Adele R. Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.
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2004 WI 93 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: COMPLETE TITLE: OF WISCONSIN 02-2260 Adele R. Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellant-CrossRespondent-Petitioner, v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., a foreign corporation, and Hall Imports, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Defendants-Respondents-CrossAppellants. REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 2003 WI App 208 Reported at: 267 Wis. 2d 622, 671 N.W.2d 317 (Ct. App. 2003-Published) OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: April 6, 2004 SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: Circuit Waukesha Lee S. Dreyfus July 1, 2004 JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by William S. Pocan, Vincent P. Megna, Susan M. Grzeskowiak and Jastroch & Labarge, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument by William S. Pocan. For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants there were briefs by Jeffrey S. Fertl, Jeffrey D. Patza and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey S. Fertl. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stephen E. Meili, Marsha M. Mansfield, and Nelle R. Rohlich, Madison, on behalf of the Consumer Law Litigation Clinic. An amicus curiae brief was filed by James E. Thiel, John J. Sobotik, Paul E. Nilsen, Madison, on behalf of State of Wisconsin. 2 2004 WI 93 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 02-2260 (L.C. No. 01 CV 2812) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT Adele R. Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellant-CrossRespondent-Petitioner, FILED v. JUL 1, 2004 Mazda Motor of America, Inc., a foreign corporation, and Hall Imports, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court Defendants-Respondents-CrossAppellants. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and cause remanded. ¶1 decision DAVID T. PROSSER, J. of the court of This is a review of a published appeals, Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 2003 WI App 208, 267 Wis. 2d 622, 671 N.W.2d 317, affirming the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Mazda Motor, Inc. and Hall Imports, Inc. (Mazda).1 1 The case For simplicity, we refer to respondents collectively as "Mazda." However, we recognize that Hall Imports, Inc. remains in the case as co-respondent. No. 02-2260 commenced when petitioner, Adele Garcia (Garcia), sued Mazda alleging that Mazda had failed to comply with Wisconsin s "Lemon Law," (2001-02),2 Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 a remedial statute enacted to protect buyers of new vehicles if they experience certain types of problems with their purchases. Consumers requesting relief under the Wisconsin Lemon Law must fulfill two requirements: they must elect a remedy by demanding either a replacement vehicle or a refund, and they must offer to transfer title to the vehicle back Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)-(3). she had purchased, replacement but the manufacturer. See Dissatisfied with a Mazda vehicle Garcia vehicle, to elected she did a remedy not by demanding explicitly offer a to transfer title to Mazda. ¶2 After Garcia filed this action, Mazda moved for summary judgment, alleging that Garcia had failed to offer to transfer title to the vehicle, and thus had not complied with the provisions of the Wisconsin Lemon Law. Both the trial court and the court of appeals found Garcia s failure to explicitly offer to transfer title to be fatal to her cause. ¶3 whether We accepted Garcia s petition for review to determine Garcia s demand for a replacement vehicle under the Wisconsin Lemon Law complied with the notice requirements of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c) by providing notice intent to transfer title to her vehicle to Mazda. 2 of Garcia's Because we All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 200102 edition unless otherwise indicated. 2 No. 02-2260 conclude that a consumer s demand for a replacement vehicle under the Wisconsin Lemon Law necessarily implies an offer to transfer title, we reverse the court of appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¶4 Garcia presented the following facts.3 Garcia purchased a new 2001 Mazda Tribute in February of 2001. immediately, she experienced problems with the Almost vehicle s transmission. These transmission problems were covered by the vehicle s car new warranty. On several occasions, Garcia presented the vehicle at an authorized Mazda dealer for service, but Mazda s technicians never succeeded in repairing the vehicle to Garcia s satisfaction. Garcia also claimed that the vehicle had been completely out of service for a number of days. parties exchanged September 2001 letters Garcia and phone became fed up calls. with Eventually, the The in transmission problems and wrote Mazda a letter demanding relief under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. Garcia s letter contained the following statements: It is my understanding that the Lemon Law in the State of Wisconsin is that after a reasonable number of unsuccessful repair attempts by Mazda or its authorized dealers, or that the vehicle has been out of service a specific number of days, that I m 3 As this case is before us on Mazda s motion for summary judgment, we must interpret the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of Garcia, the nonmoving party. Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶7 n.3, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443 (citing Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980)). 3 No. 02-2260 entitled to either a comparable replacement vehicle or a refund of the purchase price. At this time the automobile has been out of service for a period of 16 days and I would like to have a replacement. ¶5 Mazda and Garcia exchanged several additional rounds of correspondence. Mazda attempted to negotiate a settlement with Garcia, offering her reimbursements of car payments and an extended warranty, but Garcia refused these overtures. In October 2001 Mazda informed Garcia that it could not locate a replacement vehicle and that she should select a new vehicle. While selecting the vehicle, Garcia claims a dispute arose regarding payment of fees and taxes.4 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶6 Garcia filed this action on November 21, 2001, alleging that Mazda had violated the provisions of the Wisconsin Lemon Law. On May 15, 2002, Mazda moved for summary judgment on grounds that Garcia s letter was insufficient to establish her claim under the Wisconsin Lemon Law because she did not offer to transfer Court, title to the Lee S. vehicle. Dreyfus, Jr., The Waukesha County Circuit granted Mazda s motion Judge, because it agreed that Garcia s notice was deficient. court of appeals affirmed. see no ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c): manufacturer to transfer A divided As the majority opinion put it: "We the the title 4 first consumer to two must sentences offer to of the the . . . vehicle . . . . Mazda, on the other hand, asserts that the parties reached a settlement agreement in late October 2001. However, as already noted, at this stage of the case we must construe all facts against the party moving for summary judgment. 4 No. 02-2260 Garcia s reading that the request for a replacement vehicle is implicitly an statute] is language." offer not a to transfer reasonable title that reading of Garcia, 267 Wis. 2d 622, ¶11. triggers the [the statutory One judge dissented, finding it "nonsensical for the owner of a 'lemon' to demand a replacement and not, at the same time, be offering to transfer title." Id., ¶21 (Lundsten, J., dissenting). III. WISCONSIN S LEMON LAW ¶7 The issue in this case, whether Garcia's written demand for a replacement vehicle under the Wisconsin Lemon Law complied with the notice Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c), presents statutory Statutory requirements interpretation. us with a question interpretation and of of the application of a statute to specific facts are questions of law that we review de novo. In re Commitment of Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶5, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 677 N.W.2d 276. ¶8 We begin the process of statutory interpretation by analyzing the language of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-45, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. As we have repeatedly stated, we construe remedial, consumer protection statutes like the Wisconsin Lemon Law "with a view towards the social problem legislature was addressing when enacting the law." which the Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶19, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 N.W.2d 832 (citing Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 982, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996)). Put another way, we will liberally construe remedial statutes to suppress the mischief and advance 5 No. 02-2260 the remedy that the legislature intended to afford. Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 979 (citing Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 373, 243 N.W.2d 422 (1976)). ¶9 Wisconsin s Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, effective on November 3, 1983. became Like similar laws nationwide, the statute was enacted to protect purchasers of new vehicles that turn out to be defective (colloquially known as "lemons"). See, e.g., Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978-80. Wisconsin s Lemon Law provides a remedy to the purchaser of a new vehicle if the purchaser, within one year of the purchase date, experiences problems with the vehicle that (1) are covered by the vehicle s warranty; and (2a) are severe enough to keep the vehicle out of service for a total of 30 days; or (2b) the manufacturer or the manufacturer s authorized representative repairing after four attempts. are unsuccessful in Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(h) and 218.0171(2)(a). ¶10 Although the Wisconsin Lemon Law is clearly a consumer protection statute, responsibility. 