Patricia A. Steiner v. Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company
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2005 WI 72 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: COMPLETE TITLE: OF WISCONSIN 2003AP1959 Patricia A. Steiner Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, John M. Steiner, Plaintiff, Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp. and Healthcare Financing Administration, Involuntary-Plaintiffs, v. Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant-Respondent, Robert Steiner and Mt. Morris Mutual Ins. Co., Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 2004 WI App 135 Reported at: 275 Wis. 2d 359, 685 N.W.2d 831 (Ct. App. 2004-Published) OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: March 1, 2005 SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: Circuit Adams Duane Polivka JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: June 9, 2005 WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). ROGGENSACK, J., joins the dissent. NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Jeffrey T. Nichols, Stacy K. Luell and Crivello, Carlson & Mentkowski, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Stacy Kay Luell. For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Timothy J. Yanacheck, Ward I. Richter and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Timothy J. Yanacheck. 2005 WI 72 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2003AP1959 (L.C. No. 01 CV 125) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT Patricia A. Steiner Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, John M. Steiner, Plaintiff, Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp. and Healthcare Financing Administration, FILED Involuntary-Plaintiffs, JUN 9, 2005 v. Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company, Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court Defendant-Respondent, Robert Steiner and Mt. Morris Mutual Ins. Co., Defendants-AppellantsPetitioners. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. remanded. Reversed and No. ¶1 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. 2003AP1959 This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court for Adams County, Duane H. Polivka, Judge. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company (WAMIC), Steiner Corporation's insurer, against Patricia Steiner and her husband John Steiner, the plaintiffs, concluding that the Corporation (the land contract vendee) did not own the property in question as of October 7, 1999, and therefore was not liable for the plaintiffs' injuries sustained on the property on October 15, 1999. ¶2 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that the period for redemption for the judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract against the Corporation (the land contract vendee) ended on October 7, 1999, and that under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 (2001-02),2 equitable title reverts to the land contract vendor at the expiration of the redemption period if the land contract vendee fails to make full payment, that is, fails to redeem. appeals, the Corporation October 7, 1999. ceased to According to the court of own the property as of Therefore, the corporation was not liable for 1 Steiner v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 135, 275 Wis.2d 359, 685 N.W.2d 831. 2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 200102 version unless otherwise indicated. 2 No. 2003AP1959 any personal injuries occurring on the property after October 7, 1999. ¶3 The issue presented in this case is when, under Wis. Stat. § 846.30,3 does equitable title to the property in a land contract revert from a land contract vendee to the land contract vendor. That is, does equitable title remain with a land contract vendee until a circuit court, following expiration of the redemption period for strict foreclosure, enters an order confirming the land contract vendee's default? Or does equitable title to the property automatically revert to the land contract vendor at the expiration of the redemption period for strict foreclosure without a circuit court entering an order? ¶4 We hold that under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 equitable title remains with a land contract vendee until a circuit court enters a final order, following the redemption land contract for strict foreclosure, confirming nonredemption. As a result, in the present case equitable title 3 the period vendee's Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 reads: If a court finds that the purchaser under a land contract is obligated to make certain payments under that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period confirming that no redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute. 3 No. 2003AP1959 did not pass from the Steiner Corporation (the land contract vendee) to the land contract vendors until December 1, 1999, when an order confirming the nonredemption was entered. Accordingly, the Corporation had equitable title to the property under the land contract on October 15, 1999, the date of the plaintiffs' personal injuries, and the Corporation and WAMIC, its insurer, may be subject to liability for plaintiffs' injuries. ¶5 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. ¶6 We discuss the issue presented, exploring its various aspects, in the following order: review. II. The facts. contracts. I. The standard of appellate III. The law of foreclosure of land IV. The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. The application of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 to the facts. V. VI. The liability of Steiner Corporation for the acts of Robert Steiner. I ¶7 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the standards governing summary judgment set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) in the same manner as the circuit court.4 of Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no issues material fact, but only questions moving party is entitled to judgment.5 4 of law upon which the In reviewing whether Badger State Bank v. Taylor, 2004 WI 128, ¶12, 276 Wis. 2d 312, 688 N.W.2d 439. 5 Id. at ¶12. 4 No. 2003AP1959 there are genuine issues of material fact, a reviewing court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.6 ¶8 There are no issues of material fact at issue in the present case. namely, the The only question interpretation and presented is application § 846.30 to the undisputed facts. one of of Wis. law, Stat. This court determines this question of law independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses.7 II ¶9 We set forth the facts that are, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, not in dispute. ¶10 Patricia Steiner and John Steiner, Sr., Patricia's husband, are the plaintiffs in this suit for personal injuries. They and John Steiner, Sr.'s brother, Robert Steiner, purchased the resort property at issue in this case in 1954.8 The three will be referred to as the land contract vendors. ¶11 The land contract vendors conveyed their interest in the property in 1995 to the Steiner Corporation by a series of 6 Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., 2000 WI 87, ¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142. 7 Id. at ¶13. 8 Patricia Steiner and her husband owned an undivided half interest; Robert Steiner owned the other undivided half interest. 5 No. land contracts.9 2003AP1959 The plaintiffs' three sons, John, Jr., Patrick, and David Steiner, were the shareholders of Steiner Corporation. WAMIC provided Steiner Corporation liability insurance coverage for the property. ¶12 The Steiner Corporation apparently made a modest down payment and paid very little on the principal and interest under the land contract. By 1998 Steiner Corporation making payments on the land contract altogether. had stopped Third parties had liens on the property. ¶13 The land contract vendors filed suit in April 1999 to foreclose on the land contract and take back the property. They moved for a default judgment on the foreclosure action in August 1999. In response to this motion, on September 7, 1999, the circuit court held a hearing. ¶14 The land contract vendors' suit for foreclosure originally sought strict foreclosure, but at the hearing the parties and the circuit court agreed that specific performance (judicial sale) would be preferable in this case because of third-party debts, including a tax lien by the state. ¶15 the The property was not sold by judicial sale. circuit October 19, performance. court 1999, entered not a the strict foreclosure previously Instead, judgment agreed-upon on specific The judgment provided that if the Corporation did 9 Originally, the land contract vendees were John Steiner, Jr. and Patrick Steiner, but a year later the land contract was voided and the land was conveyed by land contract to Steiner Corporation. 6 No. 2003AP1959 not pay the amount owed by October 7, 1999, "all right, title and interest" of the Steiner Corporation in the property would cease to exist; title would vest in the land contract vendors. The judgment read, in relevant part: [T]here is now due and unpaid on said Land Contract, as of September 7, 1999, the sum of [$178,330.15 plus costs, fees, and interest]. . . . That the said Land Contracts . . . be strictly foreclosed. That the Defendants shall, on or before October 7, 1999, pay the Clerk of this Court the total sum now due under said Contract [plus interest to redeem the contract.] . . . . That if payment is not made within the time above specified, the real estate described herein, and any interest therein of Defendants and any persons claiming under them, and all right, title and interest of Defendants therein, shall cease to exist, with the title vesting in the name of Plaintiffs . . . . [The judgment also contained provisions should Steiner Corporation redeem the property by paying the outstanding amount.] The judgment's ____, 1999." typewritten date line reads: "Dated September "September" is crossed out and "October" is hand- written over it; the blank is filled in with "19th." This October 19 judgment provides for a redemption period ending 30 days after the September 7 hearing, or October 7. ¶16 A final judgment was entered on December 1, 1999. The final judgment states that the October 19, 1999 order provided for strict foreclosure with a redemption period ending 30 days from October September October 7. 19. This 7 hearing or final a judgment 30-day does redemption not mention period ending the on The December 1 judgment nevertheless confirmed that 7 No. 2003AP1959 Steiner Corporation failed to pay the amount owed within 30 days of October interest 19, "shall forever barred." 1999, cease and to that exist the and land shall contract be and vendee's hereby are The relevant portion of the December 1, 1999 judgment reads as follows: The Court having entered its judgment . . . on October 19, 1999, providing for the strict foreclosure of Land Contracts by and between Plaintiffs, as vendors and Defendants . . . as purchasers, providing the Defendants shall have thirty (30) days from October 19, 1999 to pay the Clerk of this Court the amount due under said Land Contracts recorded on September 6, 1994 . . . . That the Court having been further advised that no payment has been received by the Clerk of Court as appears by the Affidavit of Non-Redemption on file . . . . NOW, THEREFORE, the original judgment entered by this Court on October 19, 1999 be and the same hereby is confirmed in all respects; that any and all right, title and interest of Defendants, and each of them in the original Land Contracts between Plaintiffs and said Defendants, and any parties claiming under them, shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby are forever barred. The judgment's date line reads, "Dated November ____, 1999." November is crossed out and "December" is handwritten over it; the ____ is filled in with "1st." ¶17 All the preceding hearings and judgments would have passed without notice if Patricia Steiner had not been injured on the resort property on October 15, 1999, by slipping and falling into a dry well. ¶18 The plaintiffs sued WAMIC in August of 2001 alleging that the Steiner Corporation was the owner of the property on 8 No. 2003AP1959 October 15, 1999, and that WAMIC was responsible for paying the damages associated with her amended their complaint injuries. to include The Robert plaintiffs Steiner later and his homeowner's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company (Mt. Morris) as defendants. Mt. Morris filed a cross-claim against WAMIC seeking indemnification for Robert Steiner because he was allegedly acting as an agent of Steiner Corporation when he uncovered the dry well into which Patricia Steiner fell. ¶19 On May 20, 2003, the circuit court held that the Steiner Corporation no longer owned the property as of October 7, 1999, and that the Corporation "had no basis on which to employ Robert Steiner and no right to control his activities." Accordingly, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of WAMIC and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for personal injury. ¶20 The plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's judgment. The court of appeals affirmed; the plaintiffs sought review in this court. III ¶21 We now turn to the law of foreclosure of land contracts. ¶22 Land instrument contracts in contracts Wisconsin provide a are an real number important estate of vendor and land contract contract vendee may make a mortgage transaction vendee costs, with the opportunity long-standing transactions. advantages contract and for the land Because vendee. both the land smaller a down payment land contract may to purchase 9 Land property. and avoid present The the land No. contract vendor structuring has the advantage terms, installment of greater payments for 2003AP1959 flexibility beneficial in income tax advantages, and alternative remedies in the event the vendee defaults.10 Similarly, it has historically been faster and cheaper to foreclose a defaulted land sale contract.11 ¶23 A land contract vendor holds legal title as security for the unpaid balance of the contract, while the land contract vendee holds effect gives equitable the title.12 land Holding contract vendee equitable "full title in rights" of ownership, including the ability to "sell, lease or encumber the real estate subject to the rights of contract provides to the contrary."13 has liabilities generally attributed the Vendor unless the The land contract vendee to ownership, such as 10 Jay E. Grenig & Nathan A. Fishbach, Methods of Practice, 1 Wisconsin Practice Series § 8.3 at 275 (4th ed. 2004); Martin J. Greenberg & Henry R. Pinekenstein, Wisconsin Land Contracts 2-7 (1986); John S. Goodland, Mortgage and Land Contract Foreclosures in Wisconsin § 11.01 at 45 (1989). 