State v. Williams-Holmes
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition for postconviction relief in this challenge to a condition of extended supervision and probation that prohibited Petitioner from living with any women or unrelated children without the permission of the court, holding that the circuit court erred by denying Petitioner's request to transfer the approval power to the Department of Corrections (DOC) without clarifying how the imposed condition was lawful.
In denying Petitioner's postconviction motion to transfer the authority to regulate Defendant's residential placements to DOC the circuit court concluded that the DOC's practices were "incompatible with the program of probation envisioned by the court." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court "all but said it intended to administer [Defendant's] condition through case-by-case oversight, which it cannot do." The Court remanded the cause to the circuit court for it to clarify how the imposed condition was consistent with the law or to modify its order accordingly.
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2023 WI 49 SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN CASE NO.: 2021AP809-CR COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 88,978 N.W.2d 523 PDC No:2022 WI App 38 - Published OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: June 20, 2023 February 23, 2023 Circuit Kenosha Bruce E. Schroeder JUSTICES: HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender. For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general. 2 2023 WI 49 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2021AP809-CR (L.C. No. 2019CF687) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT State of Wisconsin, FILED Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUN 20, 2023 Junior L. Williams-Holmes, Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and remanded. ¶1 a BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. condition of extended This case concerns a challenge to supervision and probation that prohibited Junior Williams-Holmes from living with any women or unrelated children Williams-Holmes without moved for the permission postconviction of relief, the Court. asking the circuit court to transfer the approval power from the circuit court to the Department of Corrections (DOC). The circuit court No. denied the motion, and suggested that it had 2021AP809-CR the power to supervise Williams-Holmes through case-by-case approval. ¶2 The question before us is whether the circuit court had the authority to do so. courts to impose probation and to statutory process. Wisconsin law empowers circuit conditions modify of those However, extended conditions actual supervision through a administration and formal of the sentence and conditions is entrusted to DOC. ¶3 In this case, we conclude likely stepped over the line. administer Williams-Holmes' that the circuit court It all but said it intended to condition oversight, which it cannot do. through case-by-case Therefore, we reverse and remand the cause to the circuit court for it to either clarify how the condition imposed is consistent with the law or to modify its order accordingly. I. ¶4 BACKGROUND While on probation for a felony battery conviction, Williams-Holmes physically assaulted his girlfriend. The State brought charges and he eventually pled guilty to two counts of battery, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of bail jumping, each as a repeat offender. On the battery charges, the circuit court1 imposed consecutive sentences consisting of one year of initial confinement and one year of extended The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of the Kenosha County Circuit Court presided. 1 2 No. supervision. and false 2021AP809-CR The court withheld sentence on the bail jumping imprisonment charges, ordering probation for three years to be served consecutive to his sentences on the battery charges.2 On periods, the both court the extended imposed a supervision condition and that probation Williams-Holmes could not live with any women or unrelated children without the permission of the Court.3 ¶5 Williams-Holmes moved for postconviction relief. He asked the circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to require that permission to reside with women or unrelated children must come from DOC, not the court. ¶6 The explained circuit that it court "was the denied the practices motion. of the The court Department of Corrections which led me initially to impose the requirement for my approval of residential placements of offenders with unrelated children." To show an example of the of what it a 2019 email attached department's saw as exchange parole agent and the court. imposed a similar DOC's condition practice past between "practice," a DOC the court probation and In the example, the court had as in Williams-Holmes' case——the defendant could not "reside with children unless he received The circuit court ordered probation for two years on the bail-jumping count and three years on the false imprisonment count concurrent to one other. 2 The Judgment of Conviction stated: "Do not reside with any person in any place in which children reside unless you are related to them by blood w/o Court's permission. Not to reside w/ anyone of the opposite sex w/o Court's permission." 3 3 No. permission from the Court." 2021AP809-CR The agent emailed the court to ask if it would allow the defendant to live at his girlfriend's residence with her and several of her family members, including her young son. In an email response, the court said no. It explained that it "would not approve the placement which DOC is proposing without more information" because of the defendant's history of violence and drug use. This email chain illustrated why the court believed DOC's practices were "incompatible with the 'program of probation envisioned by the court.'" the court declined to transfer the authority Therefore, to regulate Williams-Holmes' residential placements to DOC. ¶7 Williams-Holmes appealed. In a thoughtful opinion with which we largely agree, the court of appeals observed that the circuit court's condition could be administered in one of two ways. 404 State v. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38, ¶¶17-18, Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523. effectuated The "through condition could the oversight/'regulation'/'supervision' be informal, that the [circuit] court appears to have utilized" in the past. Id., ¶17. the procedure This would not be lawful, however. condition could be effectuated Id. consistent Alternatively, with the through the statutorily authorized modification process. ¶18. The referring affirmed court only the of to appeals the circuit motion on that basis. then statutory court's construed modification decision Id., ¶23. petition for review. 4 the on the law Id., condition process as and postconviction We granted Williams-Holmes' No. II. ¶8 those Circuit courts convicted including of are Wis. 2d 447, State 629 granted v. broad accountable to supervision and probation. 973.09(1)(a); DISCUSSION crimes discretion 2021AP809-CR impose authority for their conditions to hold actions—— on extended Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(5) (2021-22);4 Oakley, N.W.2d 200. 2001 The WI 103, question in ¶12, this 245 case, however, is whether the circuit court's condition transgressed DOC's statutory authority to administer extended supervision and probation. Statutory interpretation is "a question of law we review independently." Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31, ¶3, 401 Wis. 2d 575, 973 N.W.2d 756. ¶9 When a defendant is sentenced to probation, Wis. Stat. § 973.10(1) states that this has "the effect of placing the defendant in the custody of" DOC, and the defendant is under the "the control of the department under conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established by" DOC. Under this statutory structure, then, the court can impose probation and place conditions upon it, but control over the defendant and administration of the terms of probation are carried out by DOC. ¶10 which A circuit court may also sentence someone to prison, includes a mandatory following confinement. "the court may impose period of extended Wis. Stat. § 973.01. conditions upon the supervision As with probation, term of extended All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version. 4 5 No. supervision." § 973.01(5). 2021AP809-CR And DOC "may not discharge a person who is serving a bifurcated sentence from custody, control and supervision until the person has served the entire bifurcated sentence." § 973.01(7). The structure here also places the power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and control thereafter belongs to DOC. ¶11 Stat. The broad statutory authority given to DOC in Wis. ch. 301 confirms "shall . . . Administer" Wis. Stat. carefully. Administer, Language extended § 301.03(3). The "Administer" means The 22 this. American (3d ed. It supervision legislature to Heritage 1992). "have DOC and probation. chose charge Dictionary This is naturally its of; of that manage." the and words English logically includes not just administering DOC's own rules and conditions,5 but those set by the circuit court as well. ¶12 day While the circuit court is not involved in the day-to- administration of probation or role is not necessarily extinguished. that conditions imposed by the extended supervision, its The statutes also provide court for both extended supervision and probation are not set in stone; they can be modified. See Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(7m)(a); 973.09(3)(a). This DOC has established standard rules all defendants on extended supervision or probation must comply with. See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(3) (Oct. 2019). For example, defendants must obtain permission from a probation agent prior to changing their residence or place of employment, traveling out of state, purchasing a car, or borrowing money. § DOC 328.04(3)(h)-(k). 5 6 No. occurs via a formal process. conditions of extended 2021AP809-CR A party seeking "to modify any supervision set by the court"——and modification can be requested by DOC or the person subject to extended supervision——"may petition the sentencing court" to do so. § 302.113(7m)(a). The statute then provides various processes, standards, and restrictions governing the sentencing court's consideration of the petition.6 Ultimately, the court can determines grant the petition only "if it that the modification would meet the needs of the department and the public and would be person's sentence." consistent with the § 302.113(7m)(c). objectives of the Similarly, a court "may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions period. thereof" before § 973.09(3)(a). the expiration of the However, the extension or modification of conditions can only occur "for cause and by order." ¶13 probation Id. With this in view, we turn to the present dispute: whether the circuit court lawfully imposed the condition that Williams-Holmes could not live with any unrelated children without the permission of the Court. women or The court of appeals acknowledged the possibility that this condition could either refer to a type of supervision the statute entrusts to DOC, or to the statutorily permitted Williams-Holmes, 404 Wis. 2d 88, ¶¶17-18. statutes and do so in a manner modification process. But to "harmonize the consistent with the circuit For example, the statute makes provision for victim notification (Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7m)(b)) and a hearing on the petition (§ 302.113(7m)(c)). 