SLC v. Hoskins

Salt Lake City v. Hoskins

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Salt Lake City,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Roy Benjamin Hoskins,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20031008-CA
 

F I L E D
(April 21, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 187

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable William Barrett

Attorneys: D. Gilbert Athay, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Scott Fisher, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.

JACKSON, Judge:

    Roy Benjamin Hoskins appeals his conviction for simple assault, a class B misdemeanor, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2000), claiming the trial court erred in excluding the prior convictions of a government witness, Lee Charles Wanlass, under rule 609 of the Utah Rule of Evidence. We affirm.

    "Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32,¶8, 76 P.3d 1165. If evidence has been improperly admitted or excluded, we cannot reverse the conviction unless the error was harmful, meaning that "absent the error, there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome, undermining our confidence in the result." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4,¶54, 57 P.3d 977; see also State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989) (applying harmless error principle to Utah R. Evid. 609).

    Under rule 609, evidence of a witness's prior convictions may be used to attack credibility if "the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year" and "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Alternatively, evidence of a prior conviction is readily admissible if the underlying crime "involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." Id. 609(a)(2). Hoskins maintains on appeal that the trial court misapplied rule 609 when it determined that Wanlass's prior burglary convictions were felonies involving dishonesty, but then excluded them as more prejudicial than probative. He argues that the error likely altered the outcome of the trial because Wanlass's credibility was essential to the government's case. We need not address the trial court's application of rule 609 because, even were we to assume error, there is not a "sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome," nor would admission of the prior convictions "undermin[e] our confidence in the result." Honie, 2002 UT 4 at ¶54.

    At trial, the testimony of Wanlass and Hoskins differed greatly. Wanlass testified that when he saw Hoskins and an associate, both African-American, arguing with a woman he intervened to protect her and simply raised his arms in an unthreatening manner, stating "Look, we don't want any trouble." He testified that Hoskins then punched him and his only recollection was awaking in the hospital some time later. Hoskins, on the other hand, testified that he was having a calm conversation alone with the woman when Wanlass approached and began to argue with him. Hoskins testified that Wanlass pushed him, Hoskins pushed back, knocking Wanlass against a car, injuring his mouth on its side, and causing Hoskins to slide underneath the car. At this point, according to Hoskins, an African-American friend of Hoskins drove past, saw the situation, and stopped to help Hoskins up, which may have required Hoskins to shift Wanlass with his feet in a manner that resembled kicking.

    Evidence of Wanlass's prior convictions would likely not change the outcome of the trial for two reasons. First, the jury was apprised that Wanlass has an extensive criminal history. Wanlass was in jail at the time of trial and, as the trial court itself noted in its ruling on the evidence, he testified in handcuffs and a jail jumpsuit. Moreover, the jury heard evidence of his methamphetamine use, his felony joyriding conviction, his convictions relating to stolen vehicles, and his current parole violation. This evidence gave the jury ample occasion to assess Wanlass's credibility in light of his criminal past.

    Second, even if Wanlass's prior burglary convictions would have further impaired his credibility--and we must agree that, as burglaries go, these were comparatively minor offenses--the government called several witnesses that generally supported Wanlass's testimony and discredited that of Hoskins. Hoskins, by contrast, called no corroborating witnesses. Jesse Garcia, who witnessed the incident from his apartment balcony, confirmed Wanlass's rendition of events leading up to the incident, but testified that from his viewpoint, he could see Hoskins's companion strike Wanlass first, with Hoskins punching and kicking Wanlass as Wanlass began to fall. On cross-examination he estimated that Hoskins's companion struck Wanlass ten to fifteen times and Hoskins struck him only five to ten times. Also, Angela Montoya contradicted Hoskins's testimony that he was the only African-American involved until his friend stopped to help him after Hoskins and Wanlass had already fallen near the car. She testified that, although she saw only a brief portion of the incident, she did see Wanlass standing near a car with two African-American men who appeared to be arguing with him. Like Garcia, she identified Hoskins's larger companion as the aggressor, pushing Wanlass against a car and causing him to fall. Finally, Detective Cordon Parks testified that during his interview of Hoskins eleven days after the incident, Hoskins told him that Wanlass's first move was to punch him in the face, rather than push him as Hoskins had testified.

    Given these considerations, we cannot conclude that the evidence of Wanlass's other prior convictions would have changed the outcome of the trial.

    We affirm.

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge