State v. Jennings

State v. Jennings

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Mark Robert Jennings aka Foster Myles Weller

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030629-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 24, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 142

 

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Fifth District, St. George Department

The Honorable G. Rand Beacham

Attorneys: Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

    This matter is before the court on Mark Robert Jennings's motion for summary reversal and the State's cross-motion for summary affirmance.

    Jennings was convicted and sentenced in 1998 to three counts of securities fraud, each a second degree felony, pursuant to a guilty plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2)(b) (Supp. 1998).(1) The district court sentenced Jennings to three concurrent terms of one to fifteen years.

    On April 30, 2003, Jennings filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). Jennings argued that he should not have been sentenced under the general second degree felony sentencing statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (Supp. 2003). Jennings argued that before Utah Code section 61-1-21 was amended effective May 5, 1997, it carried a sentence of zero to ten years. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1997). Jennings urged that the earlier version of this statute should have been applied. The district court denied Jennings's motion, along with a subsequent motion to supplement the record.

    Jennings argues that the district court erred because there was additional or new evidence which could have shown that Jennings's crimes were committed before the effective date of the amendment to the sentencing statute. Jennings's plea agreement renders this question moot.

    As described by this court in State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), once a plea agreement is entered, "disputes about the actual facts of the crime come to an end." Id. at 140. "In short, upon acceptance of the plea agreement, the underlying facts of a crime become undisputed." Id.

    In his plea agreement, Jennings stipulated that the acts forming the basis for the securities fraud counts took place "during the period May through August 1997." Each of the counts set forth in the plea also specifically referenced the fact that it carried a sentence of one to fifteen years. Therefore, the district court correctly applied the statute in effect at the time the crime was committed and correctly denied Jennings's motion to vacate an illegal sentence.

    Accordingly, we affirm.

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. At the time of Jennings's sentence, Utah Code section 61-1-21 stated, in relevant part: "A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 . . . is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth more than $10,000." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2)(b) (Supp. 1998).