect Pullman passenger against acts of train employees, 76 A.L.R. 927.

Liability of carrier operating in street to passenger struck by other vehicle while on platform, step, or running board of car, 77 A.L.R. 429.

Ferry operator's duty as regards automobiles or their occupants, 82 A.L.R. 798.

Changed conditions as affecting duty, or enforcement of duty, as to train service or maintenance of stations imposed upon railroad by charter or statute, 111 A.L.R. 57.

Liability of carrier for injury to passenger as result of ice, snow, or rain on exposed or interior portions of car or vessel, 117 A.L.R. 522.

Duty of carrier to discover abnormal condition of passenger, 124 A.L.R. 1428.

Carrier's liability for conduct of passenger (other than assault) causing injury to other passenger, 140 A.L.R. 1194.

Carrier's liability to person in street or highway for purpose of boarding its vehicle, 7 A.L.R.2d 549.

Liability of motorbus carrier to passenger injured through fall while alighting from vehicle, 9 A.L.R.2d 938.

Duty and liability of carrier to intoxicated passenger while en route, 17 A.L.R.2d 1085.

Liability for injury to customer or patron from defect in or fall of seat, 21 A.L.R.2d 420.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported, 21 A.L.R.2d 910.

Liability of carrier to passenger for injury due to crowded condition of motorbus, or pushing or crowding of passengers therein, 26 A.L.R.2d 1219.

Attempt to board moving car or train as contributory negligence or assumption of risk, 31 A.L.R.2d 931.

Duty of railroad to passengers to keep steps or vestibule of car free from debris or foreign substances other than snow or ice, 34 A.L.R.2d 360.

Carrier's liability to passenger injured by landslide, or the like, 34 A.L.R.2d 831.

Duty and liability of carrier with respect to allowing passenger sufficient time for change of vehicles, 40 A.L.R.2d 809.

Liability of motor carrier for injury to passenger's hand in vehicle door, 42 A.L.R.2d 1190.

Liability of carrier to passenger injured by hurling of object through window by a third person, 46 A.L.R.2d 1098.

Carrier's liability to passenger injured while using washroom or lavatory facilities on conveyance, 50 A.L.R.2d 1071.

Employer's liability for assault by taxicab or motorbus driver, 53 A.L.R.2d 720.

Motor carrier's liability for injury to passenger by sudden stopping, starting, or lurching of conveyance, 57 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability of motor carrier for injury or death of passenger inflicted by the vehicle from which he has alighted, 58 A.L.R.2d 932.

Liability of motor carrier for injury or death of passenger who has alighted, caused by conditions at place of alighting, 58 A.L.R.2d 948.

Liability of air carrier to passenger injured while boarding or alighting, 61 A.L.R.2d 1113.

Liability of carrier to passenger injured through fall of baggage or other object from overhead repository, 68 A.L.R.2d 667.

Liability of motor carrier for loss of passenger's luggage or packages, 68 A.L.R.2d 1350.

Carrier's duties to passenger who becomes sick or is injured en route, 92 A.L.R.2d 656.

Duty and liability of carrier by motorbus to persons boarding bus, 93 A.L.R.2d 237.

Liability for injury to or death of passenger from accident due to physical condition of carrier's employee, 53 A.L.R.3d 669.

Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 63 A.L.R.3d 893.

Liability for injury caused by fall of person into shaft, or by abrupt drop, sudden movement, or stopping between floors, of automatic passenger elevator, 64 A.L.R.3d 950.

Liability of air carrier for damage or injury sustained by passenger as result of hijacking, 72 A.L.R.3d 1299.

Carrier's liability for injury or death of infant passenger as affected by fact that child was in custody of parent or other adult, 74 A.L.R.3d 1171.

Application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to accidents incurred by passenger while boarding or alighting from a carrier, 93 A.L.R.3d 776.

Liability of taxicab carrier to passenger injured while alighting from taxi, 98 A.L.R.3d 822.

Liability of common carrier for personal injury or death of passenger occasioned by inhalation of gases or fumes from exhaust, 99 A.L.R.3d 751.

Motor carrier's liability for personal injury or death of passenger caused by debris, litter, or other foreign object on floor or seat of vehicle, 1 A.L.R.4th 1249.

Width or design of lateral space between passenger loading platform and car entrance as affecting carrier's liability to passenger for injuries incurred from falling into space, 28 A.L.R.4th 748.

Liability of land carrier to passenger who becomes victim of third party's assault on or about carrier's vehicle or premises, 34 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Liability of land carrier to passenger who becomes victim of another passenger's assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 189.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported, 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Right to contribution or indemnity on behalf of owner, operator, maintainer, repairer, or installer of automatic passenger elevator in action by elevator user, 100 A.L.R.5th 409.

Limitation of liability of air carrier for personal injury or death, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 547.

Liability for injury on or in connection with escalator, 63 A.L.R.6th 495.