State v. Subdiaz-Osorio

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Justia Opinion Summary

Appellant pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide. At issue on appeal was whether law enforcement officers (1) violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by contacting Appellant’s cell phone provider to obtain Appellant’s cell phone location information without first securing a court order; and (2) violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. While the Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in this case, the lead opinion contained the following conclusions: (1) assuming without deciding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that police conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they track a cell phone’s location, and assuming there was a search in this case, police did have probable cause for a warrant, and the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant in this case failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when officers continued to question Appellant after he asked how he could get an attorney.

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2014 WI 87 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: COMPLETE TITLE: OF WISCONSIN 2010AP3016-CR State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 396, 824 N.W.2d 927 (Ct. App. 2012 Unpublished) OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: NOT PARTICIPATING: July 24, 2014 October 3, 2013 Circuit Kenosha Mary K. Wagner BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) CROOKS, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) ROGGENSACK, ZIEGLER, JJ. concur. (Opinion filed.) ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN, JJJ. Concur. (Opinion filed.) ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) ATTORNEYS: For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by John A. Pray and Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by Lanny Glinberg. For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Daniel J. O Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 2014 WI 87 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2010AP3016-CR (L.C. No. 2009CF149) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, FILED v. JUL 24, 2014 Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Supreme Court Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. ¶1 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a Affirmed. review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. SubdiazOsorio, No. 2010AP3016-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012). ¶2 The case involves the increasingly busy intersection between Fourth Amendment privacy considerations and the constant advancement of electronic technology. whether law enforcement officers The court must determine may contact a homicide suspect's cell phone provider to obtain the suspect's cell phone location information without first securing a court order based No. 2010AP3016-CR on probable cause. The court also must consider whether the suspect invoked effectively his right to counsel during an interrogation when he asked how he could get an attorney rather than affirmatively requesting the presence of counsel. ¶3 After The homicide fatally stabbing (Subdiaz-Osorio)1 scene of the here his borrowed crime. occurred in brother, his Kenosha, Nicolas girlfriend's Kenosha police Subdiaz-Osorio car quickly Wisconsin. and fled suspected the that Subdiaz-Osorio, who was in the country illegally, was heading for Mexico and carrying the murder weapon. They marshalled their information and, acting through the Wisconsin Department of Justice, asked Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone provider to track his cell phone Subdiaz-Osorio headed south. Arkansas to location. was The arrested Several interrogate tracking on a Kenosha the was highway officers suspect. in successful, Arkansas promptly and as he went to Subdiaz-Osorio questioned in Spanish and given his rights in Spanish. was After the officers explained the extradition process, Subdiaz-Osorio asked how he could get an attorney because he could not afford one. The officers told him that Arkansas would provide him an attorney if he needed one but then continued to question him. Subdiaz-Osorio later moved to suppress all evidence obtained after his arrest on grounds that the search of his cell phone's 1 This opinion refers to Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio and his brother, Marco Antonio Ojeda-Rodriguez, by their full hyphenated last names. For the sake of simplicity, the opinion refers to all other witnesses, other than police officers, by their first names. 2 No. 2010AP3016-CR location information violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that he was denied his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. also alleged violations of his rights under the He Wisconsin Constitution. ¶4 The Kenosha County Circuit Court, Mary K. Wagner, Judge, denied Subdiaz-Osorio's motions to suppress the evidence obtained after his arrest in Arkansas, accepted his plea to an amended charge, and entered a judgment of conviction for firstdegree reckless homicide. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that any error by the circuit court was harmless because it was beyond a reasonable doubt that Subdiaz-Osorio would have entered the same plea even if the evidence obtained after his arrest had been suppressed. ¶5 This case presents two issues for review. First, did law enforcement agents violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fourth Amendment rights when they procured his cell phone location information without first obtaining a court order2 based on probable cause? Second, Fifth did Kenosha Amendment police right to officers counsel violate when Subdiaz-Osorio's they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney? 2 A court order that meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment may function as a warrant. State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶2 & n.4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; see also State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶39, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317. However, when a statute provides procedures for obtaining a warrant in a given set of circumstances, law enforcement should follow the statute to ensure that a search conducted under the circumstances contemplated by the statute does not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. 3 No. ¶6 The court is deeply divided on 2010AP3016-CR these issues as evidenced by the number of separate writings. ¶7 This opinion is the lead opinion. It will outline the legal conclusions of the writer, including a mandate that the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Bradley, Justice Roggensack, N. Justice Patrick Annette Crooks, Justice Ann Walsh Justice Kingsland Patience Ziegler, and Drake Justice Michael J. Gableman concur solely in the mandate. ¶8 The following conclusions are my conclusions. ¶9 First, I assume for this case, without deciding the issue, that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that when police track a cell phone's location, they are conducting a search under the Fourth Amendment. I make these assumptions to avoid delivering a broad pronouncement about reasonable expectations of privacy in the rapidly developing field of wireless technology.3 ¶10 Second, even though I assume there was a search in this case and recognize that police did not have a court order when they tracked Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone location, I conclude that police did have probable cause for a warrant and 3 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice N. Patrick Crooks believe that tracking a cell phone's location is a search that requires a search warrant. Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson shares this view in her dissent. 4 No. 2010AP3016-CR that the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement.4 ¶11 Third, I conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he said, "How can I do to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford for one." Subdiaz-Osorio asked how he could get an attorney, which could lead a reasonable officer to wonder counsel simply whether to be Subdiaz-Osorio present inquiring attorney. See during about State was the v. the affirmatively custodial procedure Jennings, Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142. for 2002 WI asking for interrogation how 44, to obtain ¶¶27-33, or an 252 Moreover, Subdiaz-Osorio asked how he could get an attorney immediately after a discussion about the extradition process. interviewing officers The context is important, could reasonably believe that and the Subdiaz- Osorio was asking how to get an attorney for his extradition hearing rather than asking for counsel to be present at the interrogation. violate Therefore, Subdiaz-Osorio's the interviewing Fifth Amendment 4 officers rights did when not they Justice Patience Drake Roggensack, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, and Justice Michael J. Gableman agree that the facts of this case qualify for the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. 5 No. 2010AP3016-CR continued to question him after he asked about how he could get an attorney.5 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶12 In February 2009 Subdiaz-Osorio lived at a trailer park in Kenosha with his brother, Marco Antonio Ojeda-Rodriguez (Ojeda-Rodriguez). Two other men, Liborio DeLaCruz-Martinez (Liborio) and Damien DeLaCruz-Martinez (Damien), lived with the brothers. ¶13 Subdiaz-Osorio was 27 years old and had been living in Kenosha for about two years. Subdiaz-Osorio and The week before the homicide, Ojeda-Rodriguez had argued because their employer had laid off Ojeda-Rodriguez but allowed Subdiaz-Osorio to keep his Subdiaz-Osorio job. Rankled threatened to by Ojeda-Rodriguez's stab Ojeda-Rodriguez. bitterness, Liborio reported that while they were eating in the kitchen, SubdiazOsorio held up a steak knife and said that if Ojeda-Rodriguez kept bothering him about being laid off, Subdiaz-Osorio would stab him. ¶14 The bad blood culminated in the late evening and early morning hours of Saturday, February 7 and Sunday, February 8, 2009.6 Late on February 7, Subdiaz-Osorio and Roberto Gonzales- 5 Justice N. Patrick Crooks, Justice Patience Drake Roggensack, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, and Justice Michael J. Gableman agree that there was no Fifth Amendment Miranda violation in this case. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 Unless otherwise indicated, the events described in this section occurred in 2009. 6 No. Carreno (Roberto) had a few beers (Lanita) to come and dance for them. and Ojeda-Rodriguez together for because approximately the four and 2010AP3016-CR called Lanita Mintz Lanita knew Subdiaz-Osorio three of months. them had worked Subdiaz-Osorio and Roberto picked up Lanita and brought her to the trailer around 10:45 p.m. The three of them went to Subdiaz-Osorio's bedroom, and Lanita changed into lingerie. p.m. Roberto left around 11:20 At some point after that, Ojeda-Rodriguez tried to force his way into Subdiaz-Osorio's bedroom while Subdiaz-Osorio tried to keep him out. Ojeda-Rodriguez, a former boxer, was heavier than Subdiaz-Osorio and was able to gain entry into the bedroom. ¶15 When Ojeda-Rodriguez began arguing in Spanish. entered, he and Subdiaz-Osorio Lanita could tell that both Subdiaz- Osorio and Ojeda-Rodriguez had been drinking, but because she speaks little Spanish, she could not understand what they said. The argument lasted less than two minutes and ended with OjedaRodriguez punching Subdiaz-Osorio in the face. Subdiaz-Osorio fell into his dresser, then got up to retrieve two knives from his closet. Lanita later testified that Subdiaz-Osorio had a knife in each hand and that he stabbed Ojeda-Rodriguez in the chest after Ojeda-Rodriguez said something aggressive in Spanish and pounded on his chest. As Ojeda-Rodriguez continued to pound his chest, Subdiaz-Osorio lifted one of the knives and brought it down toward Ojeda-Rodriguez's face, cutting him just under the left eye. The blade pierced Ojeda-Rodriguez's left eye socket and entered the right hemisphere of his brain. Rodriguez fell back into the wall, 7 and Subdiaz-Osorio Ojedabegan No. 2010AP3016-CR kicking him in the face and punching him between kicks. When he stopped beating Ojeda-Rodriguez, Subdiaz-Osorio turned to Lanita and asked her to push one of his teeth back into place because it had probably been dislodged when Ojeda-Rodriguez hit him. Lanita refused, Rodriguez and and punched Subdiaz-Osorio him two turned more back times. to Ojeda- Lanita pushed Subdiaz-Osorio off of Ojeda-Rodriguez and into the doorway. ¶16 After Subdiaz-Osorio left the room, Liborio and Damien arrived and entered the bedroom. either Damien or Ojeda-Rodriguez's Lanita said that Liborio and Subdiaz-Osorio bedroom. As carried Lanita Ojeda-Rodriguez remembers it, to Ojeda- Rodriguez was moving and speaking when she left, but she did not talk with him. She knew Ojeda-Rodriguez was hurt, but she did not think that his wounds were fatal. 1:05 a.m. on February 8. stabbing. Lanita arrived home at She was the only eyewitness to the Although Lanita could recall the event itself, she could not recall what happened to Subdiaz-Osorio's two knives. ¶17 After the stabbing, Subdiaz-Osorio asked Liborio for help bandaging Ojeda-Rodriguez, but when Liborio suggested that they call the police, Subdiaz-Osorio refused and said that he did not want to be arrested. girlfriend, care of Estella Subdiaz-Osorio then asked his Carreno-Lugo Ojeda-Rodriguez. (Estella), Estella came to to help him take Subdiaz-Osorio's trailer and helped bandage Ojeda-Rodriguez's wounds and clean him up. home. She and Subdiaz-Osorio then left the trailer for her Despite Estella's efforts, Liborio found Ojeda-Rodriguez dead the next morning. At 9:27 a.m. on February 8, Liborio, 8 No. 2010AP3016-CR Damien, and Norma Romero (Norma) reported to the front counter of the Kenosha Safety Building that there had been a stabbing. ¶18 The police found Ojeda-Rodriguez's body battered and stabbed with "purple swelling" on his face and eyes and bandages on his left cheek and shoulder. Emergency Medical Services personnel confirmed that Ojeda-Rodriguez was dead. The medical examiner noted that there was a fatal stab wound under OjedaRodriguez's left eye and two stab wounds on Ojeda-Rodriguez's left shoulder. The fatal stab occurred when Subdiaz-Osorio thrust the knife into Ojeda-Rodriguez's left eye, causing the blade to penetrate Ojeda-Rodriguez's brain three to four inches. ¶19 Detective David May (Detective May) and Detective Gerald Kaiser (Detective Kaiser) became the lead detectives for the investigation. about the Several Detective incident Spanish individuals who about speaking May 9:30 testified a.m. officers on that Sunday, learned February interviewed came to the Safety Building. he the 8. three Officer Ernan DelaRosa arrived at 10:25 a.m. and interviewed Liborio, who said that Subdiaz-Osorio Rodriguez. admitted that he had stabbed Ojeda- Officer Gloria Gonzales arrived at 11:55 a.m. and interviewed Norma. Officer Arturo Gonzalez arrived at 12:06 p.m. and interviewed Damien. ¶20 Estella Officer around 10 Pablo a.m. Torres7 (Officer at home, her 7 and Torres) she spoke told him with that There is no dispute that Officer Torres speaks Spanish fluently. 9 No. 2010AP3016-CR Subdiaz-Osorio came to her trailer asking for help because he had stabbed Ojeda-Rodriguez. Estella gave Subdiaz-Osorio's name to Officer Torres and told him that she allowed Subdiaz-Osorio to borrow her silver Saturn station wagon when he asked for it. She also gave Officer Torres Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone number and the license plate number of her car. Police determined that Subdiaz-Osorio had family living in two communities in nearby Lake County, Illinois, but witnesses also informed the police that Subdiaz-Osorio was in the country illegally, and Estella thought that it was possible that Subdiaz-Osorio was on his way to Mexico, where he also had family. Officer Torres continued to interview Estella back at the police station until about 12 p.m. Following up on the information from Estella, the police contacted Subdiaz-Osorio's family that they had not heard from him. in Illinois and determined Officer Torres believed that since Subdiaz-Osorio's family in Illinois did not know where he was, it was likely he was on his way to Mexico. ¶21 After compiling essential information from the witnesses, the Kenosha police put a temporary want8 on Subdiaz- 8 A temporary want means "that the suspect was alleged to have committed a felony and should be apprehended promptly, and that there was information sufficient to support an arrest warrant, but that no arrest warrant had yet been issued." State v. Collins, 122 Wis. 2d 320, 322 n.1, 363 N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1984). 10 No. 2010AP3016-CR Osorio into the Crime Information Bureau (CIB)9 and National Crime Information Center (NCIC).10 CIB is a state system and 9 CIB is part of the Wisconsin Department of Justice's Division of Law Enforcement Services. Crime Information Bureau, Wis. Dep't of Justice, http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/crime-information-bureau (last visited July 14, 2014). CIB "operates and manages the Transaction Information for the Management of Enforcement or TIME System." Time & Technical Unit, Wis. Dep't of Justice, http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/time-and-technical-unit (last visited July 14, 2014). The TIME/NCIC Systems allow for entry of a wanted person record even if no warrant has been issued in special circumstances. Agencies that have knowledge by police that a felony was committed and who the person was that committed the felony but no warrant has been issued yet may enter the subject as a wanted person in the Temporary Felony category while the process for obtaining a felony warrant is pursued. The want can be entered into CIB only or CIB and NCIC, and the entry remains on file for 48 hours before being automatically purged. As the entry remains on the system for such a short amount of time, agencies are not allowed to add detainer information to such a record. TIME System Newsletter Crime Information Bureau, Wis. Dep't of Justice, https://wilenet.org/html/cib/news-time/201211.pdf (Nov. 2012). 10 NCIC is "an electronic clearinghouse of crime data that can be tapped into by virtually every criminal justice agency nationwide, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year." National Crime Information Center, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last visited July 14, 2014). The FBI operates NCIC in conjunction with other federal, state, local, and tribal criminal justice entities. Id. For NCIC, A "Temporary Felony Want" may be entered when a law enforcement agency has need to take prompt action to establish a "want" entry for the apprehension of a person who has committed, or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, a felony 11 No. NCIC is a national system. information. The systems work together by sharing To enter information into the CIB and NCIC, the police had to demonstrate probable cause. had probable 2010AP3016-CR cause to believe The Kenosha police Subdiaz-Osorio committed the homicide based on their investigation, and they entered SubdiazOsorio's information into the systems. Together, the CIB and NCIC notified all law enforcement agencies in the country about the temporary want for Subdiaz-Osorio. ¶22 The technology. notification Kenosha of police a temporary wanted also want track to was old Subdiaz- Osorio's cell phone location to find the vehicle in which he was travelling. CIB and Sometime after 12 p.m., having heard nothing from NCIC, they contacted the Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and asked DCI to seek information from Sprint Osorio's cell phone provider. Nextel (Sprint), Subdiaz- DCI filled out and submitted a "Mandatory Information for Exigent Circumstances Requests" form to Sprint. The description on the form said, "Local law and who may seek refuge by fleeing across jurisdictional boundaries and circumstances preclude the immediate procurement of a felony warrant. A "Temporary Felony Want" shall be specifically identified as such and subject to verification and support by a proper warrant within 48 hours following the entry of a temporary want. The agency originating the "Temporary Felony Want" shall be responsible for subsequent verification or re-entry of a permanent want. Privacy Act of 1974; Notice of Modified Systems of Records, 64 Fed. Reg. 52343-01 (Sept. 28, 1999). 12 No. enforcement homicide suspect. 