State v. Dennis R. Thiel
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2000 WI 67 SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN Case No.: 99-0316 Complete Title of Case: In re the Commitment of Dennis R. Thiel: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Dennis R. Thiel, Respondent-Appellant. ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS Opinion Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Oral Argument: June 23, 2000 May 31, 2000 Source of APPEAL COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: Circuit Court Fond du Lac Peter L. Grimm JUSTICES: Concurred: Dissented: Not Participating: PROSSER, J., did not participate. ATTORNEYS: For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral argument by John D. Lubarsky, assistant state public defender. For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Diane M. Welsh, assistant attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 2000 WI 67 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 99-0316 STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT In re the Commitment of Dennis R. Thiel: State of Wisconsin, FILED Petitioner-Respondent, JUN 23, 2000 v. Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI Dennis R. Thiel, Respondent-Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded to the court of appeals. ¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals.1 The defendant, Dennis R. Thiel, challenges his commitment as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. § 980.06 (1997-98)2 and asserts that the 1 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1997-98), the court appeals certified an appeal of an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm, J., committing the defendant to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services as a sexually violent person. 2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated. No. State of Wisconsin failed to satisfy its burden of 99-0316 proving beyond a reasonable doubt that its petition for commitment was filed within 90 days of Thiel s release date. We determine that in a commitment trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject of the petition is within 90 days of release or discharge from a sentence imposed on the basis of a sexually violent offense. Because the evidence on the record does not provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the State filed its petition within 90 days of Thiel's release, we reverse the circuit court and remand to the court of appeals to determine the appropriate remedy. ¶2 On June 23, 1997, the State filed a petition in circuit court seeking an order to detain Thiel as a "sexually violent person" under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). In support of its petition, the State alleged that: 1) Thiel had been convicted of three sexually violent offenses; 2) he is scheduled to be released on June 24, 1997 from the sentence imposed for the convicted offenses; 3) Thiel suffers from two mental disorders, namely pedophilia and anti-social personality disorder; and 4) these disorders predispose him to engage in acts of sexual violence. ¶3 Additionally, the petition set forth numerous facts to establish probable cause to believe that Thiel is a sexually violent person, including statements 2 and the diagnosis of a No. clinical psychologist who had evaluated him. 99-0316 Upon reviewing the petition, the circuit court found cause to believe that Thiel meets the criteria of a sexually violent person and is eligible for commitment under Wis. Stat. § 980.05(5). ordered his detention whether there is and probable sexually violent person. ¶4 scheduled cause to a The court then hearing believe to that determine Thiel is a Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2). On the following day, June 24, 1997, the circuit court held a hearing and found probable cause to believe that Thiel is a sexually violent § 980.01(7). person within the meaning of Wis. Stat. The court ordered that he remain in custody during the pendency of the proceedings at any facility approved by the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) and further ordered that DHFS conduct an evaluation of Thiel. ¶5 August A bench trial on the commitment petition was held on 6, testimony 1997, from during several the psychologists Thiel's mental condition. seek treatment. which circuit on their court accepted assessments of Thiel testified as to his efforts to The State offered numerous exhibits in support of its petition, including various reports and risk assessments by those who had evaluated Thiel. ¶6 Although the State apparently did not attempt to prove that the commitment petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's release, several of the documents 3 received into evidence No. reference a mandatory release (MR) date. 99-0316 A number of these exhibits note Thiel's MR date as June 1997. One particular document specifies the release date as June 29, 1997. However, other documents indicate the MR date as March 19, 1997. Thiel did not challenge the admission of these exhibits into evidence. ¶7 At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court rendered findings that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) Thiel had been convicted of a sexually violent offense; 2) he had a mental disorder, namely pedophilia; and 3) Thiel is dangerous to others because his mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. However, the court failed to make an explicit finding that the State's petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's release. ¶8 adjudged As a Thiel result a of sexually its findings, violent committed to the custody of DHFS. the person and circuit ordered court him The court entered the final order of commitment on November 6, 1998. ¶9 