2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 5 - Crimes Against the Person
Article 3 - Kidnapping, False Imprisonment, and Related Offenses
§ 16-5-41. False Imprisonment

1. A person commits the offense of false imprisonment when, in violation of the personal liberty of another, he arrests, confines, or detains such person without legal authority.
2. A person convicted of the offense of false imprisonment shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.
3. Any person convicted under this Code section wherein the victim is not the child of the defendant and the victim is less than 14 years of age shall, in addition, be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Section 17-10-6.2.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 788; Code 1863, §§ 4263, 4264; Code 1868, §§ 4298, 4299; Code 1873, §§ 4364, 4365; Code 1882, §§ 4364, 4365; Penal Code 1895, §§ 106, 107; Penal Code 1910, §§ 106, 107; Code 1933, §§ 26-1501, 26-1502; Code 1933, § 26-1308, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 6/HB 1059.)

- Civil action for false imprisonment, § 51-7-20 et seq.

- Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 1/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. The General Assembly finds that this makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. The General Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with sufficient justification to implement a strategy that includes:

"(1) Incarcerating sexual offenders and maintaining adequate facilities to ensure that decisions to release sexual predators into the community are not made on the basis of inadequate space;

"(2) Requiring the registration of sexual offenders, with a requirement that complete and accurate information be maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement authorities, communities, and the public;

"(3) Providing for community and public notification concerning the presence of sexual offenders;

"(4) Collecting data relative to sexual offenses and sexual offenders;

"(5) Requiring sexual predators who are released into the community to wear an electronic monitoring system for the rest of their natural life and to pay for such system; and

"(6) Prohibiting sexual predators from working with children, either for compensation or as a volunteer.

"The General Assembly further finds that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual offenders to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual offenders. The General Assembly declares that in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual offenders be registered and that members of the community and the public be notified of a sexual offender's presence. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes. Likewise, the designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from findings by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board and a court if requested by a sexual offender."

Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30(c)/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment."

- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 11 (2006).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Application
• Jury Instructions
• Sentence

General Consideration

Statute not unconstitutionally vague.

- Georgia's false imprisonment statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), was not unconstitutionally vague, as the word in it "confine" had a commonly understood meaning which would place a person of common intelligence on notice of the prohibited acts; accordingly, defendant's conviction under that statute would not be overturned on constitutional grounds. Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 620 S.E.2d 792 (2005).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and false imprisonment, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the out-of-court identifications of the defendant because the court found that the simultaneous lineup was not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law based on the testimony of the officer who prepared and presented the lineup that the victims were admonished that the suspect may not be in the array. McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014).

Essential difference between kidnapping and false imprisonment is that kidnapping involves the additional element of asportation. Raysor v. State, 191 Ga. 422, 382 S.E.2d 162 (1989).

Evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of kidnapping where the transcript reveals that defendant assisted sister by carrying and lifting the victim into defendant's truck and dumping the body in another county. Vincent v. State, 203 Ga. App. 874, 418 S.E.2d 138 (1992).

State's evidence established the element of asportation for kidnapping under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) by showing that, while the victim willingly entered the defendant's vehicle, the victim demonstrated the desire to escape by jumping from the defendant's vehicle and trying to call9-1-1 for help. The defendant moved the victim against the victim's will by dragging the victim back into the vehicle and continuing to drive; thus, the defendant's movement of the victim in the vehicle was not a criminally insignificant circumstance attendant to some other crime. Day v. State, 317 Ga. App. 243, 730 S.E.2d 734 (2012).

- Trial evidence showed that defendant confined the victim in the bedroom without lawful authority. In light of defendant's testimony that the victim had not been confined at all, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue jury instructions based on an inconsistent theory that defendant had in fact confined the victim, but was legally authorized to do so. Smith v. State, 314 Ga. App. 583, 724 S.E.2d 885 (2012).

- See Vincent v. State, 210 Ga. App. 6, 435 S.E.2d 222 (1993), aff'd, 264 Ga. 234, 442 S.E.2d 748 (1994).

- Defendant's contention that the crimes against a stabbing victim were solely committed by the codefendant was rejected pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as ample evidence existed to conclude that defendant either committed the crimes or was a party to the crimes, including that both defendant and the codefendant drove to the stabbing victim's home, that victim was stabbed to death, and the victim's wallet and checkbook were stolen so that both defendants could have money to buy more drugs. Odom v. State, 279 Ga. 599, 619 S.E.2d 636 (2005).

When private person arrests fugitive from justice, that person must deliver prisoner to qualified officer without unreasonable delay, or that person becomes liable for false arrest. Lavina v. State, 63 Ga. 513 (1879).

To arrest one illegally and detain that person for any length of time is a criminal offense and a tort for which an action for damages will lie. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41, on its face, does not require that the false imprisonment be for a specific length of time, only that there be an arrest, confinement or detention without legal authority and against that person's will. Rehberger v. State, 235 Ga. App. 827, 510 S.E.2d 594 (1998).

False imprisonment is tort for which an action for damages will lie. Holliday v. Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779, 78 S.E. 482 (1913); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

"Custody" is synonymous with "imprisonment," which is detention of person contrary to that person's will. Everett, Ridley & Co. v. Holcomb, 1 Ga. App. 794, 58 S.E. 287 (1907).

- See Reynolds v. State, 231 Ga. App. 33, 497 S.E.2d 580 (1998).

- Georgia cases made clear that false imprisonment in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41 ordinarily creates risks of physical injury to another similar to the risks of burglary: the risk of a violent confrontation between the offender and the person being falsely imprisoned, including the risk that the offender will have to inflict serious physical injury to detain the victim. And, just as with burglary, the offender's awareness that such a confrontation is possible and could be necessary indicates that the offender may well be prepared to use violence if necessary to complete the crime or to escape. United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 288, 184 L. Ed. 2d 169 (2012).

Court abused the court's discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to false imprisonment charges because the state conceded that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel as to the less serious armed robbery and kidnapping offenses that were part of the same negotiated plea agreement, that were included in the same indictment, and that involved the same codefendants; defendant should have been permitted to withdraw the guilty plea in order to avoid a manifest injustice. Clue v. State, 273 Ga. App. 672, 615 S.E.2d 800 (2005).

Cited in Caldwell v. State, 167 Ga. App. 692, 307 S.E.2d 511 (1983); Gilbert v. State, 176 Ga. App. 561, 336 S.E.2d 828 (1985); Grissom v. State, 187 Ga. App. 653, 371 S.E.2d 137 (1988); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Shelton v. State, 220 Ga. App. 163, 469 S.E.2d 298 (1996); Dorillas v. State, 224 Ga. App. 336, 480 S.E.2d 351 (1997); Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 493 S.E.2d 634 (1997); Markee v. State, 229 Ga. App. 644, 494 S.E.2d 551 (1998); Johnson v. State, 232 Ga. App. 717, 503 S.E.2d 603 (1998); Armstrong v. State, 244 Ga. App. 871, 537 S.E.2d 147 (2000); Darnell v. State, 257 Ga. App. 555, 571 S.E.2d 547 (2002); Upton v. Johnson, 282 Ga. 600, 652 S.E.2d 516 (2007); Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008); Hyde v. State, 291 Ga. App. 662, 662 S.E.2d 764 (2008); Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (2008); Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (2008); Greene v. State, 295 Ga. App. 803, 673 S.E.2d 292 (2009); Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga. App. 683, 761 S.E.2d 91 (2014); Robinson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 420, 838 S.E.2d 92 (2020); Spikes v. State, 353 Ga. App. 454, 838 S.E.2d 121 (2020).