2010AP3016-CR Believed that suspect will flee the state or the country to avoid prosecution. Suspect has no ties and to Wisconsin. Suspect considered Suspect poses a threat to the public." armed dangerous. DCI requested Subdiaz- Osorio's subscriber information, his call records with cell site information within the past week, his precision location (GPS location), and his real-time Pen Register, Trap & Trace.11 ¶23 contains Subdiaz-Osorio's Sprint Nextel Privacy Policy (Policy) a "Disclosure of Personal Information" section that reads: We disclose personal information when we believe release is appropriate to comply with the law (e.g., legal process, E911 information) . . . or if we reasonably believe that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury 11 According to Wis. Stat. § 968.27(13) (2009-10), "Pen register" means a device that records or decodes electronic or other impulses that identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which the device is attached. "Pen register" does not include any device used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by the provider or any device used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business. Wis. Stat. § 968.27(13) (2009-10). "'Trap and trace device' means a device that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted." Wis. Stat. § 968.27(15) (2009-10). 13 No. 2010AP3016-CR to any person requires disclosure of communications or justifies disclosure of records without delay. "[P]ersonal associated information" with a person is "information such as his that or her is name, directly address, telephone number, e-mail address, activities and preferences." The Policy also refers to Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI), which is "information Sprint Nextel obtains or creates when it provides wireline or telecommunications services to a customer." mobile wireless Under the Policy, location information is CPNI and is protected as described in the above block quotation. The Policy informs the subscriber that the "network knows the general location of your phone or wireless device whenever it is turned on." It goes on to say in a section titled "Presence, Location and Tracking Information" that in the event of an emergency, "The law also permits us to disclose the call location of a device on our network without a user's consent . . . ." ¶24 In addition to pursuing the cell phone location information, the police applied for a search warrant to search Subdiaz-Osorio's trailer. Detective Kaiser later stated that it usually takes between two and three hours to draft a search warrant and different. have it signed by a judge. This case was no Kenosha County Circuit Judge Bruce Schroeder issued the search warrant for the trailer on February 8 at 2:37 p.m. Judge Schroeder happened to be in his car when he was called and was able to stop at the police station relatively quickly. After obtaining the warrant, the Kenosha police searched the 14 No. trailer around 3 p.m. 2010AP3016-CR The police did not find any knives that could have been the murder weapon at the scene of the crime, and thus did not know whether Subdiaz-Osorio had the knives with him. ¶25 Sometime during the afternoon, DCI obtained tracking information for Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone without obtaining a warrant. The only information that DCI received from the cell phone provider was location information, not conversations or other data. After obtaining Subdiaz-Osorio's location information, Detective Kaiser called Arkansas police to inform them that Subdiaz-Osorio was traveling South on I-55 and that the knives used in the murder were never recovered. Detective Kaiser gave the license plate information, the make, and the model of the car to an Arkansas patrol officer around 5:43 p.m. The Arkansas patrol officer pulled the car over in Luxora, Arkansas around 6:11 p.m. and took Subdiaz-Osorio and Roberto, who was driving the car, into custody. On the Sunday night he was consent arrested, Subdiaz-Osorio signed a police to obtain trace evidence from him, fingernail clippings. form allowing including DNA and The Arkansas police did not interrogate him that evening. ¶26 On Monday, February 9, Detective Kaiser traveled to Arkansas with Detective May and Officer Torres. The Arkansas police obtained a search warrant for the car at 2:34 p.m., and Detective Kaiser processed the car for evidence. ¶27 Officer Torres and Detective May interviewed Subdiaz- Osorio in the Mississippi County Jail in Luxora. 15 The room was No. 2010AP3016-CR well-lit and roughly eight feet by eight feet in size with a table separating Officer Torres the suspect entered the from the two interrogation officers. room, he When removed Subdiaz-Osorio's handcuffs, and Subdiaz-Osorio accepted a Coke at the beginning of the interview. Subdiaz-Osorio told the police that he preferred that the interview be in Spanish, so that Officer Torres provided translation assistance. Officer Torres believed that Subdiaz-Osorio understood him "very well," and Subdiaz-Osorio never said that he comprehending Officer Torres's Spanish. Subdiaz-Osorio, Officer Torres informed constitutional rights (Miranda12 was having trouble Before speaking with Subdiaz-Osorio warning), and of his Subdiaz-Osorio signed a waiver form titled "Waiver of Constitutional Rights." Officer Torres read the form written in Spanish, Subdiaz-Osorio read the form himself, and Subdiaz-Osorio signed the form in Officer Torres's presence on February 9 at 3:34 p.m. ¶28 The officers made an audiovisual interview, portions of which were recording of the later played in court and translated contemporaneously from Spanish into English. During the interview, Subdiaz-Osorio asked if Officer Torres would be taking him back to Kenosha, and Officer Torres replied that he and Detective May would not be taking Subdiaz-Osorio Officer Torres explained the extradition process: We aren't going to take you back to Kenosha. What happens is that you have to appear in front of a judge . . . . And after you appear in front of a 12 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 16 back. No. 2010AP3016-CR judge here in Arkansas then they will find out if there is enough reason to send you back to Kenosha, . . . but we are not going to do that right now. We are not going to know that right now . . . . Immediately after Officer Torres explained how extradition would work in the above quotation, Subdiaz-Osorio asked, "How can I do to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford for one." Officer Torres responded, "If you need an attorney . . . by the time you're going to appear in the court, the state of Arkansas will get an attorney for you . . . ." Then their interview continued. Subdiaz-Osorio was very cooperative throughout the interview, which lasted less than an hour. Although he was cooperative, he did at one point contradict Lanita's version of the stabbing when he claimed that Ojeda-Rodriguez brought a knife into the bedroom and that he disarmed Ojeda-Rodriguez. After the interview, Officer Torres read a form titled "Consent to Search and Seizure," and SubdiazOsorio agreed to give up DNA and trace evidence when he signed the form at 4:12 p.m. ¶29 At no point in the interview in Arkansas did Officer Torres or Detective May threaten, coerce, or make any promises to Subdiaz-Osorio to get him to sign the Waiver of Constitutional Rights or the consent to obtain DNA and trace evidence. ¶30 On February 9, after the police had collected a substantial amount of evidence against him, Subdiaz-Osorio was charged with first-degree intentional homicide contrary to Wis. 17 No. Stat. (2009-10),13 §§ 940.01(1)(a) 2010AP3016-CR 939.50(3)(a), and 939.63(1)(b). ¶31 Officer Torres and Detective May interviewed Subdiaz- Osorio again on February 22, this time at the Kenosha Police Department, after Subdiaz-Osorio's return to Wisconsin. Again, the officers read Subdiaz-Osorio the Waiver of Rights form, and Subdiaz-Osorio signed a consented "Consent to and signed Search" form police to search his trailer. it. that Subdiaz-Osorio allowed the also Kenosha The Kenosha police applied for and obtained another search warrant for the trailer, but they did not consent. need the warrant because they had Subdiaz-Osorio's On February 22 Subdiaz-Osorio accompanied Detective May, Officer Torres, and other Kenosha police personnel to the scene of the stabbing, and Subdiaz-Osorio walked through and assisted the officers in the investigation. Subdiaz-Osorio described the incident and again claimed that Ojeda-Rodriguez had brought a knife into the bedroom. The officers told Subdiaz-Osorio that his story conflicted with Lanita's account, and Subdiaz-Osorio then admitted that he had procured the knives. ¶32 On April 1, 2009, Subdiaz-Osorio filed a pretrial motion to suppress all statements and evidence that the police 13 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 18 No. obtained after his arrest.14 2010AP3016-CR In the suppression motion, Subdiaz- Osorio argued that the warrantless search of his cell phone's location data therefore all suppressed. violated evidence his Fourth obtained Amendment after the rights, arrest and should be Subdiaz-Osorio also filed a motion challenging the sufficiency of the criminal complaint and the bindover, and he moved to dismiss the information.15 On May 14, 2009, Subdiaz- Osorio filed a separate motion to suppress the statements he made during the interrogation in Arkansas, on grounds that Officer Torres failed to properly inform Subdiaz-Osorio of his Miranda rights. ¶33 motion to Amendment On June 26, 2009, Judge Wagner denied Subdiaz-Osorio's suppress statements violation. Judge based Wagner on the cited alleged United Fourth States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. on other grounds, Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005), for the proposition that tracking a phone on a public roadway is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy on public roadways. Alternatively, the 14 It is unclear exactly what evidence the police obtained after Subdiaz-Osorio's arrest. However, the State filed a "Notice of Intent to Use DNA Evidence at Trial and Summary of Expert Testimony" and attached Laboratory Findings that contained an analysis of blood stains on Subdiaz-Osorio's shoes and pants. In the DNA analyst's opinion, the blood on SubdiazOsorio's shoes and pants belonged to Ojeda-Rodriguez. 15 In his motion, Subdiaz-Osorio argued that there was no probable cause to suggest he had the requisite intent to kill under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a). 19 No. 2010AP3016-CR court determined that there were exigent circumstances because an alleged murderer was fleeing and was unpredictable. The court also denied the motion challenging the sufficiency of the complaint and bindover and refused to dismiss the case. Finally, the circuit court concluded that Officer Torres did not fail to properly inform Subdiaz-Osorio or honor his Miranda rights: Subdiaz-Osorio's question about an attorney was not a request to have an attorney with him during the interview; rather, Subdiaz-Osorio was asking about how he could obtain an attorney for the extradition hearing. ¶34 Therefore, Judge Wagner denied all motions to suppress evidence. The State filed an amended information on February 15, charging 2010, Subdiaz-Osorio with first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.63(1)(b), and Subdiaz-Osorio pled guilty to the charge accepted in the the plea amended and information. found Subdiaz-Osorio The circuit guilty of degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. court first- On June 28, 2010, the circuit court sentenced Subdiaz-Osorio to 20 years of confinement and 15 years of extended supervision. ¶35 the Subdiaz-Osorio appealed the judgment of conviction and denial of § 971.31(10).16 his State suppression v. motion Subdiaz-Osorio, 16 under No. Wis. Stat. 2010AP3016-CR, "An order denying a motion to suppress . . . may be reviewed upon appeal from a final judgment or order notwithstanding the fact that the judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10). 20 No. 2010AP3016-CR unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012). The court of appeals assumed without deciding that the circuit court should have granted the suppression motion. Id., ¶3. However, the court determined that any error by the circuit court was harmless because it was beyond a reasonable doubt that SubdiazOsorio would have accepted the same plea absent the error. ¶12. Id., The court of appeals rejected Subdiaz-Osorio's argument that he could have pursued a self-defense theory if the evidence would have been suppressed inasmuch as Subdiaz-Osorio continued to assault Ojeda-Rodriguez after stabbing him and did not seek medical help. ¶36 The Id., ¶5. court also rejected the argument that without evidence that he fled to Arkansas, Subdiaz-Osorio could have shown that he did not act with utter disregard for life (a required element of first-degree reckless homicide). 9. from Id., ¶¶6, According to the court of appeals, Subdiaz-Osorio's flight Wisconsin and his false statement to the police about Ojeda-Rodriguez bringing one or more knives into his room were not especially important evidence in proving that Subdiaz-Osorio was acting with utter disregard; thus, the failure to suppress that evidence did not significantly impact the State's ability to prove that Subdiaz-Osorio acted with utter disregard. ¶¶9-11. Id., Finally, the court of appeals noted that the State had a strong eyewitness account of the murder, and Subdiaz-Osorio received a significant benefit reckless homicide. Id., ¶12. concluded error that any by in pleading to first-degree Therefore, the court of appeals the 21 circuit court was harmless No. beyond a reasonable conviction. ¶37 doubt and affirmed the 2010AP3016-CR judgment of Id. Subdiaz-Osorio petitioned this court for review, which we granted on March 13, 2013. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶38 Whether law enforcement agents have violated a suspect's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights is a question of constitutional fact. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 189- 91, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998); see State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369; State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶16, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317. upholds findings of historical fact unless Although the court they are clearly erroneous, constitutional questions are questions of law that this court reviews independently. Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, ¶17; Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 189-91. In addition, the court applies a de novo standard of review to "determine whether the historical or evidentiary facts establish exigent circumstances" to justify a warrantless search. State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29 (citation omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. The Current Privacy Landscape ¶39 This case involves a brutal killing, but the law enforcement effort to apprehend the killer has implications for citizens at large. Thus, I begin my analysis with a general discussion of privacy and citizens' concerns about protecting personal information in an era when technology is chipping away at traditional notions of privacy. 22 No. ¶40 in Privacy is a pillar of freedom. being able disclose the discretion. bond over to enter details and of withdraw our There is great value from thoughts 2010AP3016-CR and public spaces movements at and our We share pieces of ourselves with loved ones and the secrets of our identities. We perfect ideas behind closed doors and reveal them to the public when they are ready. We take comfort in seclusion from the world in moments of intimacy. Privacy is not insignificant; it is not something to be taken for granted; and even as it diminishes as our world becomes more interconnected and dangerous, privacy must not value of become a legal fiction. ¶41 It would be difficult to overstate the privacy: Privacy is valuable because it is necessary for the proper development of the self, the establishment and control of personal identity, and the maintenance of individual dignity. Without privacy, it not only becomes harder to form valuable social relationships relationships based on exclusivity, intimacy, and the sharing of personal information but also to maintain a variety of social roles and identities. Privacy deserves to be protected as a right because we need it in order to live rich, fulfilling lives, lives where we can simultaneously play the role of friend, colleague, parent and citizen without having the boundaries between these different and often conflicting identities breached without our consent. Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 Miss. C. L. Rev. 227, 233 (2012) (quoting Benjamin Goold, Surveillance and the Political Value of Privacy, 1 Amsterdam L. Forum 3, 3-4 (2009)). Thus, 23 privacy serves more than the No. individual; it is an integral component of 2010AP3016-CR a well-ordered society. ¶42 The privacy landscape is shifting as we embrace new technologies. and Electronic devices afford us great convenience efficiency, but unless our law keeps pace with our technology, we will pay for the benefit of our gadgets in the currency of privacy. As we incorporate more of our lives into our smartphones and tablets, we are not merely using technology as a tool for societal digitizing our identities. information in our and electronic professional Thus, devices navigation; access the and invade are to efforts we expose the marrow of our individuality. ¶43 As Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis noted presciently well over a century ago, "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.'"17 Perhaps in this age of technology, that right is not as strong as it once was, but it should be our goal to quell its attenuation insofar as it is safe and reasonable to do so. It used to be that were "the greatest protections of privacy constitutional nor statutory, but practical." neither United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). Today, in an environment of rapid technological 17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890) (footnote omitted). 24 to No. 2010AP3016-CR advancement that allows tracking via electronic data, practical limitations on surveillance are quickly dissipating. Technology, it seems, has been irreversibly incorporated into our modern lives. The question we face is whether privacy must be eviscerated to accommodate innovation. ¶44 I believe there is room in the law for both, as well as security. Technology brings with it the danger of criminal opportunism. Thus, at times privacy must make room for security, for privacy is worth little if it is overshadowed by fear. There security in terrorism. will order be at thwart to times which crimes, privacy yield to identity from must theft to The Fourth Amendment often conjures the image of a scale on which we balance the needs of law enforcement and the rights of individuals. the need for difficult. It Technological innovation does not change balance, is no but small it makes task to the act afford of law balancing enforcement officers and government agencies the leeway they need to keep citizens safe while ensuring that citizens retain a reasonable degree of privacy. ¶45 close The balancing is especially important as citizens pay attention wireless to technology. increases, surveys their As privacy awareness consistently rights of in our reveal the context dwindling that of privacy people are apprehensive about losing privacy with regard to their personal 25 No. information.18 ubiquitous,19 2010AP3016-CR As cell site location and GPS technology become Americans are adding information to the list of concerns.20 cell phone location This concern makes sense 18 See Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 379, 427-29 (2003) (citing numerous polls in which citizens expressed concerns about their privacy and revealed that they wanted more legal protection for privacy, especially for personal information on the internet). 19 There are different ways in which cell phone companies, and consequently, the government, can track a cell phone. Providers can obtain a subscriber's location information using global positioning system (GPS) technology or triangulation. GPS technology can calculate an accurate location within 20 meters by "measuring the time it takes for a signal to travel the distance between satellites and a cell phone's GPS chip." Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones As Personal Locators, 18 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 307, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Who Knows Where You've Been?]. To locate a phone by triangulation, two or more cell towers that receive signals from an active phone compare the phone's signals and calculate location based on the difference between the times that the signals arrived or the angle of the signals. Id. When a cell phone provider "pings" a phone pursuant to law enforcement's request, the provider enters the phone number in a computer program to make the cell phone identify its GPS coordinates to the provider. United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 350 (D. Vt. 2013). 