Hammer v. DWS

Hammer v. DWS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Paul Hammer,

Petitioner,

v.

Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Board,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030558-CA
 

F I L E D
(November 18, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 422

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Paul Hammer, Cedar Hills, Petitioner Pro Se

Michael R. Medley, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Greenwood.

DAVIS, Judge:

    We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable law.

    Petitioner Paul Hammer seeks review of a decision of the Workforce Appeals Board (Board) affirming a decision of a Department of Workforce Services (Department) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying Hammer's claim for unemployment benefits. We affirm.

    Hammer argues that the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and, therefore, the Board erred by determining that he did not make an adequate work search and was thus unavailable for work. Hammer also asserts that the Board's determination that he would not leave school to return to full-time work was arbitrary and capricious because it was not reasonable in light of his financial considerations and family needs. Hammer's claims, however, collectively amount to a challenge to the Board's findings of fact.(1)

    An appellate court will overturn an agency's factual findings only if they are "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quotations and citation omitted). "[T]his court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views . . . ." Id. "It is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Id.

    The issue before the Board was whether Hammer was "able and available for full-time work pursuant to the provisions of [section] 35A-4-403(1)(c)" of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-403(1)(c) (2001). To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be able and "available for work during each and every week with respect to which the individual made a claim for benefits," and the claimant must have "acted in good faith in an active effort to secure employment." Id. The Board adopted in full the factual findings, reasoning, and conclusions of law of the ALJ; accepted all of the factual information provided by Hammer on appeal; and determined that Hammer was not "immediately able and available to seek and accept full-time employment." Although the Board stated that it could not accept "that going to law school is consistent with mounting the kind of work search necessary to obtain the kind of employment [Hammer] wishes to obtain," the adequacy of his job search was only one factor bearing on his availability.

    The ALJ found that Hammer had signed an agreement that he would not work in excess of nineteen hours per week while enrolled in law school, and that he was not, therefore, able and available for full-time work as long as he remained in school. The ALJ then addressed the issue of whether Hammer was willing to drop out of school if offered a full-time job. See Utah Admin. Code R994-403-117c(10)(a) (outlining the "able, available[,] and actively seeking work" requirements for claimants attending school).(2)

    In determining that Hammer would be unwilling to drop out of school for full-time employment and that he was not, therefore, able and available for full-time work, the ALJ relied on the following factual findings: "[Hammer] has rented out his home in Utah, moved his family to Washington, and completed nearly two semesters of law school. Additionally, [Hammer] ha[s] incurred $18,500 in student loans that must be paid back regardless of whether or not [he] completes school."

    We conclude that the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and that its findings support its denial of Hammer's claim for unemployment benefits.

Affirmed.

______________________________

James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

______________________________

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Hammer also argues that the Board's denial of benefits is inconsistent with the purpose and policy goals of the Employment Security Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-102 (2001); Utah Admin. Code R994-102-101, and that the Board erred by failing to justify the inconsistency of the Department's previous grant of benefits to Hammer, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1997). We decline to address these issues because they are without merit. See Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78,¶1, 985 P.2d 255 (determining not to address issues the court found to be wholly without merit).

2. Rule R994-403-117c(10)(a) of the Utah Administrative Code provides:

A claimant attending school who has not been granted "Department approval" must meet all requirements with respect to being able, available[,] and actively seeking work. Areas that need to be examined when making an eligibility determination with respect to a student include reviewing a claimant's work history while attending school, coupled with his efforts to secure full-time work. If the hours of school attendance conflict with the claimant's established work schedule or with the customary work schedule for the occupation in which the claimant is seeking work, benefits will generally be denied. An announced willingness on the part of a claimant to discontinue school attendance or change his school schedule, if necessary, to accept work, must be weighed against the time already spent in school as well as the financial loss the claimant may incur if he were to withdraw.