11 J.H. Beuscher, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts A Preface, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 379, 381 (comparing strict foreclosure of land contracts with foreclosure of real estate mortgages in 1941 and finding that it took 11 months less time and cost approximately 40% less to foreclose a land contract). 12 City of Milwaukee v. Greenberg, 163 Wis. 2d 28, 36-39, 471 N.W.2d 33 (1991). 13 Greenberg & Pinekenstein, supra note 10, at 2. 10 No. 2003AP1959 payment of taxes,14 and is also generally liable as the owner to third parties injured on the property.15 ¶24 In addition to providing parties the flexibility to set the terms of the conveyance, the land contract offers a vendor several alternative remedies should the vendee default.16 Each remedy has advantages or disadvantages depending on the particulars of the situation. The relevant remedy in this case is strict foreclosure. 14 15 Greenberg, 163 Wis. 2d at 37-38. McCarty v. Covelli, N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1994). 182 Wis. 2d 342, 345-46, 514 16 Kallenbach v. Lake Publ'ns, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 651, 142 N.W.2d 212 (1966). A land contract vendor can elect to sue for the unpaid purchase price (not an attractive option unless the land contract vendee has other assets to satisfy a judgment). Id. A land contract vendor can also sue for specific performance of the contract (under this option the vendor "elects to affirm the contract by having the property auctioned at judicial sale"). Id. If specific performance is chosen, the land contract vendor recovers only the purchase price plus costs and disbursements. Id. Were the property to sell for more than this amount, the land contract vendee gets any surplus. Id. Conversely, any shortfall between the purchase price and the sale price results in a liability for the land contract vendee. Id. See also Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, §§ 8.40-8.64 at 294-302. In certain situations the vendor can declare the contract at an end and resolve the parties' rights under the land contract with a quiet-title action. Id. 11 No. ¶25 2003AP1959 Strict foreclosure is a long-standing equitable remedy in Wisconsin.17 It is generally a faster remedy for the land contract vendor than the remedies provided a mortgagee.18 ¶26 In strict foreclosure, the land contract vendor forgoes his or her right to collect the amount remaining on the debt19 and instead recovers the property.20 In the event of a vendee's default on a land contract, under strict foreclosure the circuit court's judgment sets a period, called the 17 Exchange Corp. of Wis. v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 559, 202 For brief N.W.2d 393 (1972); Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 652. descriptions of the remedies, including strict foreclosure and specific performance, see Goodland, supra note 10, §§ 11.0211.08 at 46-51. 18 State of Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Regulation and Licensing, Wisconsin Real Estate ("Here is the principal reason for the seller's contract rather than a mortgage."). See also note 11, at 381. 19 Board, Dep't of Law 8-1 (1976) choosing a land Beuscher, supra Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 657. 20 Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 652 (quoting Henry Uihlein Realty Co. v. Downtown Dev. Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 620, 628, 101 N.W.2d 775 (1960)); see also Exchange Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 559 ("There is no dispute that the purpose of a strict foreclosure action is to terminate any further right to perform the land contract on the part of the vendee because of his default and to confirm the legal title in the vendor free of any equitable ownership or claim under the contract of purchase."). 12 No. 2003AP1959 redemption period, in which the vendee must pay up or lose all his or her interest in the land.21 ¶27 At common law, the circuit court had the discretion to set the duration of the redemption period.22 The only limit on the operation of the circuit court's discretion was that the period had to be "reasonable" when viewed under the totality of the circumstances of the case.23 ¶28 As part of Wis. Stat. § 846.30,24 the legislature mandated that a redemption period for a land contract must be at least seven working days from the date of the judgment hearing 21 In both specific performance and strict foreclosure actions, the circuit court usually grants the land contract vendee a redemption period in which the vendee is given the opportunity to pay the amount due. Benkert v. Gruenewald, 223 Wis. 44, 269 N.W. 672 (1936) (strict foreclosure); Godwin v. Miller, 199 Wis. 497, 226 N.W. 954 (1929) (strict foreclosure); Dickson v. Loehr, 126 Wis. 641, 106 N.W. 793 (1906) (strict foreclosure); Buswell v. Peterson, 41 Wis. 82 (1876) (strict foreclosure). 22 Scott C. Minter & Richard J. Staff, Wisconsin Real Estate Law 368 (2001 ed.). 23 Godwin 199 Wis. at 500. The fixing of the period of time within which a vendee under the land contract may redeem is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the court. But the time fixed must be reasonable in view of all the circumstances of the case. Unless the time fixed is reasonable, the court abuses its discretion, and the judgment will be set aside or so modified as to prescribe a reasonable time. Id. 24 1995 Wis. Act 250, § 3 (effective May 3, 1996); see also Minter & Staff, supra note 22, at 368. 13 No. 2003AP1959 or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. ¶29 We turn now to an examination of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. IV ¶30 To understand Wis. Stat. § 846.30, we look first to the text of the statute. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 reads as follows: Redemption period for land contracts. If a court finds that the purchaser under a land contract is obligated to make certain payments under that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period confirming that no redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute. ¶31 The first sentence of the statute requires, as we stated previously, that a court set a redemption period in a strict foreclosure judgment and further requires that, at a minimum, the redemption period be at least seven working days from the date of the judgment hearing or the date of the entry of the judgment order. This provision appears to be a direct reaction to an unpublished court of appeals decision, Walker v. Dorney, No. 1993AP2389-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1994). ¶32 In Walker, the court of appeals affirmed a circuit court's strict foreclosure judgment that granted no redemption 14 No. period to the land contract vendees in default. 2003AP1959 A letter in the drafting file suggested the text of the first sentence of the statute, stating: "Were it not for the Walker vs. Dorney case I would not suggest legislation I never previously considered the possibility that a judge hearing a contested strict foreclosure action would even have the authority to issue a foreclosure judgment without a redemption period."25 ¶33 The second and final sentence of the statute, at issue today, provides the mechanism for finalizing the judgment of strict foreclosure. It reads: "No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of redemption has foreclosure the redemption occurred and absolute." period making Wisconsin confirming the judgment Stat. § 846.30 that of no strict does not explicitly address whether the final order merely confirms that title has been transferred at an earlier date or whether the final order transfers title. The parties dispute the import of this sentence, and they present alternative interpretations of the sentence. ¶34 the WAMIC asserts that Wis. Stat. § 846.30 does not change common law rule that a land contract vendee's equitable title automatically reverts to the land contract vendor at the end of the redemption period, 25 so that in the present case See January 4, 1995 Letter from Atty. Bruce A. Marshall to Representative Marty Reynolds and Senator Dave Zien found in the Drafting Records to 1995 Act 250, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, WI. 15 No. equitable title contract vendors October 7, 1999. and legal when the the were period combined of in redemption the land expired on According to WAMIC, the final order merely "confirms" the reversion supplant title 2003AP1959 parties' of title; substantive the final rights order that does not exist at the under the expiration of the redemption period. ¶35 common Conversely, law and under the plaintiffs Wis. Stat. assert § 846.30 that a land contract vendee's equitable title reverts to the land contract vendor only upon entry of the final order. ¶36 Relevant to interpreting the final sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 is the statute's impact on common law. WAMIC argues, as the court of appeals held, that because Wis. Stat. § 846.30 does not clearly indicate that the legislature intended to overrule or modify the common law, the statute does not alter the common law.26 26 Gaugert v. Duve, 2001 WI 83, ¶41, 244 Wis. 2d 691, 628 N.W.2d 861 (a rule of statutory interpretation is that the legislature's intent to change the common law must be clearly expressed). The rule that statutes changing the common law must do so through a clear legislative expression and must be interpreted narrowly is a rule that has been the object of a great deal of criticism as hindering legislative change and as having no analytical or philosophical justification. See 3 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 61:4 (5th ed. Supp. 2001). 16 No. ¶37 2003AP1959 As the basis of its understanding of the common law, WAMIC relies on a passage in Exchange Corp. of Wisconsin v. Kuntz, a 1972 case.27 This court said in Exchange Corp.: Normally, a decree in strict foreclosure, which at best is an unusual form of decree, finds a default on the part of the vendee, confirms absolute title in the vendor, and provides, subject to a condition subsequent, that the vendor may have to convey if the vendee pays the total purchase price within a given period of time. . . . . [T]he judgment . . . becomes final or absolute only upon the expiration of the period of redemption. Such a judgment may be considered as an interlocutory judgment which automatically becomes final upon the expiration of the period of redemption without any further motion or decree making it absolute. If the record is to reflect the fact the vendee did not redeem, an order may be entered finding the vendee did not meet the conditions; sometimes an affidavit of such fact is filed. But if the order is used, it would normally not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal title in the vendor.28 ¶38 In essence, the judgment, under Exchange Corp., is an interlocutory judgment that automatically becomes final on the expiration of the redemption period. That is, the parties need take no further action to affect title; failure of the vendee to redeem means the vendor has complete title. ¶39 court The Exchange Corp. court also concluded that a circuit could extend the 27 Exchange Corp. N.W.2d 393 (1972). 28 of period Wis. of v. Id. at 560-61. 17 redemption Kuntz, 56 if the current Wis. 2d 555, 202 No. 2003AP1959 period of redemption had not yet expired, but once the period expired, the period of redemption could not be extended unless the circuit court had reserved the power to do so. ¶40 WAMIC is correct: Exchange Corp. can be viewed as holding that when a vendee is in breach of a land contract and the circuit court has entered a strict foreclosure judgment, title vests in the vendor without any further action of the parties or the circuit court should the vendee fail to pay the full purchase price during court. period set by the WAMIC's position is supported by at least two property treatises period, the redemption that the state land that contract upon expiration vendee's of equitable the redemption rights in the property are cut off, and the vendor is the sole owner of the property.29 ¶41 Given this, WAMIC asserts that the failure of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 to mention any change from the common law rule announced in Exchange Corp. defaulted land contract must about when title mean that the passes common under law a still stands and any circuit court order subsequent to the judgment is merely a confirmation that equitable title has already passed to the vendor. ¶42 The plaintiffs dispute WAMIC's reading of the common law under Exchange Corp. They contend that in a defaulted land 29 See, e.g., 15 Powell on Real Property, § 84.D.03[3] at 84D-35 (Rel. 79-6/97 Pub. 550) (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000); 12 Thompson on Real Property § 100.08(c) at 312 (David A. Thomas ed. 1994). 18 No. 2003AP1959 contract, equitable title does not automatically revert to the land contract vendor at the end of the redemption period absent any additional court action. The plaintiffs rely on a 1937 case, v. St. Joseph's Hospital declaration of the common law.30 Maternity Hospital, as a In St. Joseph's Hospital, the court concluded, "A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does not produce absolute finality. In such judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant's interest and claims for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and quiet title Hospital in court the plaintiff . . . ."31 declared that because the The St. strict Joseph's foreclosure judgment was not absolute, a court has equitable power to allow a land contract vendee to pay under the land contract, even if the vendee had failed to pay before expiration of the redemption period.32 ¶43 The plaintiffs are correct: St. Joseph's Hospital demonstrates that the land contract vendee's equitable ownership interest does not automatically judicial decree is needed. transfer to the vendor; a According to St. Joseph's Hospital, if the land contract vendee's equitable ownership interest had automatically transferred to the vendor upon expiration of the redemption period, the court would not have been able to allow 30 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Maternity Hosp., 224 Wis. 422, 272 N.W.669 (1937). 31 St. Joseph's Hosp., 224 Wis. at 430. 32 St. Joseph's Hosp., 224 Wis. at 430. 19 No. the vendee's interest in the property to 2003AP1959 continue after expiration of the redemption period. ¶44 Although cases subsequent to St. Joseph's Hospital have expressed reservations about the continued vitality of the St. Joseph's Joseph's rule,33 Hospital Hospital was the the basis sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. sentence is a plaintiffs codification of for the argue second that and St. final The plaintiffs assert that the St. Joseph's Hospital and establishes that equitable title to property in a land contract remains with the land contract vendee, despite strict foreclosure and despite nonredemption by the vendee, until a circuit court enters a final order declaring title in the land contract vendor. ¶45 The first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 is not a substantial change from the common law. All that the first sentence does is place a limit on a circuit court's discretion in setting a period of redemption. A circuit court cannot completely deny a period of redemption; the redemption period 33 See Exchange Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 562 ("Broader dicta in the St. Joseph's Hospital Case to the effect the court of equity has inherent jurisdiction after the expiration of the period of redemption without reserving such power is disapproved."); Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 656 (the power the circuit court exercised in St. Joseph's Hospital is contrary to the general rule). WAMIC and Exchange Corp. limit the significance of St. Joseph's Hospital, which was decided in the shadow of the Great Depression. They assume that the balance of equities tilted toward the land contract vendee in that case because of the special circumstances of the period. 20 No. 2003AP1959 must be, at a minimum, seven working days. Courts still have significant periods, control in setting redemption just as before the enactment of § 846.30; the standard continues to be reasonableness in light of the circumstances.34 ¶46 It is not clear whether the second and final sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 alters the common law, because the common law is not clear. It is not clear that Exchange Corp. altered the portion of St. Joseph's Hospital upon which the plaintiffs rely, despite language in Exchange Corp. disapproving "broader dicta" in St. Joseph's Hospital.35 As discussed previously, Exchange Corp. suggests equitable title automatically reverts to the vendor without any court order; St. Joseph's Hospital suggests that equitable title reverts to the vendor only upon entry of a final court order. ¶47 The last sentence of § 846.30 can be read as WAMIC reads it, that is, as addressing only when a strict foreclosure judgment becomes final, title. Therefore, the but not order addressing entered can the be transfer viewed of under Exchange Corp. as providing finality by confirming a transfer of title to the vendor that has already occurred. Alternatively, the required order in the last sentence of § 846.30 can be read as the plaintiffs read it, that is, as establishing the date on which a land contract vendee's equitable title reverts to the 34 Godwin, 199 Wis. at 497. 35 Exchange Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 562. 21 No. vendor. This reading Given that would be consistent with 2003AP1959 St. Joseph's Hospital. ¶48 the common law is not clear on when equitable title reverts to a land contract vendor, we turn to the practice of attorneys in land contract foreclosure, as well as the legislative drafting records, to cast light on the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. ¶49 Apparently, the practice before the 1995 adoption of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 was for a land contract vendor to obtain a final judgment after the expiration of the redemption period upon filing an affidavit of nonredemption. A 1989 practice manual on land contract foreclosures includes a form for a final judgment in a strict foreclosure of a land contract which states that the final proclaims that judgment "any confirms right, title the original and judgment interest" of the and land contract vendees "shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby are forever barred."36 judgment or performs a order much This practice suggests that the final confirming more the significant strict role foreclosure than just judgment reaffirming something everyone already knows, namely that equitable title 36 Goodland, supra note 10, at A-91. For a similar form of confirmation of judgment suggested in 2004, see Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, Form 8-12 at 324. See also Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, § 8.53 at 298. The circuit court enters the order confirming the judgment upon an affidavit of nonredemption; the order should be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in the county where the land is located. 22 No. has been vested in the vendor. needed to contract clear vendee record paid title the 2003AP1959 This final judgment would be to amount determine due whether during the the land redemption period. ¶50 The drafting record for Wis. Stat. § 846.30 decidedly supports the plaintiffs' position that if a land contract vendee fails to redeem, the equitable title of the land contract vendee does not pass to the land contract vendor until a circuit court enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period confirming nonredemption.37 The court of appeals interpreted § 846.30 without examining the drafting record. ¶51 The most relevant document in the drafting file on the issue presented in the instant case is a September 29, 1995 letter from the Chicago Title Insurance Company to Atty. Peter Christianson, suggesting what would become the last sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. The letter explains that the purpose of requiring "a final order" is to make the statute consistent with St. Joseph's Hospital.38 concerned, the St. force and effect. ¶52 As far as the drafters of § 846.30 were Joseph's Hospital case was still in full The letter does not mention Exchange Corp. The letter reads in relevant part: This bill formalizes the requirement for a redemption period after a judgment of strict foreclosure. Such a right has been recognized under [Godwin and 37 Drafting Records for 1995 Wis. Act 250 (available at the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 38 Id. 23 No. 2003AP1959 Kallenbach]. However, the bill overlooks the requirement for a final order established under St. Joseph's Hospital . . . , which states at page 430: "A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does not produce absolute finality. In such judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant's interest and claims for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and quiet title in the plaintiff . . . ." We should take this opportunity to propose that AB 579 be amended to include a requirement for a final order. This can be done very simply by adding the following language as part of proposed Section 846.30, Wisconsin Statutes, or as a new section: No judgment of strict foreclosure shall be final until the entry of an order, after the expiration of the redemption period, confirming that no redemption has been made and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute (emphasis added). ¶53 Representative Legislative problems Reference discussed in Marty Reynolds Bureau draft the Chicago requested legislation Title that based Insurance on the the Company letter. ¶54 The suggested change makes sense from the perspective of a title insurance company. A title insurance company would be interested in pinpointing, to the extent possible, the date on which a land contract vendee's equitable title passes to the vendor. A circuit court order creates certainty, finality, and clarity for passage of title, easing the task of examining real property records to determine and insure ownership. insurance company's interest in clarity and finality A title of the rights and interests of the parties to the land contract is especially strong because, as we discussed above, the case law is confusing concerning rights and interests in the event of 24 No. strict foreclosure and failure to redeem. In 2003AP1959 light of the Exchange Corp. and St. Joseph Hospital cases, clarification of when a land contract vendee's equitable interest reverts to the vendor should be welcome. ¶55 On the basis of the text of Wis. Stat. § 846.30, the case law, Wisconsin practice, and legislative history, we are persuaded that § 846.30 requires that in strict foreclosure a circuit court must issue a final order to confirm a land contract vendee's failure to redeem prior to the expiration of the redemption period, and that only upon entry of the final order does a land contract vendee's equitable title revert to the land contract vendor. ¶56 The court of appeals reached a different interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 based on three additional considerations, none of which we consider persuasive enough to convince us that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 is misplaced. ¶57 First, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 that equitable title reverts to the vendor only upon the final order would create an illogical result. According to the court of appeals, an indefinite period of time may elapse between the end of the redemption period and the order transferring title, during which the land contract vendee remains the equitable owner with all the rights and responsibilities thereof. illogical. mortgage This result is not This situation is similar to a foreclosure on a when there is a period 25 between the end of the No. redemption period and a sheriff's sale; the 2003AP1959 mortgagor holds title. ¶58 Second and related to the first point, the court of appeals concluded that "the date on which the confirming order is entered would not be tied, either by statute or by practical realities, to the actual situations of the vendor and vendee." The transfer of equitable title should depend, according to the court of appeals, on what is happening between the parties, not on when an order is presented to the court and when a court may sign and enter it. We disagree with the court of appeals. is not always clear what is happening between the parties. the instant case, for example. It Take Three different dates of passage of equitable title are possible: October 7, November 17, and December 1. For anyone interested in clear title, determining where title rests during the confusion created by the parties' actions may be a daunting task indeed. The facts of this case demonstrate that title reverting only upon a final court order makes sense. ¶59 The court of appeals' final consideration is that although under its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 the confirming order does not establish the date of transfer of title, it does add a measure of certainty and predictability that did not exist at common law. ¶60 final We agree with the court of appeals that the second and sentence designed to of add Wis. Stat. certainty § 846.30 and appears to predictability have to been strict foreclosures by characterizing the order as final and absolute. 26 No. 2003AP1959 We part company with the court of appeals, however, because its interpretation of § 846.30 disrupts certainty and predictability by mandating that a land contract vendee's equitable title reverts to the vendor at the expiration of the redemption period without any court order. The instant case illustrates the uncertainty that can occur and the importance of a court order that definitively establishes the rights and interests of the parties. ¶61 For the reasons set forth, we hold that under Wis. Stat. § 846.30, equitable title remains with a land contract vendee § 846.30 until a circuit confirming court the enters land an contract order pursuant vendee's to default, following the expiration of the redemption period for strict foreclosure. V ¶62 We now turn to the instant case and apply Wis. Stat. § 846.30: The land contract vendee's equitable title reverts to the land contract vendor on the entering of a final order in a strict foreclosure proceeding. ¶63 Although the facts are undisputed for purposes of a motion for summary judgment, we must examine the circuit court judgments and orders closely. There are inconsistencies in the proceedings, some of which were on the record in the circuit court and others of which were not. ¶64 The first hearing on took place on September 7, 1999. the proceedings, the court the foreclosure action According to the transcript of ordered 27 strict the remedy of specific No. 2003AP1959 performance, not strict foreclosure, and set a redemption date of October 7, 1999. It held that if the Steiner Corporation did not redeem before that time, the property would be sold at a sheriff's sale. ¶65 The Steiner Corporation did not redeem in the 30-day redemption period set to expire on October 7, 1999, nor was the property sold by sheriff's sale. Therefore, specific performance was not effectuated. the remedy of Instead, the parties returned to court on October 19, 1999. At the October 19, 1999 hearing, a the circuit court entered judgment of strict foreclosure, ordering (retroactively) October 7, 1999, as the redemption date. ¶66 The date of October 7, 1999 is inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 846.30. Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 requires at a minimum a seven working day redemption period "from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the judgment order." hearing and Regardless of the nature of the October 19 "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," the redemption period under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 can be construed as expiring no earlier than October 28, 1999, seven working days from the October 19 hearing, or as expiring no earlier than November 18, 30 days from October 19. ¶67 1999, That and Another hearing on the matter was held on December 1, resulted document in confirmed a document the entitled October 19, "Final 1999 Judgment." order "in all respects" and stated "all right, title and interest of [the land contract vendees] . . . shall cease to exist." 