False imprisonment charge did not merge with a kidnapping charge either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, where the kidnapping (the asportation of the victim to a place where the victim did not wish to go) involved conduct distinct from that which constituted false imprisonment, which embraced appellant's chasing the victim each time the victim managed to escape from the appellant's automobile and forcing the victim to re-enter the car and remain there until it suited appellant to release the victim. Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 723, 394 S.E.2d 586 (1990).

Because the evidence against the defendant showed that a charge of kidnapping and a charge of false imprisonment were not proven by the same facts but: (1) the kidnapping occurred when the defendant abducted the victim outside of a mobile home and forced that victim inside the home, completing the kidnapping crime at that time; and (2) the false imprisonment occurred when the defendant kept the victim inside the mobile home against the victim's will, the trial court did not err in holding that the crimes did not merge. Chatman v. State, 283 Ga. App. 673, 642 S.E.2d 361 (2007).

Because the kidnapping and false imprisonment convictions entered against the defendant were based on different conduct, the two did not merge. Snelson v. State, 286 Ga. App. 203, 648 S.E.2d 647 (2007).

Defendant committed false imprisonment by forcing the victim into a closet, binding the closet doors closed, and ordering the victim under threat of death to remain there until the defendant left. As the crime of kidnapping occurred and was complete prior to that, when the defendant forced the victim into a bedroom and held the victim there against the victim's will, the kidnapping and false imprisonment offenses were proven by different facts and did not merge. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

- False imprisonment charge did not merge with a burglary charge because evidence that supported the former charge was that defendant prevented the victim from escaping the victim's home by grabbing the victim by the hair and then ordering the victim to lie on the floor while threatening the victim with a lead pipe and none of this evidence overlapped with evidence supporting the burglary conviction. Watkins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 302, 548 S.E.2d 56 (2001).

- Offense of false imprisonment requires proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of armed robbery does not. Consequently, under the "required evidence" test, a defendant's false imprisonment conviction did not merge into the defendant's armed robbery conviction. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge false imprisonment with robbery because robbery did not require proof that the victim was confined and detained without legal authority and false imprisonment did not require a theft. Bonner v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011).

- Defendant's conviction on a charge of false imprisonment did not merge with the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because each offense required proof of facts which the other did not: an assault and a weapon were not required for false imprisonment, and violation of liberty through arrest, confinement, or detention was not required for aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614, 825 S.E.2d 188 (2019).

- Criminal defendant's false imprisonment of a victim was not merely incidental to the other crimes charged and was a distinct offense which can be punished separately since the evidence showed that the defendant confined and detained the victim from the time defendant grabbed the victim from behind and stuck the knife in the victim's ribs until defendant began the actual physical assaults upon the victim. Butler v. State, 194 Ga. App. 895, 392 S.E.2d 324 (1990).

Defendant's rape conviction was proper, even though defendant was acquitted of kidnapping with bodily injury, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault, as Georgia did not recognize the inconsistent verdict rule; further, the convictions were not necessarily inconsistent as the jury could have found that defendant raped the victim, but did not commit the other crimes. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Because the sequential crimes of false imprisonment and robbery by intimidation were complete and independent of each other, each proven by different facts, the crimes did not merge. Lancaster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 752, 637 S.E.2d 131 (2006).

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge a false imprisonment offense with an attempt to commit aggravated sodomy offense. Howard v. State, 272 Ga. 242, 527 S.E.2d 194 (2000).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for false imprisonment in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41 based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank that the defendant was armed and told the victims to get down and the victims did not feel that they could leave while the defendant was in the bank. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015).

- It could not be said under the circumstances of the crimes that the state used up the evidence establishing false imprisonment in proving the aggravated assault charge as each offense was established by proof of separate and distinct facts. Webb v. State, 210 Ga. App. 27, 435 S.E.2d 251 (1993).

Evidence the defendant held the victim at gun point in various places inside the apartment during a robbery supported the conviction for false imprisonment. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

- Since the defendant had been convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury, subsequent charges of false imprisonment, arising out of the same set of facts, were barred by former jeopardy under the "required evidence test" because false imprisonment was a lesser included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury. Sallie v. State, 216 Ga. App. 502, 455 S.E.2d 315 (1995).

Trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider the lesser included offense of false imprisonment after granting a directed verdict on the kidnapping charges against defendant because false imprisonment was a lesser included offense of kidnapping, and the indictment against defendant contained all the essential elements related to false imprisonment. Martinez v. State, 318 Ga. App. 254, 735 S.E.2d 785 (2012).

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge defendant's convictions for kidnapping and false imprisonment where the convictions were supported by evidence of complete, independent acts directed toward one of the victims. Upshaw v. State, 249 Ga. App. 741, 549 S.E.2d 526 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. State, 275 Ga. 879, 572 S.E.2d 579 (2002).

Trial court erred in failing to merge defendant's false imprisonment conviction into defendant's kidnapping conviction because false imprisonment was an integral part of the kidnapping charge, requiring the same evidence except for asportation and, accordingly, the offense of false imprisonment merged with the offense of kidnapping as a matter of fact, even though the offenses did not merge as a matter of law. Upshaw v. State, 249 Ga. App. 741, 549 S.E.2d 526 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. State, 275 Ga. 879, 572 S.E.2d 579 (2002).

Defendant's kidnapping and false imprisonment sentences did not merge for sentencing purposes when the victim had been made to drive around at gunpoint, then taken to an apartment before being forced into some woods and shot in the head; thus, the crime of false imprisonment was complete before the victim was forced into the woods and shot. John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007).

After a jury convicted a defendant on both an indicted charge of kidnapping and an unindicted lesser charge of false imprisonment without any intervention of the trial court, the rule in Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 529 S.E.2d 121 (2000) did not apply; thus, the trial court properly merged the false imprisonment with the kidnapping and properly entered judgment on the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of the kidnapping. Manning v. State, 296 Ga. App. 376, 674 S.E.2d 408 (2009).

Defendant's conviction for false imprisonment did not merge with the offense of kidnapping since the kidnapping occurred when the defendant forced the victim to move to a secluded location and held the victim there against the victim's will. After the defendant raped the victim, the defendant falsely imprisoned the victim on the premises by shoving the victim to the ground and ordering the victim to remain under threat of violence while the defendant escaped. These two events were separate in time and supported by separate facts. Consequently, the acts constituted separate offenses which did not merge. Scales v. State, 310 Ga. App. 48, 712 S.E.2d 555 (2011).