Thiel appealed, asserting that the commitment order should be vacated because the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that its commitment petition was filed within 90 days of his release. Subsequently, the court of appeals certified to this court the question of whether the State must 4 No. 99-0316 affirmatively prove that the subject of a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 commitment petition is within 90 days of release or discharge. ¶10 to The certified question before this court requires us examine Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review independently of the legal conclusions of the circuit court or the court of appeals. State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 323, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999). The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent. Id. We examine first the statutory language to identify the intent of the legislature. State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999). If the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, we need not look language to determine the meaning of the statute. ¶11 beyond the Id. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(2) governs the contents of a petition seeking to commit a person as sexually violent. statute provides in relevant part: (2) A petition filed under this section shall allege that all of the following apply to the person alleged to be a sexually violent person: (a) The criteria: person satisfies any of the following 1. The person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. . . . 5 The No. 99-0316 (ag) The person is within 90 days of discharge or release, on parole, extended supervision or otherwise, from a sentence that was imposed for a conviction for a sexually violent offense, from a secured correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02(15m) . . . . (b) The person has a mental disorder. (c) The person is dangerous to others because the person's mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in acts of sexual violence (emphasis added). In addition, Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a) states that "[a]t a trial on a petition under [chapter 980], the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt." ¶12 Thiel §§ 980.02(2) State's contends and burden that 980.05(3)(a) to prove read together, unambiguously beyond a reasonable Wis. set forth doubt petition was filed within 90 days of his release. Stat. the that the The 90-day requirement represents an essential predicate to a finding that the subject of a commitment petition under ch. 980 is a sexually violent person. Because the circuit court failed to render a finding that the State had met its burden of proof as to this essential allegation, Thiel asserts that the order of commitment should be vacated. ¶13 maintains Disputing Thiel's statutory interpretation, the State that 980.05(3)(a) the creates language an of Wis. ambiguity 6 Stat. that must §§ 980.02(2) be resolved and by No. resort to the entire statutory scheme of ch. 980. 99-0316 The State claims that Section 980.02(2) contains two types of allegations, those that are substantive in nature and the 90-day requirement, which is procedural in nature. ¶14 provides establish Another statutory section upon which the State relies that a petition probable cause may to include believe factual that the statements subject commitment petition is a sexually violent person. § 980.02(3).3 Section of to the Wis. Stat. Thus, the State asserts that a petition under 980.02(2) essentially includes three types of requires a allegations: substantive, procedural, and factual. ¶15 Although Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a) petitioner to prove the allegations in the commitment petition, the State argues that the statute is ambiguous because it leaves unanswered exactly which allegations the legislature intended to be proven. 3 This ambiguity may be resolved only by Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(3) provides: (3) A petition filed under this section shall state with particularity essential facts to establish probable cause to believe the person is a sexually violent person. If the petition alleges that a sexually violent offense or act that is a basis for the allegation under sub. (2)(a) was an act that was sexually motivated as provided under s. 980.01(6)(b), the petition shall state the grounds on which the offense or act is alleged to be sexually motivated. 7 an No. 99-0316 examination of the entire chapter and the purposes underlying the commitment of sexually violent persons. ¶16 According to the State, the twin objectives underlying ch. 980 are the protection of the public and the treatment of high risk sex offenders sexual misconduct. to reduce the likelihood of future State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 271, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). To further these objectives in detaining sexually violent persons, the State is required to prove only the substantive criteria defining one as sexually violent. These criteria include whether the person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and whether the person suffers from a mental disorder that would released to the public. render that person dangerous if Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a), (b), and (c). ¶17 In requirement contrast, under the State subsection submits (ag) that represents the a 90-day pleading requirement that does not promote the objectives of ch. 980 or help define a sexually violent person. allegation identifying the time when Rather, as a procedural the commitment petition should be filed, it is deemed waived if the subject of the petition fails to object. ¶18 In an attempt to resolve the conflicting interpretations and to discern the intent of the legislature, we begin our analysis with an examination of the language of Wis. 8 No. Stat. §§ 980.02(2) and 980.05(3)(a). A petition 99-0316 seeking to commit a person as sexually violent must contain four distinct allegations, including that the petition has been filed within 90 days of the person's release from a sentence or confinement arising from a sexually violent offense. Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 297-98, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995). At trial, the State "has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt." Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a). ¶19 A reading of the statutory language leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended the State to prove its fulfillment reasonable violent. set doubt before of a the 90-day person may requirement be adjudged beyond a sexually The words of the statutes clearly and unambiguously forth the State's burden in proving this specific allegation. ¶20 In light of the unambiguous words of the statutes, we are not persuaded by the State's argument that the legislature intended to create distinct categories of allegations, reserving one particular category for the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(2) specifies all of the allegations that must be contained in a petition. Although Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3) allows the petitioner to supplement the petition with facts to support the specific allegations listed 9 No. under Section 980.02(2), these supplemental facts 99-0316 are not categorized as "allegations," as the State asserts. ¶21 Rather, these particular facts serve merely to buttress the allegations that must be set forth under Section 980.02(2) and to establish probable cause to believe that the person named Thus, contrary 980.02(2) in and the to petition the is State s 980.05(3)(a) do a sexually violent contention, Wis. not any create person. Stat. §§ ambiguity. Instead, the statutes unambiguously require the State to prove that its commitment petition has been filed within 90 days of the subject s release. ¶22 analysis "[t]he Legislative history supports our interpretation. by the [S]tate Legislative must prove Reference each of petition beyond a reasonable doubt." the Bureau 4 confirms allegations An that in the LRB Drafting File for 1993 Wis. Act 479, Analysis of Assembly Bill 3, at 3. See also Appleton Post-Crescent v. Janssen, 149 Wis. 2d 294, 301, 441 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1989) (LRB analysis indicative of legislative intent). ¶23 Furthermore, this court has recently noted the State s requirements Kienitz, 227 of proof Wis. 2d at a 423, commitment 429 Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 396 n.4. n.6, trial. 597 N.W.2d See 712 State v. (1999); In Kienitz, we observed that "[i]n a commitment trial, the State has the burden of proving 10 No. 99-0316 beyond a reasonable doubt that the person . . . (2) is within 90 days of release from a sentence, commitment, or secured correctional facility arising from a sexually violent offense." 227 Wis. 2d at 429 n.6. ¶24 burden We also observed in Curiel that "the State has the of proving beyond a reasonable allegations in the petition for commitment." n.4. doubt all of the 227 Wis. 2d at 396 This petition "must allege that the person . . . (2) is within 90 days of release from a sentence, commitment, or secured correctional facility arising from a sexually violent offense." ¶25 Id. (quoting Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 297-98). The State posits that the above-quoted footnotes contained in Kienitz and Curiel are merely dicta because they are not essential to the holdings in those cases. We need not engage in an analysis of whether the footnotes constitute dicta because we determine that the observations in Kienitz and Curiel represent correct statements of law, accurately reflecting the legislative intent as established by the words of Wis. Stat. §§ 980.02(2) and 980.05(3)(a).4 4 The State offers the comments of the Jury Instructions Committee: 11 No. ¶26 Having determined that at trial on a 99-0316 commitment petition, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it filed its petition within 90 days of the subject's release or discharge, we turn now to determine whether the State satisfied its burden in this case. We will affirm the order of commitment if the trial record reflects that the petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's MR date, notwithstanding the circuit court's failure to make a specific finding to that effect. ¶27 The State claims that the record contains sufficient proof of its compliance with the 90-day requirement. Regardless of the proof, the State maintains that Thiel's failure to raise objections at trial constituted a waiver of the argument he now raises on appeal. ¶28 We note at the outset that the subject of a commitment petition under ch. 980 is not required to voice an objection to the allegations contained in the petition. affords the subject of a commitment A ch. 980 proceeding petition neither the Subsection (2)(ag) of § 980.02 requires that the petition further allege that the person is within 90 days of discharge or release from a sentence imposed for the sexually violent offense. The Committee concluded that this fact need not be submitted to the jury, though it certainly must be established before the trial can go forward. Wis JI-Criminal 2502 at 5 n.1. The State interprets the comments to mean that the 90-day allegation serves only as a pleading requirement, not as a substantive allegation requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 12 No. opportunity nor affirmative defenses petition. the obligation to the to file an allegations answer 