2020 Georgia Code
Title 46 - Public Utilities and Public Transportation
Chapter 8 - Railroad Companies
Article 10 - Liability of Companies for Damages Generally
§ 46-8-290. Liability of Railroad Companies and Their Officers, Agents, and Employees for Injuries to Individuals and for Damage or Destruction of Property Generally

In all cases where an individual is injured, or his property damaged or destroyed, by the carelessness, negligence, or improper conduct of any railroad company or an officer, agent, or employee of such company, in or by the running of the cars or engines of the company, such company shall be liable to pay damages to anyone whose person or property may be so injured, damaged, or destroyed, notwithstanding any bylaws, rules, regulations, or notices which may be made, passed, or given by such company and which purport to limit the company's liability.

(Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 154, § 2; Code 1863, § 3280; Code 1868, § 3292; Code 1873, § 3368; Code 1882, § 3368; Civil Code 1895, § 2320; Civil Code 1910, § 2779; Code 1933, § 94-702.)

- For article, "Actions for Wrongful Death in Georgia Part Three and Four," see 21 Ga. B.J. 339 (1959). For comment on Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Dolan, 84 Ga. App. 734, 67 S.E.2d 243 (1951), see 3 Mercer L. Rev. 349 (1952).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Nature of Duties and Standard of Care
• Duties to Persons
• Injuries to Animals
• Defenses
• Practice and Pleading

General Consideration

Cases where this Code section held not applicable.

- Former Civil Code 1895, § 2320 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-290) was not applicable to a case in which there is no evidence of any bylaws, rules, or regulations. Willingham v. Macon & B. Ry., 113 Ga. 374, 38 S.E. 843 (1901).

Former Civil Code 1910, § 2779 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-290) did not apply where company interposes regulation made in conformity with former Civil Code 1910, § 2774 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-9-40), allowing reasonable regulations for receipt of freight by common carriers. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Smith, 31 Ga. App. 135, 120 S.E. 30 (1923).

- Although the rules adopted by a railway company governing the conduct of its employees in the operation of trains may be admissible in evidence for the purpose of illustrating the negligence of the defendant in a situation to which the rule would be applicable, the measure of the duty owed by the company to a member of the traveling public is fixed by law, and, in an action for injury or death, the private rules of the company could not be set up for the purpose of founding a substantive cause of action upon a breach of them. McGinnis v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933).

Cited in Mitchell v. Western & A.R.R., 30 Ga. 22 (1860); Holmes v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 37 Ga. 593 (1868); Cato v. Southern Ry., 26 Ga. App. 578, 107 S.E. 98 (1921); Gainesville M.R.R. v. Allen, 72 Ga. App. 736, 35 S.E.2d 12 (1945); Fowler v. Western & A.R.R., 75 Ga. App. 176, 42 S.E.2d 499 (1947).

Nature of Duties and Standard of Care

Passengers alighting from train.

- Railroad company is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence toward passenger while in act of alighting from train. Metts v. Louisville & N.R.R., 52 Ga. App. 115, 182 S.E. 531 (1935).

Ordinarily there is no duty upon carrier to assist passenger in boarding or alighting from its train; whether in a given case the circumstances are such as to suggest the necessity of assisting a passenger to board or alight from a train or car is a question to be determined by the jury. Metts v. Louisville & N.R.R., 52 Ga. App. 115, 182 S.E. 531 (1935).

It is duty of railroad company to provide suitable and reasonably safe means to enable passengers to alight from cars without danger. Metts v. Louisville & N.R.R., 52 Ga. App. 115, 182 S.E. 531 (1935).

- Street railway companies must use due care and diligence to avoid injury to any person who is in the street. Brown v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 393, 167 S.E. 773 (1932).

Timely warnings of approach of streetcar should be given as will enable others to avoid any injury by it. Brown v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 393, 167 S.E. 773 (1932).

- Mere presence of safety precautions such as automatic signalling devices does not render railroad free from negligence as matter of law or relieve it from adopting such other measures as public safety and common prudence dictate; this is especially true when the evidence shows that a train was running at an undue and highly dangerous rate of speed over a much frequented crossing located in a city or town. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. West, 155 Ga. App. 391, 271 S.E.2d 36 (1980).

Duties to Persons

1. In General

- The defendant may owe many duties to a person on its tracks, the presence of whom it is bound to anticipate, whether as trespasser or licensee, which are not declared by statute. Southern Ry. v. Waldrup, 76 Ga. App. 356, 45 S.E.2d 775 (1947).

