State v. Hinkle
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order denying Defendant's postconviction motion, holding that the circuit court properly exercised adult court criminal jurisdiction over Defendant, who was then sixteen years old, based on another circuit court's prior decision to waive Defendant from juvenile court to adult court.
In his postconviction motion Defendant argued that Wis. Stat. 938.183(1) did not give the circuit court competency to proceed over the juvenile counts because, for the circuit court to waive Defendant without a waiver hearing, the statute required a prior waiver by that particular circuit court. Thus, Defendant argued, the circuit court improperly relied on the other circuit court's waiver, never acquired adult-court jurisdiction over Defendant, and thus lacked competency to preside over Defendant's case in adult court. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 938.183(1) conferred exclusive original adult criminal jurisdiction over Defendant based on the other circuit court's prior waiver.
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2019 WI 96 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: COMPLETE TITLE: OF WISCONSIN 2017AP1416-CR State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Matthew C. Hinkle, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 612,921 N.W.2d 219 PDC No:2018 WI App 67 - Published OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: NOT PARTICIPATING: November 12, 2019 September 4, 2019 Circuit Fond du Lac Robert J. Wirtz DALLET, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed) HAGEDORN, J. did not participate. ATTORNEYS: For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Christina Starner, Green Bay. There was an oral argument by Christina Starner. For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Aaron R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Aaron R. O’Neil. 2019 WI 96 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2017AP1416-CR (L.C. No. 2015CF418) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT State of Wisconsin, FILED Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NOV 12, 2019 Matthew C. Hinkle, Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. ¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. Affirmed. We review whether Fond du Lac County Circuit Court1 properly exercised adult-court criminal jurisdiction over then-16-year-old Matthew C. Hinkle based on Milwaukee County Circuit Court's prior decision to waive Hinkle from juvenile court to adult court.2 1 Our decision turns on the The Honorable Robert J. Wirtz presided. We commonly use the terms "juvenile court" and "adult court" in these cases for ease of reference and understanding. As the court of appeals decision points out, Wisconsin does not have "juvenile courts" or "adult courts." We have circuit courts with general jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal. We refer to a court as a "juvenile court" because the cases heard there involve juveniles being adjudicated under the (continued) 2 No. interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) and 2017AP1416-CR how its text prescribes the practice commonly referenced by those handling juvenile cases as "once waived, always waived."3 ¶2 Hinkle contends Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) confines the "once waived, always waived" rule to each individual county— meaning Hinkle could be waived into adult court only if another Fond du Lac County Circuit Court previously waived him. He argues Fond du Lac improperly relied on Milwaukee's waiver and, as a result, the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court lacked competency4 to handle his case. Juvenile Justice Code. We use the term "adult court" to identify when a juvenile will be transferred from a court handling juvenile matters (a.k.a. "juvenile court") to a court where a juvenile will be prosecuted as an adult under the criminal law (a.k.a. "adult court"). The terms do not differentiate between types of courts but instead signify whether a juvenile's case will be determined by the laws applicable to juveniles under Wis. Stat. ch. 938 or whether the juvenile will be prosecuted as an adult and subject to the criminal code under Wis. Stat. chs. 939-951. See State v. Hinkle, 2018 WI App 67, ¶1 n.2, 384 Wis. 2d 612, 921 N.W.2d 219 (quoting and citing State v. Schroeder, 224 Wis. 2d 706, 719-20, 593 N.W.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1999)). All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 3 The Wisconsin Constitution confers subject matter jurisdiction on circuit courts over "all matters civil and criminal." Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8. "Accordingly, a circuit court is never without subject matter jurisdiction." City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 (quoted source omitted). Competency is a distinct concept: 4 (continued) 2 No. ¶3 The State disagrees with Hinkle's restrictive view of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1). does not State 2017AP1416-CR impose a construes Wisconsin committed the original by The State argues the statute's text county-specific statute to adult-court juveniles who have restriction; give circuit instead, courts across over crimes jurisdiction been the previously waived into adult court when those prior proceedings are still pending or when the prior proceedings resulted in conviction. Both the circuit court and the court of appeals agreed with the State. We do as well. ¶4 We hold Wis. Stat. original adult jurisdiction § 938.183(1) conferred exclusive over Hinkle County Circuit Court's prior waiver. does not impose a county-specific based on The text of the statute limitation on the commonly referred to as "once waived, always waived." du Lac County Circuit Court Milwaukee properly relied on rule The Fond Milwaukee's waiver to move Hinkle from Fond du Lac's juvenile jurisdiction to Fond du Lac's adult jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court possessed competency to hear Hinkle's Noncompliance with statutory mandates affects a court's competency and "a court's 'competency,' as the term is understood in Wisconsin, is not jurisdictional at all, but instead, is defined as 'the power of a court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction' in a particular case." City of Eau Claire, 2016 WI 65, ¶7, 370 Wis. 2d 595 (quoting State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508). 3 No. 2017AP1416-CR case under the criminal code applicable to adults. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. I. ¶5 In stopped car July in 2015, BACKGROUND then-16-year-old Milwaukee County, Hinkle reached into approached the a driver's window, shut off the car, took the keys, and ordered the driver out of the car. du Lac. Hinkle then took the car and drove it to Fond Fond du Lac Police Officer Ben Hardgrove saw the car parked at a gas station and pulled up behind it to block its egress. Hardgrove saw four people in the car, including Hinkle, who was in the driver's seat. to "show their hands." Hardgrove ordered the occupants Hinkle ignored the officer's command and started ramming the car he was driving into Hardgrove's squad car and a second car parked near him in an attempt to escape. At the same time, the other passengers exited the car. Hinkle eventually cleared enough space to get past Hardgrove's squad car and fled the gas station at a high rate of speed. ¶6 Fond du Lac police pursued Hinkle, who led them on a high-speed chase through residential areas. Police reported Hinkle driving between 60-100 mph on his way out of town and reaching 120 mph when he drove back into town. Hinkle's car came to a stop only after he crashed into an SUV. Instead of stopping as the police ordered him to do, Hinkle then fled on foot. The police chased Hinkle down with the help of a canine officer and arrested him. ¶7 The State pursued charges against Hinkle in the circuit courts of both Milwaukee County and Fond du Lac County. 4 No. 2017AP1416-CR Because Hinkle was 16 years old, the State filed delinquency petitions. See Wis. Stat. § 938.12(1) ("IN GENERAL. The court [acting under ch. 938] has exclusive jurisdiction, except as provided in ss. 938.17, 938.18, and 938.183, over any juvenile 10 years of age or older who is alleged to be delinquent."). The delinquency counts.5 petition filed in Milwaukee contained two The delinquency petition filed in Fond du Lac contained 14 counts.6 In addition, the State filed a criminal complaint in Fond du Lac charging Hinkle as an adult with four counts: one count of attempting to flee and three counts of hit and run. See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.04(3), 346.74(5)(a), and 939.50(3)(i). 343.31(3)(d)1, 346.67(1), Hinkle was charged as an adult on these four traffic counts pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.17, which gives "exclusive "courts of jurisdiction in criminal and proceedings civil against jurisdiction" juveniles 16 years of age or older" for these violations. ¶8 The State also filed petitions under Wis. Stat. § 938.18 in both Milwaukee and Fond du Lac, requesting that The two counts were: (1) robbery use of force, and (2) take and operate a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. See Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(1)(a) and 943.23(2). 5 The 14 counts included: seven counts of second-degree recklessly endangering safety; one count of take and operate a motor vehicle without the owner's consent; three counts of obstructing a police officer; and three counts of criminal damage to property. See Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(2), 939.50(3)(g)&(h), 943.23(2), 946.41(1), 939.51(3)(a), and 943.01(1). 6 5 No. Hinkle be waived from juvenile court to adult 2017AP1416-CR court.7 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court held a waiver hearing and granted the State's waiver petition.8 The State then filed a criminal complaint in Milwaukee County Circuit Court charging Hinkle as an adult with: (1) robbery with use of force and (2) take and Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 sets forth the conditions under which a party or the court can request that a juvenile "14 or older" be waived from juvenile to adult court: 7 Jurisdiction for criminal proceedings for juveniles 14 or older; waiver hearing. (1) WAIVER OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION; CONDITION FOR. Subject to s. 938.183, a petition requesting the court to waive its jurisdiction under this chapter may be filed if the juvenile meets any of the following conditions: (a) The juvenile is alleged to have violated s. 940.03, 940.06, 940.225 (1) or (2), 940.305, 940.31, 943.10 (2), 943.32 (2), 943.87 or 961.41 (1) on or after the juvenile's 14th birthday. (b) The juvenile is alleged to have committed a violation on or after the juvenile's 14th birthday at the request of or for the benefit of a criminal gang, as defined in s. 939.22 (9), that would constitute a felony under chs. 939 to 948 or 961 if committed by an adult. (c) The juvenile is alleged to have violated any state criminal law on or after the juvenile's 15th birthday. At a waiver hearing, the circuit court first determines whether the matter has prosecutive merit. Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4). If the circuit court finds prosecutive merit, both the district attorney and the juvenile have the opportunity to present testimony and cross-examine witnesses. § 938.18(3) & (4). After considering the testimony and any other relevant evidence in the record, the circuit court decides whether the criteria for waiver in § 938.18(5) have been met. 8 6 operate a vehicle without owner's consent. No. 2017AP1416-CR See Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(1)(a) and 943.23(2). ¶9 County While the Milwaukee case was pending, the Fond du Lac Circuit Court considered the State's waiver petition. Hinkle wanted to contest the waiver in Fond du Lac, and be adjudicated as a juvenile. However, everyone, including Hinkle's lawyer, agreed that the rule regularly referred to as "once waived, always waived" applied. The circuit court and the parties interpreted Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) to require the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court to waive Hinkle because Milwaukee County Circuit Court had previously done so. du Lac County Circuit Court ruled that, the The Fond pursuant to § 938.183(1), Hinkle must be prosecuted as an adult. ¶10 The State filed an amended Information in Fond du Lac County Circuit Court, now charging Hinkle as an adult for all 18 counts——the four traffic counts from the original criminal complaint, plus the 14 counts from the delinquency petition. Hinkle accepted the plea bargain offered by the State, pled no contest to six counts, and entered an Alford plea on one count;9 the remaining 9 11 counts were dismissed and read-in.10 The See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). A read-in charge is any crime "that is uncharged or that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at the time of sentencing and that the court considers at the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the defendant was convicted." Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b). Similar to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b), we have defined read-in charges as (continued) 10 7 No. 2017AP1416-CR circuit court imposed a total sentence of six years of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision to be followed by two years of probation.11 ¶11 Lac Hinkle then filed a postconviction motion in Fond du County Circuit Court seeking to vacate his convictions, withdraw his pleas, and transfer the 14 counts back to juvenile court jurisdiction. Hinkle argued that Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) did not give Fond du Lac Circuit Court competency to proceed over the 14 juvenile counts because the "once waived, always waived" rule should be county-specific. In other words, Hinkle argued that for Fond du Lac County Circuit Court to waive Hinkle without a waiver hearing, the statute required a prior waiver by a Fond du Lac County Circuit Court. Hinkle contended the statutory language limits a circuit court's reliance on previous juvenile court waivers to the specific county in which the prior waiver occurred. County improperly Accordingly, relied on Hinkle Milwaukee asserted County's Fond du waiver, Lac never "charges [that] are expected to be considered in sentencing, with the understanding that read-in charges could increase the sentence up to the maximum that the defendant could receive for the conviction in exchange for the promise not to prosecute those additional offenses." State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶33, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659 (quoting State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶68, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436) (footnotes omitted). Hinkle also entered into a plea bargain in the Milwaukee County case: he pled to one charge and the second was dismissed. 11 8 No. 2017AP1416-CR acquired adult-court jurisdiction over Hinkle, and, as a result, lacked competency to preside over Hinkle's case in adult court. ¶12 The Fond du Lac County Circuit Court rejected Hinkle's interpretation and denied the motion, reasoning: I think the essence of the argument here is that Mr. Hinkle couldn't be transferred to adult court in Fond du Lac based on the waiver -- his waiver from juvenile court in Milwaukee to adult court in Milwaukee and, then, the subsequent violation in Fond du Lac County, which was then waived into adult court. And the statute . . . 938.183 [says] " . . . courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive jurisdiction over all of the following: A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation following waiver of jurisdiction under" some statute sections, basically juvenile court sections, "by the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter," 938, the juvenile justice code. And it says "by the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" under the chapter. It doesn't indicate, specifically, that it has to be in the same county. And there are a multitude of courts which vary; based on time, and year, and place; who are assigned. You know, judges get an assignment to a particular duty, whether it's for a year or for a short period of time. Right now I'm assigned to intake, which includes juvenile matters. And, so, as I read the statute, if a person has been waived -convicted of a violation following waiver of jurisdiction by a court -- by the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under the chapter, that's sufficient. It doesn't have to be in the particular same county, because that isn't what the statute says. The court assigned to exercise juvenile court jurisdiction can be, by lack of limitation, any particular court there is assigned to juvenile court jurisdiction. Mr. Hinkle was waived into adult court and convicted in adult court and, given that waiver and that transfer into adult court in Milwaukee . . . it 9 No. 2017AP1416-CR was acceptable . . . for the court here with criminal court jurisdiction to have jurisdiction over him. ¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order denying Hinkle's postconviction motion and agreed with the circuit court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1). The court of appeals interpreted § 938.183(1)(b) to give a circuit court hearing criminal cases "exclusive original jurisdiction over" a juvenile when three conditions apply: (1) the juvenile is presently alleged to have committed a criminal violation; (2) a juvenile court has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation; and (3) either that previous violation resulted in a conviction or the criminal proceedings remain pending. State v. Hinkle, N.W.2d 219. 2018 WI App 67, ¶21, 384 Wis. 2d 612, 921 Hinkle filed a petition for review of the court of appeals decision, which this court granted. II. ¶14 STANDARD OF REVIEW This case involves the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1), "which is a question of law we review independently, although we benefit from the decisions by the court of appeals and circuit court." 2017 WI 21, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 610, See State v. Talley, 891 N.W.2d 390. "We independently review questions of subject matter jurisdiction and competency." City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶6, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738. 10 No. III. ¶15 The dispute 2017AP1416-CR ANALYSIS centers on the text of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1), which provides: Original adult proceedings. court jurisdiction for criminal (1) JUVENILES UNDER ADULT COURT JURISDICTION. Notwithstanding ss. 938.12 (1) and 938.18, courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive original jurisdiction over all of the following: (a) A juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to have violated s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a juvenile correctional facility, a juvenile detention facility, or a secured residential care center for children and youth or who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to have committed a violation of s. 940.20 (2m). (am) A juvenile who is alleged to have attempted or committed a violation of s. 940.01 or to have committed a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05 on or after the juvenile's 10th birthday. (ar) A juvenile specified in par. (a) or (am) who is alleged to have attempted or committed a violation of any state criminal law in addition to the violation alleged under par. (a) or (am) if the violation alleged under this paragraph and the violation alleged under par. (a) or (am) may be joined under s. 971.12 (1). (b) A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation following waiver of jurisdiction under s. 48.18, 1993 stats., or s. 938.18 by the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 or if the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation and criminal proceedings on that previous violation are still pending. 