99-0316 or contained in raise the Thus, Thiel's failure to object to the admission of exhibits does not relieve the State of its statutorily defined burden to prove that its petition was filed within 90 days of his release. ¶29 Our examination of the record at trial and the evidence relied upon by the State reveals inconsistencies in the MR dates set forth in several documents admitted as exhibits. An information provides an MR and interview date that is request form handwritten as filed by June 1997. Thiel In another exhibit, a letter addressed to the Fond du Lac Probation and Parole office, Thiel opines: "I have only 8 months from October 96 until my MR." Both the request form and the letter indicate a release date some time in June 1997 without referring to a particular date. ¶30 Because these documents do not mention a specific date in June, it is plausible that Thiel's actual MR date may have been any date in June. beyond a reasonable Thus, although they could establish doubt that a May 31, 1997 commitment petition complied with the 90-day requirement, these particular exhibits do not establish that the State's petition on June 23, 1997 was properly filed. 13 No. ¶31 99-0316 Other evidence in the trial record likewise does not assist in proving that the State fulfilled the statutory 90-day requirement. The psychologist reached who examination had his mandatory report evaluated release prepared Thiel date on states that by a clinical that "[Thiel] sentence in June 1997, and at that time a petition was filed for commitment under Chapter 980." The report subsequently notes that "[a]fter reaching his mandatory release date," Thiel was admitted to the Mendota Mental Health Institute "on June 26, 1997." This report is not free of ambiguity because we are still left to wonder whether Thiel's MR date pre-dated the June 23, 1997 date of the commitment petition. ¶32 A Sex Offender Report received into evidence and prepared by the Department of Corrections specifies Thiel's MR date as June 29, 1997. This report, coupled with the references to June 1997 release dates, may have dispelled our doubts as to the timeliness of the State's commitment petition were it not for conflicting institutional documents implying a March 1997 release date. ¶33 The two problematic documents from the Dodge Correctional Institution specify Thiel's MR date as March 19, 1997. Attempting to dismiss the significance of these exhibits, the State contends that Thiel's own trial testimony clarifies the discrepancy in the dates: 14 No. 99-0316 Q: Was there a problem originally with credit and sentence credit or something like that? A: Yes. There was a three month or 180 day error, I believe. We are not convinced by the State's argument because Thiel's testimony fails to reconcile the discrepancy in favor of a June MR date. Rather, the testimony creates further ambiguity by suggesting a potential September release date. ¶34 Under the mistaken assumption that it need not prove that its commitment petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's release, the State understandably offered no direct proof at trial on this particular allegation. No testimony or evidence at trial established the date of the filing of the petition. Additionally, as we have noted, the exhibits admitted at trial create ambiguity as to Thiel's actual MR date. Considering the absence of testimony on the filing date, as well as the presence of ambiguity relating to the MR date, we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State filed its commitment petition within 90 days of Thiel's release. ¶35 does not Having determined that the trial record in this case establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the State filed its commitment petition within 90 days of Thiel's release, we are left now to consider the issue of an appropriate remedy. In response to a question at oral argument regarding remedies, 15 No. 99-0316 the State referenced several remedy issues, none of which have been briefed or argued before this court. ¶36 These issues include whether our decision should have retroactive or prospective application, and whether a decision affects only the "pipeline" cases on direct reaches to cases on collateral review. appeal or also Another remedy concern referenced by the State is whether the court may remand the narrow issue involving proof of the 90-day requirement, as is done in other civil cases with respect to specific issues such as the appropriate measure of damages. As the State notes, concerns of claim preclusion or double jeopardy may also arise. ¶37 In light of the significant remedy issues, we hesitate to decide the question of appropriate remedy without affording the parties an opportunity to address adequately the above and other remedy issues. Rather, we believe the more prudent course is to remand the cause to the court of appeals and direct the court to address the issue of the appropriate remedy. ¶38 In sum, we determine that in a trial on a commitment petition filed under Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2), the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petition was filed within 90 days of the subject s release or discharge from a sentence based on a sexually violent offense. determine that the trial record does not We further establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the State filed its commitment petition 16 No. within 90 days of Thiel's release. 99-0316 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and remand to the court of appeals to determine the appropriate remedy. By The Court.-The order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. ¶39 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., 17 did not participate. No. 1 99-0316
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