- If those in control of the movement of the train have no reason to apprehend that there may likely be a human being on the track in front of the engine, they are under no duty to one who may in fact be there until they have actually discovered that one is there; but if, from the locality or surrounding circumstances, there is reason to apprehend that the track in front of the locomotive may not be clear of human beings, then it is the duty of the employees of the company to keep a lookout ahead of the train. Hunt v. Pollard, 51 Ga. App. 948, 181 S.E. 793 (1935), later appeal, 55 Ga. App. 423, 190 S.E. 71 (1937).

- A peddler, in going in between the tracks to a railroad car for the purpose of vending the peddler's wares to the employees of a railroad company, where this was permitted by the employees for their benefit, is a licensee, and it can not be said that the peddler's presence there is negligence as a matter of law. Hunt v. Pollard, 51 Ga. App. 948, 181 S.E. 793 (1935), later appeal, 55 Ga. App. 423, 190 S.E. 71 (1937).

2. Passengers

Duration of carriers liability to passengers.

- Liability of carrier to passengers begins at starting point and does not end until passenger is discharged. Metts v. Louisville & N.R.R., 52 Ga. App. 115, 182 S.E. 531 (1935).

- A railroad company cannot be held liable for injuries received by a passenger while being transported over the company's lines by virtue of a gratuitous pass, which exempted the company from liability for injuries caused by ordinary negligence, unless the injuries were inflicted willfully and wantonly; to authorize a recovery against the company by such a person, it must appear that the conduct of the defendant was such as to evince a willful intention to inflict such an injury, or else was so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences, where human life, limb, or health was involved, as to justify the jury in finding a wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent. Devero v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 51 Ga. App. 699, 181 S.E. 421 (1935).

- Where one employed generally by a railroad is issued trip passes on trains to go to and from work, and who is also permitted to ride without the payment of fare without using one's pass, and who is not engaged in or within the scope of one's employment while so riding on a train, one occupies the status of a passenger for hire, and the railroad is liable to that person for injuries inflicted by its negligence, while one is so riding, and if the injury occurs at a time when the employee is using one's pass, a limitation therein relieving the railroad from liability on account of its negligence is void. Fowler v. Western & A.R.R., 75 Ga. App. 156, 42 S.E.2d 499 (1947).

- Where an action against a carrier was founded upon the alleged wrongful ejection of the plaintiff as a passenger, and no negligence of the carrier or the carrier's employees was alleged, the wrong complained of was to be regarded not as negligence, but as "improper conduct," under former Civil Code 1910, § 2779 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-290), and the law relating to diligence and negligence on the part of carriers with reference to their passengers is not involved. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Turner, 33 Ga. App. 101, 125 S.E. 598 (1924).

- One who is unlawfully ejected from a train may recover all damages which proximately flow from the expulsion, excluding all damages which, although in some measure traceable to the wrongful act, are not its natural and probable consequence. Devero v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 51 Ga. App. 699, 181 S.E. 421 (1935).

3. Trespassers

General rule of liability only to discovered trespasser.

- The general rule is that a railroad company owes to a trespasser, walking upon its tracks, the duty not to injure the trespasser willfully or wantonly after the trespasser's presence is known to its servants in charge of the train; but this duty is not active until the trespasser's presence is actually known. Collett v. Atlanta, B. & C.R.R., 51 Ga. App. 637, 181 S.E. 207 (1935).

Where party is a trespasser, and the party is not in a path which the railroad knows people customarily use, the only duty the railroad owes the party is not to wantonly or willfully injure the trespasser after the trespasser's presence is discovered. Cook v. Southern Ry., 62 Ga. App. 613, 9 S.E.2d 123 (1940).

Ordinarily, the servants of a railway company are not bound to anticipate the presence of a trespasser on or about its tracks, and the duty of exercising ordinary care in order to protect such a trespasser does not generally arise until after the trespasser's presence has been actually discovered. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

- Ordinarily the only duty which a railway company owes to a trespasser upon or about its property is not to injure the trespasser willfully or wantonly after the trespasser's presence has been discovered, and this principle of law applies to the duty of a railway company towards a dead body which happens to be upon its tracks. Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102 (1937).