11 No. 2017AP1416-CR (c) A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation over which the court of criminal jurisdiction had original jurisdiction under this section or if proceedings on a previous violation over which the court of criminal jurisdiction has original jurisdiction under this section are still pending. (Emphasis added.) The underscored text underlies the disagreement in this case. ¶16 The parties agree that "courts of criminal jurisdiction" means Wisconsin's circuit courts hearing criminal cases where defendants are prosecuted as adults. Likewise, the parties agree that "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48" means circuit courts hearing juvenile matters where juveniles may be adjudicated delinquent under the Juvenile Justice Code. court assigned court waiving court where to exercise jurisdiction, the juvenile The dispute is whether "the jurisdiction" means was only i.e., the waived. the juvenile specific That is, circuit does the statutory language confine previous waivers to specific counties so that a previous waiver under Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) in Milwaukee County jurisdiction only Circuit on the Court courts confers of exclusive criminal original jurisdiction in Milwaukee County. ¶17 When interpreting a statute, we start with the language of the statute, and if the meaning of the text is plain, we need go no further. Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 271 12 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. No. 2017AP1416-CR "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, phrases except are meaning." that given Id. technical their or specially-defined technical or special words or definitional In determining the meaning of the text, context and the statute's structure are important so that the words are not viewed in isolation, but "closely-related" statutes. the statute in a ¶18 word, considered Id., ¶46. reasonable unreasonable results." are way, together with The goal is to interpret which avoids "absurd or Id. We also attempt "to give reasonable effect to every in order to avoid surplusage," id., and apply the fundamental canon of statutory construction that "[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies[.]" Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012); see also Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 ("We decline to read into the statute words the legislature did not see fit to write."). "[R]ather, we interpret the words the legislature actually enacted into law." State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165. ¶19 We start, then, with the language of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) to see whether the meaning of the text is plain. Subsection "courts of (1) assigns criminal "exclusive original jurisdiction" over jurisdiction" juveniles in to five distinctly described circumstances as set forth in paragraphs (a), (am), (ar), (b), and (c). Both of these phrases have common, ordinary, and well-known meanings. 13 "Exclusive original No. jurisdiction" limits where the case can begin. 2017AP1416-CR "Courts of criminal jurisdiction" means courts that have jurisdiction to hear criminal cases. The Wisconsin Constitution specifically bestows circuit courts with "jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal." constitution, courts as § 753.03.13 12 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.12 the courts legislature of criminal recognizes Consistent with the Wisconsin jurisdiction in Wis. circuit Stat. This court and our court of appeals have done so as Article VII, Section 8 provides: Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state and such appellate jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may prescribe by law. The circuit court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 13 Wisconsin Stat. § 753.03 provides: JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS. The circuit courts have the general jurisdiction prescribed for them by article VII of the constitution and have power to issue all writs, process and commissions provided in article VII of the constitution or by the statutes, or which may be necessary to the due execution of the powers vested in them. The circuit courts have power to hear and determine, within their respective circuits, all civil and criminal actions and proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to some other court; and they have all the powers, according to the usages of courts of law and equity, necessary to the full and complete jurisdiction of the causes and parties and the full and complete administration of justice, and to carry into effect their judgments, orders and other determinations, subject to review by the court of appeals or the supreme court as provided by law. The courts and the judges thereof have power to award all such writs, (continued) 14 No. well. City of Eau Claire, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 2017AP1416-CR ¶7; State v. Spanbauer, 108 Wis. 2d 548, 552, 322 N.W.2d 511 (Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing exclusive "the circuit jurisdiction courts over all of this criminal state are given matters"). All of Wisconsin's circuit courts, therefore, are courts of criminal jurisdiction. ¶20 text The statute contains only two qualifiers within the assigning "courts of criminal jurisdiction" original jurisdiction" over certain juveniles. "notwithstanding" "Notwithstanding clause ss. at the 938.12(1) start and "exclusive The first is the of the sentence: 938.18[.]" The two referenced statutes concern general juvenile jurisdiction under ch. 938, juvenile and the process jurisdiction. for requesting Wisconsin Stat. waiver of general § 938.12(1) assigns "exclusive jurisdiction" to juvenile courts handling delinquency petitions. waiver Wisconsin and waiver Stat. hearing § 938.18 process, provides which may the petition result in a decision to move a juvenile from juvenile court adjudication to adult court prosecution. us that petitions even have though The "notwithstanding" qualifier tells juvenile exclusive courts jurisdiction handling over delinquency juveniles under § 938.12(1), and even though a process exists to waive juveniles into adult court, the legislature assigned our criminal circuit process and commissions, throughout returnable in the proper county. 