6 7 No. 2021AP809-CR court's probationary program," the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and determined that Williams-Holmes can only receive the permission of the circuit court through statutory modification. ¶14 Id., ¶¶20, 23. We take a different approach. While we agree with the court of appeals' analysis of the statutory scheme, the record strongly suggests the circuit court intended to administer this condition of supervision itself, and not leave future permission to a statutorily authorized modification. explanation, the circuit court In its postconviction appears to have envisaged Williams-Holmes (or a probation or parole agent) communicating with the court directly and as needed to obtain the necessary approval for him to live with a woman or an unrelated child. This would constitute administration of the impermissible conditions of supervision probation which the legislature has entrusted to DOC. by the and court, The affirmation of the condition by the court of appeals therefore seems at odds with the circuit court's own explanation.7 and remand opportunity the cause to either to the circuit clarify how Therefore, we reverse court the to afford condition it an imposed is consistent with the law or to modify its order accordingly. In the dissent's telling, the circuit court clearly intended for its "permission" to come only via statutory modification. Dissent, ¶¶15, 19. Yet no one other than the dissent reads the record that way. The court of appeals does not suggest this. Even the State acknowledged during oral argument it was unclear. In any event, if the dissent's interpretation of the condition is correct, our remand order allows the circuit court to say so. 7 8 No. By the Court.—The decision of the court of 2021AP809-CR appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 9 No. ¶15 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. 2021AP809-CR.akz (dissenting). I dissent because I would simply affirm the court of appeals' well-reasoned decision. court's condition process. as It correctly interpreted the circuit referring to the statutory modification Though the circuit court's use of the phrase "court permission" in the conditions of extended supervision appears ambiguous, the record shows that the court was referring to the statutory modification process under Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m), which involves a hearing and modification by order. The circuit court's order denying post-conviction relief, beyond citing § 973.09(3)(a), alludes to aspects of the modification process. This shows that the circuit court intended for "court permission" to be effectuated through that statutory process. concluded, the Accordingly, circuit court's as the condition court is of appeals lawful, and we should affirm the court of appeals' decision. ¶16 The majority provides a rather cursory interpretation of the circuit court's order setting conditions for extended supervision. A more careful reading reveals that the court's envisioned probationary program conforms to the law. "court permission" in the conditions of extended The phrase supervision refers to the modification process. ¶17 We interpret a circuit court's order independently, "look[ing] to the whole of the decision which was reduced to judgment." Schultz N.W.2d 116 (1995). v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 806, 535 "A court interprets a judgment in the same manner as other written instruments." 1 Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 No. 2021AP809-CR.akz Wis. 2d 539, 546, 502 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1993). "Only when judgments are ambiguous is construction permitted, allowing the court to consider the whole record . . . ." Id. at 547. "Ambiguity exists where the language of the written instrument is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, either on its face refers." or as applied to the extrinsic Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d at 805-06. facts to which it However, "[w]e defer to a trial court's interpretation of its own ambiguous order as long as it is a reasonable interpretation." Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 225 Wis. 2d 672, 683, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999). ¶18 The circuit court's order contains the condition, "Do not reside with any person in any place in which children reside unless you are related permission." follows: The "[n]ot to to order them by also reside restates with [without] Court's permission." blood anyone [without] this of Court's condition the opposite as sex The circuit court's order does not clearly explain what "court permission" means. At a high level, it is plain that the condition prevents Williams-Holmes from residing circuit court with unrelated affirmatively women permits or him children to do unless the But the so. condition is silent as to what form this "court permission" must take. As the court of appeals observed, the condition is ambiguous regarding whether "court permission" means "a type of informal, situation-by-situation "modifi[cation] through the oversight mechanisms §§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a)." by the of Wis. or Stat. State v. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38, ¶16, 404 Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523. 