- Where a number of persons habitually, with the knowledge and without the disapproval of a railroad company, use a private passageway for the purpose of crossing the tracks of the company at a given point, the employees of the company in charge of one of its trains, who are aware of the custom, are bound on a given occasion to anticipate that persons may be upon the tracks at this point, but it is not their duty to take such precautions as would prevent injury to such person; their duty is merely to take such precautions to prevent such injury as ordinary care and diligence would require. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Hemmings, 66 Ga. App. 881, 19 S.E.2d 787 (1942); Southern Ry. v. Waldrup, 76 Ga. App. 356, 45 S.E.2d 775 (1947).

Where there is evidence that the portion of the switchyard where an accident occurred was not in fact used as a switchyard but rather was used as a passageway with the knowledge of the railroad, the rule that the railroad owes a duty of ordinary care to a trespasser only after discovering the trespasser does not apply. McClain v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 473 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1973).

- Whether plaintiff is a trespasser or licensee, the railroad is bound to use ordinary care and diligence in approaching and traversing places where there is reason for it to anticipate that persons might be on the track; in such a situation, the general rule, that the railroad owes a trespasser a duty of ordinary care only after discovery of the trespasser in a place of peril, does not apply. McClain v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 473 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1973).

Where, from the locality, circumstances, and known habits of the public generally, there is reason to apprehend that the track in front of the locomotive may not be clear of human beings, then the duty of anticipating the presence of and danger to such trespassers devolves on the employees of the company operating the train. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

While it is true that a railroad track is a place of danger, and one who trespasses thereon is guilty of negligence, yet when the railroad company discovers this negligence, or has reason to anticipate it, and such a trespasser is on the track in an apparently helpless condition, ordinary diligence requires the use of every means then available to avoid running down and killing the trespasser; and if, under such circumstances, this degree of care is not exercised, and death results, the killing will be deemed in law to have been willful and wanton. Hammontree v. Southern Ry., 50 Ga. App. 822, 179 S.E. 155 (1935).

- The mere failure of the employees of a railway company to discover the presence of a trespasser at a place where, and at a time when, it was their duty to anticipate the presence of trespassers, and thereafter to take such needful and proper measures for the trespasser's protection as ordinary care might require, might amount to a lack of ordinary care but would not, in and of itself, amount to willful and wanton misconduct. Hammontree v. Southern Ry., 50 Ga. App. 822, 179 S.E. 155 (1935); Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

- If the presence of a trespasser on the track at the time and place of the injury is brought about by peculiar facts and circumstances which relieve the trespasser from the guilt of a lack of ordinary care in thus exposing oneself, the company might be liable for a lack of ordinary care on its part in failing to anticipate the trespasser's presence at a time when and a place where it was charged with such duty, and in thereafter failing to take such proper precautions for the trespasser's safety as might seem reasonably necessary. Southern Ry. v. Kelley, 52 Ga. App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (1935).

Injuries to Animals

Liability for failure to discover presence of livestock on tracks.

- Railroad companies may be held liable for ordinary negligence in failing to discover presence of livestock or other domestic animals on tracks or in avoiding their injury, as well as for their willful or wanton killing by failing to exercise ordinary care after becoming aware of their presence. Powell v. Nelson, 52 Ga. App. 351, 183 S.E. 348 (1936).

- Domestic animals ranging on unenclosed rights of way of railroad companies are not to be regarded as trespassers, and the companies owe to the owners of such animals the duty of exercising ordinary care both in discovering their presence on railroad tracks and in avoiding their injury. Powell v. Nelson, 52 Ga. App. 351, 183 S.E. 348 (1936).

- The law expects railroad companies to run their passenger trains on schedule, so far as they may be able to do so; and they are not ordinarily required, when it is foggy or raining, to reduce their trains to such a rate of speed that the engineer may be in a position to discover livestock on the track in time to prevent injuring them. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sears, 80 Ga. App. 338, 56 S.E.2d 129 (1949).

- Railroad company is not required to slow up or to check its trains when animal is seen near the track in place of safety, unless the animal is apparently approaching the track, or there is apparent danger that, through fright or otherwise, it will get on the track. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sears, 80 Ga. App. 338, 56 S.E.2d 130 (1949).

- Only when the engineer sees, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence could see, that an animal in proximity to the track is in danger of getting on it in front of the moving train, is one charged with the duty of exercising all reasonable diligence to check the train and to avoid killing or injuring the animal. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sears, 80 Ga. App. 338, 56 S.E.2d 130 (1949).

- Evidence that the plaintiff's dog was found lying dead about ten feet from the defendant's railroad track, that there were no marks or lacerations on the dog, but the slag along railroad looked as though something had been knocked or dragged over it, is insufficient to authorize inference that the dog was killed by the operation of one of the defendant's trains. Alabama G.S.R.R. v. Raines, 52 Ga. App. 589, 183 S.E. 926 (1936).