28 No. ¶68 The court of appeals concluded that 2003AP1959 "the only reasonable explanation" for the discrepancies of the redemption dates in the documents of this matter "is that the period of redemption mistake." described in the December 1 final judgment is a According to the court of appeals, the parties agreed to change the remedy to strict foreclosure after September 7 and before the judgment entered on October 19 but agreed to use the same 30-day redemption period September 7 for a sale. established by the court on Under this reasoning the redemption period expired on October 7, 1999.39 There is no support in the record for the court of appeals' explanation of the discrepancy. ¶69 Regardless of possible explanations for the numerous conflicting dates, we conclude under our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 that the equitable title of the Steiner Corporation (the land contract vendee) did not revert to the land contract vendors until December 1, 1999, the date of the final order. Thus, Steiner Corporation had equitable title to the property as vendee under the land contract when Patricia Steiner fell in the dry well on October 15, 1999. VI ¶70 The parties disagree whether Robert Steiner was agent of Steiner Corporation at the time of the accident. was, his allegedly negligent actions (leaving the an If he well uncovered) would be imputed to the Corporation and WAMIC would, 39 Steiner v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 135, ¶¶15, 17, 275 Wis.2d 359, 685 N.W.2d 83. 29 No. according to plaintiffs, be required to indemnify 2003AP1959 him for Patricia's injuries. ¶71 The injury is alleged to have occurred as follows: ¶72 Robert Steiner, despite having sold his interest in the land, including winter. continued draining to water perform from maintenance the cabins in at the resort, preparation for The procedure, which Robert was following on October 15, 1999, was to drain the water from the cabins into dry wells. Covering each dry well was a removable wood cover, under which was a piece of Styrofoam. The wood cover protected the well should a car or other large object traverse it; the Styrofoam cover underneath was meant to keep the water from freezing. Robert Steiner had removed the wood coverings from some of the dry wells, but not the Styrofoam coverings. ¶73 Patricia Steiner, concerned about her approached a dry well to see if he had fallen in. husband, She noticed that the Styrofoam covering was still in place, but when she turned away from the well she slipped and fell into the dry well. ¶74 and found Robert Steiner heard Patricia Steiner's cries for help her wedged into the bottom of a dry well. She sustained a variety of personal injuries. ¶75 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals addressed Robert Steiner's possible status as an agent of the Steiner Corporation. Likewise, we will not address that issue here. * * * * 30 No. ¶76 2003AP1959 In summary, we hold that equitable title remains with a land contract vendee until a circuit court enters a final order, following the expiration of the redemption period for strict foreclosure, failure to redeem. title did not confirming the land contract vendee's As a result, in the present case equitable pass from the Steiner Corporation (the land contract vendee) to the land contract vendors until December 1, 1999, when an order confirming the nonredemption was entered. Accordingly, the Corporation had equitable title to the property under the land contract on October 15, 1999, the date of the plaintiffs' insurer, may injuries, be and subject the to Corporation liability and WAMIC, the plaintiffs' for its injuries. ¶77 We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. By the Court. The decision reversed and the cause remanded. 31 of the court of appeals is No. ¶78 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting). 2003AP1959.jpw I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 [2000-0140] equitable title remains with a land contract vendee until a circuit court enters a final order, following the redemption period for strict foreclosure, vendee's nonredemption." confirming Majority op., ¶4. the land contract I would hold that under § 846.30, equitable title on a land contract passes as a matter of law following the vendee's nonpayment at the end of the redemption period, as established by the land contract or a previously issued court order for strict foreclosure. While the circuit court is required under the statute to enter a final order confirming the vendee's nonredemption, such order is not required in order for title to pass. ¶79 governing This position is in accordance with the common law land contracts, which, contrary to the assertion, majority op., ¶46, was quite clear. majority's The common law governing the passage of title for land contracts was shaped primarily by two Hospital, 224 Corporation cases: Wis. of St. 422, 273 Wisconsin Joseph's v. Kuntz, v. Maternity (1937), N.W.791 Hospital and Exchange 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 N.W.2d 393 (1972). ¶80 The issue in St. Joseph's Hospital was whether a circuit court had power in a strict foreclosure action to extend the period of redemption before 40 that period expired. St. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 200102 version unless otherwise indicated. 1 No. Joseph's Hosp., 224 Wis. at 424-425. 2003AP1959.jpw In addressing this issue, the court stated: A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does not produce absolute finality. In such judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant's interest and claims for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and quiet title in the plaintiff, and a writ for removing the defendant from the premises is contemplated in case it becomes necessary. Proceedings at the foot of the judgment are a matter of course in these cases and the litigation is not at an end until they are taken. It would seem, a priori, that until the final order contemplated, an order making the judgment absolute, has been entered, anything discretionary might properly be done by the court that has material bearing upon the equities of the parties respecting the order finally ending the litigation between them. Independent of a statute providing for extension in strict foreclosure cases of the period of redemption from judgments not become absolute, a court as a court of equity would unquestionably have power to extend in effect the period of redemption provided for in its judgment if such extension were required by equity and good conscience. Id. at 430. ¶81 This language from St. Joseph's Hospital can be read in one of two ways. First, it could be interpreted as holding that equitable title in a land contract does not pass at the end of the redemption period in a strict foreclosure action, but requires a final order confirming that title had passed because the court retains the power to extend the redemption period until a final order is entered confirming a judgment of strict foreclosure. unnecessary However, in such light the of a broad facts in ruling St. would Joseph's seem Hospital because there, the challenged circuit court order was an order extending the period of redemption on a land contract before the 2 No. original period of redemption had expired. 2003AP1959.jpw Id. at 424. Thus, St. Joseph's Hospital could be read as simply providing that in an action for strict foreclosure, a court retains the equitable power to extend the period of redemption before a final order is issued, assuming the redemption period has not yet run. ¶82 Whatever confusion existed as to the scope of the holding in St. Joseph's Hospital was put to rest in Exchange Corporation, which explained and clarified the meaning of the above passage Corporation, from 56 St. Joseph's Wis. 2d at Hospital. 