20 One commentator noted: Not surprisingly, cell phone users regard access to their location data as yielding private data about their locations. A research report found that seventy-three percent of cell phone users surveyed favored "a law that required the police to convince a judge that a crime has been committed before obtaining [historical] location information from the cell phone company." 26 No. 2010AP3016-CR as an estimated 335.65 million wireless subscriber connections existed in the United States at the end of 2013.21 The court is mindful of the pervasiveness of wireless technology and of our citizens' concern constitutional for their protections privacy against as we analyze unreasonable the government intrusions. B. Constitutional Protections of Privacy ¶46 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV.22 In the event of a Fourth Amendment violation, the usual remedy is suppression of evidence obtained Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 Md. L. Rev. 681, 744 (2011) (brackets in original) (footnote omitted). Others have similarly posited that "[w]hile society may be willing to accept the idea of collecting information associated with the origination and termination of calls, people are likely to reject the prospect of turning every cell phone into a tracking device." Who Knows Where You've Been?, supra note 19, at 316. 21 Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wirelessworks/annual-wireless-industry-survey (last visited July 14, 2014). 22 The Wisconsin Constitution's text is almost identical to the language in the United States Constitution. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 27 No. in the search. Wis. 2d 586, State 767 v. Ferguson, N.W.2d 187. 2009 However, exceptions to the warrant requirement. WI there 2010AP3016-CR 50, ¶21, are 317 several See State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385 (noting that exceptions to the warrant exigent circumstances). the exception for requirement include consent and Particularly relevant to this case is exigent circumstances, which this opinion discusses below. C. Judicial Interpretations of Constitutional Protections of Privacy ¶47 This case requires the court to consider whether the tracking of Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone location was a search under the above-quoted constitutional provisions and, if so, whether it required a warrant or was subject to one of the welldelineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. My analysis keeps in mind Justice Kennedy's caution that: "The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. "Historically, we have interpreted Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (citations omitted). Thus, this opinion will not explicitly address the Wisconsin Constitution in the analysis, but the analysis will apply to both constitutions. 28 No. has become clear." 759 (2010) (1928), City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, (citing overruled 2010AP3016-CR Olmstead by Katz v. v. United United States, U.S. 438 389 States, 277 U.S. 347 (1967)).23 1. Trespassory Searches ¶48 Court Recent decisions from both the United States Supreme and theory this to Amendment. court analyze have utilized whether a the search common law violated the trespass Fourth Case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment "was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century." Recently, the Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (citations omitted). Court has turned again to trespass theory, deciding in Jones that government installation of a GPS tracking device under a suspect's Jeep without a valid warrant was a search because the placement of the device was an impermissible physical applicable intrusion. to the Id. effort Trespass to obtain theory cell would phone not be location information unless one were to deem the cell phone provider's 23 The United States Supreme Court recently issued a decision in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, No. 13-132, slip op. (June 25, 2014), in which it determined that police must obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a cell phone in a search incident to an arrest. Id. at *28. The Court acknowledged that cell phones are capable of containing large quantities of private information, including historical location information, but the Court's decision did not address acquisition of contemporaneous cell phone location information like the tracking of Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone in this case. See id. at *18 & n.1, 19-20. 29 No. electronic interaction physical trespass. ¶49 This with Subdiaz-Osorio's has not had phone as a would be unnatural.24 Such an analysis court cell 2010AP3016-CR the opportunity to analyze whether the tracking of cell phones in complete absence of a warrant implicates a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, but the court has decided that valid warrants may permit GPS tracking of vehicles. See Brereton, 345 Wis. 2d 563, ¶3 (installation of GPS did device not Wis. 2d 369, ¶74 execution warrant of go beyond (warrant was scope for GPS of warrant); tracking reasonable). Sveum, 328 valid and was Although those prior cases involved tracking facilitated by technology, the present case falls under the category of a non-trespassory search and does not benefit from an analysis that relies on the trespass theory of Fourth Amendment searches. ¶50 This court's opinion in State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, discusses the requirements to obtain a warrant for cell phone location tracking.25 Tate is 24 See, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) ("Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis."); Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. Ill. U. L.J. 475, 517-18 (2012) (footnote omitted) (stating that cell phone tracking "does not require the installation of any device; rather, the telephone itself does the work, making the Jones majority's trespass rationale inapplicable."). 25 During the writing of Tate and this opinion, Governor Scott Walker signed into law 2013 A.B. 536, which requires law enforcement, with some exceptions, to obtain a warrant before obtaining cell phone location information. 2013 Wis. Act 375; see Wis. Stat. § 968.373 (2013-14). The new law went into effect on April 25, 2014. 30 No. 2010AP3016-CR similar to this case in that it does not involve a trespass. However, Tate focuses on whether the court order there was valid to authorize tracking of the defendant's cell phone location, whereas this case involves an assumed non-trespassory search in the absence of a court order. 2. Non-Trespassory Searches ¶51 The Supreme Court expanded the traditional concept of a search in 1967 by extending Fourth Amendment protections to circumstances in which technology enabled an invasion of privacy without a trespass. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (determining that regardless of trespass, the Fourth Amendment protects privacy"); see a also person's Jones, 132 "reasonable S. Ct. at expectation 953 of ("Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis."). In Katz, the government used evidence of the defendant's incriminating phone conversations that the FBI secretly recorded with attached to the outside of a public phone booth.26 U.S. at 348. a device Katz, 389 Because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone booth, and because the government failed 26 An anachronism in today's wireless world, the phone booth calls forth both a sense of irony and nostalgia as it sits unassumingly at the center of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The virtual elimination of telephone booths and payphones has made it difficult for a citizen away from home to make a telephone call without using a traceable cell phone. Even at home, people today are less reliant on a land line than in the past. 31 No. to get a warrant, the FBI's eavesdropping defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. ¶52 2010AP3016-CR violated the Id. at 353-59. Justice Harlan's concurrence set forth a two-part test to determine when a non-trespassory search implicates the Fourth Amendment: (1) the person must have a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation of privacy must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" (Harlan, J., concurring). Id. at 361 As the Supreme Court suggested in Jones, Katz offers the proper test to determine whether cell phone location tracking receives Fourth Amendment protection. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. 3. The Cell Phone Policy and the Subjective Expectation of Privacy ¶53 The State contends that Subdiaz-Osorio did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location data because his Sprint Policy said that Sprint would disclose location information emergency. intriguing privacy A recent analysis based to on of his law enforcement federal case a suspect's cell phone in from the event of an offers an expectation of Vermont subjective policy. United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013). ¶54 In Caraballo, the defendant carried out an execution- style murder when he bound up a woman, shot her in the back of the head, and left her body in the woods. Id. at 343. The victim had been arrested in the past and had told police that she was engaged Caraballo. Id. in drug activity with a man named Frank In her past discussions with police, the victim 32 No. 2010AP3016-CR said that she was very afraid of Caraballo because he would kill her if he knew she was talking to the police, and he had many weapons. Id. Given what they knew about the defendant, the police decided that they would track his cell phone so that they could find and arrest him as quickly as possible. 46. Id. at 345- Because time was precious, they did not obtain a warrant. Id. ¶55 Caraballo argued that the warrantless search of his cell phone location data violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 342. determined The court went through a variety of analyses but that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location data because his Sprint privacy policy informed him that Sprint may disclose personal information in response to emergencies. Id. at 362-63. Hence, the court said, the defendant knew that the police could track him because the situation was an emergency. Id. at 363. Although the facts of Caraballo and the cell phone policy there are similar to the present case, I choose to decide this case on different grounds because total reliance on Subdiaz-Osorio's Policy to decide this case would be problematic. ¶56 First, the Policy difficult to interpret. in this case is confusing and It consists of nine pages that include piecemeal definitions and vague terminology. For example, the Policy creates confusion by defining the term "CPNI" at several 33 No. different points with varying degrees 2010AP3016-CR specificity.27 of The definition of CPNI is important because it includes location information, but because the full definition is spread out over several pages, references to CPNI are difficult to understand. ¶57 The Policy is also unclear about what Sprint will disclose in the event of an emergency. information For example, in a paragraph titled "Protection of Sprint Nextel and Others,"28 the Policy says that Sprint discloses personal information (of which CPNI is a "special category") if Sprint "reasonably believe[s] that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure of communications delay." or (Emphasis justifies disclosure added.) The of records "communications" without language suggests that Sprint will disclose only information related to communications like phone calls and there is no attempt to define the "records" that Sprint will disclose. 27 The Policy defines CPNI on pages one and two of the Policy: "CPNI is information Sprint Nextel obtains or creates when it provides wireline or mobile wireless telecommunications services to a customer. CPNI includes the types of services purchased, how the services are used, and the billing detail for those services." On page four, the Policy says CPNI "is information about your phone usage, which is a special category of personal information." Page seven adds to the definition by stating that "Location information derived from providing our voice service . . . is CPNI . . . ." 28 The title of this paragraph suggests that the disclosure disclaimer is to protect Sprint, not the customer. 34 No. ¶58 2010AP3016-CR The Policy later says in a section titled "Presence, Location and Tracking Information" that "[l]ocation information derived from providing our voice service, in addition to being covered by this Policy, is CPNI and is protected as described above." Thus, the full definition of CPNI does not come until after the section that discusses disclosure of CPNI. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the customer's CPNI is "protected as described above" circumstances in as the which paragraph information above will be enumerates only disclosed. The "Presence, Location and Tracking Information" section goes on to say that Sprint may disclose "call location" information, but the term "call location," like communications," misleadingly the phrase implies "disclosure of that only location data obtained from a phone call may be disclosed. It is possible that a customer would read this Policy and understand that his cell phone may be tracked at all times, but that is not the only possible reading. ¶59 In sum, I am reluctant to say that a person loses his reasonable expectation of privacy based on an opaque contract. The Fourth Amendment is complicated enough without introducing contract interpretation into the calculus. ¶60 Second, even if the Policy clearly provided that Sprint may disclose location information to law enforcement in an emergency, that language merely 35 governs the conduct of No. Sprint.29 2010AP3016-CR It does not necessarily follow that law enforcement may lawfully seek and obtain the information without a court order or without exception.30 the cell satisfying the exigent circumstances Thus, a customer might still reasonably assume that phone company will disclose information only when presented with a valid court order. ¶61 Third, although it is likely that all cell phone policies contain language similar to the Sprint Policy in this case, law enforcement may not know what any given individual's cell phone policy actually says. It is untenable to contend 29 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.375(15) permits Sprint and other wireless services providers to disclose customer information without a subpoena or warrant if: The provider of electronic communication or remote computing service believes in good faith that an emergency involving the danger of death or serious physical injury to any person exists and that disclosure of the information is required to prevent the death or injury or to mitigate the injury. Wis. Stat. § 968.375(15)(b). Section 968.375 took effect on May 28, 2010. The Federal Stored Communications Act also permits a similar disclosure. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) (2006) (provider may disclose information "to a governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of information relating to the emergency"). However, statutes granting cell phone companies authority to disclose information do not necessarily grant law enforcement authority to conduct the search for that information without a court order. 30 See United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013) (probable cause and exigent circumstances justified detective's application for cell phone pinging under 18 U.S.C. § 2702). 36 No. 2010AP3016-CR that a search under the Fourth Amendment depends on the specific language in an enforcement may individual's track a cell cell phone phone policy that without a law warrant, understanding that if the policy does not alert the suspect that he may be tracked, the search will violate the Fourth Amendment. ¶62 Fourth, the language in Sprint's Policy mirrors the language in the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. One example of this exception requires law enforcement to show probable cause and a reasonable belief that there is "a threat to safety of a suspect or others." State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶19, 25, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. The Policy says that Sprint discloses information "if we reasonably believe that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious disclosure." physical injury to any person requires Thus, both the exigent circumstances exception and the Policy contemplate the government obtaining location data where someone's safety is in jeopardy. However, the exigent circumstances exception contains the additional requirement of probable cause. the Policy I believe it is more appropriate to interpret as permitting the wireless services provider to disclose information in exigent circumstances rather than saying that the clause nullifies a customer's reasonable subjective expectation of privacy. ¶63 a Fifth, interpreting the cell phone policy to eliminate customer's reasonable subjective expectation of privacy invites law enforcement to be complacent in its requests for tracking. The Caraballo court 37 noted that Sprint processes No. 2010AP3016-CR thousands of emergency requests each year, and it is Sprint's practice not to second-guess requests. Caraballo, 963 enforcement agents that providers say apparently without exception. give law F. Supp. there up enforcement's the emergency 2d is at an emergency, location 349. If law wireless information almost The deference to law enforcement's tracking requests is not inherently wrong, but requiring police to have probable cause and an exigent circumstance before requesting location data, if they do not have a warrant, diminishes the potential for abuse. ¶64 Finally, I believe it prudent to heed the cautionary advice of the Supreme Court when it comes to determining whether a policy can render an expectation of privacy unreasonable. Quon, 560 U.S. at 759. See In Quon, the Ontario Police Department (OPD) in California distributed to various officers pagers that could send and receive text messages. Id. at 750-51. OPD explicitly informed the officers that messages on the pagers were not private and that the officers should have expectation of privacy when sending texts on the pagers. 758. no Id. at When Police Sergeant Jeff Quon (Quon) challenged the OPD's decision to look at his sexually explicit text messages, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court decided not to determine whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the texts. employees' Id. at 752-53, 760 ("A broad holding concerning privacy expectations vis à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this 38 No. case on narrower grounds."). 2010AP3016-CR The Court then assumed Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and decided that the specialneeds-of-the-workplace warrantless search. exception applied Id. at 760-61. to allow the Because I can avoid a broad pronouncement regarding reasonable expectations of privacy by analyzing this case under the exigent circumstances exception, I need not decide whether Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone Policy nullified his subjective reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location information. 4. The Objective Reasonableness of the Expectation of Privacy in Cell Phone Location Information ¶65 second Despite its prong whether apparent society simplicity, is prepared the to Katz test's recognize an expectation of privacy as reasonable has been the subject of much confusion, debate, and analysis, and it is far from an easy touchstone to apply.31 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. (Brennan, 35, 46-49 (1988) J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority about whether respondents had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their trash); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 747 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority and suggesting that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that they dial). 31 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 504-05 (2007) (criticizing the numerous, inconsistent tests to determine what society accepts as a reasonable expectation of privacy). 39 No. ¶66 of what 2010AP3016-CR Although it is difficult to apply, the interpretation society is prepared to recognize as a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is an important part of the analysis under Katz. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989). In Riley, the Court considered whether police surveillance of a greenhouse from a helicopter 400 feet in the air was a search that required a warrant. Id. at 447-48. A plurality of the Court said that because anyone could have flown a helicopter and observed the top of the greenhouse without violating the law, it was not reasonable for the respondent to expect privacy when he left the top of the greenhouse partially open. Justice O'Connor's concurrence tempered Id. at 450-51. Riley's plurality by emphasizing that the search was not permissible simply because the helicopter complied with FAA regulations or citizen could have conducted the same search. (O'Connor, J., concurring). because any Id. at 454-55 Instead, Justice O'Connor suggested that "consistent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity" to determine if the search was "one 'reasonable.'" ¶67 In concurrence, that society is prepared to recognize as Id. at 454 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). accordance with the later Court Justice O'Connor's determined that Riley it was presumptively unreasonable for the government to use technology that was not in general public use to conduct a warrantless search that would normally require a physical intrusion of the home subject to the search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 40 No. 27, 40 (2001). imaging to In determine Kyllo, the whether government's the defendant's 2010AP3016-CR use of house thermal contained high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 29, 40. The Court concluded that because the government used a thermal imaging device not in general public use to see details inside a house that would normally require surveillance was a an physical improper intrusion, search. the Id. at warrantless 40. Kyllo demonstrates that surveillance aided by technology can rise to the level of an impermissible search even absent a physical intrusion. ¶68 Because expectation of the concept privacy is of an elusive, objective this reasonable opinion makes no definitive pronouncement as to whether society is prepared to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in cell phone location data. intrusion in Given the widespread apprehension of government citizens' electronic personal information, we cannot say that an expectation of privacy in cell phone location data is unreasonable even if it were true that the public is generally aware that cell phone tracking is possible. On the other better hand, cell phone location tracking might be understood and more prevalent than, say, thermal imaging. I need not decide the issue of an objective reasonable expectation of privacy on these facts to decide this case. D. Exigent Circumstances ¶69 Irrespective of whether Subdiaz-Osorio had both a subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy in 41 No. his cell phone location data, and 2010AP3016-CR irrespective of whether obtaining that data was a search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, Osorio's cell I conclude phone circumstances that location exception to the fell tracking of the within the warrant Subdiazexigent requirement. Consequently, the search did not violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fourth Amendment rights. ¶70 Seeking and obtaining the defendant's cell phone location information is assumed to be a search in this opinion because of the privacy implications. Under the exigent circumstances exception,32 a warrantless search does not violate a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights if: (1) the government can show that there is probable cause to believe that "evidence of a crime will be found"; and (2) there are exigent circumstances. Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶17, 21 (citations omitted). To establish probable cause for a search, the government must show that there is a "'fair probability' that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id., ¶21 (citation omitted). ¶71 when The there is probable cause "probable standard cause to also believe has been employed that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense." State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶19, 245 32 When the exigent circumstances exception applies, a citizen's privacy right "must give way to the compelling public interest in effective law enforcement." State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (citations omitted). 42 No. 2010AP3016-CR Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613 (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). This formulation may be a more suitable fit for searches of cell phone location information when the primary goal of the search is to obtain information to apprehend the suspect.33 "In regard to probable cause, the supreme court has stated that [the Court] deal[s] with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, [must] act." State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 215, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999) (quoting State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 739, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982)) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶72 by an The court determines whether there was probable cause objective reasonably.34 standard and asks whether the police acted State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶26, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463. "The core requirement of probable cause 33 The new statute requiring a warrant to track cell phone location information requires "probable cause to believe the criminal activity has been, is, or will be in progress and that identifying or tracking the communications device will yield information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." Wis. Stat. § 968.373(3)(e) (2013-14). 34 "In both an arrest warrant and a search warrant context, probable cause eschews technicality and legalisms in favor of a 'flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior.'" State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 83, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (quoting State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991)). 43 No. 2010AP3016-CR serves to 'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.'" Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, added) (quoting State 81, v. 532 N.W.2d DeSmidt, 155 698 (1995) Wis. 2d 119, State v. (emphasis 130, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990)). ¶73 Exigent circumstances exist if, "measured against the time needed to obtain a warrant," and under the facts known at the time, it was objectively reasonable for law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search when: (1) law enforcement was engaged in a "hot pursuit"; (2) there was a threat to the safety of either the suspect or someone else; (3) there was a risk of destruction of evidence; or (4) the suspect was likely to flee. Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶24-25 (citing State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986)). The objective exigent circumstances test asks "whether a police officer, under the facts as they were known at the time, would reasonably believe that delay in procuring a search warrant would gravely endanger life, risk destruction of evidence, likelihood of the suspect's escape." or greatly enhance the Id., ¶24 (citing Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 230). The State has the burden to prove that exigent justified circumstances the search. Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶20. ¶74 Kenosha police had probable cause to conduct a search because there was a "fair probability" that evidence of the stabbing would be found at the location of Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone. Eyewitnesses had informed the police that Subdiaz-Osorio had fatally stabbed his brother less than 24 hours before the 44 No. search and that he had admitted to the stabbing. 2010AP3016-CR Subdiaz-Osorio was now missing but known to have borrowed an automobile. murder weapon had not been found. had not been located. The Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone There was a fair probability that if Subdiaz-Osorio had his phone, evidence would be found at that location. ¶75 Of course, the police wanted to apprehend Subdiaz- Osorio because of the accumulated evidence they had against him, but the police also had a hope and expectation that SubdiazOsorio's crime. apprehension would yield additional evidence of the This evidence included the defendant's clothing if he was wearing any of the same clothing he wore at the time of the stabbing, the murder weapon if he had not discarded his knives, and his cell phone if he made calls to additional people to whom he made admissions. The defendant himself could yield DNA evidence and could make inculpatory statements when questioned. Any person accompanying Subdiaz-Osorio would likely have heard incriminating vehicle, admissions. Roberto, would Subdiaz-Osorio south. going there? For surely be asked the why driver he was of the driving Where were they going and why were they Did they avoid major highways at any point during the trip to avoid detection? ¶76 instance, If so, why? Given that they had probable cause to track Subdiaz- Osorio's cell phone, the Kenosha police arguably had their pick 45 No. of three exigent circumstances.35 2010AP3016-CR There was a threat to safety, risk of destruction of evidence, and a likelihood that SubdiazOsorio flee.36 would destruction of evidence The stem threat in to part safety from the and risk of fact that no murder weapon was ever recovered after Subdiaz-Osorio killed his brother. prevent It was important to find Subdiaz-Osorio quickly to him from destroying or disposing of his knives and clothes. ¶77 Moreover, it would be difficult to say that a potentially armed individual who recently committed a homicide did not create a threat to safety. Subdiaz-Osorio argues that stabbing his brother did not automatically support the inference that he was dangerous to others, but police do not have to have conclusive proof that a suspect is likely to harm someone in 35 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.373(8)(a)2. (2013-14) provides an exception to the warrant requirement based on exigency if "[a]n emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person exists and identifying or tracking the location of the communications device is relevant to preventing the death or injury or to mitigating the injury." 36 "Hot pursuit" is not at issue in this case because a "hot pursuit" occurs "where there is an immediate or continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the scene of a crime." State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶32, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29 (brackets in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The pursuit of Subdiaz-Osorio was not immediate or continuous. 46 No. 2010AP3016-CR order to satisfy the exigent circumstances exception. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶40.37 ¶78 Richter demonstrates that reasonableness is at the center of the exigent circumstances analysis, and in the present case, it was reasonable for the Kenosha police to believe that a potentially armed homicide suspect created an exigent threat to the safety of others. be armed and See id. ("[P]ursuit of a suspect known to dangerous would establish exigent implicating a threat to physical safety."). necessarily required, the police had circumstances Though it is not evidence that Subdiaz- Osorio was armed and dangerous because he had just committed a homicide, and it was likely that he still had the murder weapon. In fact, Subdiaz-Osorio told Liborio that he did not want to be arrested, which could lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to infer Subdiaz-Osorio might become violent if confronted. The Kenosha police had no way of knowing how desperate SubdiazOsorio might become to avoid apprehension, or to obtain money or 37 Richter involved a situation in which an eyewitness told police that a burglar fled from her trailer and went into a trailer across the street. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶1. This court determined that even though there was no information to suggest that the burglar was armed or had violent tendencies, the officer could reasonably believe that there was a threat to safety and could conduct a warrantless search of the trailer based on exigent circumstances. Id., ¶¶40-41. A requirement that law enforcement "have affirmative evidence of the presence of firearms or known violent tendencies on the part of the suspect before acting to protect the safety of others is arbitrary and unrealistic and unreasonably handicaps the officer in the performance of one of his core responsibilities." Id., ¶40. 47 No. shelter to facilitate escape. 2010AP3016-CR They did know that this was an individual who was dangerous enough to stab someone in the head, and they could reasonably believe that the delay in getting a warrant would seriously endanger life. Therefore, it was proper for them to conduct a warrantless search to find Subdiaz-Osorio as quickly as possible. ¶79 In addition, the police reasonably could have believed that the likelihood that Subdiaz-Osorio would flee created an exigent circumstance. fleeing suspect The exigent circumstance exception for a exists if getting a warrant would enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape." Wis. 2d 280, ¶24 (citation omitted). "greatly Hughes, 233 Subdiaz-Osorio was in the country illegally, had just committed a grisly murder, and the police determined that his family in Illinois had not heard from him. The police knew that he was from Mexico and had family there.38 had They knew that he had borrowed his girlfriend's car and warned Liborio that he did not want to be arrested. Therefore, there was a strong inference that he would try to 38 This case calls to mind the situation in State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶99-102, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (Prosser, J., concurring), in which the defendant booked a flight back to his home country of Albania after stabbing a relative in the neck. An arrest warrant was obtained, and authorities tried to act quickly before the defendant could fly back to Albania. Even though he spoke almost no English, Ndina evaded capture in the United States and was not apprehended in Albania until several months later. Id., ¶¶101-02. The warrant in Ndina was for an arrest, not a search, but that case illustrates how precious time can be when authorities are trying to capture a fleeing suspect. 48 No. 2010AP3016-CR flee, and time was of the essence to find him before he left the country. ¶80 It is not clear from the record exactly when Subdiaz- Osorio left Kenosha. Clearly, it was before 10 a.m. on February 8, 2009, because the police began to interview Estella by 10 a.m. It was probably before 9:27 a.m. because three of Subdiaz- Osorio's acquaintances went to the Kenosha Safety Building at 9:27 a.m. Kenosha County borders the State of Illinois so that Subdiaz-Osorio would likely have been in Illinois in less than 15 minutes after he left Estella. He probably would have been able to be in Chicago in less than an hour and a half. provides besides multiple forms of transportation automobile airplanes, trains, out buses. of Chicago the area Chicago also provided the opportunity to buy or rent a different vehicle and buy a different cell phone, perhaps a prepaid cell phone. All this is predicated on Subdiaz-Osorio traveling south rather than north or west. The police could only speculate as to his plans or his route. ¶81 8, By the time he was arrested at 6:11 p.m. on February Subdiaz-Osorio was in Arkansas, which meant that he had traveled a significant distance since he left that morning. The police could not have known what method of transportation he would use as he attempted to escape or how quickly he would be able to leave the country if that were his goal. Because time was crucial to apprehend a fleeing suspect, the Kenosha police 49 No. 2010AP3016-CR acted properly in the face of exigent circumstances and could not delay to secure an additional warrant.39 E. Constitutional Protections Against Self-Incrimination ¶82 In addition to his Fourth Amendment claims, Subdiaz- Osorio argues that Kenosha police violated his Fifth Amendment rights when they continued to question him after he asked about how he could get an attorney. I conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio's question about obtaining an attorney was equivocal, and Officer Torres did not violate Subdiaz-Osorio's Fifth Amendment rights by continuing to question him. ¶83 reads The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, law . . . ."40 source of the or property, U.S. Const. amend. V. so-called Miranda without due process of The Fifth Amendment is the warnings, which advise a 39 The events in this case occurred on February 7 and 8, 2009, in Kenosha. The events in Tate occurred on June 9, 2009, in Milwaukee. This case represents the earliest reported case of cell phone location tracking in Wisconsin. 40 Similar to the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution provides, "No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and no person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself." Wis. Const. art I, § 8(1). The Wisconsin Constitution has been interpreted to offer the same protection as the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment when it comes to invoking the right to counsel in a custodial interrogation. State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶41-42, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142. 50 No. 2010AP3016-CR defendant that he has a right to an attorney, as a means to safeguard his right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). ¶84 Having been advised of his right to an attorney and his right to remain silent, a suspect in custody must clearly invoke those rights. the Miranda "[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). "If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning." Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶29 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). The suspect "must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Id., ¶30 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). ¶85 In Davis, the Supreme Court determined that when the suspect said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," it was not an unequivocal request for counsel. court followed defendant's Davis statement, in "I Davis, 512 U.S. at 462. Jennings think maybe and I decided need to that talk This the to a lawyer," was not clear enough to invoke the right to counsel, and the interrogating officers did not have to cease questioning 51 No. or attempt to clarify what the suspect meant. 2010AP3016-CR Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶44. ¶86 In the present case, Subdiaz-Osorio said, "How can I do to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford for one." The interview took place in Spanish (so that what we have before us is a translation at the suppression hearing), but it appears as though Subdiaz-Osorio was asking about the process of obtaining an attorney rather than asking for counsel to be present during the interview. ¶87 is The context in which Subdiaz-Osorio's question arose important and circumstances. a vital Officer element Torres in had the totality just of explained the the extradition process to Subdiaz-Osorio and told him that he would have to appear before a judge in Arkansas before a decision on whether he would return to Wisconsin. It was reasonable for Officer Torres to assume Subdiaz-Osorio was asking about how he could get an attorney for his extradition hearing, especially since Subdiaz-Osorio continued to answer questions and remained cooperative for the rest of the interview. to sitting down for the interview, In addition, prior Subdiaz-Osorio signed a waiver of rights form, which Officer Torres had read to him in Spanish. Our case law is clear that it is not enough for a suspect to say something that the interviewer might interpret as an invocation of the right to counsel. invocation of that right must be unequivocal. was not. IV. CONCLUSION 52 Id., ¶29. The In this case it No. ¶88 2010AP3016-CR Although the court is divided on the rationale for an affirmance, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. By the Court. The decision affirmed. 53 of the court of appeals is No. ¶89 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. 