Defenses

No action where party could have avoided accident by exercising ordinary care.

- Where one who is injured by the running of a railroad train could by the exercise of ordinary care for one's own safety, have avoided the consequences to oneself of the defendant's negligence after it came into existence and was known to defendant, or could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, an action for damages against the railroad company on account of negligence will not lie. Clements v. Central of Ga. Ry., 41 Ga. 310, 152 S.E. 849 (1930).

- If a homicide occurs at a place upon the track of a railway company where it is the duty of the servants of the company to anticipate the presence of persons on the track, and their failure to so anticipate the presence of others thereon amounts to mere negligence, the negligence of the person killed, under such circumstances, amounting to the lack of ordinary care for one's safety, will prevent a recovery by a plaintiff who sues for such homicide, but if the servants of the company are guilty of willful and wanton negligence, which results in the homicide of the person killed, then the negligence of the person killed, however gross, will not defeat a recovery of damages for such homicide by a plaintiff who is entitled under the law to sue therefor. Pressley v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 48 Ga. App. 382, 172 S.E. 731 (1934).

- While the operators of trains and cars are bound to anticipate the presence of persons crossing the tracks on pathways of the kind involved, yet, where they see a person in a position of safety on such pathway, and it is apparent to them that such person is proceeding in a direction of continued safety, such operators have the right to presume that such person will continue in the place of safety, and not abruptly turn and step in front of the on-coming train or car. Southern Ry. v. Waldrup, 76 Ga. App. 356, 45 S.E.2d 775 (1947).

- Person in generally good health is bound as matter of law to look for approach of trains and cars, and where such person steps upon the railroad tracks in front of oncoming cars without looking, and the employees of the company on the cars immediately shout at such person and apply the brakes, such operators are in the use of ordinary care for the protection of such pedestrian, and such pedestrian was lacking in due care for the pedestrian's own safety as a matter of law to such an extent as to bar recovery. Southern Ry. v. Waldrup, 76 Ga. App. 356, 45 S.E.2d 775 (1947).

- It was no defense to an action under former Code 1882, § 3368 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-290) by a person who was injured because one's horse ran away, frightened by the blowing of a whistle by an engineer, that the latter acted maliciously. Georgia R.R. v. Newsome, 60 Ga. 492 (1878).

Practice and Pleading

Complaint alleging mutilation of dead body sets out cause of action.

- Complaint alleging that a railroad company wantonly and wrongfully ran its train over, mangled, and mutilated the dead body of the husband of the plaintiff, such mangling and mutilation not being incident to the homicide of the deceased but occurring thereafter, set out a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff where plaintiff was entitled in law to receive the body after death. Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102 (1937).

- Where there were no allegations of willful and wanton negligence, nor is there any proof of the same, proof by plaintiff that injuries were caused by running of train does not make out a prima facie case against defendant railroad, where plaintiff was at a place where defendant owed plaintiff no duty until after plaintiff was discovered. Collett v. Atlanta, B. & C.R.R., 51 Ga. App. 637, 181 S.E. 207 (1935).

- It is error to give charge that where the person or property of an individual shall be injured or the property destroyed, by the negligence of any railroad company, such company shall be liable to pay damages, notwithstanding any bylaws, rules, and regulations, or notice which may be given by such company, limiting its liability where there are no issues in the case involving an effort by the defendant to limit its liability by rules. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Green, 84 Ga. App. 674, 67 S.E.2d 184 (1951).

- Where the plaintiff relies entirely upon the presumption of negligence arising against railroad companies by proof of injury to persons or property by the running of the defendant's trains or cars, and the defendant introduces evidence which the jury would be authorized to find exonerates the defendant, it is error to charge the jury that the burden is upon the defendant to show that the railroad company was not liable. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sears, 80 Ga. App. 338, 56 S.E.2d 129 (1949).

- Error to charge that railroad has absolute duty to take such precautions as would prevent injury to persons who might be on a railroad crossing. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Hemmings, 66 Ga. App. 881, 19 S.E.2d 787 (1942).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Railroads, §§ 280 et seq., 356 et seq., 473, 474.

12 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Fires, § 2.

- 75 C.J.S., Railroads, §§ 995 et seq., 1153 et seq., 1262.

- Liability of interurban road for killing or injuring livestock running at large, 2 A.L.R. 98; 25 A.L.R. 1506.