- Defendant's cruelty to children in the first degree charge did not merge with the aggravated assault or false imprisonment charge because neither aggravated assault nor false imprisonment required proof that the victim suffered cruel or excessive physical or mental pain. Kirt v. State, 309 Ga. App. 227, 709 S.E.2d 840 (2011).

- Trial court was not required to merge the defendant's false imprisonment and aggravated child molestation convictions since the false imprisonment and aggravated child molestation convictions could be sustained based on different conduct; therefore, separate convictions were appropriate. Specifically, the indictment averred that the defendant committed false imprisonment by unlawfully detaining the victim in violation of the victim's personal liberty and committed aggravated child molestation by forcing the victim to perform oral sex on the defendant and there was evidence that on one occasion, the defendant locked the victim in the home and would not let the victim leave and, as to the aggravated child molestation conviction, there was evidence that the defendant forced the victim to perform oral sex on the defendant on repeated occasions spanning several years. Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009).

False imprisonment convictions and rape convictions did not merge, where a rational trier of fact could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that the confinement and detention of the victim far exceeded that which was immediately associated with the acts of sexual intercourse. Moua v. State, 200 Ga. App. 49, 406 S.E.2d 557 (1991).

- Because a victim was held against the victim's will throughout a beating ordeal, even when the defendant was not striking the victim, the crime of false imprisonment was proved by facts separate and distinct from those used for the defendant's aggravated battery conviction. The state did not use up the evidence establishing false imprisonment in proving the battery charge because each offense was established by proof of separate and distinct facts. Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0549, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 244 (Ga. 2010).

- Trial court properly applied former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412) by refusing to allow testimony that a victim of domestic violence had been seen working as a prostitute because that information had no relevance to the aggravated assault and false imprisonment charges for which a defendant was convicted, and further, the defendant failed to produce any evidence that could have provided a nexus between the alleged prostitution and a conclusion that someone else might have inflicted the victim's injuries. Moorer v. State, 290 Ga. App. 216, 659 S.E.2d 422 (2008).

Similar transaction evidence was properly admitted against defendant charged with rape and false imprisonment as the state showed sufficient evidence of a proper purpose for the admission, specifically, that both sex offenses involved attacks by force against the victims for the purpose of forcing sexual intercourse upon the victims, and that both incidents occurred behind a shopping center where defendant drove after promising to take the victims home. Ingram v. State, 280 Ga. App. 467, 634 S.E.2d 430 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 868 (Ga. 2007).

- Defendants' false imprisonment convictions were supported by the victim's testimony to the effect that the defendants had held the victim captive over a period of several hours, between separate episodes of rape. Moua v. State, 200 Ga. App. 49, 406 S.E.2d 557 (1991).

Since the victim's and a police officer's testimonies about the crime location established venue, and defendant induced a jury question as to whether a toy gun was a firearm but did not object to the trial court's instruction, defendant was properly convicted of rape, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-41(a),16-6-1(a), and16-11-106(b). Bravo v. State, 269 Ga. App. 242, 603 S.E.2d 669 (2004).

Since the rape victim testified that the victim tried to leave, but defendant would not permit the victim to do so, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to convict defendant of false imprisonment. Reynolds v. State, 269 Ga. App. 268, 603 S.E.2d 779 (2004).

Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), and defendant's convictions for kidnapping, burglary, aggravated sodomy, rape, and false imprisonment were supported by sufficient evidence when the victim testified that the defendant forced the victim into a train boxcar, threatened to kill the victim, and had vaginal and oral sex with the victim against the victim's will and without the victim's consent; there was also circumstantial evidence showing the victim's lack of consent, including the victim fleeing from the boxcar while naked, the victim's outcry to a train engineer that the victim had been raped, and the victim's injuries. Davis v. State, 278 Ga. App. 628, 629 S.E.2d 537 (2006).

Defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated sodomy, false imprisonment, and two counts of aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence in the form of the victim's injuries, and the victim's testimony that, among other things, after the victim refused the defendant's request for sex, the defendant threw the victim on the bed, hit her in the back and on the arms with hedge clippers, ordered the victim to remove the victim's clothes, dragged the victim by the hair back into the house after the victim had escaped through a window, grabbed the victim, twisted the victim's arm, and said, "I'm trying - bitch, I'm going to kill you," hit the victim in the arm and leg with the hedge clippers, punched the victim on the lips and on the forehead, threw the victim on the bed and raped the victim and made the victim perform oral sex on the defendant. Tarver v. State, 280 Ga. App. 89, 633 S.E.2d 415 (2006).

Evidence was more than sufficient to support the defendant's false imprisonment conviction because the victim testified that after the defendant finished raping her, she felt like she could not leave the house since the defendant had a knife, and the defendant's mental state appeared unstable; one of the responding officers also testified that the victim was visibly traumatized, physically shaking, and crying upon her release from the house. Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape and false imprisonment because venue in Fulton County was proper as the night club and the house the victim ran to after the rape were located there; the victim accepted a ride from two men who, against the victim's will, drove the victim to a nearby field and then, forcibly and against the victim's will, had sex with the victim; a sexual assault exam was performed, DNA samples were collected from the victim, and the rape kit was sent to the GBI crime lab; and, about 20 years later, the crime lab generated a profile of the male DNA which matched known DNA profiles of the defendant contained in an existing DNA database and in buccal swabs obtained from the defendant by search warrant. Walker v. State, 341 Ga. App. 742, 801 S.E.2d 621 (2017).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment because there were hasps on both the interior and exterior doors of the residence, padlocks and keys were found in the house, the windows were glued shut, and containers of epoxy were found in the residence; the state adduced a text message sent by the defendant to the victim's mother indicating that the victim was prevented from letting the victim's alleged paramour into the residence and that, likewise, the alleged paramour was prevented from gaining access to the house; and the jury heard testimony from a cellmate that the defendant admitted to keeping the victim locked in the house so that the victim was unable to leave. Smith v. State, 304 Ga. 752, 822 S.E.2d 220 (2018).

- See Furlow v. State, 297 Ga. App. 375, 677 S.E.2d 412 (2009); Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 699 S.E.2d 363 (2010); Tucker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 611, 621 S.E.2d 562 (2005).

Evidence that defendant unlawfully detained the victim over five days during which period the victim's will was overborne by the victim's fear of the brutal beatings the victim sustained day and night at defendant's hands was sufficient to support conviction. Grier v. State, 218 Ga. App. 637, 463 S.E.2d 130 (1995).

Evidence that defendant forcibly prevented the victim from leaving a hotel room by putting defendant's foot in front of the door and that defendant covered the victim's mouth with defendant's hand when the victim screamed was sufficient to support conviction. Mayorga v. State, 225 Ga. App. 496, 484 S.E.2d 292 (1997).

Evidence that defendant held the victim against the victim's will while defendant made physical advances against the victim and physically caused the victim harm was sufficient to convict defendant of false imprisonment and simple battery. Reynolds v. State, 231 Ga. App. 33, 497 S.E.2d 580 (1998).

Evidence that defendants detained the victims under arms and color of authority was sufficient to authorize the jury verdicts that defendants were guilty of false imprisonment. Thompson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 26, 521 S.E.2d 876 (1999).

