Raber v. Cordova

Raber v. Cordova

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Steven R. Raber,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Sheriff James Cordova, Carbon County Sheriff; Steven Burge, Chairperson of the Carbon County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission; Lora Akers, Carbon County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission; Gust Kalatzes, Carbon County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission; and Carbon County,

Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030928-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 31, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 153

 

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Seventh District, Price Department

The Honorable Bryce K. Bryner

Attorneys: Phillip W. Dyer and Carey A. Seager, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

George M. Harmond Jr., Price, for Appellees

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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

    We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable law.

    We review this appeal from the district court's ruling upholding a decision by the Carbon County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission (the Commission) as if it had come directly from the Commission and, therefore, we are not required to give deference to the district court's decision. See In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah 1986); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This "no deference" standard of review notwithstanding, our review of the Commission's decision leads us to reach the same conclusions the district court reached through its thorough and insightful consideration of many of the issues Appellant Steven R. Raber raises on appeal.(1)

    While Raber raises a host of issues on appeal, our review of the Commission's decision to uphold his termination boils down to the Commission's consideration of two questions: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2) do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" Jones, 720 P.2d at 1361.

    We agree, for essentially the reasons explained by the trial court in its ruling, that the evidence before the Commission supports its determination that the charges made against Raber were factually supported. Likewise, on the question of whether the charges made against Raber warranted the sanction imposed, we conclude, as did the district court, that termination was an authorized sanction for Raber's actions.(2) See Huemiller v. Ogden City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2004 UT App 375,¶¶4-7, 101 P.3d 394 (mem.). Moreover, Raber has failed to show that termination here was a disproportionate sanction relative to the charges brought against him or that there was some disparity of treatment between himself and other similarly situated employees. See id. It follows that Carbon County (the County) and Sheriff Cordova were under no obligation to "salvage" Raber.(3)

    Additionally, Raber argues that his due process rights were violated in several ways during the proceedings before the Commission. While it is true that the Commission may not conduct its proceedings in a manner that would deny Raber procedural fairness and due process, see, e.g., Tolman, 818 P.2d at 28, we are not persuaded that Raber's due process rights were violated.(4) Nevertheless, even if we were to accept Raber's assertions that he was denied the right to confront his accusers on some of the charges, other charges that merited termination as a sanction would still be adequately supported by the testimony of other accusers who appeared before the Commission, testified, and were subject to cross-examination by Raber's counsel.

    Likewise, if we apply the residuum rule(5) to invalidate the Commission's determination, premised on certain letters and documents, that Raber's actions had an "adverse effect" on the County, there are still other charges that are supported by properly admitted evidence that, standing alone, merit the sanction of termination.(6)

    Affirmed.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

1. Even when we review an appeal de novo, the district court's decision may provide thorough and insightful analysis, and we may ultimately be persuaded by the district court's decision. See Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (observing that "[a]lthough we may not defer to a trial court's conclusion on a legal question, we certainly may derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on the issue and may be persuaded by those views"). See also Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 710 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "notion [of no deference] has always been a bit of an overstatement" because "[e]ven if not strictly required, deference is no doubt given where the trial court's analysis is illuminating"), cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).

2. In fact, our review of the proceedings before the Commission, its findings of fact, and its conclusions of law reveals that several of Raber's actions, standing alone, warranted the sanction of termination. Even if we were to accept Raber's arguments on appeal concerning the evidence supporting some of the charges or violations of due process, there would still remain sufficient evidence and grounds to support the decision to terminate Raber's employment.

3. "In determining whether the charges warrant the disciplinary action taken, we acknowledge that discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the [Sheriff]." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

4. The district court provided an insightful response to Raber's contention that he was denied due process because some of the people with whom he is accused of sharing confidential information did not appear as witnesses, even though they were listed on the County's witness list: Raber certainly had the right to call any witnesses he wanted, even from the County's list, but the County was not obliged to secure the attendance of any witnesses on Raber's behalf. If he wanted to confront witnesses from the County's list, Raber could have subpoenaed them to testify, along with the other witnesses he had testify before the Commission.

5. "The residuum rule requires that each finding of fact made by an administrative agency be supported by a residuum of legally competent evidence." Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 918 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).

6. We need not reach Raber's final contention that the district court improperly denied his petition without considering all of the issues and claims he raised because we conclude those issues are without merit in any event.