Weaver v. DirectLink Media

Weaver v. DirectLink Media

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Amanda Weaver, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DirectLink Media Group, LLC; and
John Does I through X, whose true names are unknown,

Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030947-CA
 

F I L E D
(December 16, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 471

 

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Third District, Sandy Department

The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg

Attorneys: Daniel Garriott, Denver C. Snuffer Jr., Sandy, and Jesse L. Riddle, Draper, for Appellant

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Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.

JACKSON, Judge:

    The district court dismissed Plaintiff Amanda Weaver's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction; Weaver appeals. We reverse and remand.

    We review the trial court's jurisdiction decision for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50,¶2, 980 P.2d 204. In all relevant ways, this case is factually identical to our recent case, Fenn v. MLeads Enterprises, Inc., 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 37. Thus, Fenn controls this case. In Fenn, the court held that a company that sends or causes one unsolicited, commercial email to be sent to a resident of Utah transacts business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code section 78-27-24. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1998); Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at ¶30. The court also held that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Thus, we hold that the trial court incorrectly dismissed Weaver's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.(1)

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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I CONCUR:

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in the result):

    I agree that Fenn v. MLeads Enterprises, Inc., 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, controls the outcome of this case. But I concur only in result because of my misgivings about the holding in Fenn.

    I dissented in Fenn because I do not believe that a single email can vest Utah with personal jurisdiction over the defendant-sender where the plaintiff-recipient alleges no injury resulting from the transmission of the email. In order to satisfy the jurisdictional inquiry, due process requires that a nonresident defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). This "requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of . . . 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).

    It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented here: a single email message sent to a lone Utah recipient. Here, as in Fenn, there is no allegation "that the email caused any reputational, economic, emotional, or physical 'injury.'" Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at ¶20. In both cases, the plaintiffs allege only statutory damages of ten dollars. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105 (Supp. 2003).

    To craft its single email rule, the Fenn majority relied in part on Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, 980 P.2d 204. In Starways, the Utah Supreme Court held that the nonresident defendants' alleged transmission of libelous facsimiles vested Utah with jurisdiction. Id. at ¶9. Although the Fenn majority recognized that the absence of alleged injury in Fenn distinguished it from Starways, the majority concluded that this distinction was unimportant. Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at ¶¶20-21. However, I believe that Starways should prevent Utah from taking jurisdiction over cases where no injury is alleged.

    The single email rule established by Fenn therefore improperly ignores the "'quality and nature'" of the defendant's contact, vesting jurisdiction based solely on a single contact within Utah, however trivial. Starways, 1999 UT 50 at ¶8 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Thus, contrary to the view of my colleagues, I believe that intentional contact alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to legislative determinations should play no role in our due process inquiry.

    Nonetheless, I recognize that Fenn is now controlling precedent. I therefore reluctantly concur in the result.

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Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

1. Despite the concurrence's belatedly expressed misgivings, our understanding of the difference between a purposeful act and an attenuated circumstance is whether the act was intentional. It is clear in this case that the email was sent intentionally, and therefore purposefully, to Utah. Moreover, we will not second- guess the legislature's determination that this injury is far from trivial, but rather, serious enough to warrant a cause of action that awards attorney fees as well as statutory damages.