Evidence showing that defendant forced the victim at gun point to sit on the floor of the pharmacy and remain there while defendant searched the pharmacy shelves was sufficient to find defendant guilty of false imprisonment. Brabham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 506, 524 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Defendant's conviction for false imprisonment was supported by evidence that the victim was bashed on the head during an armed robbery, dragged outside, placed into the back of a car with a gun to the head and driven to another location where the victim was dragged out of the car and left for dead. Barnett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (2000).

As the jury could have believed the victim's testimony that defendant held the victim against the victim's will but discounted the victim's testimony that defendant pushed the victim into the car, defendant's conviction of false imprisonment, a lesser-included offense of the charged crime of kidnapping, was affirmed. Shue v. State, 251 Ga. App. 50, 553 S.E.2d 348 (2001).

Evidence that defendant raped the victim, would not allow the victim to leave the apartment, that the victim was fearful of what else defendant might do, that the defendant had struck, beaten, and attacked the victim on previous occasions, and that the victim had a bruised face shortly after the incident, sufficiently showed false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a). Laredo v. State, 253 Ga. App. 155, 558 S.E.2d 742 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of false imprisonment after defendant entered the premises where the victims worked brandishing a gun, instructed the victims not to move, and then tied the victims up with telephone cords. Phoukphanh v. State, 256 Ga. App. 580, 569 S.E.2d 259 (2002).

Evidence that a store employee recognized one of the robbers' voices as belonging to defendant, that defendant's car was found behind the store with proceeds of the robbery and a loaded pistol, and that defendant was found in a dumpster behind the store was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment and armed robbery. Woods v. State, 266 Ga. App. 53, 596 S.E.2d 203 (2004).

Evidence that defendants entered the victim's apartment, took the victim by the hands and demanded money, shoved a gun into the victim's side and removed the victim's ring, watch, and money, and then forced the victim into a closet blocked with a heavy table with instructions not to come out until the defendants had left was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pinson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 254, 596 S.E.2d 734 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions as a party to the offenses of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-5-41,16-7-1, and16-8-41 because: (1) defendant received information from the defendant's love interest, about the victims' house, the location of safes, where money was located, and about the alarm system; (2) the day after the home invasion the love interest saw defendant and defendant showed the love interest a stack of cash, and defendant told the love interest it might be the victim's money; and (3) an FBI informant met with defendant and defendant told the informant that defendant had been shorted money from the robbery, and that defendant got the layout of the house from the love interest. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).

Jury was authorized to find that defendant was a party to the crime of false imprisonment, and the conviction was affirmed, since the evidence demonstrated that defendant, along with two other codefendants, took an active role in confining and/or detaining the victims; the victims testified that defendant was positioned at the foot of their bed, participated in tying the victims up, and, despite defendant's claim that defendant was a reluctant participant acting out of fear, that defendant never seemed afraid or intimidated. Adcock v. State, 269 Ga. App. 9, 603 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and armed robbery convictions after one of the victims opened the door to the victim's home when the victim recognized one of defendant's accomplices, when defendant and another then pushed the door open and rushed inside, and when defendant grabbed the first victim, pointed a gun at the first victim's head, took money from the second victim's wallet, kept the gun pointed at both victims during the entire incident, ripped the telephone cord out of the wall, and instructed defendant's accomplices to bind and blindfold the victims, which they did; the victims both identified defendant as the gunman from a police photo array, plus made an in-court identification at trial, and any conflict between the victims' testimony that the gunman had a tattoo on the gunman's arm and a trial demonstration revealing no tattoo on defendant's arm was a matter for the jury to resolve and did not affect the sufficiency of the identification. Kates v. State, 269 Ga. App. 8, 603 S.E.2d 342 (2004).

Evidence supported defendant's robbery by intimidation and false imprisonment convictions and codefendant's armed robbery and kidnapping with bodily injury convictions as defendant lured the victim to defendant's apartment where the codefendant struck the victim in the back of the head and robbed the victim at gunpoint. Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 133, 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's false imprisonment conviction because, in responding to a9-1-1 call, a deputy witnessed the defendant's actions toward the victim, heard the defendant running from the bedroom and observed that the bedroom had been barricaded while the defendant had the victim inside the bedroom. Pitts v. State, 272 Ga. App. 182, 612 S.E.2d 1 (2005), aff'd, 280 Ga. 288, 627 S.E.2d 17 (2006).

Defendant's convictions of aggravated stalking, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-91,16-7-1,16-5-21, and16-5-41, were supported by sufficient evidence because, despite the victim's recantation at trial, the victim stated to police earlier that defendant broke into the victim's apartment, scratched and damaged furniture and other property, tied the victim up, locked the victim in the bedroom for several hours, harmed the victim, threatened that defendant and defendant's friends were going to lock the victim in a basement for a few months, and defendant had been waiting for the victim to arrive home. Andrews v. State, 275 Ga. App. 426, 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).

Even in the absence of proffered evidence that an alleged victim voluntarily went to the codefendant's house for purposes of prostitution, evidence that the victim was forced into a closet against the victim's will was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction on a false imprisonment charge. Grier v. State, 276 Ga. App. 655, 624 S.E.2d 149 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, even though none of the victims could identify the defendant as the gunman in the robbery due to the fact that the defendant wore a mask because defendant was found shortly after the robbery with cash, weapons, a ski mask, a car, and clothing matching the victims' description; surveillance videotape of the robbery was shown to the jury to determine whether defendant was the person on the videotape. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 625 S.E.2d 411 (2005).

Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, false imprisonment, and hijacking a motor vehicle were supported by sufficient evidence since a perpetrator identified as the defendant robbed a pizza restaurant at gunpoint, ordered everyone into a cooler, and took the restaurant manager's vehicle, after which an officer discovered the defendant the next day driving the manager's vehicle and wearing a hat identical to that worn by the perpetrator, and since a customer at the restaurant identified the defendant as the robber in a photo line-up and at trial; while three of the four crimes arising out of the incident were committed after the customer, who was the only witness to identify defendant, was ordered into the cooler, only one robber entered the restaurant and the jury was authorized to infer that the man identified by the customer also committed the crimes committed after the customer was in the cooler. Head v. State, 279 Ga. App. 608, 631 S.E.2d 808 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for robbery, battery, false imprisonment, and obstruction of an emergency telephone call were all upheld on appeal as no error flowed from: (1) the trial court's admission of an audio recording of the attack on the victim and order granting the state two hearings regarding the admissibility of that recording; (2) the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction after the prosecutor injected a personal experience with domestic violence into the closing argument; (3) the trial court's failure to strike the testimony of similar transaction witnesses and issue a curative instruction; and (4) the trial court's order restricting the counsel's closing argument. Ellis v. State, 279 Ga. App. 902, 633 S.E.2d 64 (2006).

Given that all three victims identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes of armed robbery and false imprisonment, the defendant's theft of the father's money at gunpoint, as well as duct-taping the parents and detaining all three victims in the basement, the evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction for one count of armed robbery and three counts of false imprisonment; moreover, conflicts in the testimony, even between the state's witnesses, went to the credibility of the witnesses, which was a matter for the jury to resolve. Feldman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 390, 638 S.E.2d 822 (2006).