180, it does 247 Wis. Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0171 new Wisconsin absolve the consumer from See Smyser v. W. Star Trucks Corp., 2001 WI App ¶¶13-14, comparable not motor Lemon 2d reads vehicle Law], a or 281, in a 634 N.W.2d 134. part: "To receive refund due under consumer . . . shall offer to a [the the manufacturer of the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to transfer title of that motor Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c). vehicle to that manufacturer." In another section, the Wisconsin Lemon Law requires a consumer to notify the manufacturer of the 6 No. 02-2260 consumer s elected remedy (the consumer may choose a replacement vehicle or a refund). Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 (2)(b); see also Berends v. Mack Truck, Inc., 2002 WI App 69, ¶11, 252 Wis. 2d 371, 643 N.W.2d 158. ¶11 This is not the first time that we have been called upon to interpret Wis. Stat. § 218.0171. In Hughes, we had to determine whether consumers could recover the purchase price of the car as "pecuniary damages" under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. Because the statutory language did not directly address that question, we began by reviewing the history of lemon laws in general and Wisconsin s Lemon Law in particular. Hughes, 197 Wis. of 2d at interpretation 980-82. of Adhering consumer to protection our rule statutes, we liberal determined that the purchase price of the car did qualify as pecuniary damages. ¶12 In Dieter, decided four years after Hughes, we faced the question of whether consumers who are aware of defects in a vehicle upon delivery may still sue the manufacturer under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. We held that they could, overruling a court of appeals decision to the contrary, because the statute contained no "hidden" defect provision and expressly disallowed waiver by the consumer. ¶13 Dieter, 234 Wis. 2d 670, ¶¶21-22. Today, we need not revisit the historical discourse of Hughes because the plain language of the Wisconsin Lemon Law appears to settle the issue. judgment upon Mazda based its motion for summary Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c), relying on Berends for the proposition that a manufacturer has no obligation to act 7 No. 02-2260 until the consumer has given it proper notice (consisting of election of remedy and Wisconsin Lemon Law. offer to transfer title) under the Mazda admits that Garcia elected a remedy but disputes whether she offered to transfer title. Both the circuit court and the court of appeals agreed with Mazda. Both courts found the statutory language to be dispositive, and found that Garcia had not complied with the statute. Accordingly, those two courts found that Garcia did not qualify for relief under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. ¶14 We have no doubt that a consumer must offer to transfer title to her vehicle to qualify for relief under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. But that is not the end of our inquiry. Rather, the question we attempt to answer is: What form must that offer take? The definitions section of the Wisconsin Lemon Law does not define "offer to transfer title." The language of the rest of the Wisconsin Lemon Law provides no further guidance as to the required form of the consumer s offer to transfer title. As we have repeatedly held, if a word is not defined in a statute, we look next to recognized dictionary definitions to determine the common and ordinary meaning of a word. See, e.g., State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶19, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330 (using dictionary to discern meaning of statutory text); Smith v. Katz, 218 Wis. 2d 442, 451 n.4, 578 N.W.2d 202 (1998) (using dictionary to discern meaning of words in insurance policy); State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288, 300, 366 N.W.2d 871 (1985) (using dictionary to discern general). 8 meaning of words in No. 02-2260 ¶15 In this case, though, we do not analyze the words of the statute itself, but rather the words of Garcia s demand, to determine whether that demand implies an offer to transfer title and therefore conforms to the statute. "replacement" vehicle from Mazda. Garcia demanded a The dictionary definition of "replacement" is "the act or process of replacing or of being replaced; substitution." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1531 (3d ed. 1992). definition of "substitute" another." Id. at 1792. is "one that In turn, the ordinary takes the place of Applying these dictionary definitions to this case, we believe that Garcia s demand for a replacement implied that she wanted "one (vehicle) that takes the place of another (vehicle)" i.e., a new vehicle to take the place of the one she originally bought. Although Mazda attempts to convince us that a demand for a replacement does not equate to an offer to transfer title, we do not see how it can seriously be argued that Garcia intended to retain both vehicles or turn over the vehicle without the title.5 We agree with the dissenting judge in the court of appeals that it would be "nonsensical" for a consumer to demand a replacement without offering to transfer 5 Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c) reads in part: "When the manufacturer provides the new motor vehicle . . . the consumer shall return the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to the manufacturer and provide the manufacturer with the certificate of title and all endorsements necessary to transfer title to the manufacturer." (Emphasis added). We think it is unlikely that the manufacturer would permit the consumer to drive off with a replacement vehicle and new title until the consumer has complied with these requirements. 9 No. 02-2260 title to the original vehicle. One enduring principle of statutory interpretation is that statutes are to be interpreted reasonably to give effect to the textually manifest statutory purpose. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44, 46, 49. A literalistic interpretation of the Wisconsin Lemon Law on these facts would not be consistent with the statute's remedial purpose. See Dieter, 234 Wis. 2d 670, ¶19; Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 982. ¶16 Garcia's letter asking for a replacement vehicle also linked her demand to the Wisconsin Lemon Law. Garcia referenced the "Lemon Law in the State of Wisconsin" after detailing her problems with the vehicle (in a different paragraph), and she described the conditions for invoking the law and her options under the law. No reasonable person could confuse the letter as something other than an attempt to invoke and comply with the law. ¶17 Mazda s heavy reliance decision in Berends is misplaced. on the court of appeals Mazda, citing Berends, first argues that a manufacturer has no duty to seek clarification of a consumer s notice invoking the Wisconsin Lemon Law. 252 Wis. 2d 371, ¶¶19-23. Berends, We do not disturb that holding of the court of appeals. However, we disagree with Mazda that this aspect bears of Berends manufacturer remains clarification of a on the to free issue decide consumer s notice we face today. whether to invoking the A seek Wisconsin Lemon Law, but a manufacturer who does not seek clarification of a valid notice, believing it noncompliance with the statute. 10 invalid, runs the risk of No. 02-2260 ¶18 Next, Mazda directs us to a footnote in Berends in which the court of appeals, although not basing its holding on the issue, stated that a consumer s "most prudent approach would be to explicitly offer to transfer title of the motor vehicle to the manufacturer." disagree. Berends, 252 Wis. 2d 371, ¶1 n.2. However, we are also cognizant that consumers do not carry statute books under their arms. transfer title consumer to Wisconsin Lemon believe We cannot is surely follow that the when Law; but Garcia s best path invoking for the demand An explicit offer to for a dissatisfied the protections reasons already for a of the stated we replacement adequately implied an offer to transfer title. vehicle The statute does not require the consumer to use any "magic words." ¶19 forced to Finally, Mazda warns us that manufacturers would be "speculate" as to whether a particular notice "implies" an offer to transfer title. Mazda s concern. a replacement consumer s We do not share We are satisfied that when a consumer demands vehicle under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, the consumer impliedly offers to transfer title to the old vehicle, and we so hold in this case. Garcia's demand for a replacement satisfies the Wisconsin Lemon Law s requirement of an offer to transfer title. IV. CONCLUSION ¶20 Our holding today resolves the issue we accepted for review, but other factual issues remain for trial. 11 We do not No. 02-2260 address the issues of whether the parties reached a settlement,6 whether Garcia s vehicle actually was a lemon, or whether Mazda complied with the provisions of the Wisconsin Lemon Law. are factual Accordingly, issues we remand properly the before case to the the circuit circuit These court. court for appeals is determination of these factual issues. By the Court. The decision of the court of reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 6 Garcia filed a motion to strike Mazda's reply brief because it raised an issue whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement that it believed was not properly presented to the court. Because we are remanding this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings, we deny Garcia's motion to strike. 12 No. 02-2260 1
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