Liability of railroad company for interference with fire department while attempting to extinguish fire, 5 A.L.R. 1651.

Liability of street railway company to passenger struck by vehicle not subject to its control, 12 A.L.R. 1371; 31 A.L.R. 572; 44 A.L.R. 162.

Liability of master for damage to person or property due to servant's smoking, 13 A.L.R. 997; 31 A.L.R. 294.

Liability for death of, or injury to, soldier in service of government, by negligently constructed, maintained, or operated railroad, 13 A.L.R. 1028.

Duty of railroad to fence track as against children, 16 A.L.R. 944.

Personal care required of one riding in automobile driven by another as affecting his right to recover against third person, 18 A.L.R. 309; 22 A.L.R. 1294; 41 A.L.R. 767; 47 A.L.R. 293; 63 A.L.R. 1432; 90 A.L.R. 984.

Right of grantor of railroad right of way or his privy to recover damages for interference with surface water by construction of road, 19 A.L.R. 487.

Duty and liability of carrier as to "step box" or other device to facilitate entering and leaving car, 20 A.L.R. 914.

Liability of master for injury to child whom servant permits to ride on wagon or truck, 24 A.L.R. 670.

Liability of railroad company where fence or cattle guard becomes ineffective because of snow, 26 A.L.R. 679.

Independent contractor: remedial rights in respect of injuries caused by breaches of positive duties correlative to corporate franchises, 28 A.L.R. 122.

Liability of railroad company for injuries from negligence of postal clerk on train, 34 A.L.R. 520.

Liability of carrier for injuries from falling articles of freight, 40 A.L.R. 501.

Failure to stop, look, and listen at railroad crossing as negligence per se, 41 A.L.R. 405.

Running past stop signal as wanton or willful misconduct rendering railroad company liable for injury to trespasser, 41 A.L.R. 1354.

Validity and construction, as regards buildings not on right of way, of contract relieving railroad from liability for destruction of buildings, 48 A.L.R. 1003; 51 A.L.R. 638.

Infrequent use of crossing by railroad company as affecting its duty or liability to traveler at crossing, 52 A.L.R. 751.

Duty and liability of carrier as to assisting passenger to board or alight from car or train, 55 A.L.R. 389; 59 A.L.R. 940.

Contributory negligence of one who attempts to cross railroad tracks just after a train, or part of a train, has passed over the crossing, 56 A.L.R. 543.

Duty and liability to passenger temporarily leaving train, 61 A.L.R. 403.

Liability of a railroad for personal injury and property damage caused by frightening horses, 61 A.L.R. 1078.

Liability for injury inflicted when vehicle is struck by overhang of street car rounding curve, 62 A.L.R. 307.

Liability of master for injury to one whom servant, in violation of instructions, permits to ride on vehicle, 62 A.L.R. 1167; 74 A.L.R. 163.

Failure or delay in sounding crossing signals as affecting liability of railroad company to persons not crossing nor about to cross track, 66 A.L.R. 811.

Failure of train employee to discover in time to avert accident that object seen on or near track is human being, as negligence, 70 A.L.R. 1116.

Liability of railroad for damages other than those incident to bodily injury for blocking street or highway crossing, 71 A.L.R. 917.

Liability of railroad company for acts of employees in ejecting trespassers from train, 72 A.L.R. 536.

One in general employment of carrier as servant temporarily of shipper or consignee while aiding in loading or unloading or moving cars, as regards responsibility for his negligence, and vice versa, 102 A.L.R. 514.

Liability for collision between street car and vehicle driven ahead of or toward it along or close to the track, 102 A.L.R. 716.

Part or extent of highway adjoining railroad crossing for condition of which railroad is responsible, 105 A.L.R. 547.

Liability of railroad company for injury to trespassers or licensees other than employees or passengers struck by object projecting, or thrown, from passing train, 112 A.L.R. 850.

Sufficiency of complaint in action against railroad for killing or injuring person or livestock as regards time, and direction and identification of train, 115 A.L.R. 1074.

Liability of railroad for injury to or death of one other than its employee due to defective condition of car received from another railroad which he was unloading or loading, 126 A.L.R. 1095.

Liability for death or injury as result of suction from passing train, 149 A.L.R. 907.

What conduct on part of railroad, in connection with crossing accident, amounts to wantonness, wilfulness, or the like, precluding defense of contributory negligence, 151 A.L.R. 9.

Standing railroad car or streetcar and appliances as attractive nuisance, 152 A.L.R. 1263.