Because the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when the evidence showed: (1) two separate aggravated assaults, one with a knife and one with a hammer; (2) two separate instances of simple battery; and (3) a hours-long detention of the victim by the defendant, the evidence amply supported the jury's conviction on the charges of false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and simple battery. Brigman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 481, 639 S.E.2d 359 (2006).

Evidence that the defendant and other perpetrators bound the victim with an electrical cord was sufficient for a jury to find that the victim was illegally detained against the victim's will to support the defendant's conviction for false imprisonment; similarly, the jury could have found that the victim's babies were confined without legal authority during the hour-long ordeal, and therefore the evidence supported the verdict convicting the defendant of false imprisonment. Bills v. State, 283 Ga. App. 660, 642 S.E.2d 352 (2007).

Legally sufficient evidence existed to convict the defendant of false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a) because the defendant's live-in girlfriend, the victim, testified that the victim was held against the victim's will and handcuffed in a bathroom all night long; the victim was then shoved into a closet and also held there against the victim's will. Austin v. State, 286 Ga. App. 149, 648 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, No. SO7C1698, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 687 (Ga. 2007).

Evidence that defendant bound victims with rope was sufficient for a jury to find that the victims were illegally detained against their will. Ayers v. State, 286 Ga. App. 898, 650 S.E.2d 370 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 117 (Ga. 2008).

Because contradictions and uncertainties in the testimony did not render the evidence against the defendant insufficient, but were ultimately for the jury to decide, and the defendant's statement to the police was corroborated by other evidence, the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal. Sheely v. State, 287 Ga. App. 92, 650 S.E.2d 762 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions as a party to malice murder, felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault since: the victim, who claimed to have been robbed of money the defendant and a codefendant gave the victim for drugs, had been made to drive around while a codefendant pointed a gun at the victim; the victim was later taken to an apartment where the victim was threatened and pistol-whipped; the victim was taken out of the apartment, forced into some woods, and fatally shot; and following the killing, the defendant and a codefendant moved the victim's car from the apartment complex to a parking lot where the defendant and others had met the victim earlier that evening. John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007).

Given the undisputed evidence from two eyewitnesses that the defendant detained the murder victim at gunpoint despite the victim's pleas to be released, the elements of false imprisonment were established and supported the defendant's conviction of that offense. Clark v. State, 283 Ga. 234, 657 S.E.2d 872 (2008).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a new trial, and there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for false imprisonment, based on the evidence that defendant went to the victim's home uninvited; forced entry into the victim's home; assaulted the victim; and forced the victim to wait in a bathroom and refused to allow the victim to exit. Griffin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 618, 662 S.E.2d 171 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant on a charge of false imprisonment since the defendant failed to carry the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated at the time the defendant went into the victim's home and held the victim at knife point, and there was at least some evidence before the jury of each element of false imprisonment that the state was required to prove. Stewart v. State, 291 Ga. App. 846, 663 S.E.2d 278 (2008).

Evidence was legally sufficient to convict a defendant on charges of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices, which implicated the defendant in the crimes, was corroborated by evidence that the defendant was captured with the two accomplices shortly after the robbery, that defendant had a large amount of cash, a gun, and a roll of duct tape, and that the victim was able to identify all three men as the ones who robbed and assaulted the victim. Spragg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (2008).

Testimony by a victim that the defendant and an accomplice, armed with handguns, forcibly entered the victim's apartment, raped and sodomized the victim, struck the victim with a gun, stole jewelry, bound the victim, and escaped in a car owned by the victim's prospective spouse, and evidence that 24 fingerprints lifted from the apartment and car matched the defendant's, was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment. Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463, 664 S.E.2d 820 (2008).

Evidence that a defendant moved the victim from the victim's vehicle to a house and then from the house to the garage against the victim's will was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for kidnapping. Likewise, the victim's testimony that the defendant took the victim into the house and tied the victim's hands against the victim's will was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for false imprisonment. Cornette v. State, 295 Ga. App. 877, 673 S.E.2d 531 (2009).

Victim's testimony that the victim was unable to leave the victim's apartment because the defendant was holding the victim, along with evidence that the defendant dragged the victim from room to room by the victim's hair while beating the victim, was enough evidence for the jury to determine the victim was detained against the victim's will and sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for false imprisonment. Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0549, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 244 (Ga. 2010).

There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the first incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the first crime was used in the second crime and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant's mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-21 after a jury convicted the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment because the evidence was legally sufficient to support the crimes of which the defendant was convicted; the victim was shown a photo array containing six photographs and immediately picked the defendant's photo as the person who held a gun to the victim's head during the incident, and the victim also identified the defendant in court. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

Evidence including the geographic proximity of the defendant's home to the crime and pawn shop, the temporal proximity of the defendant's visit to the pawn shop after the intrusion, the victim's vehicle being found running across from the pawn shop, the defendant's initial denial of pawning the stolen television, and the lack of evidence about the identity of the person the defendant claimed to have gotten the television from supported robbery for force, burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and theft by taking convictions. Strickland v. State, 348 Ga. App. 892, 825 S.E.2d 379 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment because the victim testified that the defendant shoved the victim onto the bed when the victim attempted to leave the defendant's bedroom and tied the victim's hands. Nguyen v. State, 351 Ga. App. 509, 831 S.E.2d 213 (2019), cert. dismissed, No. S20C0488, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 402 (Ga. 2020).

- In the defendant's aggravated assault and false imprisonment trial arising out of the defendant's and the defendant's brother's beating of a marijuana dealer with a handgun, whether the defendant knew that the defendant's brother was going to steal the marijuana was not relevant; regardless of whether the defendant knew that the defendant's brother was going to steal the marijuana, the defendant actively participated in the false imprisonment and beating of the victim and was responsible as a party. Gonzalez v. State, 350 Ga. App. 297, 829 S.E.2d 385 (2019).

- Jury's verdict convicting a defendant of false imprisonment was supported by evidence that the defendant threatened the victim, a 65-year-old widow, and ordered her to stay on her bed in the nude while the defendant spit on her and cursed her, then ordered her to sit in a filled bathtub where the defendant threatened to drop a hair dryer into the tub with her. Schneider v. State, 312 Ga. App. 504, 718 S.E.2d 833 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for false imprisonment, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the perpetrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee's car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told the relatives what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer's gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer's blood was found on the defendant's chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because although the defendant argued that there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence to show that the defendant was the victim's attacker, determinations of witness credibility and the weight to give the evidence presented was solely within the province of the jury; defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim, the responding officers, and the investigator regarding the victim's demeanor after the attack, the victim's description of the attack and the attacker, and the inconsistencies between what the victim told each of them. Pennington v. State, 313 Ga. App. 764, 723 S.E.2d 13 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant and an accomplice entered a store and the defendant approached two women, pulled out a gun, forced the women and children to the back of the store, and forced them to lie on the floor while the defendant and the accomplice forced an employee to give them money was sufficient to support defendant's robbery and false imprisonment convictions. Taylor v. State, 318 Ga. App. 115, 733 S.E.2d 415 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant came into the victim's hotel room uninvited, put a hand across the victim's mouth, and laid on top of the victim, confining the victim's movement and rendering the victim unable to resist was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for false imprisonment. Murrell v. State, 317 Ga. App. 310, 730 S.E.2d 675 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's false imprisonment conviction, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant took nothing from the victim and did not point a weapon at the victim, because: (1) it was undisputed that the crime occurred; and, (2) whether the defendant or the defendant's accomplice pointed the gun and took the property, the defendant could be convicted through the defendant's role as a party, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant kicked in a door and entered an occupied apartment with others, the defendant provided the guns used, the defendant placed a gun to one victim's head, a victim's wallet and key were taken, and marijuana, digital scales, and a device used to grind marijuana were found at the defendant's house was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for four counts of aggravated assault, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count each of armed robbery, burglary, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (2013).