2010AP3016-CR.awb (concurring). I agree with the dissent that the tracking of a cell phone constitutes a search in the warrantless context search circumstances. of the here Fourth was Dissent, parts I-V. and justified not Amendment that by the exigent Likewise, I agree that Subdiaz-Osorio's statement was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel. Dissent, part VI. ¶90 However, I part ways with the dissent because, like the court of appeals, I conclude that the circuit court's errors in denying There is failure the no to defendant's reasonable grant conviction. the suppression probability suppression motion that motion the were harmless. circuit contributed court's to the Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the mandate of the lead opinion. I ¶91 The uncontested. facts in this case are for the most part After a night of drinking the defendant, Subdiaz- Osorio, and his brother, Ojeda-Rodriguez, got into an argument in front of a guest, Mintz, at their trailer. escalated and after his brother punched him, The argument the defendant retrieved a knife and stabbed his brother in the eye. Then, after the brother fell down, the defendant began kicking and punching him in the face. After Mintz pushed Subdiaz-Osorio away from his brother, Subdiaz-Osorio left the room. ¶92 Subdiaz-Osorio asked his roommate, Martinez, for help bandaging Ojeda-Rodriguez. Martinez wanted to call the police, but Subdiaz-Osorio refused and threatened to stab Martinez if he 1 No. did. Martinez telephoned Carreno-Lugo taking care of Ojeda-Rodriguez. asking 2010AP3016-CR.awb for assistance Upon arriving she bandaged him, then she and the defendant went back to her trailer and went to bed. The next morning Martinez found the brother dead. telling the defendant that his brother was dead After and that Martinez was calling the police, Subdiaz-Osorio left. ¶93 Police beaten body. arrived and found Ojeda-Rodriguez's badly When they interviewed Carreno-Lugo, she told them that the defendant asked for help because he had stabbed his brother. his He spent the night at her trailer, and after learning brother was dead, he told her that he had to Careeno-Lugo allowed the defendant to take her car. police that he had family in Illinois and leave. She told Mexico and acknowledged that he might be headed to Mexico. ¶94 After tracking his Subdaiz-Osorio in Arkansas. including DNA. cell phone, the police located They took trace evidence from him, The next day, after officers read the defendant his Miranda1 rights, he signed a waiver of rights form and agreed to speak without an attorney present. During the interview, the defendant asked if he would be taken back to Kenosha. The officer informed him that he would first have to appear before a judge in Arkansas who would make that determination. At that point the defendant asked "How can I do [sic] to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford one?" told him that Arkansas would appoint hearing, and continued the interview. 1 him a lawyer for the At one point during the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 The officer No. interview, the defendant gave a of version 2010AP3016-CR.awb the stabbing, indicating that his brother brought the knife into the room. ¶95 A few weeks later, after the defendant was read his Miranda rights again and signed another waiver of rights form, Subdiaz-Osorio recounted the events of the indicating that his brother brought the knife. evening, again When the officer interviewing the defendant told him that his version of the events conflicted with Mintz's version, the defendant admitted that he had retrieved the knife. ¶96 Subdiaz-Osorio intentional homicide. was charged with first-degree After his suppression motion was denied, Subdiaz-Osorio accepted a plea bargain and pled to a reduced charge of first-degree reckless homicide by use of a deadly weapon. Subdiaz-Osorio now argues that the circuit court erred in failing to suppress the DNA evidence, the location of his apprehension, and his statement in the interview that his brother brought the knife into the room. II ¶97 In assessing whether a trial error is harmless, we focus on the effect of the error on the jury's verdict. State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485. have described the test as "whether it appears beyond We a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶44, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, quoting in turn Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)). determination, "a court must be 3 able to To make that conclude 'beyond a No. reasonable doubt that a rational jury defendant guilty absent the error.'" would 2010AP3016-CR.awb have found the Id. (quoting Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶48 n.14). ¶98 However, in a guilty plea situation following the denial of a motion to suppress, the test for harmless error on appeal is whether there is a reasonable probability that the erroneous admission of the disputed evidence contributed to the conviction. State v. Semrau, 2000 WI App 54, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 508, 608 N.W.2d 376; State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 503-04, 605 N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1999). As part of this inquiry, the court considers: (1) the relative strength and weakness of the State's case and the defendant's case; (2) the persuasiveness of the evidence in dispute; (3) the reasons, if any, expressed by the defendant for choosing to plead guilty; (4) the benefits obtained by the defendant in exchange for the plea; and (5) the thoroughness of the plea colloquy. Semrau, 233 Wis. 2d 508, ¶22. ¶99 As an initial matter, neither the court of appeals nor the State addressed Subdiaz-Osorio's arguments relating to the DNA evidence. It is unclear if he previously raised this as evidence he wanted suppressed. In any event, the DNA evidence is not necessary to link him to the crime scene. Subdiaz-Osorio admitted to stabbing his brother and that his asserted defenses were that he acted in self-defense and did not act with utter disregard for human life. Thus, I conclude it is not reasonably probable that this evidence contributed to the conviction. ¶100 The second piece of evidence Subdiaz-Osorio believes should have been suppressed was the fact that he was located in 4 No. Arkansas. 2010AP3016-CR.awb This court has previously determined that evidence of flight has probative value as it tends to show consciousness of guilt. Wangerin v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 427, 437, 243 N.W.2d 448 (1976). In this case, however, even without the evidence that the defendant was found in Arkansas, there was strong evidence against him, including an eyewitness to the stabbing, and other witnesses he spoke with after seeking help. See State v. Quiroz, 2009 WI App 120, ¶28, 320 Wis. 2d 706, 772 N.W.2d 710 (admission of flight evidence harmless error where evidence of guilt was overwhelming). ¶101 To the extent that Subdiaz-Osorio's arrest location indicates flight, it was cumulative of other evidence. As the State asserts, the statements from Carreno-Lugo that SubdiazOsorio took her car and was possibly going to Mexico or Illinois, together with his absence from his home, could have independently established that he fled. ¶102 It is also notable that Subdiaz-Osorio reduced charge in exchange for his guilty plea. received a The charge of intentional homicide, which is a class A felony with a maximum sentence of 939.50(3)(a), life was imprisonment, reduced to a Wis. charge Stat. of §§ 946.01(a), reckless homicide, which is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of 65 years imprisonment, Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1), 939.50(3)(b), 939.63(1)(b). ¶103 Because Subdiaz-Osorio accepted a reduced plea, in the face of testimony strong and evidence his own against him, confession, 5 I including conclude eyewitness it is not No. 2010AP3016-CR.awb reasonably probable that the circuit court's failure to suppress the location information contributed to the conviction. ¶104 I turn next to the third piece of evidence SubdiazOsorio sought to suppress: his initial statement to officers that his brother brought the knife into the room. error analysis also applies here. 2d 331, 368-370, admission of State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) evidence obtained The harmless in (concluding that the violation of Miranda was harmless error); State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 263, 544 N.W.2d 545 (1996) (determining that it was harmless error for the court to admit the fruits of a Miranda violation); State v. Rockette, 2005 WI App 205, ¶33, 287 Wis. 2d 257, 704 N.W.2d 382 (determining that regardless of whether a Miranda violation occurred, the error was harmless as the defendant would still have accepted the State's plea deal). ¶105 As with the DNA evidence and the location evidence, the denial of Subdiaz-Osorio's suppression motion with respect to his statement about his brother bringing the knife to the room is also harmless error. As discussed above, the State had a strong case against Subdiaz-Osorio, there was an eyewitness who could testify about who brought the knives, and SubdiazOsorio confessed. a reduced charge. In exchange for his guilty plea, he received Accordingly, I conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the circuit court's failure to suppress Subdiaz-Osorio's statements contributed to the conviction. ¶106 In sum, although I determine that the circuit court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, I conclude 6 No. that the circuit court's errors were harmless. 2010AP3016-CR.awb Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the mandate of the lead opinion. 7 2010AP3016-CR.npc ¶107 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring). In the consolidated cases of Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, the United States Supreme Court recently recognized that "[m]odern cell convenience. phones are not just another technological With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans 'the privacies of life.'"1 generally requiring following an definitive arrest, approach, a warrant the which before Supreme it a Court stated in cell phone unanimously simple By search took terms: a "Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple get a warrant."2 ¶108 Our decision in State v. Carroll,3 a cell phone case, is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Riley/Wurie. In Carroll, we held that an officer was not justified in searching through images stored on a suspect's cell phone absent a warrant.4 We reasoned that the images stored on the cell phone were "not in immediate danger of disappearing before [the officer] could obtain a warrant."5 Like Riley/Wurie, 1 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op., at *20 (U.S. June 25, 2014) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). I will refer to the two consolidated cases as Riley/Wurie. 2 Id. 3 State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 4 See id., ¶33. 5 Id. 1. 1 2010AP3016-CR.npc our decision in Carroll demonstrates a definitive approach, requiring a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone. ¶109 The holdings of the United States Supreme Court in the Riley/Wurie cases and of this court in Carroll lead me to the conclusion that, emergency, a absent warrant phone's location. write case-specific is required for exceptions, the search such of as a cell Therefore, I cannot join the lead opinion. separately to express my concern with the an I broad pronouncements of the lead opinion, especially given that Fourth Amendment cell phone jurisprudence, cell phone technology, and related legislation are all rapidly evolving. However, for the reasons explained below, I would apply a good faith exception consistent with the rationale of State v. Eason6 decline to apply the exclusionary rule here. location evidence obtained from provider should not be suppressed. Subdiaz-Osorio counsel. did not and would I agree that the Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone In addition, I agree that unequivocally invoke his right to Therefore, I respectfully concur with the mandate of the lead opinion. I. ¶110 The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 6 State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. 2 2010AP3016-CR.npc describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7 ¶111 "As the text makes clear, 'the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'"8 The United States Supreme Court has also "determined that '[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.'"9 ¶112 In general, law enforcement should be required to obtain a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest and to obtain location information from a cell phone provider.10 example, In addressing the facts of the United States Supreme the Wurie case, for Court held that law enforcement was required to obtain a warrant to search a cell phone for information as to the location of the arrestee's 7 U.S. Const. amend IV. In similar language, the Wisconsin Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 8 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op. at *6 (U.S. June 25, 2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 9 Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). 10 See id.; see also Carroll, 322 Wis. 2d 299. 3 2010AP3016-CR.npc apartment.11 I see a definite connection between the location information obtained obtained this in in Wurie case. As and the the United location States information Supreme Court explained, Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, __ (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3) ("GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations.").12 The United States Supreme Court recognized that there is a balancing of interests required when determining whether there should be a definitive rule or some exceptions permitted: Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).13 ¶113 Therefore, I would hold that law enforcement should obtain a warrant before obtaining cell phone location information from providers. 11 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op. at *5, 9 (U.S. June 25, 2014). 12 Id. at *19. 13 Id. at *9. 4 2010AP3016-CR.npc ¶114 I am persuaded requiring a warrant location data is for that cell the phone appropriate. I definitive searches recognize and that approach cell of phone before the Riley/Wurie decisions, other jurisdictions that have considered cases involving cell phone location data have come to differing conclusions concerning a warrant requirement.14 ¶115 Furthermore, a general warrant requirement is preferable considering the rapid evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and related legislation in the area of cell phone 14 See Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement's Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 1061, 1079 (2010). Compare In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the government must demonstrate probable cause in order to obtain cell site tracking information due to Fourth Amendment privacy concerns), and In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding same), and In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (D. Md. 2005) (holding same), and In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding same), with In re U.S. for an Order, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that probable cause was not required for cell site location information), and In re Application of U.S. For an Order, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006) (holding same), and In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding same), and In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding same). 5 2010AP3016-CR.npc and other location technology.15 tracking Justice Alito recognized this very principle when he concurred in part and concurred in the judgment in Riley/Wurie, where he stated: In light of these developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.16 ¶116 It is noteworthy that the Wisconsin Legislature has quite recently enacted17 Wis. Stat. § 968.373, which generally requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before "track[ing] the location however, of provides a communications device."18 an to exception the This statute, general warrant 15 In addition to Riley, the United States Supreme Court has also recently considered questions arising under the Fourth Amendment as they relate to location tracking technology. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that a GPS device placed on an automobile to record the vehicle's location constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment). 16 Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132, 13-212, slip op. at *22 (U.S. June 25, 2014). 17 At the time the police obtained the location information at issue here, our case law was not clear as to the need for a warrant, nor were the statutes clear as to the procedures necessary to obtain a warrant, as those procedures are spelled out in the recently enacted provision (Wis. Stat. § 968.373(2)). See Dissent, ¶ ___ n.32; State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶___ n.33, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 18 Wis. Stat. § 968.373(2) (2011-12) (Effective April 25, 2014). 6 2010AP3016-CR.npc requirement if "[t]he customer or subscriber provides consent for the action" or if "[a]n emergency involving the danger of death or serious identifying device is or physical tracking relevant to guidance to the to any location of preventing mitigating the injury."19 provides injury the person the death or exists and communications injury or to Furthermore, Wis. Stat. §968.373(8)(b) cell phone providers faced with law enforcement requests for location data absent a warrant.20 In the fast developing area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and emerging technology, I would generally require that law enforcement obtain a warrant to obtain cell phone location data. ¶117 There is no indication that law enforcement lacked the necessary time to obtain a warrant to access Subdiaz-Osorio's cell phone location through information disclosed by his cell phone provider. Furthermore, nothing suggests that a delay in obtaining a warrant would have hindered law enforcement efforts. Based on the record in this case, law enforcement could have and 19 Wis. Stat. § 968.373(8)(a). 20 Wis. Stat. § 968.373(8)(b) (instructing providers to disclose information to law enforcement in situations where customers have provided consent or when the provider has a good faith belief that such information is necessary to prevent death or serious injury). 7 2010AP3016-CR.npc should have obtained a warrant in time to access the requested cell phone location data and apprehend the defendant.21 II ¶118 Despite my view that usually law enforcement must obtain a warrant before obtaining a cell phone location, I would not exclude the location evidence in this case even though law enforcement did not first obtain a warrant. However, I do not agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that the warrantless search was justified exigent circumstances. on the grounds of probable cause and Instead, I would apply a good faith exception in this case to conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. ¶119 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: [W]e now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized. We do so because the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for the rule ceases, its application must cease also.22 21 I agree with Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent that there was sufficient time and information for the police to get a warrant. 22 United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980). 8 2010AP3016-CR.npc ¶120 The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon23 recognized the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the invalidated context warrant. of a search However, as based a on a treatise subsequently writer has recognized, Leon's sweeping language supports the extension of the good faith exception beyond the warrant situation to nonwarrant cases where a police officer's conduct is objectively reasonable: Although the holding in both Sheppard and Leon is limited to with-warrant cases, the possibility that these decisions will serve as stepping stones to a more comprehensive good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be discounted. Certainly the author of those two decisions, Justice White, was prepared to go farther, as he clearly indicated prior to and contemporaneously with the rulings in those two cases, and some current members of the Court may be equally prepared to take such a step. If they are, much of the reasoning in Leon will offer support for such an extension of that case beyond the with-warrant situation. Particularly noteworthy is the Leon majority's broad assertion that whenever the police officer's conduct was objectively reasonable the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule is not served and that "when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system."24 23 24 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984). 