562, when In discussing Exchange strict foreclosure judgments, this court held: A strict foreclosure judgment is of such a nature that the court must be considered as having the power to control the judgment even beyond a term of court to the extent the period of redemption may be extended on equitable grounds if an application for extension is made prior to the expiration of the period; the judgment did not reserve this power for it becomes final or absolute only upon the expiration of the period of redemption. Such a judgment may be considered as an interlocutory judgment which automatically becomes final upon the expiration of the period of redemption without any further motion or decree making it absolute. If the record is to reflect the fact the vendee did not redeem, an order may be entered finding the vendee did not meet the conditions; sometimes an affidavit of such fact is filed. But if the order is used, it would normally not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal title in the vendor. It is possible for a court to reserve power to extend the period of redemption even after the original period of redemption has expired, in which case it would have power to extend time even without the vendee's application prior to expiration of the original period. If the court does reserve this power, a subsequent order would seem necessary to finally terminate any possible rights in the vendee; but this would be an unusual case. 3 No. Id. at 561-62 (emphasis expressly stated: added). In so 2003AP1959.jpw holding the court "Broader dicta in the St. Joseph's Hospital Case to the effect the court of equity has inherent jurisdiction after the expiration of the period reserving such power is disapproved." added). Thus, Corporation of Exchange redemption Id. at explained 562 without (emphasis that a narrow reading of St. Joseph's Hospital was correct and it disapproved any dicta suggesting a broader holding that title in a land contract passes only upon the circuit court entering a final order indicating that title has passed. ¶83 The following rules governing the passage of title on land contracts in strict foreclosure actions are apparent from Exchange Corporation. First, "the period of redemption may be extended on equitable grounds if an application for extension is made prior to the expiration of the period[.]" Second, the original period of redemption redemption period has may be expired Id. at 561. extended only if after the the court expressly "reserve[d] power to extend the period of redemption even after the original period of redemption has expired." at 561-62. Third, if the original judgment of Id. strict foreclosure did not expressly reserve the power to extend the redemption period after the redemption period had expired and no application was made to extend the period of redemption before it expired, the judgment "automatically becomes final upon the expiration of the period of redemption motion or decree making it absolute." without any Id. at 561. further In this third scenario, although "an order may be entered finding the 4 No. 2003AP1959.jpw vendee did not meet the conditions[,] . . . [the order] would normally not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal title in the vendor." Id. Thus, such an order merely effects record title; it is not a prerequisite for the title to pass in the first instance. of the required redemption for title Title passes as a matter of law at the end period. to The pass is only where time the a final judgment order of is strict foreclosure reserved the right of the circuit court to extend the period of redemption after the redemption period has expired. ¶84 With these common-law rules in mind, I now turn and examine § 846.30, which provides: If a court finds that the purchaser under a land contract is obligated to make certain payments under that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period confirming that no redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute. Wis. Stat. § 846.30. ¶85 I am not persuaded by the majority's discussion of legislative intended history to Corporation that overrule and treat this land Majority op., ¶¶50-53, 57. Wis. Act 250. the last sentence of court's decision contracts similar § 846.30 in to was Exchange mortgages. Section § 846.30 was enacted as 1995 The legislative history of the Act indicates that 5 No. its purpose was twofold. 2003AP1959.jpw First, the Act was intended to require a mandatory minimum redemption period in an action for strict foreclosure, as existing law did not mandate that a redemption period exist and an unpublished court of appeals decision had recently held that there was no right to a redemption period. Second, the Act was intended to codify "existing case law requirements" in relation to the need for a final order in a strict foreclosure action. ¶86 At the time 1995 Wis. Act 250 was enacted, the law governing the passage of title and need for a final order was that as explained by Exchange Corporation, which clarified the holding of St. Joseph's Hospital. history Exchange of 1995 Wis. Corporation. Act 250 Quite Nothing in the legislative evinces the an intent opposite, codify "existing case law requirements." to the overrule goal was to While the intent of the legislation was to require a final order, it is Exchange Corporation that sets forth the effect of such an order. ¶87 As such, I would interpret the last sentence of § 846.30 in accordance with the rules set forth by this court in Exchange Corporation and hold that equitable title on a land contract passes nonpayment at foreclosure. as the a end A final matter of of the order law following redemption merely the period reaffirms that vendee's for strict title has indeed passed; however, in doing so, it provides clarity and certainty to third parties about legal title. In addition to being consistent with our common law, this interpretation avoids the inequitable result that a 6 land contract vendee who has No. 2003AP1959.jpw failed to pay at the end of the redemption period will still hold title to the land until the circuit court enters a final order. Majority op., ¶57. ¶88 Finally, even if the last sentence of § 846.30 is viewed as overturning the portion of Exchange Corporation that holds that equitable title on a land contract passes as a matter of law following redemption the period for vendee's nonpayment strict foreclosure, affect the remainder of the opinion. order is required before title at the end the does § 846.30 of not That is, even if a final may pass, under Exchange Corporation, the circuit court does not have the power to extend the period of redemption once the period of redemption has expired, unless the judgment of strict foreclosure reserved such a power. Exch. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 561-62. As the text of § 846.30 does not state differently, this portion of Exchange Corporation remains good law. As such, if the period of redemption has expired and the vendee has not made payment, the circuit court may not subsequently extend the period of redemption unless its judgment of strict foreclosure reserved such a power. ¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. ¶90 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 7 No. 1 2003AP1959.jpw
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