Defendant's admission that the defendant helped the defendant's son hold down the victim as the son penetrated the victim, that the defendant rubbed the defendant's own penis against the victim and ejaculated on the victim, that the defendant put the defendant's hands over the son's as the son choked the victim, that the defendant helped dump the victim's body, and the testimony of the defendant's wife that the defendant helped undress the victim, the defendant put the defendant's mouth on the victim's penis, and the defendant attempted to put the defendant's penis in the victim's anus was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for murder, false imprisonment, two counts of aggravated child molestation, child molestation, cruelty to children in the first degree, concealing the death of another, and tampering with evidence. Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018).

While the victim initially identified someone else as the assailant, evidence that that defendant's DNA matched the seminal fluid found on the victim's clothing, the defendant was seen near the house shortly after the rape, and the defendant's shirt was found in the residence supported the defendant's convictions for rape, child molestation, false imprisonment, and burglary. Couch v. State, 326 Ga. App. 207, 756 S.E.2d 291 (2014).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to the false imprisonment charge because the evidence showed that, after moving the victim into the backseat of defendant's vehicle, defendant sat on the victim's chest and forced fingers into the victim's vagina despite pleas to stop from the victim, and did not stop until distracted by a stop sign and exited the vehicle, which gave the victim an opportunity to leave. Nichols v. State, 325 Ga. App. 790, 755 S.E.2d 33 (2014).

Given the victim's testimony that the victim could not leave through the only door to a mobile home because the defendant was blocking the door, holding a gun, and threatening to kill the victim, leading the victim to jump through a glass window, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's false imprisonment conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a). Kiser v. State, 327 Ga. App. 17, 755 S.E.2d 505 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment, theft by taking, and three counts of battery because the defendant locked the victim in the victim's room, struck the victim in the face, hit the victim in the back of the head with a blunt object, threw the victim to the floor when the victim tried to escape, and took the victim's cellphone. Pierre v. State, 330 Ga. App. 782, 769 S.E.2d 533 (2015), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

Testimony from two victims stating that the gunmen held another victim at gunpoint and that victim was not free to leave during the robbery was sufficient to support the first defendant's conviction for false imprisonment. Ray v. State, 338 Ga. App. 822, 792 S.E.2d 421 (2016).

Evidence that the two victims were held by the defendant in the home for approximately six hours, that the adult victim did not attempt to escape because the adult victim was afraid the defendant would harm the adult victim or the child, and that the defendant told the child to stay in the bathroom and patted the child down for a cell phone was sufficient to support the two counts of false imprisonment. Mitchell v. State, 337 Ga. App. 841, 789 S.E.2d 797 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0012, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 211 (Ga. 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment because the other store employees' testimony about the victim's actions of observing the encounter between the defendant and a store employee attempting to leave the store, retreating from the front door of the store to warn the manager of a robbery, activating the silent alarm, and hiding in the back of the store showed the jury that the victim was detained against the victim's will; and, although the defendant was allegedly unaware of the victim's presence, that did not negate the evidence of false imprisonment as the defendant's actions upon accosting the other employee and towards all the other employees located inside clearly demonstrated an intent to confine them. Moore v. State, 340 Ga. App. 151, 796 S.E.2d 754 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of cruelty to a child and false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-70(c) and16-5-41(a), respectively, based on the defendant locking the defendant's seven-year-old son in a wooden box the defendant built for the purpose and also binding the child in a sleeping bag; it was for the jury to determine if these actions were justified as reasonable parental discipline. Leslie v. State, 341 Ga. App. 731, 802 S.E.2d 674 (2017).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and aggravated assault based on the state showing that the defendant held the four boys at gunpoint, forced the boys into the pool to restrict their ability to flee, and stole two cell phones and money from the boys before fleeing. Smith v. State, 342 Ga. App. 656, 805 S.E.2d 251 (2017).

Evidence including the geographic proximity of the defendant's home to the crime and pawn shop, the temporal proximity of the defendant's visit to the pawn shop after the intrusion, the victim's vehicle being found running across from the pawn shop, the defendant's initial denial of pawning the stolen television, and the lack of evidence about the identity of the person the defendant claimed to have gotten the television from supported robbery for force, burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and theft by taking convictions. Strickland v. State, 348 Ga. App. 892, 825 S.E.2d 379 (2019).

- Verdict for false imprisonment was supported by evidence that defendant illegally confined a 15-year-old child to the defendant's van, threatening to kill the child if the child disobeyed defendant's orders. Walker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 693, 538 S.E.2d 563 (2000).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and false imprisonment with regard to allegations that the defendant forced a romantic friend's minor child to perform oral sex on the defendant several times over a three year period, based on the testimony of the victim (which alone was sufficient), the videotaped forensic interview of the victim, the testimony of the police investigator and the victim's mother concerning what the victim told them, as well as the testimony of the victim's siblings, who were eyewitnesses to one incident. Further, the testimony of the victim that the defendant locked the victim in the house and would not let the victim leave supported the conviction on the false imprisonment charge. Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009).

- Evidence, in the form of testimony that defendant handcuffed the defendant's spouse to the bedposts so that the defendant's spouse would not leave the residence, was sufficient to support the defendant's false imprisonment conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41. Jones v. State, 259 Ga. App. 698, 577 S.E.2d 878 (2003).

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts against defendant for false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and simple assault in regard to acts of domestic violence against the victim, defendant's spouse, as the evidence showed that defendant dragged the spouse down a hallway by the spouse's hair and held the spouse in a bedroom against the spouse's will, that defendant broke the spouse's nose and arm, and that defendant beat the spouse with a car-washing brush. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. App. 486, 585 S.E.2d 913 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment because, when the victim walked away from the apartment in the morning, the defendant approached the victim in the defendant's car and promised to drive the victim home, but, instead of taking the victim home as promised, the defendant made multiple stops, during which the defendant stayed in or near the car; when the victim asked to get out of the car, the victim was not allowed to do so; and the defendant did not allow the victim to leave until the victim's friend's mother threatened to call the police. Mayes v. State, 336 Ga. App. 55, 783 S.E.2d 659 (2016).

- Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated assault with defendant's fists and feet, and false imprisonment since the police found defendant's love interest laying on the floor of a hotel room, bruised, there were knives in the hotel room, and the love interest testified that the defendant had kicked and hit the love interest. Banks v. State, 260 Ga. App. 515, 580 S.E.2d 308 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant committed false imprisonment after defendant repeatedly attacked the victim over a 26-hour period and did not allow the victim to leave until the victim finally told defendant what defendant wanted to hear - that the victim loved the defendant and that they could start a new life together. Hammonds v. State, 263 Ga. App. 5, 587 S.E.2d 161 (2003).

Evidence that defendant forced the defendant's love interest to remain in the love interest's car against the love interest's will, that the defendant chased the love interest with the love interest's car when the love interest tried to escape, that the defendant hit the love interest with the car, and that the love interest suffered a broken ankle was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for false imprisonment and aggravated assault. Scott v. State, 268 Ga. App. 889, 602 S.E.2d 893 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for false imprisonment, simple assault, and criminal trespass with regard to actions the defendant took toward the victim, who was a prior romantic friend, as the evidence established that the defendant went to the victim's home uninvited and entered the home; as the victim exited the bathroom, the defendant was standing in the hallway in front of the victim; alarmed, the victim attempted to flee into an adjacent room at which time the victim and the defendant struggled as the defendant attempted to prevent the victim from passing the defendant; once in the adjacent room, the defendant took the telephone from the victim as the victim tried to call9-1-1; and the victim ultimately pushed out the screen and successfully exited the residence through an open window despite the defendant's attempt to pull the victim back inside. Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to prove false imprisonment because the defendant's girlfriend testified that the defendant repeatedly pushed her away from the front door of her townhouse, that she could not get to the door, and that the defendant stood right in front of the door the whole time; the defendant eventually threw the girlfriend down the stairs into the basement, where the defendant attempted to lock her in. Wilson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 743, 698 S.E.2d 6 (2010).

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of robbery, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a), and false imprisonment, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), after the defendant tricked a jailer into letting the defendant out of the defendant's cell, subsequently elbowed the jailer in the stomach, spun the jailer around, locked the jailer in the cell, and retrieved the jailer's key from the floor where the key had fallen during the scuffle. Forehand v. State, 270 Ga. App. 365, 606 S.E.2d 589 (2004).

- When sufficient evidence was presented that defendant: (1) detained the victim in the defendant's patrol car without legal authority; and (2) grabbed the victim when the victim attempted to escape, threw the victim into the back seat of the patrol car, held the victim down, and raped the victim, a jury could have found that defendant arrested, detained, or confined the victim without legal authority and without consent; thus, defendant's false imprisonment conviction was upheld. Walker v. State, 267 Ga. App. 155, 598 S.E.2d 875 (2004).

- Evidence that defendant and another person burst into a home after they had lured the victim brandishing an automatic gun and wearing black t-shirts that said "Sheriff," handcuffed the victim, took the victim's money, and forced the victim to write a bill of sale for the victim's motorcycle was sufficient to support convictions for robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and impersonating a peace officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-23. Powers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 326, 693 S.E.2d 592 (2010).

- There was no evidence to indicate that the defendant at any time confined or detained the victim in violation of the victim's personal liberty (i.e., against the victim's will), and consequently there was no evidentiary basis for defendant's conviction of false imprisonment. Lucas v. State, 183 Ga. App. 637, 360 S.E.2d 12 (1987).

There was no evidence supporting the claim of false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a) as the hospital employee did not falsely imprison the children by accepting the children from the parent. Gwinnett Health Sys. v. DELU, 264 Ga. App. 863, 592 S.E.2d 497 (2003).

Defendant's conviction for falsely imprisoning a young woman was reversed, but the defendant's conviction for falsely imprisoning male victims was affirmed because the evidence showed that there were four men in the house, and an officer testified as to their names, but there was no evidence regarding false imprisonment of the woman. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault convictions but insufficient to support false imprisonment convictions because at no time did the defendant arrest, confine, or detain either victim in a bedroom but the defendant knew one victim was in the bedroom when the defendant knowingly assaulted that victim with a deadly weapon by shooting through the bedroom door. Miller v. State, 305 Ga. 276, 824 S.E.2d 342 (2019).

Because the evidence showed that the victims chose to barricade themselves and their children in their back bedroom and tried to stop the defendant and the codefendant from entering and nothing showed the defendant detained the victims, the evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for false imprisonment. Cunningham v. State, 304 Ga. 789, 822 S.E.2d 281 (2018).

In the defendant's trial for home invasion, there was no evidence that the defendant confined or detained the victims, requiring reversal of the defendant's convictions for false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a); rather, the victims chose to barricade themselves and their children in their back bedroom and tried to stop the defendants from entering. Harris v. State, 304 Ga. 276, 818 S.E.2d 530 (2018).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to allow withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea on the ground that the factual basis set forth by the state was insufficient to support the false imprisonment charge, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41, because the state's recitation of facts reflecting that the defendant had detained the victim on a bed and inside the defendant's residence presented a sufficient factual basis for the false imprisonment charge. James v. State, 309 Ga. App. 721, 710 S.E.2d 905 (2011).

- Defendant's prosecution for the crimes of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41, and kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), were barred by the statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1, because the state did not indict the defendant on those charges until after the four-year statute of limitations ran; the state's decision to reissue the indictment to include the false imprisonment and kidnapping counts substantially amended the original charges because those offenses contained elements separate and distinct from any of the crimes charged in the original indictment. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010).

Jury Instructions

False imprisonment charge not warranted.

- Evidence did not require the trial court to give defendant's requested charge on false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. Williams v. State, 237 Ga. App. 555, 515 S.E.2d 862 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for false imprisonment, as it showed that defendant entered the home of a relative through a window without permission, placed a hand over the relative's mouth, and pinned the relative to the bed, thereby restricting the relative's movement; defendant admitted as much and other family members identified defendant as the intruder. Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 620 S.E.2d 792 (2005).

State presented evidence that the defendant detained the victim inside the victim's car and made the victim drive to a secluded location and the defendant provided no evidence of any alternative scenario involving detention without asportation; thus, there was no evidence of false imprisonment, and the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on that offense. Lundy v. State, 341 Ga. App. 767, 801 S.E.2d 629 (2017).

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on consent because, notwithstanding the trial court's failure to specifically charge the jury regarding consent, the court did instruct that to prove sexual battery, the state was required to prove that the defendant made physical contact with the victim's breasts without the victim's consent; and to prove false imprisonment, the state had to establish that the defendant detained the victim without legal authority. Orengo v. State, 339 Ga. App. 117, 793 S.E.2d 466 (2016), overruled on other grounds, White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 823 S.E.2d 794, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 66 (2019).

Charge of simple kidnapping as a lesser included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury was not warranted because the evidence showed that after the defendant lured the victim into the van, the defendant drove to another location and assaulted and injured the victim; the victim was never free to leave until the defendant finally dropped the victim off after sexually assaulting and injuring the victim. Robertson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 376, 629 S.E.2d 79 (2006).