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(f), at 128 (5th ed. 2012) (citations omitted). See also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward A Better Categorical Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 270-71 (2005) (advocating a broader application of the good faith exception to cases involving serious crimes wherein the police officers involved reasonably believed probable cause existed for the search or seizure) 9 2010AP3016-CR.npc ¶121 The purpose of good the faith exception exclusionary rule. does not When contravene there has been the an unlawful search, a common judicial remedy for the constitutional error is exclusion."25 Specifically, "[t]he exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure from a criminal proceeding against the victim of the constitutional violation."26 That the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, a not right, is significant; "its application is restricted to cases where its remedial objectives will best be served."27 ¶122 Thus, a court considering whether to apply the exclusionary rule must bear in mind the primary purpose of the rule: deterring police misconduct.28 "[M]arginal deterrence is not enough to justify exclusion; 'the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.'"29 In employing this type of cost/benefit analysis to the facts of a particular case, a court should recognize the "substantial social costs exacted by the 25 State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶15, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. 26 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶46, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987)). 27 Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct 695, 700 (2009)). 28 Id., ¶41 (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 347). 29 Id., ¶35 (citing Herring, 129 S.Ct at 700). 10 2010AP3016-CR.npc exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights . . . ."30 The social costs of deterrence are particularly high where "law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor" because the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system. 31 ¶123 The exclusionary rule is based on a desire to deter law enforcement from violating the constitutional right of a citizen to be free from illegal searches and seizures. "Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force."32 On that basis, we have refused to apply the exclusionary rule where it would otherwise apply where officers proceeded consistent with "law that was controlling at the time of the search,"33 and where police reasonably relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.34 We stated specifically, "[T]he laudable purpose of the exclusionary rule deterring police from making illegal searches 30 Id. at 907. 31 Id. at 907-908. 32 State v. Gums, 69 Wis.2d 513, 517, 230 N.W.2d 813 (1975) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447) (1979). 33 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶3, 231 Wis.2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 34 Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶2. 517. 11 2010AP3016-CR.npc and seizures would not be furthered by applying the exclusionary rule."35 ¶124 That is a guiding principle in the application of the exclusionary rule. We have, consistent with the United States Supreme Court, stressed that "just because a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred does not mean the exclusionary rule applies. . . . The application of the exclusionary rule should focus on its violations. efficacy in deterring future Fourth Amendment Moreover . . . 'the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.'"36 Citing to Eason, Dearborn made clear that in those circumstances where "the exclusionary rule cannot deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity, . . . it should not apply . . . ."37 Many courts have endorsed this approach and have declined to apply the exclusionary rule in a rigid manner where law enforcement acted reasonably.38 35 Id. 36 Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (citations omitted) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct 695, 700 (2009). 37 Id., ¶37. 38 See State v. Coats, 797 P.2d 693, 696 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3925, Arizona's statutory good-faith exception); Toland v. State, 688 S.W.2d 718 (Ark. 1985); Matter of M.R.D., 482 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Mo. 1985); State v. Welch, 342 S.E.2d 789, 795 (N.C. 1986); State v. Gronlund, 356 N.W.2d 144, 146-47 (N.D. 1984); McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (Va. 1984). 12 2010AP3016-CR.npc ¶125 I agree with that approach, and, based on the record here, this case falls within the category of cases to which the exclusionary rule should not apply because no deterrent purpose would be served by requiring the exclusion of the cell phone location evidence at issue. ¶126 Here police were investigating a murder, and, after pursuing other Wisconsin investigative Department Investigation (DCI), information from Proceeding according of and leads, Justice, asked DCI Subdiaz-Osorio's to the police Division the cell of Criminal request to requirements contacted location phone of the provider. cell phone provider, and pursuant to the terms of its user agreement, DCI filled out and submitted to the cell phone provider a "Mandatory Information for Exigent Circumstances Requests" form. There is no evidence or allegation of police misconduct in this case. ¶127 What occurred here is certainly similar to what we required in structuring the good faith exception: We hold that where police officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon the warrant, which had been issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. We further hold that in order for a good faith exception to apply, the burden is upon the State to show that the process used in obtaining the search warrant included a significant investigation and a review by either a police officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable government attorney. We also hold that this process is required by Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, in addition to those protections afforded by the good faith 13 2010AP3016-CR.npc exception as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).39 Parallel to our reasoning in Eason, there was a "significant investigation" brother, underway including into multiple the murder interviews search warrant executed at his home. of with Subdiaz-Osorio's witnesses and a Furthermore, as part of the investigation, law enforcement consulted with the Department of Justice, an outside entity certainly "trained and knowledgeable" in these matters, whose staff then requested the cell phone location data. These steps were of a similar nature to the steps outlined in Eason. ¶128 Searches involving cell phone data represent a rapidly evolving area of law where it is appropriate to recognize law enforcement's consistent good with faith efforts constitutional to conduct restrictions. investigations There is no allegation that there was clearly established law that police disregarded in the course of the investigation in this case. The actions of the police here show that the officers were acting in good faith, and, therefore, a good faith exception to the warrant requirement is appropriate here. ¶129 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur with the mandate of the lead opinion but write separately. 39 Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶74. 14 No. 2010AP3016-CR.pdr ¶130 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring). I agree with the lead opinion's conclusions that law enforcement acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment due to exigent circumstances and that Subdiaz-Osorio failed to unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. because I cannot endorse I write in concurrence, however, the lead opinion's discussion of whether a search occurred.1 ¶131 The lead opinion says that it does not decide whether law enforcement's activities constituted meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2 a search within the It does so in order "to avoid delivering a broad pronouncement about reasonable expectations of privacy in technology."3 of judicial the rapidly developing field of wireless While I wholeheartedly agree with the principles restraint the lead opinion espouses, I write separately because I believe the lead opinion has "elaborat[ed] too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear."4 City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). ¶132 Specifically, assume without while deciding 1 opinion people have purports a to reasonable Id., ¶¶9, 64, 68. 3 "that lead Lead op., ¶¶48-68. 2 the Id., ¶9. 4 As an example of the changing landscape, I note that on April 23, 2014, 2013 Wis. Act 375 was enacted as Wis. Stat. § 968.373 and now governs "tracking the location of a cellular telephone." 1 No. 2010AP3016-CR.pdr expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that when police track a cell phone's location, they are conducting a search under the Fourth Amendment," it nonetheless applies Katz's two-part test for determining whether a search occurred.5 (Harlan, See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) J., concurring). In doing so, it seems to decide several points of law that are unrelated to its conclusion, which is grounded in the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Were I writing for the majority of the court, I would write more narrowly, avoiding the conclusions above and also those mentioned below. ¶133 First, the lead opinion concludes that the SubdiazOsorio's Sprint policy suffers from multiple legal shortcomings. After noting "piecemeal definitions and vague terminology" in that contract, it concludes that "[i]t is possible that a customer would read th[e] Policy and understand that his cell phone may be tracked at all times, but that is not the only possible reading."6 Whether a contract is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore ambiguous, is a question of law that may have important legal ramifications.7 5 Lead op., ¶¶9, 51-68. 6 I Id., ¶56, 58. 7 Most commonly, if a statute is ambiguous, meaning "it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses," we may turn to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to aid in our interpretation of a statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶47, 50, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. In the context of contract interpretation, the ambiguous term may be construed against its drafter. Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857. 2 No. would therefore refrain from the interpreting 2010AP3016-CR.pdr contract when doing so is unnecessary to our holding. ¶134 The lead opinion further states that even if the cell phone contract were clear, "[i]t does not necessarily follow that law enforcement information without a may lawfully court seek order without exigent circumstances exception."8 or and obtain the satisfying the It concludes that "a customer might still reasonably assume that the cell phone company will disclose information only when presented with a valid court order."9 ¶135 This pronouncement calls into serious question the ability of a defendant's voluntary disclosure of information to shape the defendant's expectation of privacy, and therefore questions the continued viability of the third party disclosure doctrine itself, under which a defendant "typically retains no . . . constitutional information conveyed reasonable to a third expectation party." of ABA privacy in Standards for Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, 6 (3d ed. 2013). This is a developing issue that I believe is better evaluated in a decision that requires us to address third party disclosures. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties"). 8 Lead op., ¶60. 9 Id. 3 No. 2010AP3016-CR.pdr ¶136 Finally, the lead opinion notes that law enforcement will not know, in each instance, whether a suspect's cell phone contract contains language similar to the Sprint contract in the present case.10 It then expresses concern that law enforcement will "track a cell phone without a warrant, understanding that if the policy does not alert the suspect that he may be tracked, the search will violate the Fourth Amendment."11 This will, in turn, "invite[] law enforcement to be complacent in its requests for tracking," according to the lead opinion.12 As distasteful as that idea may be, I would not evaluate cell phone contract rationales that do not drive our decision. ¶137 In sum, while the lead opinion "believe[s] it prudent to heed the cautionary advice of the Supreme Court" and to decide the case on the narrowest grounds possible, its wideranging discussion fails to implement that directive.13 Instead, its decision all but forecloses argument "that a search under the Fourth Amendment depends on the specific language in an individual's cell phone disclosure of information expectation of privacy.14 policy" to a Because or that third I do the party not wish defendant's shapes to his decide whether a search occurred in this case, or any of the issues 10 Id., ¶61. 11 Id. 12 Id., ¶63. 13 Id., ¶64. 14 Id., ¶60-61. 4 No. 2010AP3016-CR.pdr that are unnecessary to that inquiry, I do not join the lead opinion, and respectfully concur in its mandate. ¶138 I am authorized to state KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 5 that Justice ANNETTE No. ¶139 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. Justice Roggensack's concurrence, 2010AP3016-CR.akz (concurring). but write I join separately to address the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). Riley addressed whether a warrantless search of the contents of a suspect's cell by police was constitutionally permissible, id. at 2477, while in the case at issue, Subdiaz-Osorio objects to the disclosure provider. of location data See Lead op., ¶2. by his cell phone service The location of a cell phone and the contents contained therein may or may not be subject to the same constitutional analysis. At this point, the parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to brief or argue that point, or address the import of Riley on the case at issue. Especially considering the recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent, I agree with Justice Roggensack, and I would decide this case on the narrowest possible grounds. ¶140 The Riley decision explicitly stated that it was not addressing "the question whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other circumstances." clarified that 134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1. "[o]ur holding, of The Court further course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant search . . . ." is Id. generally at 2493 required (emphasis before added). such The a Riley decision acknowledged that "[i]f the police are truly confronted with a now or never situation, for example, circumstances suggesting that a defendant's phone will be the target of an 1 No. imminent remote-wipe attempt they may be 2010AP3016-CR.akz able to exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately." rely on Id. at 2487 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶141 In further limiting its holding to the facts of the case, the Riley court also stated: Moreover, even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone. One wellrecognized exception applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Such exigencies could include the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury. . . . In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception, there is no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not be able to address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested: a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the child's location on his cell phone. The defendants here recognize indeed, they stress that such factspecific threats may justify a warrantless search of cell phone data. The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case. Id. at 2494 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶142 Thus, the Supreme Court in Riley did not necessarily address the specific question presented in the case at issue, presumably because that question was not squarely presented by the facts of Riley. I conclude that, given these uncertainties, 2 No. 2010AP3016-CR.akz we should exercise restraint and cabin our analysis to the facts of this case. ¶143 We have received no briefing or argument on the broader privacy questions that are addressed in the lead opinion or in Riley. As a practical matter, the issue of what actions law enforcement needs to take when seeking cell phone location information has also been addressed by the legislature. Wis. Stat. §§ 968.373 and 968.375(3)(c) (2013-14).1 See The technological implications of a broader approach are vast and difficult to predict, and we are generally obliged to decide our cases on the "narrowest possible grounds." Barland v. Eau Claire Cnty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 566 n.2, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998); see also State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶23, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463. As a result, I join Justice Roggensack's concurrence. ¶144 For the foregoing reasons I respectfully concur. ¶145 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 1 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 968.373 and 968.375(3)(c) after the commencement of the case at issue and directly applicable. Our inability to consider the in this case is an additional argument in favor approach. 3 were enacted so are not new statutes of a narrow No. ¶146 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa (dissenting). "Advances in technology offer great benefits to society in many areas. At the same time, they can pose significant risks to individual privacy rights."1 The proliferation of cell phones and their location tracking capabilities exemplify the risks to privacy rights posed by technological advancement. ¶147 The criminal cases State v. Tate2 and State v. SubdiazOsorio3 raise the question whether individuals have a constitutional right of privacy in their cell phone location data. In other words, do the United States4 and Wisconsin Constitutions5 permit law enforcement to access a person's cell phone location data without a warrant? 1 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 631-32 (N.J. 2013). 2 State N.W.2d ___. v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 3 State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 4 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 5 Article provides: 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 1 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶148 Cell phones are a "pervasive and insistent part of daily life . . . ."6 The vast majority of Americans own cell phones; the Pew Research Center has reported that, as of May 2013, 91% of American adults have a cell phone and 56% have a smartphone.7 Cell phones are literally and figuratively attached to their users' persons, such that "the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy."8 Unlike land-line phones, people generally carry cell phones with them at all times at home, in the car, at work, and at play. ¶149 Cell devices that accuracy. shops, phones can can pinpoint thus our serve as movements powerful with tracking remarkable They can isolate in time and place our presence at doctors' offices, religious services, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, AIDS treatment centers, abortion clinics, political events, theaters, bookstores, and restaurants, and the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 6 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 7 Earls, 70 A.3d at 638. 8 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. The Riley Court additionally noted that "nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower." Id. at 2490. 2 No. identify with whom Cellular service the user providers of the have cell records 2010AP3016-CR.ssa associates.9 phone of the geographic location of almost every American at almost every moment of the day and night.10 Accessing this information reveals intimate details about a person and intrudes on the constitutional right of association. location data The United States Supreme Court characterizes as "qualitatively different" from physical records, noting that location data can "reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building."11 The more precise the tracking, the greater the privacy concerns. ¶150 Cell phone location data can also be a formidable instrument in fighting crime. In both Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio, the were law public enforcement safety criminal duties suspects officers by were performing investigating apprehended in violent their important crimes. relatively short Both order through law enforcement use of cell phone location data. ¶151 The officers in Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio had to deal with the thorny issues raised by seeking access to individuals' 9 See Earls, 70 A.3d at 632. See also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person. . . . [Cell phones] could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers."). 10 See Noam Cohen, It's Tracking Your Every Move and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1. 