2 court" No. ¶19 motion The for circuit court's post-conviction order denying relief 2021AP809-CR.akz Williams-Holmes' clarifies that "court permission" refers to the statutory modification process. background, two statutes conditions: Wis. Stat. cover modification § 973.09(3)(a), of which For probation discusses the court's ability to modify conditions on its motion; and Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7m), which discusses a defendant's ability to petition the court for modification. Under § 973.09(3)(a), "[p]rior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof." A criminal defendant may also "petition the sentencing court to modify any conditions of extended § 302.113(7m)(a). the petition." supervision set by the court." "The court may conduct a hearing to consider § 302.113(7m)(c). The court may also "provide notice of the petition to a victim of a crime committed by the person who is the subject of the petition." § 302.113(7m)(b). At the hearing, the court determines whether "modification would meet the needs consistent of with § 302.113(7m)(c). the the [DOC] and objectives the of the public and person's would be sentence." If the defendant instead seeks modification to the term of a bifurcated sentence, the defendant must prove "by the greater weight of the credible modification would serve the public interest. ¶20 The circuit court's order evidence" that § 302.113(9g)(e). denying post-conviction relief confirms that "court permission" refers to the statutory modification process. In fact, the order expressly references 3 No. 2021AP809-CR.akz the circuit court's ability to modify conditions by order. It cites our decision in State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999), and § 973.09(3)(a) notes allows that decision circuit courts probation at any time'" (quoting while discussing governmental how the statistical "held to modify court which [the Wis. Stat. conditions id. at 69). circuit data 'that of Additionally, "began court] to felt cite clearly justified these conditions," the court noted "the burden is on the offender, not [the court], to prove the inaccuracy of the information." This burden the order references most reasonably seems to be the defendant's burden of persuasion under Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9g)(e) to prove that modification "would serve the public interest." ¶21 The majority's conclusory assertion that "the record strongly suggests the circuit court intended to . . . not leave future permission to a statutorily-authorized modification" appears to be based on an email the circuit court included in its order to illustrate the court's Department of Corrections ("DOC"). email does obtaining not "court serve as an permission" displeasure with Majority op., ¶¶7, 14. example the of circuit the the This procedure court for envisioned. Quite to the contrary, the circuit court disapproved of nearly every aspect of the email. ¶22 The circuit court included the email in its order as "one example of how [DOC] even now approaches this issue." first email whether the was sent court from DOC to the "[w]ould . . . be 4 circuit willing court to" The asking permit a No. defendant serving girlfriend as response, probation well the as her circuit information gap "definitely would to son court about" and with adult remarked the not live approve the the the and In its "substantial said placement proposing without more information." defendant's sister. on defendant 2021AP809-CR.akz the which court DOC is The court further stated it "would also want to hear the opinion of the child's father, if available, so [the court can be made] sure that he understands the history of the man living with his child." ¶23 The circuit court hardly offered this example of what it meant by "court permission." email as an The reason the court included the email in its order was to demonstrate why the court disapproved of DOC's practices. Its purpose was not to demonstrate the form of "court permission" the court envisioned. The majority reads far too much into the email's inclusion in the order. To the extent the email does reveal what the court meant by "court permission," it shows that the circuit court disapproved of how DOC raised the matter. The circuit court's stated concerns about needing "more information" and possibly hearing from the child's father indicate that the court expected to——and quite likely normally does——hold a hearing on whether to grant permission consistent with the statutory modification process. ¶24 yields Our process for interpreting a circuit court's order a conditions clear of result: extended modification process. "court permission" supervision refers as to used the in the statutory But the majority eschews this task in 5 No. favor of clarify remanding what is with direction already clear. for the Not only 2021AP809-CR.akz circuit is court this to remedy inappropriate and unnecessary, but none of the parties requested it. Williams-Holmes instructions require that the requested judgment [Williams-Holmes] to reversal of "and conviction obtain agent remand be with modified permission." to The State asked that we affirm the court of appeals and, at oral argument, pointed out that the circuit court could modify or clarify the condition on its own motion anyway "without . . . a needless remand." ¶25 By failing to interpret the circuit court's condition and imposing a remedy nobody requested, the majority turns its ruling into an advisory opinion. "assume various hypothetical This court will normally not states of fact and determine [lawfulness] prospectively under each of these states of fact." Waukesha Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Baird, 45 Wis. 2d 629, 643, 173 N.W.2d 700 (1970). That is exactly what the majority does here. The opinion is unmoored from any concrete facts being declared lawful or unlawful. It abstractly declares the law and tells the parties to go forth and apply it to whatever the facts may be. I would fully resolve the case at hand, which is what we agreed to do when we accepted review. ¶26 The court of appeals got this case exactly right, but the majority adds confusion to the law by reversing a decision with which it agrees. The circuit court intended for "court permission" to be effectuated through that statutory process, which both the court of appeals 6 and the majority agree is No. lawful. 2021AP809-CR.akz Accordingly, we should affirm the court of appeals' decision. ¶27 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. ¶28 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 7 No. 1 2021AP809-CR.akz
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