Liability of railway company for personal injury, other than to passenger, caused by defective condition of car delivered to another company, 152 A.L.R. 1313.

Liability of railroad company for negligence in extricating animal caught in tracks or trestle, 159 A.L.R. 152.

What amounts to negligence of gate tender at railroad crossing, 160 A.L.R. 731.

Duty of railroad toward persons using private crossing or commonly used footpath over or along railroad tracks, 167 A.L.R. 1253.

What causes of loss are incident to the "operation" of a railroad, within clause of contract relieving the railroad from liability, 2 A.L.R.2d 1074.

Liability of carrier for injuries to person boarding vehicle or ship for social or other purposes in connection with a passenger, 11 A.L.R.2d 1075.

Construction and effect of liability exemption or indemnity clause in spur track agreement, 20 A.L.R.2d 711.

Failure of occupants of motor vehicle stalled on railroad crossing to get out and move to place of safety as contributory negligence, 21 A.L.R.2d 742.

Liability of railroad to adult pedestrian attempting to pass over, under, or between cars obstructing crossing, 27 A.L.R.2d 369.

Railroad's duty to children walking longitudinally along railroad tracks or right of way, 31 A.L.R.2d 789.

Attempt to board moving car or train as contributory negligence or assumption of risk, 31 A.L.R.2d 931.

Railroad carrier's liability for loss of baggage or effects accompanying passenger, 32 A.L.R.2d 630.

Duty of railroad to passengers to keep steps or vestibule of car free from debris or foreign substances other than snow or ice, 34 A.L.R.2d 360.

Railroad's liability for injury or damage from collision of road vehicle with train or car at place other than crossing, 44 A.L.R.2d 680.

Liability of carrier to passenger injured by hurling of object through window by a third person, 46 A.L.R.2d 1098.

Duty of railroad company toward employee with respect to close clearance of objects alongside tracks, 50 A.L.R.2d 674.

Status of employee or his family traveling on employer's interstate conveyance by means of pass issued pursuant to specific provision of employment or collective bargaining agreement, 55 A.L.R.2d 766.

Railroad company's liability for injury or death of pedestrian due to condition of surface of crossing, 64 A.L.R.2d 1199.

Liability of railroad for injury or damage resulting from motor vehicle striking bridge or underpass because of insufficient vertical clearance, 67 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Liability of railroad for injury due to road vehicle running into train or car standing on highway crossing, 84 A.L.R.2d 813.

Railroad's liability for crossing collision as affected by fact that train or engine was backing or engine was pushing train, 85 A.L.R.2d 267.

Failure of signaling device at crossing to operate, as affecting railroad company's liability, 90 A.L.R.2d 350.

Railroad's liability to owner or occupant of motor vehicle for accident allegedly resulting from defective condition of road surface at crossing, 91 A.L.R.2d 10.

Railroad's liability for injury or death of one other than employee because of alleged unsafe or defective condition of its own freight car which he was loading or unloading, 99 A.L.R.2d 176.

Contributory negligence of child injured while climbing over or through railroad train blocking crossing, 11 A.L.R.3d 1168.

Validity, construction, and effect of agreement, in connection with real-estate lease or license by railroad, for exemption from liability or for indemnification by lessee or licensee, for consequences of railroad's own negligence, 14 A.L.R.3d 446.

Liability, because of improper loading, of railroad consignee or his employee injured while unloading car, 29 A.L.R.3d 1039.

Railroad's liability for injury to or death of child on moving train other than as paying or proper passenger, 35 A.L.R.3d 9.

Carrier's liability for injury or death of infant passenger as affected by fact that child was in custody of parent or other adult, 74 A.L.R.3d 1171.

Validity of release of prospective right to wrongful death action, 92 A.L.R.3d 1232.

Application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to accidents incurred by passenger while boarding or alighting from a carrier, 93 A.L.R.3d 776.

Liability of common carrier for personal injury or death of passenger occasioned by inhalation of gases or fumes from exhaust, 99 A.L.R.3d 751.

Width or design of lateral space between passenger loading platform and car entrance as affecting carrier's liability to passenger for injuries incurred from falling into space, 28 A.L.R.4th 748.

Liability of land carrier to passenger who becomes victim of third party's assault on or about carrier's vehicle or premises, 34 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Liability of land carrier to passenger who becomes victim of another passenger's assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 189.

Measure and elements of damages for injury to bridge, 31 A.L.R.5th 171.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injury to patron on premises from criminal attack by third party, 31 A.L.R.5th 550.