11 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 3 No. cell phone location data. interpreting 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Law enforcement is the first word in constitutional requirements; the courts are the last. ¶152 It is this court's responsibility to evaluate a potential search "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). ¶153 This court owes it to law enforcement, lawyers, litigants, circuit courts, the court of appeals, and the public at large to provide clarity about when a search has occurred regarding cell phone location data and what procedures must be undertaken by constitutional.12 the government to render such searches A clear set of rules will protect privacy interests and also give guidance to individuals evaluating these interests. ¶154 Rather than dance around the issue of whether government access to cell phone location data in the instant cases is a search within the meaning of the Constitutions, I propose that the court address it head-on. Government access to cell phone location data raises novel legal questions of great importance for the privacy rights of the public in an emerging 12 "[W]e promote clarity in the law of search and seizure and provide straightforward guidelines to governmental officers who must apply our holdings." State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶25, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460. 4 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa area of technology exactly the type of questions appropriate for resolution pursuant to this court's law-developing function. ¶155 I location conclude data in the that government instant cases, access which to cell involves phone invasive surveillance of an individual's movements, is a search within the meaning of the Constitutions.13 To read the Constitutions more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the cell phone has come to play in private communications, to paraphrase the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).14 ¶156 People do not buy cell phones to have them serve as government tracking devices. They do not expect the government to track them by using location information the government gets from cell phones.15 People have a subjective expectation of privacy in cell phone location data that society is prepared to 13 Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and N. Patrick Crooks agree with this conclusion. 14 "To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 15 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2599917, at *9 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[I]t is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information.") (quoting In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. To Disclose Records to Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010)); Earls, 70 A. 3d at 632. 5 No. recognize as reasonable. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Thus, absent a warrant, such a search is per se unreasonable.16 ¶157 If the State does not have a warrant, the State can access cell phone location data only if the State can demonstrate one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. In both Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio, law enforcement officers could have accessed cell phone location data with a properly authorized warrant that complied with existing relevant statutes.17 They did not. ¶158 I address the balance between privacy interests and law enforcement Osorio.18 interests as presented by Tate and Subdiaz- These two cases address substantially similar issues regarding government access to cell phone location data but pose distinct fact patterns. ¶159 Neither Prosser's lead the opinion Tate in majority opinion Subdiaz-Osorio decides nor Justice whether the government access in question constituted a search within the meaning of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. Both opinions assume that a search occurred. ¶160 Despite the insistence of the Tate majority opinion and Justice Prosser's lead opinion in Subdiaz-Osorio that they 16 State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶27, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 N.W.2d 713; State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶30, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548. 17 I refer to the court order issued in Tate as a "warrant," as does the Tate majority opinion. The applicable statute refers to a court issuing a "subpoena" requiring the production of documents. Wis. Stat. § 968.135. 18 "Privacy comes at a cost." 6 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa merely assume, without deciding, that the government access was a search in each case,19 both opinions address the search issue as they elaborate on cases and principles underlying their assumption that a search occurred. ¶161 The Tate majority opinion and Justice Prosser's lead opinion in Subdiaz-Osorio refer to and draw guidance from the same Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court cases, including the recently mandated Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).20 ¶162 The Tate majority opinion and Justice Prosser's lead opinion announce principles of law that overlap and to an extent 19 Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶2, 26; Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶9, 70 (Prosser, J., lead op.). But see Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶132 (accusing Justice Prosser's lead opinion of not merely assuming the issue of the reasonable expectation of privacy but in effect deciding the issue). 20 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶20 n.11; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶47 n.23); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶1921; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶51-52, 6566; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶132); Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶1725; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶43, 48, 51; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶135; State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (cited in Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶16-18, 40; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶38, 49; State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (cited in Tate, ¶¶14, 23, 28, 30, 40-43; in Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶49). 7 No. conflict with each other.21 separate writings in 2010AP3016-CR.ssa The two opinions, as well as the Subdiaz-Osorio of Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and Patience Drake Roggensack, must thus be read together carefully to understand the court's position on the constitutionality of law enforcement access to a person's cell phone location data.22 ¶163 To address the overlapping issues raised by these two cases, I organize my dissenting opinions as follows. Each heading number corresponds to the relevant subdivision of each dissent. ¶164 In my dissent in Tate, I address the following main points: Part I. The police access to the defendant's cell phone location data, an issue in both Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio, was a search within the meaning of the Constitutions.23 21 See Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶131-132 (criticizing Justice Prosser's lead opinion for "elaborate[ing] too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear"); Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶50 (noting that Tate shares similarities with Subdiaz-Osorio even though it is ultimately decided on other issues). 22 In footnotes 23 through 30, I consolidate and summarize the position of each opinion in Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio regarding particular topics. 23 For discussions of whether a search existed, see: Tate, 2014 WI 89, there was a search. ¶26: Assumes, without deciding, that Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶9: Assumes, without deciding, that there was a search but hints strongly that a search existed. 8 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Part II. The search existed as a trespass.24 Part III. The search existed as an invasion of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. A. The subjective expectation of privacy was not undermined by: 1. The cell phone contract;25 or Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89; Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶116: Determine that there was a search. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶131137: Criticizes Justice Prosser's lead opinion for elaborating too fully on right to privacy in cell phone location data. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶139-143: Joining Justice Roggensack's concurrence, and requesting additional briefing on whether a search existed. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶61 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): Yes, access to cell phone location data is a search. See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶155. 24 For discussions of whether a trespass existed, see: Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶18-20: Discusses trespass but refers to the search only as "nontrespassory." Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead Trespass analysis would be "unnatural." op., ¶¶48-50: Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶101-102 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): State does not disclose how information was obtained; appears to be a trespass. See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 25 For discussions of whether the cell phone contract created consent to access the cell phone location data, see: Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶22: purchase of cell phone. Defendant might consent through Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶53-63: Consent through cell phone purchase contract was invalid. 9 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa 2. The third-party doctrine.26 B. Society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone location data.27 Subdiaz-Osorio, 135: Questions contract. Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶133Justice Prosser's lead opinion regarding Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶116-121 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): Adhesion contract will not be enforced to waive constitutional rights. See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 26 For discussions of the impact of third-party doctrine, see: Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶24-25: Third-party doctrine may need reevaluation. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶134-135: Questions whether expectation of privacy exists in thirdparty records. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶122-135, (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): Third-party doctrine in inapplicable to cell phone location data. 27 For discussions of whether reasonable expectation of privacy, see: society recognizes a Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶2, 16-25: Expectation of privacy may be lower for cell phone location, especially in a public area; expectation of privacy was dependent on the cell phone's location in a home. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶65-68: Public expects privacy in cell phone location data and worries about invasion of privacy. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶134135: Questions whether expectation of privacy exists in third-party records. 10 No. Part IV. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135, the 2010AP3016-CR.ssa statute setting forth the requirements for a subpoena of documents, should have been followed it was not in either Tate or in Subdiaz-Osorio.28 ¶165 In my dissent in Subdiaz-Osorio, I address two main points: Part V. The State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the existence of exigent circumstances;29 and Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶136-149 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): Case law, public policy, and Wisconsin legislation point to society recognizing reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone location data. See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 28 For discussions of the warrant requirement, see: Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶33-50: Warrant did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 968.135, subpoena for third-party information. Non-statutory warrant met constitutional requirements. Non-statutory warrants met "spirit" of warrant statutes. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶5 n.2: No warrant at issue, but warrants must meet Fourth Amendment and statutory requirements. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89: A warrant was needed and the State's warrant failed to comply in either case. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶118: warrant was needed but the good-faith exception applied. A Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶150-163 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting): State fails to comply with statutory warrant requirements. Warrant was invalid. See also Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶168. 29 For discussions of exigent circumstances, see: Tate: Exigent circumstances not at issue. 11 No. Part VI. The defendant invoked his 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Miranda right to an attorney at his interrogation.30 ¶166 My discussion in Parts I-IV of my Tate dissent is relevant to Subdiaz-Osorio, and I incorporate Parts I-IV of my Tate dissent into my Subdiaz-Osorio dissent without repeating Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶69-81: Exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement was satisfied. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89: there were no exigent circumstances. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Crooks' were no exigent circumstances. concurrence, ¶118: there Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶130: Law enforcement acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment due to exigent circumstances. Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶169208: State fails to meet its burden to show exigent circumstances. 30 For discussions of the Miranda right to an attorney, see: Tate: Miranda rights not at issue. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Prosser's lead op., ¶¶82-87: Defendant failed to invoke unequivocally right to an attorney. Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, Defendant successfully invoked Miranda right. ¶89: Subdiaz-Osorio, Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶109; Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶130: Defendant failed to invoke unequivocally right to an attorney. Subdiaz-Osorio, Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶209219: A reasonable person would understand Subdiaz-Osorio to have invoked his Miranda right. 12 No. them in full. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Parts V and VI address issues found only in my Subdiaz-Osorio dissent.31 ¶167 Accordingly, I dissent in both cases. I-IV ¶168 Parts I-IV of my dissent in Tate constitute Parts I-IV of this dissent. In other words, I incorporate by reference Parts I-IV of the Tate dissent. See Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶52-163 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). V ¶169 Law defendant's enforcement cell phone did not location obtain a data in warrant for the Subdiaz-Osorio. Warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth 31 The two cases raise numerous additional issues that I do not address, including the applicability of federal statutes, the good-faith exception, and the proper standard for reviewing and remedying an illegal search of cell phone location data. Justice Crooks' concurrence in Subdiaz-Osorio asserts that an illegal warrantless search occurred, Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶¶125-128, but that the good-faith exception applies, and that the evidence should not have been excluded. As I explain in Parts I-IV, our state's case law already set forth the need for a warrant and the statutes provide procedures for obtaining a warrant. These rules of law existed at the time that the officers initiated the search in the instant cases. I am unconvinced that the usual harmless-error analysis is the proper approach in Tate and Subdiaz-Osorio. See SubdiazOsorio, Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶97-105 (applying harmless-error analysis in Subdiaz-Osorio). When illegally obtained cell phone location data forms the entire basis for the apprehension and arrest of the defendant, rather than evidence of the crime, the usual harmless-error analysis appears to be a poor fit. 13 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Amendment . . . ."32 of the United States Constitution and under the Wisconsin Constitution. ¶170 The government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a warrantless search falls within one of the requirement.33 ¶171 By narrowly delineated exceptions to the warrant One such exception is exigent circumstances. definition, exigent circumstances justifying an exception to the warrant requirement must be exceptional; the circumstances must generate a sense of urgency. Furthermore, the particular warrantless search must be justified by weighing "the urgency of the officer's need to [search] against the time needed to obtain a warrant." State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶28, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29. ¶172 In order to show that an urgent situation existed and that there was no time to secure a warrant, "[t]he officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts," constitute grounds to believe an emergency existed and there was a need to act.34 Each case must be decided on its facts, not on a court's acceptance of overgeneralizations.35 32 Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶27. 33 Payano-Roman, 290 Wis. 2d 380, ¶30; State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998). 34 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.6(a), at 599 (5th ed. 2013) (citation and quotations omitted). 35 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013) (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) (blanket rules cannot be used to justify a lack of a warrant)). 14 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶173 The State failed to demonstrate that any of the three purported circumstances advanced by Justice Prosser's lead opinion threat to safety, risk of destruction of evidence, and increased likelihood of flight36 existed with sufficient urgency to justify the privacy violation in the instant case. To get around the State's paucity of evidence in the record to support urgency, Justice Prosser's lead opinion engages in the type of overgeneralizations condemned by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013). ¶174 In most criminal investigations, at least one of these three purported circumstances exist. If the mere allegation of one of these circumstances is sufficient to demonstrate exigent circumstances, an officer circumstances in most cases. could simply presume exigent Justice Prosser's lead opinion's holding allows the exigent circumstances exception to swallow the warrant requirement in the present case. ¶175 In addition to its failure to show urgency, the State also failed to show that there was not sufficient time to get a warrant under the circumstances. ¶176 Because the State failed to meet its burden to prove exigent circumstances, I dissent. Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks case, agree that in the instant the State failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances to justify an exception to the warrant requirement.37 36 Lead op., ¶76. 37 See Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶89; Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶118. 15 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa A ¶177 In the instant case, the State entered no evidence that alleged exigencies posed the urgent threat necessary to justify the warrantless search in question. ¶178 Justice Prosser's lead opinion relies on three exigent circumstances: (1) destruction evidence"; of "a threat defendant] would flee." ¶179 First, because the and safety"; (3) "a (2) "risk likelihood of that [the states that Lead op., ¶76. Justice murder to Prosser's weapon (a lead knife) opinion was not recovered, "a potentially armed individual who recently committed a homicide" created a "threat to safety." Lead op., ¶77. ¶180 I agree that a threat to safety exists when an armed and dangerous believed to suspect be is armed at large, and but dangerous not poses every an suspect exigent circumstance. ¶181 State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, is instructive. In Richter, the court held that an imminent threat to safety existed when an officer knew that one home had been burglarized, had evidence that the suspect had fled to a second home, observed signs of forced entry into that home, and saw that there were people sleeping inside the second home at the Wis. 2d 524, time ¶41. the This intruder combination entered. of factors Richter, 235 "creat[ed] a situation fraught with potential for physical harm if something was not immediately done to apprehend the suspect." 