15 the state, No. courts exclusive original adult jurisdiction 2017AP1416-CR over juvenile of criminal offenders in certain circumstances. ¶21 The jurisdiction" second to qualification have "exclusive for "courts original jurisdiction" over juveniles appears as described in the five paragraphs within Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1). Each paragraph describes a type of juvenile who will be subject to adult court jurisdiction in the criminal court. ¶22 Paragraph (b) applies to Hinkle and confers criminal court jurisdiction over "[a] juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law": convicted of jurisdiction a previous under . . . s. (1) "if the juvenile has been violation 938.18 by following the court waiver of assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48," or (2) "if the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation and criminal violation are still pending." ¶23 mandating Hinkle interprets automatic proceedings on that previous Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b). Wis. adult-court Stat. original § 938.183(1)(b) jurisdiction within the county in which a previous waiver occurred. as only In all other counties, the State would be required to request a waiver. In other words, Hinkle thinks only the criminal court in the specific county where the juvenile was waived can exercise adult jurisdiction over the juvenile based on the previous waiver. Because the waiving court was Milwaukee County, Hinkle argues § 938.183(1)(b) should not apply 16 to his Fond du Lac case. No. Instead, presiding he believes over his the Fond 14-count du Lac County delinquency 2017AP1416-CR Circuit petition Court should have conducted its own waiver hearing to determine whether to waive him into adult court or keep him in Fond du Lac's juvenile court system. ¶24 The statutory interpretation, which text would does require based restriction into the text. not support reading Hinkle's Hinkle's county- It is a cardinal "maxim[] of statutory construction . . . that courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain meaning." Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶30 (quoting Fond du Lac Cty. v. Town of Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989)). Neither the statute's reference to "courts of criminal jurisdiction" nor its reference to "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter" legislature wanted refer to to individual confine either counties. "courts of If the criminal jurisdiction" or "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" to circuit courts within a particular county, it could have easily done so. The legislature could have limited adult court jurisdiction to "the particular county" or "the specific county" or "the individual county" where the juvenile had previously been waived. The legislature, however, did not, and "[w]e will not read into the statute a limitation the plain language does not evidence." Dane Cty. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571; Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶30 ("We do not read words into a statute regardless of how persuasive the source may be; rather, we interpret the words the 17 No. legislature actually enacted into law."); see 2017AP1416-CR also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 93 ("Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies"); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) ("To supply omissions transcends the judicial function."). ¶25 Examining the context and structure of ch. 938 further defeats Hinkle's proposed county-by-county constriction of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)'s adult jurisdiction. Most of the provisions within ch. 938 address juvenile courts, and particular processes relating to their §§ 938.12-938.185, particular. operation. Subchapter however, addresses III, Wis. Stat. jurisdiction in The examples Hinkle posits about the use of "the court" as juxtaposed with "any court" in the non-jurisdictional portions of ch. 938 are not helpful in assessing the context and structure informing the interpretation of the jurisdictional section. ¶26 The legislature's use of the plural term "courts" as the place of exclusive original jurisdiction when a juvenile has been waived by the juvenile court shows the legislature did not limit this exclusive original jurisdiction to a specific county, but instead included all criminal courts across the state. specific definition § 938.02(2m) for interpretation. the the legislature term provided "court" also in The Wis. Stat. supports this It provides: "Court," when used without further qualification, means the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 or, when used with reference to a juvenile who is subject to s. 938.183, 18 No. 2017AP1416-CR a court of criminal jurisdiction or, when used with reference to a juvenile who is subject to s. 938.17 (2), a municipal court. Accordingly, "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" under ch. 938 means all the circuit courts across the state hearing juvenile matters——unless "further juvenile courts jurisdiction exercise qualifi[ed]" under because all 938. The ch. definition does not interpose a county-specific qualifier on the term "court", but instead contemplates the legislature could "further qualif[y]" "the court" beyond this general definition. The legislature chose not to further qualify "the court" in Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) with any county-based limitation. ¶27 In addition, definitional paragraph (2m) further identifies "court" in "s. 938.183" specifically as "a court of criminal jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) The generality of this reference further evidences that the legislature did not restrict the application of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) on a countyby-county basis. ¶28 Hinkle also relies on the purpose expressed by the legislature in individualized Wis. Stat. assessment § 938.01(2)(c): of each alleged "[t]o and provide an adjudicated delinquent juvenile" and in § 938.01(2)(f) "[t]o respond to a juvenile with