- When, on the trial of a state patrolman for false imprisonment, it appears from the evidence that the patrolman's sole defense was that the arrest for drunkenness was made upon the public highway without a warrant when the patrolman in good faith had probable cause to believe that such offense was being committed in the patrolman's presence, it is error requiring the grant of a new trial for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on this defense. Henderson v. State, 95 Ga. App. 830, 99 S.E.2d 270 (1957).

- Trial court's jury instructions in defendant's criminal trial on multiple charges arising out of a domestic dispute were proper as: (1) there was no requirement that the jury be instructed on the element of assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) in order to be properly instructed on the crime of aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21); (2) the methods of committing an aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were properly defined based on the methods asserted in the indictment; (3) there was no support for a requested charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); and (4) there was no possibility of a lesser included conviction for false imprisonment (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41), such that instruction only on the indicted offense of kidnapping (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40) was proper. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

As to the false-imprisonment counts, pretermitting whether the trial court erred in the case, the court cured any defect in the court's jury charge on false imprisonment by instructing the jury that the state must prove every material allegation in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, further instructing that the jury could only find the defendant guilty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged, and sending the indictment out with the jury during the jury's deliberations. Curry v. State, 330 Ga. App. 610, 768 S.E.2d 791 (2015), cert. dismissed, No. S16C0519, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 278 (Ga. 2016).

- When the victim and the victim's two-year-old granddaughter were washing their hands in a department store ladies' restroom when the defendant stormed out of one of the stalls with a stun gun, which the defendant fired into the victim's neck and demanded that the victim join the defendant in the stall and where a violent struggle ensued, with the victim trying to exit the restroom with the victim's granddaughter while the defendant fought with the victim and cut the victim with a knife in trying to prevent the victim from leaving, the evidence was sufficient to establish the asportation element of kidnapping under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) because the defendant moved the victim in trying to force the victim into the bathroom stall and away from the bathroom exit; the movement enhanced the defendant's control over both victims by substantially isolating the victims from the protection of rescuers who were trying to reach the victims on the other side of the door. However, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a) because the elements of the two crimes were the same except that kidnapping also required the element of asportation, and the jury could have found that element lacking. Hall v. State, 308 Ga. App. 858, 709 S.E.2d 348 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) was reversed because the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a); there was some evidence from which the jury could have convicted the defendant on the lesser-included offense, and the evidence of kidnapping was not so overwhelming so as to render the trial court's failure to give the charge harmless. Curtis v. State, 310 Ga. App. 782, 714 S.E.2d 666 (2011).

- In a prosecution for aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and kidnapping, a written Allen charge issued by the court was not coercive, despite the court's use of the phrase "must be decided", given that the language was only a small portion of an otherwise fair and balanced charge, the trial court urged the jury to take their time, and the defendant was acquitted of the kidnapping charge. Benson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 643, 634 S.E.2d 821 (2006).

- As the crime of kidnapping was complete when the defendant seized law office employees and forced the employees to a back office, and when the defendant taped up and moved an attorney from place to place in the office, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on a lesser included offense because there was no evidence that the defendant was guilty of merely false imprisonment. Brower v. State, 298 Ga. App. 699, 680 S.E.2d 859 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1845, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 13 (Ga. 2010), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

Fifteen-year sentence for false imprisonment is illegal. Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 363 S.E.2d 322 (1987).

- Defendant's sentence to 10 years for false imprisonment, 12 months for sexual battery, and 12 months for simple battery, to run concurrently, provided that upon service of four years in custody, defendant could serve the remaining six years on probation, was not void as it fell within the allowable sentencing ranges of no less than one nor more than 10 years for false imprisonment, and up to 12 months each for sexual battery and simple battery. Rehberger v. State, 267 Ga. App. 778, 600 S.E.2d 635 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to vacate, void, or correct an illegal sentence several years after the defendant's sentence was imposed because the alleged errors in the defendant's case clearly went to the validity of the judgment of conviction entered on the defendant's guilty plea, not the validity of the defendant's sentence; Georgia law authorized the concurrent sentences of 10 years in prison for false imprisonment, and 20 years, with 13 years to be served in prison and the remainder on probation, for trafficking of persons for sexual servitude. Jones v. State Two Cases, 354 Ga. App. 29, 840 S.E.2d 117 (2020).

- Because the judge correctly explained that the defendant's suspended sentence could not possibly be revoked for more than defendant's ten-year sentence on false imprisonment because ten years was the maximum sentence for that crime, any alleged error that could have occurred in the first part of the judge's explanation was harmless in light of the explanation as a whole. Watson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 174, 620 S.E.2d 176 (2005).

- Since the sentence for false imprisonment was within the statutory limits, the court would not review the sentence, holding that any question as to the excessiveness of the sentence should be addressed to the sentence review panel. Rehberger v. State, 235 Ga. App. 827, 510 S.E.2d 594 (1998).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sheriff subject to liability for false imprisonment for illegal arrest.

- If the sheriff, in capacity as a law enforcement officer of this state, undertakes to arrest an individual under circumstances which do not give the sheriff the authority to make arrests, it is an illegal arrest and as such may subject the sheriff to liability for false imprisonment. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 32 Am. Jur. 2d, False Imprisonment, §§ 1 et seq., 108.

False Imprisonment - Failure to Take Arrestee Before Magistrate Without Unreasonable or Unnecessary Delay, 26 POF2d 617.

Compensatory Damages for False Imprisonment, 13 POF3d 111.

- 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, §§ 1 et seq., 71, 72.

- False imprisonment as affected by offer to release plaintiff conditionally or temporarily, 6 A.L.R. 1475.

Civil liability of judicial officer for false imprisonment, 13 A.L.R. 1344; 55 A.L.R. 282; 173 A.L.R. 802.

Malice and want of probable cause as elements of action for false imprisonment, 19 A.L.R. 671; 137 A.L.R. 504.

Action for malicious prosecution or false arrest based on extradition proceeding, 55 A.L.R. 353.

Justification in action for false imprisonment by proof of existence of ground other than that on which arrest was made, or one of several grounds on which it was made, 64 A.L.R. 653.

Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as supporting action for false imprisonment, 79 A.L.R. 13.

Malice and want of probable cause as element or factor of action for false imprisonment, 137 A.L.R. 504.

Liability, for false imprisonment or arrest, of a private person answering call of known or asserted peace or police officer to assist in making arrest which turns out to be unlawful, 29 A.L.R.2d 825.

False imprisonment as included offense within charge of kidnapping, 68 A.L.R.3d 828.

Principal's liability for punitive damages because of false arrest or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 A.L.R.3d 826.

Liability for false arrest or imprisonment under warrant as affected by mistake as to identity of person arrested, 39 A.L.R.4th 705.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for false imprisonment or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165.

Penalties for common-law criminal offense of false imprisonment, 67 A.L.R.4th 1103.

Liability of police or peace officers for false arrest, imprisonment, or malicious prosecution as affected by claim of suppression, failure to disclose, or failure to investigate exculpatory evidence, 81 A.L.R.4th 1031.