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶41 (emphasis added). 16 Richter, No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶182 Conversely, in the instant case, there was no such immediate threat. The police could identify only a generalized threat that exists any time a suspect is believed to be armed and is sought offense. armed suspicion of having committed a violent If exigent circumstances exist any time a suspect is and offense, on is under exigent suspicion of circumstances having would committed exist in a most violent criminal investigations and the warrant requirement would be rendered a nullity. ¶183 Justice Prosser's lead opinion bases its determination that a "threat to safety" existed here on pure speculation and conjecture, repeatedly citing information that the police "had no way of knowing." Lead op., ¶78. The police had no way of knowing or even inferring, as Justice Prosser's lead opinion supposes, "that [the defendant] might become violent if confronted," or "how desperate [the defendant] might become to avoid apprehension." Id. ¶184 Second, Justice Prosser's lead opinion asserts that there was a "risk of destruction of evidence." Lead op., ¶76. For this proposition, Justice Prosser's lead opinion offers no reasonable or articulable facts, because none were offered by the State. Nothing in the record 17 demonstrates an imminent No. threat of destruction of evidence.38 2010AP3016-CR.ssa Unlike other cases in our jurisprudence, there were no signs of evidence being destroyed,39 or particular facts to support an officer's suspicion of the destruction of evidence.40 ¶185 Third, Justice Prosser's lead opinion asserts there was "a likelihood that [the defendant] would flee." op., ¶76. The defendant was no longer at the scene. that Lead The police knew the following: the suspect had already fled; the suspect had family in Mexico; and the suspect had told a friend that he did not want to be arrested. ¶186 Criminal suspects are often no longer at the scene of a crime when law enforcement officers arrive. Criminal suspects often have family and friends in places other than the place of the crime. of Criminal suspects can usually access various forms transportation. Criminal suspects rarely intend to be arrested. 38 See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 ("[I]n some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.") (emphasis added); id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J. & Alito, J.) ("[The exigent circumstances exception] applies when there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of important evidence, and there is no time to obtain a warrant.") (emphasis added). 39 See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶26, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621; State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶31, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (in which such signs appeared). 40 See State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 751-53, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998) ("[P]articular facts must be shown in each case to support an officer's reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances exist."). 18 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶187 If these facts alone are enough to justify exigent circumstances, then the rule that the State must show "particular facts" to meet its burden is rendered a nullity. ¶188 Beyond the sparse facts I have stated, the State makes no showing of the delay that would have occurred had the police pursued a warrant. delay, had it Nor does the State make any showing that a existed, defendant's flight. would have had any impact on the The State thus failed to show that getting a warrant would "greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape."41 ¶189 Instead, using 20/20 hindsight, the lead opinion relies upon the defendant's travel time and location upon arrest to justify its assertion that there was an increased risk of flight.42 Justice Prosser's lead opinion speculates about where the defendant went and how he could have moved after he began driving.43 Justice Prosser wonders where the defendant could have gone, listing in great detail the transportation options available in Chicago, then noting that the defendant could have gone elsewhere as well.44 ¶190 Justice Prosser's lead opinion admits that "the police could only route". speculate as Lead op., ¶80. 41 Lead op., (emphasis added). ¶79 42 defendant's] plans or his Justice Prosser's lead opinion then (citing Hughes, Id., ¶80. 44 [the Id., ¶¶80-81 43 to Id. 19 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶24) No. speculates about what the police might 2010AP3016-CR.ssa have speculated a tenuous chain of reasoning with no basis in fact. ¶191 Thus, Justice Prosser's lead opinion bases its determination that there was a greatly enhanced flight risk upon speculation about speculation, creating its own narrative and ignoring the glaring failure of the State to offer one iota of evidence that increased flight risk existed at all. B ¶192 Even if we accept that there was some urgent threat created by the defendant's apparent flight with the murder weapon, the State can meet its burden to establish the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement only when "there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."45 ¶193 All warrants necessarily require some amount of time to secure, but the inquiry for exigent circumstances is whether the State can demonstrate specific, articulable facts showing that the warrant process would "significantly increase" the delay before the officers can act.46 ¶194 Justice Prosser's lead opinion lays out in careful detail the timeline of the events leading up to the defendant's arrest, yet it is missing any evidence about the existence of or length of a delay that would have been caused by obtaining a 45 McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)); id. at 1570 (Roberts, C.J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J. & Alito, J.) (same). 46 Id. at 1561. 20 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa warrant or any evidence that such a delay would have adversely affected law enforcement's ability to act to apprehend the suspect. ¶195 Nothing in the record tells us why the officers, who had obtained a warrant for a search of the defendant's residence, could not have obtained a warrant for the defendant's cell phone location data. based on the record In other words, there is no reason, before us, to suppose that it was impracticable for the officers to obtain a search warrant for the defendant's cell phone location data as well.47 ¶196 The United States Supreme Court has recently informed us once again of the burden of proof the State must meet to fulfill the exigent circumstances exception to a warrant. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, is instructive. ¶197 In dissipation McNeely, of alcohol the in State the of Missouri bloodstream urged created that a per the se exigent circumstance that created an exception to the warrant requirement for a blood draw. The Court held that such a rule would be contrary to the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that it has employed in the past and would potentially relieve the state of any burden to show the actual delay created by securing a warrant: In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 47 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970). 21 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa L.Ed. 153 (1948) ("We cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative"). . . . . Consider, for example, a situation in which the warrant process will not significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because an officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to a medical facility by another officer. In such a circumstance, there would be no plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. ¶198 Thus, the burden on the State in the present case was to show that the situation made the warrantless search in question "imperative" and that securing a warrant "significantly increases" the delay before the officers can take action. ¶199 In the instant case, the record does not include any testimony or evidence demonstrating ¢ at what time the police decided to seek the defendant's cell phone location data; ¢ the estimated amount of time needed to obtain a warrant for the data and the duration of any delay; or ¢ the timeline for obtaining the data absent a warrant, i.e., at request what was time made the to law enforcement the Department of officer's Justice to obtain the cell phone location data; at what time the Department made the request of the cell phone service provider; at what time the cell phone service provider received the Department's request; at what time the 22 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa cell phone service provider processed the request; and at what time the information was transmitted to Arkansas law enforcement. ¶200 Rather demonstrates the than need a clear for a timeline warrantless of the search, events the that record reveals only the barest of facts. Sometime between 10 a.m. and 12 defendant's girlfriend, the information regarding the p.m., Kenosha while police interviewing received the the defendant's departure in a car. The police stated that their interviews, which finished around 12 p.m., established probable cause to send the temporary "want" to CIB/NCIC "within an hour and a half of obtaining information from the witnesses." ¶201 The record reflects that some time transpired between the time that the "want" was executed with CIB/NCIC and the time that the request for cell phone location data was made to the Wisconsin Department of Justice, which then requested the data from Sprint, the cell phone service provider. The State was not able to pinpoint the relevant times: [PROSECUTOR]: Prior to contacting the state of Wisconsin agents for assistance, had you received any hits or any feedback or any communication back from CIB or NCIC? [OFFICER]: No. [PROESCUTOR]: And you indicate that at a point in time then that you contacted state agents to assist in your investigation to locate the defendant? [OFFICER]: Yes. [PROESCUTOR]: Do you recall what time that occurred? [OFFICER]: I don't know the specific time. It was probably sometime after 12:00 in the afternoon. 23 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa On cross-examination, defense counsel was not able to get the officer to pinpoint the approximate time frame for the various events: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it was after you had received information from [four witnesses] that you put in the information for the Temporary Felony Worksheet, the document submitted to CIB/NCIC? [OFFICER]: I had not spoken with [one witness] before that was entered. I don't know exactly when the temporary want was entered because, like I said, I didn't do that. But it was after we had gathered enough information to establish probable cause for [the defendant]. ¶202 After CIB/NCIC did not respond with any hits, the Kenosha police requested the defendant's location data "sometime after 12:00 p.m." The police received the data from state law enforcement "sometime in the afternoon." The information was not transmitted to Arkansas until 5:37 p.m. ¶203 The record does not show that any additional wait time would have resulted from obtaining a warrant. The record does not show that the time to secure a warrant would have made any demonstrable difference in the time it took to obtain the cell phone location data. ¶204 On testimony the reveals contrary, the the law efficiency and system to approve warrants. enforcement speed of the officers' existing When the police in the instant case sought to obtain a search warrant for the defendant's residence, it took a mere ten to fifteen minutes after the affidavit was completed for a judge to arrive. Within half an hour of the judge's arrival, the search warrant was approved. From the time the police began working on the affidavit for a search warrant 24 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa for the defendant's residence until the warrant was approved, a maximum of an hour and a half had elapsed. ¶205 On this record, the State cannot meet its burden to demonstrate that the time to secure a warrant would significantly delay, or indeed, delay at all, the disclosure of the defendant's cell phone location data or the apprehension of the defendant. ¶206 In sum, the State failed to carry its burden of proof. Through conjecture and speculation, the lead opinion fills in the many blanks of key facts missing from the record. ¶207 The lead opinion's exigent circumstances swallows the rule of the warrant requirement. Justice Prosser's lead opinion's exception According to reasoning, almost every criminal investigation presents exigent circumstances. ¶208 I decline to undercut the warrant requirement or ignore the heavy burden placed on the State to prove the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. VI ¶209 I turn at last to the invocation of his right to counsel. issue of the defendant's The key holding of Miranda v. Arizona48 was straightforward: "If [an] individual states that he [or she] wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."49 48 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 49 Miranda, 834 U.S. at 474. 25 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶210 Justice Prosser's lead opinion requires a suspect to make an "unequivocal invocation" of the right to counsel. This test stems from Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). ¶211 The test has Davis been "unequivocal" heavily or criticized on "unambiguous" a number of invocation grounds, including that the "unequivocal" test invites equivocation on the part of courts identical statements appear "unequivocal" to one court "unequivocal but "equivocal" invocation" to another.50 test, courts In have applying the "rejected as ambiguous an array of statements whose meaning might otherwise be thought plain."51 50 Compare United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (invocation was unequivocal when defendant said "I'd rather talk to an attorney first before I do that") with Delashmit v. State, 991 So. 2d 1215 (Miss. 2008) (invocation was equivocal when defendant said "I prefer a lawyer"). Compare also Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2011) (invocation was unequivocal when defendant said "I think I should get a lawyer") with Commonwealth v. Morganti, 917 N.E.2d 191 (Mass. 2009) (invocation was equivocal when defendant said he was "thinking I might need a lawyer and want to talk to him before talking to you"). 51 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 410-11 & n.9 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor cites a variety of cases in the context of invocations of the Miranda right to remain silent in which courts have applied the test subjectively. As Marcy Strauss notes in her empirical overview of cases regarding the application of the "unequivocal invocation" rule, courts apply their own subjective spin to a purportedly objective test: [T]he evidence suggests gross inconsistencies in the approaches of the courts. Some courts deem seemingly clear demands as ambiguous. Yet in other cases, virtually identical language is treated differently in ways inexplicable by the context. It is drastically unfair that a suspect in one jurisdiction who says, "I 26 No. ¶212 Davis requires a court to make 2010AP3016-CR.ssa an objectively reasonable analysis of the circumstances to determine whether an individual's request for a lawyer is unequivocal. The defendant need evince only "a certain and present desire to consult with counsel" to invoke the right. 938, 942 (7th Cir. 2013). United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d Courts are required "to evaluate a defendant's request as ordinary people would understand it, and to give a defendant's broad, request rather for than a counsel." narrow, interpretation Hunter, 708 F.3d at to a 942 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).52 think I would like to talk to my attorney," can be ignored, while a similar statement in another jurisdiction is treated as invoking Edwards. It makes no logical sense whatsoever that the police may continue questioning a suspect who says, "Can I call my lawyer?" in one station house, while in another one the comment, "Can I have my lawyer present when [I tell you my story]?" is deemed an invocation of rights requiring the cessation of questions. Such contradictory results are not only unfair, they are pernicious. Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1011, 1061-62 (2007) (footnotes and citations omitted). 52 "Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2013), the court held that the defendant's asking "Can you call my attorney?" while giving the officer the name of the attorney constituted an unequivocal invocation of the right to an attorney. 27 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶213 In the instant case, the defendant said, "How can I do to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford for one" (emphasis added). ¶214 An defendant's ordinary statement, reasonable would person, understand making a request for a lawyer. cannot afford an attorney and looking the at defendant the to be The defendant is saying he wants to know how to get an attorney at that place and time. ¶215 Justice interpretation Prosser's of the lead opinion defendant's Prosser's lead opinion gives squinting hard at record, the them ignores words. a Instead, narrow searching the broad Justice interpretation, for ambiguity equivocation where a reasonable person would find none. or Lead op., ¶¶86-87. ¶216 Justice Prosser's lead opinion focuses on the discussion of extradition to twist the defendant's request for a lawyer into a request for counsel at the extradition hearing. Lead op., ¶86-87. Justice Prosser's lead opinion claims that the officer had "just explained the extradition process to [the defendant]," which made it reasonable for the officer to infer that "here" meant "at the extradition hearing." ¶217 Here is what happened: Lead op., ¶87. The officer interrogating the defendant described the extradition hearing ("What happens is that you have to appear in front of a judge here in Arkansas then they will find out if there is enough reason to send you back to Kenosha"). But then, the officer added, "But we are not going to do that right now. We are not going to know that right 28 No. now" (emphasis added).53 The officer made 2010AP3016-CR.ssa clear that the extradition hearing was no longer the subject of conversation. ¶218 It is not objectively reasonable to assume that the defendant used the word "here" to mean anything other than its generally understood definition. The word "here" is generally intended to mean "in or at this place or time." A reasonable person would not understand "here" to mean "at some later point in time." What was happening "here"? The interrogation. reasonable person, saying the defendant is that he To a wants a lawyer and wants a lawyer at the interrogation. ¶219 Justice Prosser's lead opinion requires the defendant to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don54 and to use an "exact formula" counsel. or "magic words"55 to invoke the right to That's not the law. * * * * 53 The relevant portion of the interrogation was transcribed by the circuit court as follows: [POLICE OFFICER]: We aren't going to take you back to Kenosha. What happens is that you have to appear in front of a judge . . . . And after you appear in front of a judge here in Arkansas then they will find out if there is enough reason to send you back to Kenosha, . . . but we are not going to do that right now. We are not going to know that right now . . . . [DEFENDANT]: How can I do to get an attorney here because I don't have enough to afford for one. 54 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 55 United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]here is no exact formula or magic words for an accused to invoke his [or her] right."). 29 No. 2010AP3016-CR.ssa ¶220 In sum, for the reasons stated, I conclude that in the instant case the State failed to meet its demonstrating the existence of exigent circumstances. burden of I further conclude that Subdiaz-Osorio invoked his Miranda right to an attorney at his interrogation. ¶221 For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in my dissent in Tate, 2014 WI 89, dissenting), I dissent. 30 ¶¶52-165 (Abrahamson, C.J., No. 1 2010AP3016-CR.ssa

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