the offender's needs prevention of for care and delinquency, treatment, each consistent juvenile's best interest and protection of the public, by allowing the court to utilize the most effective dispositional option" as support for his county-specific interpretation. He argues that a smaller community like Fond du Lac might be better suited to provide 19 No. individualized treatment for a juvenile than 2017AP1416-CR Milwaukee, and therefore Fond du Lac should not be bound by a Milwaukee waiver. While different counties across Wisconsin may handle juvenile waivers differently, that possibility cannot alter or supplement the plain language of the statute, which endows courts of criminal jurisdiction with exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile who has been waived by the juvenile court. Even textually-expressed purpose "cannot be used to contradict text or to supplement it" but instead, "[p]urpose sheds light only on deciding which of various textually permissible meanings should be adopted." Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 57. The textual absence of the sort of county-based qualifier Hinkle would have us read into the statute——"what a text chooses not to do——are as much a part of its 'purpose' as its affirmative" expressions. Id. Respect for what the legislature omitted from the statutory text requires us "to reject the replacement or supplementation of text with purpose" and we do so here. ¶29 Stat. Id. at 57-58. As with any statute, we interpret the text of Wis. § 938.183(1) to mean what it says. The text plainly assigns exclusive original jurisdiction to courts of criminal jurisdiction over juveniles who fall under any of § 938.183(1)'s five paragraphs. court Paragraph (1)(b) places a juvenile under adult jurisdiction when the juvenile is "alleged to have violated any state criminal law" either (1) after a previous conviction following a waiver by the juvenile court; or (2) when the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction on a violation where criminal proceedings are still 20 pending. Wis. Stat. No. § 938.183(1)(b). 2017AP1416-CR Hinkle met the requisites under para. (1)(b) because the juvenile court in Milwaukee waived its jurisdiction over Hinkle in favor of adult criminal court jurisdiction, and the Milwaukee criminal proceeding was still pending when Hinkle appeared before the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court on the 14count delinquency petition. ¶30 We hold the text of the statute does not limit the adult court jurisdiction prescribed in Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) to the individual juvenile court in the specific county where a juvenile was previously waived. Whenever a juvenile court exercising jurisdiction under ch. 938 (or ch. 48) has previously waived a juvenile——who is alleged to be in violation of any state law and that juvenile is either convicted or the criminal proceeding is still pending——courts of criminal jurisdiction anywhere in Wisconsin have exclusive original jurisdiction. The waiver by the juvenile court means that any pending or future violations by that juvenile must begin in adult criminal court pursuant to the exclusive original jurisdiction assigned to courts of criminal jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1). Once waived, always waived.14 Although the statutes say any pending or new criminal matters against a waived juvenile must always begin under adult criminal jurisdiction, Wis. Stat. § 970.032 provides two ways in which a juvenile may be returned to juvenile court jurisdiction. See Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (permitting the criminal court to return a juvenile to the juvenile system when no probable cause exists); and Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2) (allowing the criminal court that finds probable cause to transfer the juvenile back to juvenile jurisdiction under a reverse waiver analysis); see also State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶128, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 (continued) 14 21 No. IV. ¶31 original 2017AP1416-CR CONCLUSION We hold Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) conferred exclusive adult criminal jurisdiction over Hinkle Milwaukee County Circuit Court's prior waiver. based on The text of the statute does not impose a county-specific limitation for the "once waived, Circuit Court always waived" properly relied rule. on The Fond Milwaukee's du Lac waiver County to move Hinkle from Fond du Lac's juvenile jurisdiction to Fond du Lac's adult jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court had competency to handle Hinkle's case prosecuting him as N.W.2d 144. While the phrase "once waived, always waived" does not appear in the statute, it is routinely used by attorneys and judges in the juvenile justice system in reference to the statute we interpret in this case. The Juvenile Judicial Benchbook uses "once waived always waived" in two places, cautioning circuit courts that the "Judge should point out the 'once waived always waived' provision of Juv Justice Code" so in an uncontested waiver situation, the juvenile's decision to not contest the waiver petition is "knowing, voluntary and intelligent." WISCONSIN JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK: JUVENILE, JV 5-9 & JV 5-18 (2019) (JV 5-18 same as JV 5-9, except refers to "new Juv Justice Code"). We use the phrase "once waived, always waived" as a convenient shorthand reference to the rule plainly expressed in the statutory text and nothing more. 22 No. an adult under the criminal code. 2017AP1416-CR We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.15 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. ¶32 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. did not participate. Hinkle also maintains that his trial lawyer gave him ineffective assistance by failing to argue that Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) should be interpreted to have a county-specific waiver limitation. To prove his lawyer was ineffective, Hinkle must show both that his lawyer acted deficiently and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶32, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89. Hinkle cannot prove ineffective assistance because a trial lawyer's failure to raise a nonmeritorious issue "does not constitute deficient performance." See State v. Sanders, 2018 WI 51, ¶54, 381 Wis. 2d 522, 912 N.W.2d 16 ("[F]ailure to bring a meritless motion does not constitute deficient performance."). 15 Finally, the State asks us to hold that Hinkle forfeited his claims because he did not contemporaneously object to adult court jurisdiction or because he resolved the case by entering pleas. It is not necessary for us to address the State's forfeiture argument, and we decline to do so. See Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶33 n.18, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285 (cases should be decided on the narrowest possible grounds). 23 No. ¶33 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. 2017AP1416-CR.rfd (dissenting). The majority opinion interprets Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) in violation of the very canons of statutory construction it purports to follow and substitutes justice. a one-size-fits-all I read the language of rules of statutory construction: approach to juvenile § 938.183(1)(b) within the in relation to the language of surrounding and closely-related statutes and in accordance with the Juvenile Justice Code's textually explicit purpose to individually assess each juvenile based on their needs and the availability of resources.1 See Wis. Stat. the meaning § 938.01(2). Accordingly, I dissent. ¶34 The parties dispute of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) which provides, in relevant part, that "courts of criminal jurisdiction" have exclusive original jurisdiction over "[a] juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law . . . if the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and [Wis. Stat.] ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over the proceedings juvenile on § 938.183(1)(b) "courts of for that previous previous (emphasis criminal a violation violation added.) jurisdiction" The are are and still parties circuit criminal pending." agree courts hearing criminal cases where defendants are prosecuted as adults. majority op., ¶16. that See The dispute in this case lies in the meaning of "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" that has waived I, like the majority, will use the term "Juvenile Justice Code" to refer to Wis. Stat. ch. 938. 1 1 No. 2017AP1416-CR.rfd its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation. Is "the court" equivalent to "a" or "any" juvenile court in any county statewide? Or is "the court" the juvenile court in the same county where the new charges are filed? In other words, in the context of this case, does § 938.183(1)(b) confer exclusive original jurisdiction over Hinkle on any circuit court hearing criminal cases of adult defendants, or only on those courts in Milwaukee County, where juvenile jurisdiction over Hinkle was waived? ¶35 The majority concludes that "the court" is equivalent to "a" or "any" juvenile court in any county statewide, and bases its opinion on what it deems a common "practice" or "rule" of "once waived, always waived." 11, 30-31 & n.14. the majority's § 938.183(1)(b), language. See majority op., ¶¶1-2, 4, 9, This "practice" provides little support for plain as it meaning analysis appears nowhere of in Wis. the Stat. statutory Instead, it derives from a recommendation made by a legislative study committee that may not have been taken into consideration by the legislature. Committee, Juvenile Justice: See Juvenile Justice Study A Wisconsin Blueprint for Change 14-15 (Jan. 1995); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 369, 376 (2012) (describing worthwhile the aid "false in notion" statutory that committee construction reports because are "they a are drafted by committee staff and are not voted on (and rarely even read) by the committee members, much less by the full house.") The only authority that the majority cites for the proposition 2 No. that "once waived, always waived" is 2017AP1416-CR.rfd "routinely used by attorneys and judges in the juvenile justice system" is the Juvenile Judicial Benchbook alone Benchbook. is not Majority independent op., legal ¶30 n.14. authority The and it provides no statute or case as authority for this "practice."2 See Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶33 n.11, 312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820 (recognizing that the Benchbook "is not intended to stand as independent legal authority for any proposition of law.").3 ¶36 Moreover, although the majority declares Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b)'s reliance on an meaning to extrinsic source meaning indicates otherwise. confine our analysis of be plain, to or unambiguous, determine the statute's As we recently reaffirmed: unambiguous laws to its their "[W]e text." Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cty., 2019 WI 24, ¶18, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153; see also Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon Cty., 2019 WI 50, ¶9, 386 Wis. 2d 632, 926 N.W.2d 731 ("'Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult legislative extrinsic sources history.'" § 938.183(1)(b)'s meaning of (quoted is truly interpretation, source such omitted)). unambiguous, the as If majority It is noteworthy that the two sections of the Juvenile Justice Benchbook cited by the majority are the only portions of JV5: Waiver to Adult Court/Reverse Waiver where the citation is "Recommendation" rather than a statute or case. 2 The first page of the Juvenile Justice Benchbook admonishes: "[t]he Wisconsin Judicial Benchbooks are not intended to be cited as independent legal authority." 3 3 No. 2017AP1416-CR.rfd would not need to focus on sources outside of the statutory language to determine its meaning. I recognize that the language of § 938.183(1)(b) is ambiguous because it reasonably gives rise to two different, competing meanings, as advocated for by the parties in this case. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. ¶37 In analyzing the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b), I rely not on a common "practice" appropriated from the recommendation of a legislative study committee, but on the seminal case of Kalal, which instructs this court to begin a statutory interpretation analysis with language. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. the statute's plain The statutory language is then examined "not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of reasonably, to statutes; and results." Id., ¶46. the statute, which language . . . ." ¶38 My surrounding avoid or absurd closely-related or unreasonable Lastly, I look to the purpose or scope of "may be readily apparent from its plain Id., ¶49. interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) is informed by the two considerations ignored by the majority: the context and of § 938.183(1)(b) in relation to surrounding closely-related statutes and explicit statements of legislative purpose expressed in the Juvenile Justice Code. that surround or are closely-related to In statutes § 938.183(1)(b), the legislature differentiates between "the court" in a particular county and "a court" or "any 4 court" in any county, which No. 2017AP1416-CR.rfd demonstrates that these terms convey different meanings. "When the legislature uses different terms in a statute——particularly in the same section——we presume it intended the terms to have distinct meanings." Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996). For example, Wis. Stat. § 938.35(1) requires "[t]he court" to enter a judgment setting forth proceeding, "the and court's" finding § 938.35(1)(b) and allows disposition that record in the to be admissible "[i]n a proceeding in any court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48." "The court," the juvenile court (Emphasis added.) entering judgment in a particular county, is thus distinct from any juvenile court in any county where the record is admissible. ¶39 Similarly, § 938.396(2g)(gm) assigned to in the provides exercise context that of upon jurisdiction . records, request . . of the Wis. Stat. "any court court assigned to exercise jurisdiction . . . shall open for inspection . . . its records . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Here the legislature distinguishes "any court," any juvenile court in any county, from "the court" the records. in the county that is the custodian of Likewise, in § 938.396(2m)(b)1., the legislature contrasts "the court" assigned to exercise jurisdiction under the Juvenile Justice Code with "any other court" assigned to exercise jurisdiction under the chapter.4 (Emphasis added.) The Further examples include Wis. Stat. §§ 938.028(3), 938.341 and 938.37(1), all of which refer broadly to "a court" to encompass any juvenile court. 4 5 No. 2017AP1416-CR.rfd legislature chose to use the term "the court" in Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b), thereby giving it a meaning distinct from "any" or "a" court. ¶40 The majority claims that because Wis. Stat. § 938.183 addresses jurisdiction, other sections unrelated to jurisdiction are "not helpful" in assessing context and structure. Majority op., ¶25.5 The majority cites to no authority for this novel proposition that context. limits this court's review of statutory Instead, the majority looks to a section unrelated to jurisdiction which defines the word "court" "when used without further qualification" jurisdiction under as this "the court assigned chapter . . . ." § 938.02(2m) (emphasis added). to Wis. exercise Stat. In this case, our task is to resolve the meaning of "court" when it is qualified by the word "the" in the context of § 938.183(1)(b). Simply applying the definition of "court" in § 938.02(2m) begs the question of which court is "the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction" under § 938.183(1)(b). ¶41 Finally, I read Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(b) in accordance with the Juvenile Justice Code's textually explicit purpose, which requires a circuit court to individually assess The majority overlooks a statute related to jurisdiction where "courts," "the court," and "a court" are juxtaposed: Wis. Stat. § 938.17. Section 938.17 gives "courts of criminal and civil jurisdiction" exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings against juveniles for specific vehicle violations. (Emphasis added.) The statute subsequently refers to a juvenile being charged in "a court of criminal or civil jurisdiction" and in a successive subsection refers to "the court." (Emphasis added.) 5 6 No. each juvenile resources. based The following as on their Juvenile and Justice "important individualized needs the Code of each availability of characterizes the "provid[ing] an purposes": assessment 2017AP1416-CR.rfd alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile" and "respond[ing] to a juvenile offender's needs for care and treatment, consistent with the prevention of delinquency, each juvenile's best interest and protection of the public, by allowing the court to utilize the dispositional Wisconsin option." Stat. Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(c) most effective §§ 938.01(2)(c) further requires and each (f). court evaluating waiver to adult court to consider "[t]he adequacy and suitability of facilities, services and procedures available for treatment of the juvenile and protection of the public within the juvenile justice system." this explicit which of various adopted." majority Justice textual op., contradicts Code and purpose textually Majority As the majority acknowledges, "sheds permissible ¶28. the prevents light . . . on The explicit a meanings meaning purpose circuit court should adopted of the from deciding by be the Juvenile making the statutorily required individualized assessment of what is in the "best interests" of the juvenile and the public in light of available resources. ¶42 ambiguous I See §§ 938.18(5) and (6). conclude because it that is Wis. Stat. "capable of § 938.183(1)(b) being understood reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses." 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47. is by Kalal, I adopt Hinkle's interpretation because he reads the language of § 938.183(1)(b) within the rules of 7 No. statutory construction: in relation to the 2017AP1416-CR.rfd context of Juvenile Justice Code and its textually expressed purpose. the Student Ass'n Wis. 2d 283, of Univ. 294-95, of 246 Wisconsin-Milwaukee N.W.2d 622 (1976) v. See Baum, (explaining 74 "the purpose of the whole act is to be sought and is favored over a construction which will defeat the manifest object of the act."). ¶43 A Milwaukee County Circuit Court's waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over jurisdiction on a Hinkle Fond does du not Lac confer County criminal cases of adult defendants. exclusive Circuit original Court hearing Therefore, I would remand the case to the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court to allow Hinkle to withdraw his plea and to vacate the Fond du Lac County order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction. ¶44 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. ¶45 I am authorized to state BRADLEY joins this dissent. 8 that Justice ANN WALSH No. 1 2017AP1416-CR.rfd
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